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Abstract 
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funds management of UK pensions 
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ix 
 
The aim of the thesis is to investigate whether the corporate governance of 
professional pension fund managers supports outsourced funds management for 
the UK pensions industry; significant as the largest client of the UK financial 
services industry with over £2 trillion in assets under management (Godfrey, 
2014).  The study examines fund manager corporate governance from the 
perspective of agency theory.  The thesis proposes that pension fund managers, 
some of the largest corporate entities globally, exhibit the same corporate 
governance induced behaviour as corporate entities in the real economy.  Where 
governed in fiduciary for shareholder wealth maximisation, this may conflict with 
the agency duty of best interests to a pension client.  The post-positivist 
methodology examined two aspects of pension asset management: 1) 
relationships between the size of pension assets per member and the corporate 
governance characteristics of the fund manager appointed; and 2) the 
perceptions of whether this governance concerns pension trustees, including the 
perception of whether a fiduciary duty was owed to the client, under the trajectory 
of regulatory and case law reviewing pension trusts’ fiduciary relationship with 
fund managers.  These analyses found a statistically significant relationship 
between the corporate entity of the fund manager and the size of the assets of 
the pension scheme assets they manage.  It also revealed a convoluted and 
contradictory expression of the fiduciary duties owed to pension clients by 
pension trustees, law courts, and regulators.  With the Financial Conduct 
Authority’s imminent review of the asset management industry, the study 
contributes a comprehensive assessment of this potentially fiduciary agency 
relationship, being both timely and relevant to the financial industry reform 
agenda in academia, policy and regulation. 
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Adapted from The Pensions Regulator (2016)1  
 
Absolute return 
An investment policy/strategy that aims to give the same return regardless 
of market conditions. The return should not rise or fall in line with UK 
equities, but will often offer a fixed percentage above bank rates, inflation 
or other objective measure.  See also: targeted return. 
Active fund management 
The management of assets (eg equities, gilts) in which the skill of the fund 
manager is used to select particular stocks at particular times, with the aim 
of achieving higher than average growth for the assets in question. 
See also: passive fund management. 
Active member 
A member of an occupational pension scheme who is at present accruing 
benefits under that scheme in respect of current service. 
Alpha 
Returns on a portfolio which exceed those indicated by movements in the 
index for the asset class in question. 
Usually alpha is achieved by appointing fund managers with specific skills 
in selecting the asset in question which will allow for these excess returns. 
See also: beta. 
 
 
                                            
1
 http://www.thepensionsregulator.gov.uk/glossary.aspx 
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Benchmark 
A measure against which fund management performance is to be judged. 
A series of appropriate indices is chosen which reflects the requirements 
of the trustees. Usually a target is set which requires an agreed percentage 
better performance from the fund manager than the benchmark. 
Beneficiary 
A member of a pension scheme who is entitled to a benefit from the 
scheme or a dependant who will become entitled on the death of the 
member. 
Beta 
Returns on a portfolio which can be attributed to movements in the market 
as a whole, rather than the skills of a particular fund manager. Usually 
achieved by holding a portfolio which exactly mirrors a particular index, eg 
the FTSE 350. 
Breach of trust 
Any act or omission on the part of the trustee that is inconsistent with the 
terms of the trust agreement or the law of trusts. 
Capital markets 
The markets in which capital is raised initially through the issue of shares 
(equities) and loans (bonds) and then subsequently traded. The stock 
market (dealing with the trading of equities) forms a significant, but by no 
means only, part of the capital market. 
 
 
 
xlv 
 
Closed scheme 
A pension scheme which does not admit new members. Contributions may 
or may not continue and benefits may or may not be provided for future 
service. 
Conflicts of interest 
A conflict, for example, between: 
• a trustee's interest as an employee, eg financial director, and his or 
her duty as a trustee 
• the duty of a professional to the employer as well as to the trustees, 
where they are acting for both 
DB scheme: Defined benefit scheme. 
A scheme in which the benefits are defined in the scheme rules and accrue 
independently of the contributions payable and investment returns. Most 
commonly, the benefits are related to members' earnings when leaving the 
scheme or retiring, and the length of pensionable service. 
Also known as 'final salary' or 'salary-related' scheme. 
DC scheme: Defined contribution scheme. 
A scheme in which a member's benefits are determined by the value of 
the pension fund at retirement. The fund, in turn, is determined by the 
contributions paid into it in respect of that member, and any investment 
returns. 
Also known as 'money purchase' scheme. 
Deferred member 
A member entitled to a deferred pension (sometimes known as 'preserved 
benefits'). 
xlvi 
 
Deferred pension 
A benefit relating to the past service of members of an occupational 
pension scheme who are no longer active members but have not yet 
retired. The benefits are payable at retirement or earlier death. 
Deficit 
The amount by which a scheme's liabilities exceed its assets. 
Engagement letters 
Used by accountants, investment banks and other advisers to set out the 
terms under which they are giving advice, they are now used by a wide 
range of advisers and suppliers. The precise form of the document will 
vary greatly depending on which type of adviser you are appointing. There 
are statutory requirements prescribing how scheme actuaries and scheme 
auditors must be appointed, and also the professional bodies that regulate 
your advisers will have their own requirements. 
Usually drawn up by the adviser in question, the document should reflect 
everything you have agreed with your adviser including their liability limit, 
agreed fees and charges, their conflict of interest policy and arrangements 
for terminating their appointment. 
Also known as: terms of appointment, letter of engagement, letter of 
appointment, signed agreement, contract. 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) 
On 1 April 2013 the Financial Services Authority (FSA) split into two 
regulatory bodies - the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) and the 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). 
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The FCA is responsible for regulating the standards of conduct in retail 
and wholesale, financial markets and for supervising the infrastructure that 
supports those markets. The FCA also has responsibility for the prudential 
regulation of firms that are not regulated by the PRA. 
Fixed interest 
A generic term covering all investments which pay interest at a pre-agreed 
rate for a fixed term, including corporate bonds, gilts and index-linked gilts. 
FSA: Financial Services Act 
This act, passed in 2012, sets out the framework under which the 
Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) and the Financial Conduct Authority 
(FCA) operate2. 
Fund manager 
An individual (or company) to whom the trustees delegate the 
management of all or part of the scheme's assets. 
Also known as investment manager or asset manager. 
Independent trustee 
An individual or company which performs the duties of the trustee but has 
no other direct or indirect involvement with the pension scheme or its 
advisers, the sponsoring employer or the members. 
                                            
2
 Differentiated from the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Available at: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/8/introduction).  According to the Pension Regulator, 
the Financial Services and Markets Act was “passed in 2000, sets out the framework under which 
the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) operate.” 
(Available at:  http://www.thepensionsregulator.gov.uk/glossary.aspx (accessed 24 April 2017)). 
xlviii 
 
The regulator may appoint an independent trustee to an occupational 
pension scheme, where an insolvency practitioner has been appointed to 
the employer. 
Investment management agreement 
The document agreed between a fund manager and the trustees of a 
scheme setting out the basis upon which the fund manager will manage a 
portfolio of investments for the trustees 
Mandate 
That part of the investment management agreement which stipulates the 
target return and covers such matters as the proportion of the assets in 
question which may be invested in different sectors/geographical 
areas/fixed interest/equities/property (a constrained mandate). 
Alternatively, it may go so far as to offer the manager total discretion about 
how to achieve the target (an unconstrained mandate). 
Member 
A person who has been admitted to membership of a pension scheme and 
is entitled to benefit under that scheme. 
Sometimes narrowly used to refer only to an active member. 
See also: active member; deferred member; pensioner. 
Passive fund management 
The management of assets, eg equities, gilts, by holding an exact replica 
of a given index, eg FTSE100, FTSE350, with the result that the assets in 
question move exactly in line with the chosen index. 
See also: active fund management. 
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Pension Protection Fund (PPF) 
Established to pay compensation to members of eligible defined benefit 
pension schemes, whose sponsoring employers become insolvent. The 
PPF is funded by a levy on all eligible DB schemes. 
The PPF became operational on 6 April 2005. 
Pensioner 
A person who is currently receiving a pension from a pension scheme. 
Preserved benefits 
Benefits arising on an individual ceasing to be an active member of an 
occupational pension scheme, payable at a later date (eg a member who 
leaves that employment before retirement date). 
Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) 
On 1 April 2013 the Financial Services Authority (FSA) split into two 
regulatory bodies - the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) and the 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). 
The PRA is responsible for the authorisation, in conjunction with the FCA, 
and prudential supervision of individual deposit takers (including banks, 
building societies and credit unions), insurers (including friendly societies) 
and certain designated investment firms3. 
 
 
                                            
3
 See definition of FSA 2012, there is conflicting information published by the Pensions Regulator 
regarding their role and supervision under the FSMA Act 2002 and the FSA Act 2012.  According 
to the Parliamentary Legislator, the prior Act was considerably amended by the FSA Act 2012 by 
the Bank of England to outline the objectives of the newly formed FCA (Financial Conduct 
Authority) and PRA (Prudential Regulation Authority)  http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ 
ukpga/2012/21/contents/enacted (Accessed 24 April 2017) 
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Real returns 
The difference between the rate of return of an investment and a selected 
measure of inflation (eg. RPI) over the same period. 
Returns 
The amount by which an investor benefits from owning an asset (interest, 
dividends and any change in value less any charges levied). 
See also: real returns, wealth capture 
Risk premium 
The extra yield of an investment (over the gilt yield) demanded by investors 
to compensate them for the higher risk. Sometimes used in the calculation 
of expected investment returns on equities, when selecting an assumption 
for the discount rate. 
Sponsoring employer 
The employer with responsibility for meeting the liabilities of a DB pension 
scheme. 
In DC schemes, typically the employer who sets up and/or assumes 
responsibility for the running of the scheme, and meets the expenses. 
SRI: Socially responsible investment. 
Investments that comply with any social, environmental and ethical 
principles which may be adopted by the trustees. 
Occupational pension schemes are required to disclose the extent to 
which, if at all, social, environmental or ethical considerations are taken 
into account in the selection, retention and realisation of investments. 
 
 
li 
 
Statutory funding objective 
The requirement for an ongoing scheme to have sufficient and appropriate 
assets to cover its technical provisions, or a recovery plan to reach that 
position. 
Statutory objectives 
The three specific objectives set for The Pensions Regulator in the 
Pensions Act 2004: 
1. to protect the benefits of members of work-based pension schemes 
2. to promote good administration of work-based pension schemes 
3. to reduce the risk of situations arising that may lead to claims for 
compensation from the Pension Protection Fund 
Strategic investment 
Carried out by trustees as part of the preparation of their SIP, it is the 
practice of making long term decisions on asset allocation so that they are 
able to pay pension benefits as they fall due. 
Also called Liability Driven Investing 
Targeted return 
A particular absolute return agreed between the trustees and the fund 
manager. 
Also called relative return.  See also: absolute return. 
Traffic light principle 
The Pensions Regulator's principle to help trustees decide whether a 
breach of the law is serious enough to report ('of material significance'). 
A breach is in the red category when: 
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1. it is caused by dishonesty, deliberate contravention of the law, poor 
advice, or poor scheme governance; 
2. it is significant; 
3. steps are not being taken to put it right; and 
4. it has wider implications. 
'Amber' breaches are harder to define as they fall in between red and 
green. They might consist of several failures of administration that, 
although not significant in themselves, have a cumulative significance 
because steps are not taken to put things right. 
'Green' breaches are those that are not caused deliberately or dishonestly, 
or by poor governance or poor advice; they are not significant, steps are 
being taken to put them right, and they don't have wider implications. 
Trust corporation 
A company empowered under trust law to act as a custodian for scheme 
assets and which is expected to provide professional expertise in 
managing trusts. 
Trustee 
An individual or company appointed to carry out the purposes of a trust in 
accordance with the provisions of the trust instrument and general 
principles of trust law. 
Wealth capture  
The amount of targeted, or relative return withheld by the manager of 
assets for services provided that detach the targeted return from the risk 
premium paid by the owner of assets. 
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See the statutory objectives for contemplation of a conflict of interest in the 
instance that wealth capture is too great. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
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1.1  Context of the thesis 
 
“The maintenance of old age has hitherto been a private, not a public 
charge.  The proposal to alter this is more than an amendment to the 
Poor Law.  It is a proposal to alter a fundamental principle of society.”  
(Hon. Sec. T. Mackay 1892; cited in Harris, 2006; p51) 
 
This research thesis examines the governance of the fund managers stewarding 
contributed pension funds in the United Kingdom (UK).  Altering the fundamental 
principle (above) of the universal right to retirement security in 1948 handed a 
very real problem to modern day government; delivering a retirement pension as 
a non-optional, vastly expensive commitment to an aging population (Blackburn, 
2006).  Throughout the European Union the conflict between recognition of the 
sanctity of this social protection and its fiscal consequences has led to substantial 
legislative reform (Dale, 2012).  In light of the magnitude of the modern retirement 
problem, this thesis explores the outsourcing implications of the UK’s subsequent 
statutory shift (back) to private sector apparatus for a retirement solution.  It 
examines whether there is evidence that this apparatus of outsourced suppliers 
provide corporate governance systems that protect the contributed assets of both 
working and retired members; one its constituents consider an economically 
efficient and socially justifiable return on contributed assets at a fair price as a 
fiduciary duty, were it to be found existing, would imply. 
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1.1.1  Why the pension industry is socially vital 
 
The synopsis of the pension problem is rudimentary.  In the mid-twentieth 
century, with life expectancy less than 60 years of age, few people drew the state 
pension at age 65, and only on average for a short period of time (Barr, 2006).  
By 1970 men spent an average of 10 years in retirement, rising to approximately 
20 years in 2004 (Barr, 2006).  The UK population aged over 65 is already 15% 
of total population, and projected to rise to 24% by 2032 (Blackburn, 2006).  
Simultaneously there are fewer young people, the pension pool’s future 
contributors, and the population of those aged 20-64 is projected to continue its 
steep decline (Barr, 2006).  Economist Paul Krugman describes the pension crisis 
as “an immense problem that requires changing everything” (Krugman, 2005; 
p11), and the World Bank concurs calling it unsustainable (Petraki, 2012). 
 
At inception in the mid twentieth century the projected impact of state pensions 
on the public purse did not anticipate these seismic demographic shifts, and 
Anglo-American governments have reacted with various reforms such as 
increasing the statutory retirement age, reducing entitlements and decreasing tax 
incentives (Dale, 2012; Hannah, 2002).  However, the most significant reform 
came in the 1980s when the Thatcher government scaled back the state pension, 
intending that the workforce should utilise private sector financial products to 
secure anything above a subsistence retirement income (Orenstein, 2011).  
Responsibility for pension delivery was firmly shifted from the public sphere to 
individual savings managed by the finance industry. 
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Employer or industry sponsored pension trusts were established from this time to 
support the financial objectives of their employees.  Pension scholar Robert 
Monks (2002b; p116) observes that these trusts have: 
 
…a simple obligation to collateralise the pension promise by maximising 
the long-term value of trust assets.  The importance of appropriate 
fiduciary management of these contributions cannot be overstated.  The 
beneficiaries of pension funds are not rich people.  Fluctuations in market 
values are no longer primarily a question as to whether rich people are a 
bit richer or poorer, they are a question as to whether pensions will be 
paid to the roughly half of the population of the OECD world who have 
interests in employee benefit plans.  This makes investment a matter of 
social and political concern. 
 
In order to fulfil this fiduciary obligation, the majority of pension schemes 
outsource their contributed assets to institutional investors in the finance sector 
with the expertise to maximise the long-term value of pension assets and match 
forecast liabilities (Ingley and van der Walt, 2004).  The rise of institutional 
investors (such as fund managers) servicing the pension industry is a 
contemporary phenomenon as incorporated entities have taken charge of 
pension asset management in an outsourced capacity (O’Brien, 2004).  These 
fund managers comprise some of the largest listed corporations in the world 
(Ingley and van der Walt, 2004).  Now pension funds represent 36% of the total 
assets managed by the finance industry, making them the largest client of the 
industry, well ahead of second placed client, the insurance industry (accounting 
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for 20% of assets) (Godfrey, 2014).  There are approximately £2 trillion in UK 
workforce assets currently managed by fund management firms (Godfrey, 2014).  
This immense pool of wealth is reliant on the finance industry to fulfil a 
stewardship role.  In a short period of time the promise of a pension has 
transformed workforce protection from a government commitment to the largest 
client of the finance industry. 
 
1.1.2  Corporate governance in the finance industry is significant 
to the pension solution 
 
In the collapse of the New York Stock Exchange in 1929 many family investors 
were bankrupted by exposure to corporate risk through financial illiteracy (White, 
1990).  Consequently, listed corporations have received increased scrutiny and 
corporate governance has become entrenched in economic, accounting and 
corporate legal research, policy and practice (Ramirez, 2012; Reich-Graefe, 
2011a).  The codified Anglo-American understanding of corporate governance is 
that corporations should be managed by an agent (management) in the fiduciary 
best interest of their principal (shareholder owners, although this ownership 
concept is debated), widely interpreted as the maximisation of returns on the 
shareholders’ invested assets (Purnell and Freeman, 2012; Arcot and Bruno, 
2006; Waring, 2006; Bratton, 2001).  This code applies equally to any publicly 
listed institutional investor managing pension funds.  The thesis explores whether 
in contrast with their codified fiduciary shareholder duties, the fiduciary 
obligations institutional investors owe to protect pension assets seem currently 
disjointed and ambiguous in legal, practice and academic fields.  Two economic 
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systems (corporate governance codification and pension privatisation) that were 
formed separately for decades have quickly and contemporarily become 
inextricably linked.  Waring (2006) describes institutional investors as guardians 
of the investing public with fiduciary duties to these beneficiaries.  This social 
dependence raises the question over whether the finance industry and managers 
of financial firms have a different role or special obligations not owed by 
managers of firms in other industries (Ryan et al., 2010).  With the deregulation 
of the pensions industry and demutualisation of the savings industry great power 
to control society’s wealth shifted to the finance industry (Sparkes, 2010).  
Workforce pensions are exposed to fund manager governance compliance 
towards their shareholders.  The Law Commission Review (LCR, 2013) exhorts 
that pension investments are in important need of fiduciary clarification.  The 
Financial Conduct Authority is currently examining whether fund management 
fees are justifiable (FCA, 2015).  This thesis concentrates on the fiduciary 
management of pension savings, specifically their access to fiduciary agency 
from institutional fund managers to comment on its adequacy for purpose. 
 
 
1.2  The aim of the thesis:  Contributing to pension governance 
research, policy and practice 
 
The aim of the thesis is to investigate whether the corporate governance of 
professional fund managers with pension clients share a relationship with asset 
management outcomes for the UK pensions industry.  It proposes to achieve this 
aim through a set of four research objectives. 
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1.2.1  Research objectives 
 
The research is designed to achieve its aim through the following objectives: 
 
1) To describe the various corporate governance structures of the 
professional fund managers with UK pension clients; 
2) To investigate whether different corporate governance characteristics of 
professional fund managers relate with characteristics of their pension clients, 
and whether particular pension client attributes mitigate any negative corporate 
governance correlations; 
3) To investigate whether pension clients perceive that the corporate 
governance of the fund manager matters to the governance of asset 
management for their beneficiaries; and 
4) To determine whether pension clients believe the fiduciary duties of 
professional fund managers conflict with the delivery of outsourced asset 
management. 
 
The objectives were developed through the literature explored in Chapters 2 and 
3.  The research design adopts a post-positivist research methodology (described 
in Chapter 5) that acknowledges reality cannot be measured with certainty and 
all theories are revisable (Ryan, 2006) particularly in the social sciences where 
the falsifiability of more traditional science is more challenging (Popper,1934).  In 
order to describe the agency of fund management in the UK meeting the 
requirements of post-positivist theory testing, the thesis analyses two aspects of 
the fiduciary agency relationship.  The first examines results of the 2013 pension 
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scheme assets under management correlated with corporate governance 
characteristics of the fund manager appointed.  The second surveys the fund 
manager selection techniques of pension trustees, including the perception of the 
fiduciary duty, if any, the fund manager owes the client. This is accomplished in 
the context of examining the regulatory and case law assessment of fiduciary 
agency owed by fund managers to the pension industry.  Combining these sets 
of analysis provides a comprehensive view of this agency relationship from an 
empirical and stakeholder perspective.  This thesis contributes to the current 
conception of the need for urgent financial industry reform in academia, policy 
and regulation. From the practical perspective it contributes to efforts to optimise 
fund manager selection frameworks. 
 
 
1.3  Research rationale 
 
To illustrate the timeliness of the thesis, the convergence of an aging population 
and pension deregulation are reiterated.  Alongside the increase in longevity, the 
combined effect of a post-war baby boom and subsequent collapse in fecundity 
in recent decades will see the population aged over 65 rise by 20% in the Anglo-
American economies over the next twenty years (Blackburn, 2006).  Retirees are 
more numerous and living longer, with fewer young people entering the workforce 
to perpetuate pension contributions.  This demographic shift prompted one of the 
most profound changes to the finance industry in modern times. 
 
10 
 
In October 1986 the Thatcher government deregulated the finance industry in the 
UK (Davies et al., 2010).  It marked several important changes in the industry, 
among them the deregulation of state based pension plans.  Tony Greenham 
observed: 
 
“It marked a sudden and significant increase in capital alongside an 
industry shift from a client-based to a transaction-based business model, 
potentially rife with short-termism and conflict of interest implications.”4 
 
This presented a challenge to the newly conceived finance industry in 
establishing their responsibility for pension management.  Should it be that the 
industry: 1) use their new inter-temporal role as pension custodians to deliver 
adequate returns on investment to achieve retirement for members today while 
protecting the savings contributions of future generations (Monks, 2002a); 2) use 
their new role as institutional investors with vast capital at their disposal to 
influence the long term sustainable value creation activity of the entities in which 
they are invested (Sparkes and Cowton, 2004); or 3) fulfil their traditional role as 
institutions with shareholders of their own, to protect and serve the interests of 
their shareholders as fiduciaries with duties to the commonly understood owners 
of the corporation (Bebchuk and Weisbach, 2010)? 
 
The Law Commission (2013) defines duties as they apply to employer control 
over intermediaries as "…the ultimate decision makers in appointing contract-
                                            
4
 Tony Greenham, Founder of the New Economics Think Tank, (Stewart and Goodley, 2011; p1). 
11 
 
based workplace pension schemes providers, employers have a responsibility to 
put in place pension arrangements that offer value for money and act in the 
scheme members' best interests." (Simpson, 2014; p1).  With no clear regulatory 
guidance on their new role forthcoming, the investment industry has been left to 
create its own narrative, one that some commentators have characterised as 
avaricious and opportunistic (Graafland, 2012; Salter, 2010; Augur, 2009).  In 
1992 the United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative was 
established, working with the global finance industry to understand their 
responsibility to consider environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors 
when directing capital (UNEP FI, 2015).  In 2005, law firm Freshfields Bruckhaus 
and Deringer comprehensively reported to the UNEP FI that it is within the 
fiduciary remit of pension trustees to apply ESG considerations to asset selection, 
rather than the previously held doctrine of returns maximisation alone.5 
(Freshfields et al., 2005). 
 
As the Freshfields et al. (2005) review highlighted, pension trusts have legal and 
court appointed fiduciary duties (Richardson, 2011; Freshfields et al., 2005).  
Berle and Means (1932; p336) described the essence of these duties: 
 
Taking this doctrine back into the womb of equity, whence it sprang, the 
foundation becomes plain.  Wherever one man or a group of men 
entrusted another man or group with the management of property, the 
second group became fiduciaries.  As such they were obliged to act 
                                            
5
 Landmark case Cowen v. Scargill is discussed in chapter 3. 
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conscionably, which meant in fidelity to the interests of the persons 
whose wealth they had undertaken to handle. 
 
The fiduciary obligation demands pension trusts undertake to invest member 
contributions with attention, expertise and care (Pacces, 2000).  To fulfil this duty, 
the majority believe it best to outsource their assets to corporate intermediary 
experts of the finance sector.  These contractual relationships exhibit typical 
principal-agent characteristics, where the principal lacks the expertise to carry out 
a task and enlists the agent with relevant expertise to act on their behalf 
(Eisenhardt, 1989).  The law of agency confers strong commitments on the agent 
to protect the principal and avoid using their advantageous position to the 
principal’s detriment (Lan and Heracleous, 2010). 
 
Yet the fiduciary duty Berle and Means described was that to external 
shareholders.  Fund managers are a heterogeneous group of investors, from 
small partnerships to the largest listed organisations globally (Ingley and van der 
Walt, 2004).  Juntunen (2007) believes the landscape is shifting: “…the 
ownership structure of many consultancies changed from partnerships to 
corporates where the goal is to boost shareholder assets”.  This confronts the 
issue of conflicts of interest, and whether corporates are appropriately neutral to 
be financial intermediaries. 
 
In the behavioural analysis of capital channelling Franklin Allen (2001, p1165) 
asks “do financial institutions matter?” Financial intermediation theory assumes 
investors enter the market directly, incurring market-induced transaction costs for 
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channelling pooled savings through the banking industry as borrowing and 
lending, or through the stock and commodities markets as investment in assets 
(Levine, 2002).  The finance industry is theoretically an agora for buyers and 
sellers to come together.  Allen (2001, p1166) argues “how can it be that when 
you give your money to a financial institution there is no agency problem, but 
when you give it to a firm there is?”  The narrow focus of corporate governance 
theory remains on traditional corporations, and financial intermediation theory 
assumes an institution-free finance industry, so these phenomena have not been 
analysed together (Bogle, 2009).  Pension investors are dependent on financial 
institutions for information and transactions execution, dependent on their 
fiduciary obligations of disclosure, honesty and promise keeping (Dunfee and 
Gunter, 1999).  These are the functional outcomes of the corporate governance 
mechanism for shareholders. 
 
Whether there is a fiduciary conflict between the exclusive best interest of fund 
management shareholders and the pension principal is the question addressed 
by the thesis and essential to optimising pension trust fund management 
selection practices.6 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
6
 Through the extraction of returns rightly owing to the pension principal. 
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1.4  The contribution of the thesis 
 
The thesis contributes to the conception of pension wealth management and the 
development of a fund manager selection framework.  It posits that the almost 
ubiquitous deployment of finance theory in the study of institutional investor 
performance is insufficient in supporting the conception of fiduciary asset 
management.  In the modern finance industry principal-agent theory is the 
appropriate theory for examining the relationship between the pension scheme 
and the institutional fund manager they engage, and the thesis makes a 
contribution to its development as a theory capable of multi-principal 
considerations. 
 
The research contributes to the academic understanding of structural conflicts 
fund managers may experience when their primary corporate governance 
compliance objective and their primary asset provider for the funds they manage 
are different principals.  It contributes to the young, yet growing body of literature 
surrounding the governance of pension contributions.  It further contributes to 
policy making in the pensions and institutional investment industries by 
investigating whether the corporate governance norm of shareholder primacy is 
creating perverse outcomes for pension contributors through an inflated cost of 
financial intermediation.  It would be expected that either fund managers owed 
significant fiduciary responsibilities to the pension assets they are mentoring, 
protecting the long term value of assets in a significantly long-tail industry, or 
pension clients are empowered to negotiate contracts benefiting contributing 
members.  Evidence of this conflict (or lack thereof), either empirical or perceived, 
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is the chief contribution of the thesis, supported by the findings of the Kay Review 
(2012) and Law Commission Review (2013). 
 
1.4.1  The research relationship to the literature:  Contributions 
to the academy 
 
Agency theory is founded on the agency cost of information asymmetry (Dittmar 
and Thakor, 2007).  Information asymmetry (specifically moral hazard) the 
pension principal experiences suggests they may not understand or be capable 
of informed consent (Clark, 2013).  Whether the fund manager’s motivations are 
aimed at the pension scheme’s long term wealth preservation, or to short term 
investment results favouring the fund managers themselves is argued in the 
literature (Clark, 2013; Erkens et al., 2012; Holland, 2011; Ryan et al., 2010).  
Holland (2011) believes there is only anecdotal evidence examining this potential 
conflict.  The thesis will contribute empirically to this literature. 
 
In the corporate governance literature, corporate management is characterised 
as trying to wield unrestrained power, and increasing shareholder power has 
been advocated as the means of curbing this potential opportunism (Bebchuck, 
2007; Monks and Sykes, 2002; Hay, 1972).  Legislatively increasing shareholder 
powers in a bid to combat the management excess has received wide support 
(Dunning, 2012; Bebchuk and Weisbach, 2010; Becht et al., 2009).  What is not 
known, and may be exacerbated by increasing shareholder power, is the 
increased incentive to encourage management risk-taking and short-termism by 
shareholders themselves (Dunning, 2012).  Shareholders of fund managers 
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might easily replace corporate managers in the ruthless acquisition of firm’s 
managed assets for their own benefit (Becht et al., 2009).  Despite this, minority 
shareholders are not seen as holding responsibilities and can attempt to influence 
the corporation as they see fit, including in self-serving ways (Anabtawi and Stout, 
2008), their only informal duty being the exercise of their ownership rights 
(Waring, 2006).  With the deregulation of the pensions industry great power to 
control society’s wealth shifted to the finance industry (Sparkes, 2010).  The 
thesis contributes empirically to the exploration of whether listed entities are 
appropriate financial intermediaries when their interests are conflicted.  It both 
explores whether listed entities contribute lower returns to pension beneficiaries 
in revealed data, then questions trustees specifically on whether they believe this 
is the case.  In asking these questions it seeks to understand what duties are 
contractually passed to the agent by the pension principal.   
 
Literature on the fiduciary duties of directors and officers to the firm and 
shareholders proliferates (Johnson, 2016; Anabtawi and Stout, 2008; Gillan, 
2006; Boatright, 1994).  However, there is little formal guidance and few principles 
aimed at investment professionals (Johnston and Morrow, 2016; Jennings, 
2014).  John C. Bogle (2009, p15), Founder of American investment management 
company The Vanguard Group, described a fiduciary principle: cautioning that no 
man can serve two masters: 
 
“No thinking man can believe that an economy built upon a business 
foundation can permanently endure without some loyalty to that 
principle… Financial institutions … consider only last, if at all, the 
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interests of those whose funds they command, suggesting how far we 
have ignored the necessary implications of that [the fiduciary] principle.” 
 
Bogle (2009) believes the fiduciary principal is absent from the fund manager-
pension scheme relationship.  He criticises the paucity of academic scrutiny into 
funds management conflicts of interest in modern research.  Alongside 
shareholder pressure on fund management institutions Bogle sees the lack of 
clarity regarding the fiduciary nature of funds management as a further glaring 
gap in the literature in need of academic attention. 
 
Many commentators hold that fund managers have not yet been handed special 
duties to pension clients (LCR, 2013; Clark, 2013; Kay, 2012; O’Brien, 2004).  
Monks (2002a) insists that if fund managers have a conflict of interest between 
pension clients and shareholders, they must step aside.  The institutional 
investment literature concurs with Ingley and van der Walt (2004) who believe 
the implications of this conflict for the investment industry are profound, 
encouraging exploitation of the pension funds to capture wealth for a tightly held 
group of shareholders in the finance industry, rather than facilitating its efficient 
flow between corporate investment and pension beneficiaries. 
 
The investment performance of fund managers has been widely researched 
through the traditional literature of finance, portfolio construction and financial 
intermediation theory (Whitehall, 2014).  This literature rests on the assumption 
that funds management is agency cost-free.  Yet the little work available on 
pension agency, where the fund manager is conflicted, in the business ethics and 
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corporate governance literature is being treated in a conceptual sense only as 
deeply flawed with systemic conflicts of interest (Dunning, 2012; Boatright, 2011; 
Kangis and Kareklis, 2001).  The business ethics and corporate governance 
literature agrees that increasing shareholder power may inevitably invite 
unintended consequences not yet capable of observation in academia or 
practice, and the solution requires a fundamental overhaul of the corporate 
governance architecture (see Ryan et al., 2010; Blair and Stout, 2006). 
 
Figure 1.1 illustrates the literature considered in the agency of pension funds 
management for evaluating the asset management function addressed by the 
thesis.  The background literature examined the large bodies of work addressing 
economics and corporate law (the theory of the firm), business ethics (how firm 
agents should behave) and the real world phenomenon (the function of the 
finance industry). Through an agency theory lens, two principals considered in 
isolation in the literature are the shareholders of the financial intermediary firm 
and the asset owners of the funds they intermediate.  The mediating literature is 
the fiduciary duty of asset management.  The contribution of the thesis is the 
concept of multi-fiduciary agency. 
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Figure 1.1 The thesis in the context of the existing literature 
 
• Background literature (three large bodies of relevant literature); • Framing literature (four bodies of finance industry and agency theory focused literature sitting within the 
background literature); • Focal literature (three bodies of literature describing agency in the pension asset investment supply 
chain); • Fiduciary agency:  The conflicted fiduciary agency of the pension funds manager (the thesis contribution 
to the literature). 
Source:  Author 
 
Chapters 2 and 3 present the literature of principal 1 (the fund management 
shareholder) and principal 2 (the pension asset client) respectively.  Chapter 4 
then situates this literature of two principals with one agent into a conceptual 
framework grounded in the literature of business ethics generally, and specifically 
the finance ethics of fiduciary duty and the agency theory of corporate 
governance to summarise the intentions of the research design (Chapter 5) for 
capturing and empirically analysing the fiduciary nature of the pension problem. 
Finance 
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intermediation 
Agency theory 
Finance 
theory 
Pension asset 
management 
Corporate 
governance 
Fiduciary 
duties 
Fiduciary 
agency 
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The analysis Chapters aim to further understand the agency-costs of pension 
savings intermediation.  The finance theory of returns on investment does not 
capture the agency theory of corporate institutional behaviour.  The proposition 
that information asymmetry and moral hazard may affect the statutorily protected 
shareholder of the fund manager more than the pension contributor is common 
to the analysis chapters. 
 
1.4.2  Using economic agency theory to analyse pension asset 
management:  Theoretical contributions 
 
While the thesis evaluates the relevant theories for post-positivist testing 
(stakeholder, agency and finance theory) agency theory is still the dominant 
theory in empirical studies of corporate governance and alleviating some of its 
parsimony is a useful contribution.  The research proposes that the majority of 
agency theory contributions are to the study of the relationship between corporate 
management and their shareholders.  It questions whether shareholders are 
theoretically the owners of corporations and contributes to a multi-agency view 
that there are other principals more significant to the agent and deserving of 
priority.  In this case it is the pension client to the fund manager, whose supply of 
finance dwarfs that of equity holders.  The two-fold theoretical contributions are 
an analysis of the current academic status of the theory of the firm and the 
introduction of more than one principal to agency theory to challenge its currently 
dyadic perspective. 
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The contribution assists the gap in the literature fails to connect economic agency 
theory to either business ethics and finance theory.  The agency problem 
manifests at the moment shareholders believe management have deviated from 
their interests.  Economist Milton Friedman (1970, p1) assigned managers the 
foundational duty of attending to the business of profit increases “while 
conforming to the basic rules of society, both those embodied in the law and those 
embodied in ethical customs”.  The formalisation of economic agency theory was 
proposed by Ross (1973) in a seminal treatise on both the moral hazard and 
allocation inefficiencies created by the information asymmetry benefiting the 
manager.  In 1976 Jensen and Meckling (1976; p35) wrote of the prevalence of 
firms with widely dispersed ownership, “[h]ow does it happen that millions of 
individuals are willing to turn over a significant fraction of their wealth to 
organisations run by managers who have so little interest in their welfare?” before 
outlining the practice for binding management motives to shareholder gain 
specifically.  This article placed agency theory at the core of management theory 
and practice.  The firm behaved like all agents in the markets, principals will 
contract with the agent until the cost is too high and substitution is available, with 
shareholder principals being the rightful claimants of the agent’s value creation 
process (Bainbridge, 2006; Jones, 1995; Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  A body of 
economic literature has developed around the concept of the rationally self-
interested agent who requires controlling through market oriented mechanisms 
(Stieb, 2009; Jensen, 2001; Williamson, 1979).  These mechanisms include 
aligning agent desires with those of principals through performance based 
contracting, and shareholder principals have the board of directors who act as 
monitors of management on their behalf and the market for corporate control to 
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penalise transgressions (Lan and Heracleous, 2010; Donaldson and Davis, 
1991).  Pension principals are left vulnerable to information asymmetry problems 
with no market mechanisms to incentivise or censure the agent outside the fund 
management contract and the ability to exit (Boatright 2011).  This absence of 
acknowledgement in current agency theory can be conceptualised by the thesis 
as the contribution to multi-principal environments where principals are not 
equally equipped. 
 
Notions of trustworthiness, duty or professionalism have been undermined by 
agency theory, acknowledging only self-serving motivations of the agent that may 
encourage a self-fulfilling prophecy (Ghoshal, 2005; Stout, 2003a).  Blair and 
Stout (2006, p722) speculate on agency theory under Kuhn’s shifting paradigm; 
“intellectual progress sometimes must await the arrival of new tools and 
technologies”.  Agency theory became the primary intellectual tool available to 
scholars in economics and corporate law yet in the corporate governance 
literature it fails to predict fundamental elements in the agent’s reality that they 
have a multiple principal universe by simplifying the firm’s economic problem 
down to getting management to act as shareholders require of them. 
 
Empirical contributions include a bespoke database, survey data and content 
analysis of the fiduciary developments in pension asset management.  This 
research will add the UK pension wealth management industry to the growing 
body of empirical agency work in the business and management literature in the 
search for a predictive theory. 
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1.4.3  Contribution to practice 
 
Fund manager selection is influenced by the real world agency problems 
threatening moral hazard and adverse selection.  The research is aiming to 
provide pension trustees with insight into the governance characteristics of fund 
managers that are most likely to align with one of these perverse outcomes.  It 
also studies the characteristics of pension funds that are most able to resist them, 
such as collective bargaining or multiple fund manager engagement, as a 
decision making aid.  It is grounded in the current practice of Environmental, 
Social and Governance (ESG) screening fund managers conduct on portfolio 
assets, suggesting these screening practices could easily be modified to screen 
the fund managers themselves for socially responsible attributes.  The intended 
result is to encourage a more efficient investment returns distribution system to 
the providers of capital and owners of the long-term liability underwriting the 
managed assets. 
 
1.4.4  Contribution to policy 
 
The current Law Commission Review analysis of fiduciary duties was mandated 
to provide an opinion on “how fiduciary duties currently apply to investment 
intermediaries,” (LCR, 2013; p4).  This review marks a significant step forward in 
clarifying current understanding of trustee powers to command best interest from 
the investment supply chain.  It may signal room for regulators to grant the 
trustees power to instruct fund managers to consider the interests of their 
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beneficiaries as the primary fiduciary duty owed by the fund manager.  This active 
passing of fiduciary duties to the agent may provide the means of achieving 
efficient intermediaries in pension fund management in light of the fact that fund 
managers are increasingly listed corporate entities (Juntunen, 2007).  It also 
hopes to illuminate for regulators whether or not these corporations with 
limitations imposed by shares are an appropriate vehicle to manage compulsory 
retirement savings.  This is the subject of the discussion in Chapter 8 (particularly 
Section 8.5). 
 
 
1.5  Structure of the research 
 
The thesis is presented in a series of chapters that establish the relevant literature 
for the industry and the theories used for its analysis.  These culminate in the 
conceptual framework that supports the research design and methodology.  The 
methodology is then deployed through three analysis chapters and the results 
are triangulated for discussion.  The logic and epistemology of chapters are 
represented in Figure 1.2, describing their contribution to the research design as 
a progression from theory to empirical observation.  They are then described 
briefly in the following subsections. 
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Figure 1.2 The design of the research to achieve the aim of the thesis 
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1.5.1  Chapter 2:  Literature review:  The theory of the firm and its 
philosophical and pragmatic development over time 
 
This chapter presents a critical review of the theory and practice of corporate 
governance in light of its role in the three crises of the early twenty first century 
that Ryan et al. (2010; p673) labelled the “Decade from Hell”.  The decade began 
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with the failure to protect investors during the turn of the century dot.com boom 
and bust, saw the crisis of managerial fraud blamed for the 2003 collapse of 
numerous giants including Enron and WorldCom, and culminated with the 2007-
2008 financial crisis.  Corporate governance is in a state of turmoil that has left 
economists (see Aglietta and Reberioux, 2005), business ethicists (see Rodin, 
2005), corporate law theorists (see Hutchison, 2011) and firm theorists (see 
Karns, 2011) criticising current theory as incapable of guiding or explaining the 
ethics of modern business practices of the large, complex organisations 
dominating the capital market system.  The chapter proposes that contrary to 
common belief shareholders are not the owners of firms, and not entitled to 
demand fiduciary advantage from the firm (Boatright, 1994). 
 
1.5.2  Chapter 3:  Literature review:  The governance of pension 
funds management 
 
This chapter outlines the development of the occupational pensions industry 
alongside the development of the finance industry into an era dubbed 
“financialisation”, where financial markets dominate traditional industrial and 
agricultural economics (Aglietta and Reberioux, 2006). The chapter then 
describes how this transformation has changed the conceptualisation of fiduciary 
duties borne by the administrators of pension funds that academia believes have 
not been formally reflected in the pension’s supply chain.  Fiduciary duties are 
examined from a finance ethics perspective and described as the development 
of the concept and practice of these duties. The chapter explores a framework 
for how the fund manager have been assessed as delivering a fiduciary 
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relationship in practical terms from both industry and legal perspectives.  It 
concludes that finance theory and financial intermediation theory assume the 
intermediary has no agency conflicts.  Yet the fact that intermediaries are profit 
oriented commercial vehicles negates this premise.  There is ambiguity over the 
principal of chief benefit in industry, yet almost ubiquitous understanding that it is 
the shareholder by law makers. 
 
1.5.3  Chapter 4:  Conceptual framework:  The theories employed 
to examine pension fiduciary agency 
 
This chapter unites the two preceding literature reviews into a conceptual 
framework based on an adaptation of John Holland’s (2011; p159), “A conceptual 
framework for changes in Fund Management and Accountability relative to ESG 
issues.” It then proposes that the agent’s (fund manager) two principals (the 
dispersed shareholder where they exist, and the pension client) may be in conflict 
for the agent’s fiduciary attention.  This conception of the multi-agency problem 
is based on the principle of founder of The Vanguard Group, John C. Bogle (2009; 
p15):  “The Fiduciary Principle: No Man Can Serve Two Masters.”  The chapter 
establishes the proposition that the conflict between the principals is the business 
ethics conundrum proposed by Arya and Sun (2004, p297) that “real ethical 
dilemmas arise when people must choose between right and right where both 
choices can be justified, yet one must be chosen over the other.”  The fund 
manager is ethically justified in promoting the fiduciary best interests of either 
principal over the other.  The chapter concludes that pension fund management 
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presents this ethical dilemma, one that must be addressed by academia and the 
regulatory regime rather than reliance on voluntary self-regulation. 
 
1.5.4  Chapter 5:  Research design, methodology and methods 
 
This chapter commences with a description of the philosophy, epistemology and 
ontological understanding the researcher holds on the nature of the research 
problem.  It then situates the research in the existing ontology of finance and 
pensions research to guide the design of the methodology.  It proposes a 
sequential research design that commences with a portrait of the relationship 
between fund managers and their UK pension clients in 2013 (Wilmington, 2013) 
to identify any pattern between the corporate governance characteristics of 
particular fund managers and the asset allocation per member of the pension 
schemes they manage to determine if any dual principal relationships can be 
identified.  It proceeds to describe a survey of pension scheme trustees on 
whether they identify corporate governance traits during fund manager selection 
and/or perceive a fiduciary conflict.  It concludes with a description of the content 
analysis method determining where legislation, regulation and case law 
narratives on fiduciary responsibility are reflected in industry perceptions via the 
industry media.  The following three chapters explore the sequential analysis. 
 
 
 
29 
 
1.5.5  Chapter 6:  Analysis Part 1:  Empirical examination of the 
relationship between fund manager corporate governance and 
pension assets 
 
The chapter commences describing the creation of a proprietary database that 
makes an important contribution to industry research.  The database combines 
the size of assets per single member of a pension scheme with the independently 
researched corporate governance characteristics of the fund manager in control 
of their funds.  The analysis provides the context that maps the pension industry 
asset spread onto the corporate governance characteristics of the fund managers 
controlling their wealth creation.  It explores whether fund managers with 
dispersed shareholders are attached to pension clients with fewer assets per 
member.  It goes onto consider whether the traits of the scheme itself mitigate 
any wealth capture or share trends in the type of pension scheme and the type 
of fund manager they select. The chapter concludes, after examining the 
limitations of the data, that there is a relationship between ownership structure 
and size of pension assets, however the direction of the relationship cannot be 
ascertained. 
 
1.5.6  Chapter 7:  Analysis Part 2: Survey examination of the 
perceptions of pension trustees 
 
This chapter analyses the findings of an attitudinal survey of pension scheme 
trustees.  The survey addresses their attitudes to fund management selection, 
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and the characteristics they assess when selecting fund managers.  Specifically, 
it asks whether corporate governance attributes are considered during screening, 
and their perception of the fiduciary duty the fund manager applies to their role.  
The chapter builds on the findings from the previous analysis to develop a picture 
of whether trustee perceptions reflect the previous chapter results.  Further, it is 
the vital link between the corporate governance results and the perception of the 
fiduciary relationship to determine if it changes as the fund manager shareholding 
disperses.  The challenge of the fund manager demands for non-disclosure 
agreements over fees erupting during the deployment of the survey are discussed 
as emblematic of the secrecy of the relationship.  The chapter concludes that 
there is genuine confusion over the state of duties agents owe to pension trusts.  
Corporate governance characteristics are not noteworthy to trustees as 
traditional financial measures such as past performance.  Agency theory does 
not appear to predict fund manager selection choices, however externally owned 
fund managers in. 
 
1.5.7  Chapter 8:  Discussion and conclusions 
 
This chapter draws on the previous three analysis chapters to determine whether 
there is an appropriately functioning fiduciary obligation in the UK finance 
industry.  It takes independent observations, trustee perceptions and the 
developments in supporting legal infrastructure to form an opinion on whether 
pension funds are protected when managed externally.  By determining the 
existence of a functioning and universally acknowledged fiduciary obligation to 
the assets of the members of a pension scheme and, in keeping with the Berle 
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and Means (1932) definition of one man’s fiduciary obligation to another when 
managing their assets, it discusses financial intermediation institutions and the 
state of fiduciary protection of modern day pension assets. 
 
The summary of this collation of knowledge of fiduciary duty in pension 
governance is an important analysis of what the concept of the universal right to 
retirement security means in reality.  The workforce has salary-sacrificed for this 
right and the finance industry needs to function according to its intended purpose.  
It must funnel capital into investment returning assets, where those returns are 
enjoyed by appropriate owner.  The confusion found in the results implies that 
the appropriate owner needs identification at regulatory level. Currently the 
fiduciary duty to maximise profit is for the exclusive benefit of shareholders in 
dispersed ownership entities, the occupiers of the finance industry itself.  
However, the largest supply of finance by orders of magnitude is the contributing 
workforce that accounts for half of the OECD population (Monks, 2002b).  If the 
returns on these assets are not ‘returned’ to their originating owners through an 
efficient cost of intermediation, and instead reside with Clark’s (1976; p6) "elite 
suppliers of capital" pension trustees are failing in their duty to demand fiduciary 
agency from a finance industry that currently retains 40% of the UK’s corporate 
profits (Crotty, 2009). 
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1.6  Conclusion 
 
Given the pension trust responsibility for intergenerational retirement returns and 
an asymmetrical information reliance placed on outsourced experts, the 
governance of these experts (fund managers) becomes critical to any 
examination of pension asset management.  Agency theory rests on the 
economic assumption of self-interested management and the mechanisms 
shareholder owners must employ to ensure management acts in the best interest 
of their investment (Hasnas, 1998).  Corporate law reinforces this assumption 
with fiduciary duties assigned to management to act in the best interests of the 
company and its shareholders (Waring, 2006).  Over 75% of fund management 
firms specialised in catering to pension wealth management are owned, broadly 
equally, by investment banks and insurance companies (Bogle, 2009; Monks and 
Sykes, 2002).  The duties owed to shareholders by fund managers may 
incentivise them to enter into inefficient contracts with their pension clients, ones 
that over-reward and under-monitor their effort and expertise for the benefit of the 
theory’s self-interested shareholders. 
 
Fund managers with shareholder governance structures must navigate a conflict 
of interest that sets the fiduciary duties held to shareholders against the agency 
duties held to a client vulnerable to information asymmetry and imperfect 
monitoring opportunities.  This vulnerability, and agency to act on the principal’s 
behalf would feasibly trigger a fiduciary obligation in the agent.  Following the 
significant losses suffered by pension schemes through the 2007-2008 financial 
crisis the government commissioned Kay Review noted: 
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“The long term public goal for equity markets is in securing the public 
purposes of high performing companies and strong returns to savers 
through an effective asset management industry, and in ensuring that the 
profits earned by companies are as far as possible translated into 
returns to beneficiaries by minimising the costs of intermediation… 
It would seem fair to say that equity markets today serve the needs of the 
players in these markets better than they serve either those who put up 
the money or the businesses wanting finance to support growth.” (Kay 
Review, 2012; p6) [Emphasis added] 
 
This agency problem of the incorrect fiduciary beneficiary of the agent’s efforts in 
a multi-principal environment has been described by Blackburn (2006) as inviting 
the systematic failure of modern day pension provision.  The thesis seeks to 
contribute understanding of the empirical manifestation of this pension challenge. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature review:  The theory of the firm 
and its philosophical and pragmatic 
development over time 
 
Solvitur Ambiando – “It is solved by walking” (Saint Augustine) 
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2.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter presents a critical review of the theory and practice of the corporate 
governance7 of UK fund managers.  It is the exploration of the first principal of the 
fund management agent; their shareholders (for later comparison with the second 
agency principal, the pension client).  The objective of the Chapter is to explore 
the origin and development of fiduciary obligations to shareholders in fund 
management firms through the literature of economic and legal corporate 
governance. 
 
The governance crises of the start of the twenty first century (the dot.com bust 
2001, Enron collapse 2003, and the financial crisis of 2007-2008) were 
successively decried in the media and academia as the worst since the Great 
Depression of the 1930s (Ryan et al., 2010).  In 2001, $USD7 trillion in market 
value was wiped from global markets (Zukin, 2012).  Enron, WorldCom and Tyco 
financial scandals created widespread job losses and destroyed tens of 
thousands of retirement plans (Christofi et al., 2010).  The financial crisis’ 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) saw the US government pour $700 billion 
into bailing out corporations that free market theorists would dictate failed in what 
Verret (2010; p283) described as “a unique historical event; not merely because 
of its size, but also because of a resulting ripple through corporate scholarship 
and practice.”  Corporations, according to Zukin (2012) caused such “egregious” 
                                            
7
 “The way that a… company… is controlled by the people who run it” at www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/governance (accessed 25 March 2016) 
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money loss without board intervention that it robbed shareholders of their entire 
investment.  Ramirez (2007; p345) quotes mutual fund founder John C. Bogle as 
accusing corporate governance practice of contracting a “pathological mutation” 
that has transformed “traditional owners’ capitalism” to “new managers’ 
capitalism”.  Atherton et al. (2011; p1) condemned “[t]he lack of trust in American 
corporations and corporate management over the recent scandals and financial 
crises has increased public and legislative outcry for accountability in business 
decisions.”  However, before Atherton et al.’s public and legislative outcry can be 
given appropriate and cautious determination, an important set of questions 
needs clarification: what is a business corporation and what purpose should it 
serve?  Leading corporate law scholars Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout (Blair and 
Stout, 2008; p720) expand, “[t]hese questions have been raised repeatedly by 
legal scholars, practitioners and policy makers for at least the last 150 years.  
Each generation has struggled to find acceptable answers.”  Previously Stout 
(Stout, 2003a) outlined the puzzle facing corporate theorists; investors place their 
own hard won capital into the overwhelming control of the firm and its 
management.  They thereby relinquish any control over the efficient or ethical 
running of the firm, or even whether corporate earnings will be distributed back 
as dividends and used instead, for instance, to raise salaries, build empires or 
fund unspecified charitable works.  Kenneth Goodpaster (1994) described this 
conundrum as the underlying foundation of the corporate governance problem.  
The relationship between managers and shareholders is “ethically different” 
precisely because of this vulnerability.  While corporations must at a minimum act 
legally towards all stakeholders (Spurgin, 2001), they owe special or fiduciary 
duties to shareholders to control the corporation in the best interest of their 
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assets.  In Lynn Stout’s (2007; p2) later opinion this has developed as a “common 
but misleading” representation of shareholders as owners of firms.  So dominant 
is this perception that Sundaram and Inkman (2004) believe finance textbooks 
assert its logic, rather than argue for it.  Popularly coined “shareholder primacy”, 
Fisch (2006) believes there are no longer attempts at justification in the finance 
literature; it is incorporated without consideration of the implications.  It is written 
into the UK governance codes (Armour et al., 2003) and explicit in the accounting 
body of literature (Christofi et al., 2010; Stein, 2008; Waring, 2006; Pitts, 2002).  
Yet whether the firm’s responsibilities to the shareholder is the only fiduciary duty 
held by fund management firms is the contemplation of this and the following 
literature chapter addressing the two principals purportedly vulnerable to the 
agent’s control of their assets. 
 
Whether agreeing that shareholders are owners of firms or not, La Porta et al. 
(2000) argue that investor protections are essential for preventing exploitation in 
any investment.  When external investors finance firms they need certainty (or at 
least risks mitigated) that there will be a return on investment and management 
or controlling shareholders will not exploit their advantageous position (Boatright, 
2009).  McSweeney (2008) agrees; external monitoring to protect finance is a 
positive role played by stock markets and investors would be in short supply 
without it.  However, he continues, this is not an argument to place shareholders’ 
short-term interests above those of the long-term health of the corporation or 
society in the absence of stock market protections.  Blair (2003; p889) catalogues 
Enron, WorldCom and many other firms where shareholder primacy rhetoric was 
used to artificially inflate share prices and manipulate accounting positions.  She 
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concluded that “the Anglo-American insistence that share value is the only right 
way to measure corporate performance and only acceptable goal for corporate 
executives and directors rings suddenly, pathetically, hollow.”  While canonical 
theorists, Berle and Means (1932) believed in the efficacy of the judicial system 
to alleviate distributive injustices, shareholder hegemony supported by business 
theory has been criticised by Merino et al. (2010) as having a long history of 
dangerous outcomes when economic markets dictate social norms.  This has 
profound implications for funds management firms managing client funds as well 
as those of their own powerful shareholders, one that O’Brien (2004) worries 
leads to the danger of unmanageable conflicts of interest. 
 
Central to the chapter is an investigation of the development and current state of 
firm governance.  This establishes the governance characteristics for later 
empirical interrogation to determine whether they predict or prescribe the 
mechanisms of financial intermediary behaviour in the pensions industry.  Section 
2.2 of the chapter briefly examines the relationship business shares, or should 
share, with society and where contemporary corporate governance theory has 
brought tension to this relationship.  Section 2.3 investigates the formation of 
academic theories and what characteristics a theory needs to sustain legitimacy.  
Section 2.4 builds on the creation of academic theories over time, outlining the 
historical progress of the theory of the firm and the events that have shaped 
contemporary views on the very nature of the modern firm.  Section 2.5 takes 
these heterogeneous views and applies them to corporate governance changes 
over time and into the contemporary controversies over which stakeholders 
should be the responsibility of the firm.  Section 2.6 concludes that until the 
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purpose of the firm is agreed, tensions in corporate governance theory will 
continue to plague academic development and an undisputed dominant 
paradigm to guide fiduciary business governance will remain elusive. 
 
 
2.2  The duties and obligations of firms in society 
 
Letza et al. (2004) explain that the exploration of who should control the firm and 
how they should control it is unresolved in the business ethics literature.  Carroll 
(1996; p13) paints a society distrusting of business “because society’s 
expectations of its behaviour have outpaced business’s ability to meet these 
growing expectations”.  Business in the modern era undoubtedly wields a great 
deal of power but whether it necessarily abuses that power requires careful 
examination.  Democratic society decides the laws for business so where 
compliance is in evidence, many scholars argue that the firm cannot be held to 
be abusing power simply by not redistributing resources further than that 
specified by law (Stieb, 2009; Jensen, 2001; Davis, 1973; Friedman, 1970).  
While ethical conduct is often mistaken as not breaking the law, others argue it 
goes beyond the letter and to the spirit of the law society intended, and the 
consideration of what is right and good (Augur, 2009; Arcot and Bruno, 2006; 
Freshfields, 2005, Freeman, 1984).  Certainly, ethics scholarship is the study of 
theories in the right and wrong of human behaviour and the conduct of business 
is simply an outcome of human behaviour (Stieb, 2009).  How the firm is governed 
shapes the nature of its interactions with society, and the study of business ethics 
explores the normative principles for governing business in order to meet any 
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obligations society demands (Craft, 2012; Crane and Matten, 2007; Phillips et al., 
2003; Hasnas, 1998).  The theory of business ethics is discussed in Chapter 4 
as the foundation literature supporting the conceptual framework of the theories 
of fiduciary agency in financial management when two principals share a common 
agent.  Supporting this, the objective of this section is to establish how the modern 
corporation came to conceptualise shareholders as firm owners.  The 
shareholder principal has come to possess strong economic and legal influence 
over their agent managers.  While the theories of agency and fiduciary duty are 
explicitly described in Chapter 4, this chapter seeks to clarify the historical and 
current role of the shareholder in the modern firm as the principal of fiduciary 
concern for corporate managers, including fund management firms stewarding 
the £5 trillion in UK pension funds on behalf of non-shareholder principals with 
contestable fiduciary protection (Godfrey, 2014). 
 
 
2.3  The theory of the firm 
 
This section examines the development of a theory of the firm from the time of 
Adam Smith (1723-1790) to the post Reagan-Thatcher era of economic 
rethinking to contextualise developments in corporate governance in the geo-
political legislative regimes where UK pension money is managed.  Coase (1937; 
p386) influentially wanted a clear definition of the firm in economic theory, and if 
it differed from the “plain man’s” understanding it should be made clear how.  
This, argued Jensen (2000), would enable us to better engineer organisational 
and management practices that help firms create value, thereby theoretically 
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increasing human living standards.  Firms are simple to describe, as Coelho et 
al. (2002; p2) demonstrate; “corporations are legal fictions created by the State 
to engage in enterprises that the State allows.”  The modern corporation is 
characterised by limited liability and the ability to lock in capital regardless of the 
wishes of owners and creditors (Ramirez, 2012).  However, since the invention 
of the joint stock company economic theory has struggled to explain the 
conditions where gains from specialisation and cooperative production are better 
achieved in a firm than across efficient markets.  Alchian and Demsetz (1972) 
point to the delusion that firms have any powers of fiat, authority or discipline 
different to two parties contracting in the market.  Reich-Graefe (2011a; p343) 
goes further, the firm “is the principal legal vehicle utilized in order to remove large 
areas of economic activity from free market forces and to internalize and 
concentrate such activity in planned economies under absolutist, hierarchical 
command-and-control structures such that the orthodox view would classify them 
as socialist or non-market economies”.  He concludes that they displace pricing 
signals used to guide markets, rule by fiat, hold assets and returns on these 
collectively and so should not be embraced by economists as an efficient mode 
of organisation.  Green (1993) holds that legalese such as “fiduciary obligations” 
and “principal-agent” have unwittingly created popular myths of the firm’s nature.  
However, at the heart of firm theory confusion is the separation of the decision 
and risk bearing functions outlined by Fama and Jensen (1983), where decision 
makers bear no adverse wealth effects regardless of their decisions.  This 
functional separation departs from the traditional finance theory relationship 
between risk and reward in asset management, and is more accurately described 
by the agency theory conception that agents require incentivising to fully deliver 
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the principal’s appropriate risk/reward relationship.  The thesis posits that this 
holds true for both of the fund managers’ principals. 
 
In 1932 Adolf Berle, a law scholar, and Gardiner Means, an economist, famously 
documented the contradiction in the modern firm; the transaction cost to the 
dispersed owner-shareholder of monitoring the management of the company 
(and the risk of other shareholders freeriding at their expense) had delivered all 
realistic power to the firm’s non-owner managers (described variously in 
Bebchuck and Weisbach, 2010; Cheffins and Bank, 2006; Bratton, 2001; Katz, 
1960).  Their monograph, The Modern Corporation and Private Property has 
been described as “the last major work of original scholarship” (Reich-Graefe, 
2011b; p346).  Its publication led to the iconic Berle-Dodd debate, where Merrick 
Dodd argued that by unshackling managers from the relentless pursuit of profit 
to satisfy shareholder avarice, they would be free to act responsibly on behalf of 
the firm (Stout, 2007).  Berle eventually also backed this decoupling from the 
traditional view of ownership; even while concerned there was no clear alternative 
steward for management, but assuming they would rise to “business 
statesmanship” challenge (Hay, 1972).  Corporations were, according to Berle 
and Means, more than investment vehicles for shareholders, they had an impact 
on “whole districts, bring[ing] ruin to one community and prosperity to another... 
giving rise to new responsibilities towards the owners, the workers, the 
consumers, and the State [that] thus rest upon the shoulders of those in control” 
(Winkler, 2004; p113).  Shareholders, on the other hand, had simply become 
passive property owners.  In Berle’s corporate legal opinion they were the owners 
of shares, not the owners of the corporation.  Ingley and van der Walt (2004; 
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p537) are more direct, “…there are few owners, most being punters rather than 
proprietors” possessing little loyalty and easy exit options.  In 1960 Katz observed 
that modern investors viewed themselves as speculative stock market 
participants rather than company owners because ownership implies taking on 
risk and active management.  Shareholders had departed from the traditional 
model of corporate owner management earlier in the century.  Reich-Graefe 
(2011a; p345) illustrates the shareholders’ removal from the firm operational 
reality with a case study: 
 
“As the world’s largest, fully-integrated retailing business Wal-Mart 
accumulates to nothing more than a fiction in the legal realm - a 
corporation organized under the laws of the State of Delaware.  Its almost 
four billion outstanding shares of common stock are principally traded on 
the New York Stock Exchange, but its almost 300,000 shareholders will 
never be able to touch what they own - in most cases, not even in the 
form of a physical share certificate.  What makes this legal fiction 
tangible, however, and indeed a vast economic reality is that Wal-Mart 
owns, controls and operates an enormous empire of productive 
resources which generates superlatives in the global marketplace on an 
Olympian scale: net sales of $401.2 billion in its 2008 fiscal year; a market 
capitalization of close to $220 billion at the end of 2008 (ranking Wal-
Mart, at the time, the third-largest publicly listed enterprise by market 
capitalization in the world).” 
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It is unrealistic heurism to view this firm as operating for the benefit of 300,000 
anonymous and constantly shifting shareholders alone when its societal impact 
is global and immense.  However, according to Stout (2007) it is a commonly 
received wisdom that shareholders are the owners of the corporation, alongside 
strong sense that someone must be empowered to command obedience 
following a wake of management scandals.  Supporting this is the core concept 
of traditional corporate governance as the responsibility to assure minority 
investors that their powerlessness will not be improperly exploited, thus 
encouraging that investment in the first place (Clarke, 2010).  This still does not 
address the fundamental issue of traditional private property ownership or 
whether the theory of shareholder primacy is predicting or explaining the 
phenomenon of the firm behaviour.  Siebecker (2010) sees the nature of the 
phenomenon as evolving rapidly.  Reich-Graefe (2011b) calls the theory 
“unfinished business”.  In order to unpick this fundamental corporate governance 
knowledge gap, the next section explores the development of the joint-stock 
corporation over time to ascertain where the “owner” was determined. 
 
2.3.1  The firm and capital markets from Adam Smith to the turn 
of the twentieth century 
 
According to prominent business ethicist, Ronald Duska, “Adam Smith may be, 
perhaps, the most misunderstood academic frequently taught in the academy 
today” (Duska and Ragatz, 2008; p158).  Adam Smith was a Scottish economist, 
philosopher and academic in the eighteenth century, and author of An Inquiry into 
the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776).  This treatise, according 
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to biographer Robert Falkner (2008) continues to influence economic and political 
liberal theory and the conception of the free markets.  Smith was concerned with 
the nature of joint-stock companies on the basis of a perceived separation of 
ownership and control (Stephen and Backhaus, 2003; Jensen and Meckling, 
1983): 
 
“[Shareholders] seldom pretend to understand anything of the business of 
the company, and when the spirit of faction happens not to prevail among 
them, give themselves no trouble about it, but receive contentedly such 
half-yearly or yearly dividend as the directors think proper to make to them.  
This total exemption from trouble and from risk, beyond a limited sum, 
encourages many people to become adventurers in joint stock companies, 
who would, upon no account, hazard their fortunes in any private 
copartnery.” Adam Smith (2005; 1776; p606). 
 
This sentiment alludes not only to the passivity of shareholders, but also to the 
attractiveness of limited risk.  However, contemporary firm theory development 
cannot be considered absent the operation of private property rights of the firm’s 
host market, and in the context of Smith’s most quoted contribution to classical 
economic thinking; the concept of the “invisible hand”: 
 
“By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, he 
intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a 
manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his 
own gain; and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible 
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hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention” (Smith, 2005; 
1776; p363). 
 
This introduced the construct and legitimisation of self-interest to the vocabulary 
of economic and firm theory (Dunning, 2012).  The pursuit of self-interest results 
in efficient resource allocation and social wealth maximisation; a misinterpretation 
of Smith’s intention, Karns (2011) believes.  On the Social Science Research 
Network8 199 papers endorsing the egoism of the ‘invisible hand’ have been 
posted since 1997.  However, this quote is the only reference Smith makes to the 
concept in the 786 pages of The Wealth of Nations (Smith, 2005: 1776; compared 
with 36 references to the moral duties of man, 2 to ethical duties and 3 to the 
injustices of the Poor Law).  His earlier book, The Theory of Moral Sentiments 
1759, which Falkner (2008) credits as Smith’s preferred work, shapes his own 
theory on the development of moral behaviour and judgement arising from social 
relationships, and was written while a theologian and moral philosopher at 
Glasgow University.  Smith clearly evidenced the importance of the moral duty in 
economic theory (the fellow-sympathy theory, see Mele, 2008) and this would 
extend to the duty to manage another man’s property with fiduciary care.  
However, it is also important to contextualise Smith’s writing to the business 
environment at the time. 
 
Smith’s ire was directed at the injustices of mercantilism and government 
nepotism focused on filling the treasury rather than allowing free and competitive 
                                            
8
 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Results.cfm (accessed 7 February 2014) 
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participation in the market place to the greater social good (Dunning, 2012).  At 
the start of the twentieth century business ownership in the UK was changing 
rapidly following the passing of the Limited Liability Act 1855 (Jeffreys, 1946).  In 
the US in 1929 Owen D Young (future president of General Electric) articulated 
the change in perception this ushered in; “no longer attorneys for stockholders”, 
he dubbed managers “trustees of an institution”, owing duties to all the 
institution’s stakeholders (Katz, 1960; p77).  This re-envisioning so soon after the 
initial existence of the firm in the market and enabled the future tectonic shift in 
the governance conception of the manager as a fiduciary for the institution. 
 
2.3.2  The firm and capital markets in the age of Berle and Means 
 
The canonical work of Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means in 1932 introduced the 
first conventional academic theory of corporate governance that continues in 
relevance today.  Monks and Minow (2008) introduce their corporate governance 
text book stating “most people begin the study of ownership in the context of the 
public corporation with Berle and Means”.  Hill (2010; p1005) concurs “…in 
corporate law, all paths radiate” from this work.  It, alongside the Dodd-Berle 
exchange, is used by proponents advocating the director primacy view of 
ownership, Owen Young’s “institutional trustee” owing a social service along with 
a profit function (Hutchison, 2011; Stout, 2007; Boatright, 1994).  However, in 
adding to ambiguity in corporate governance, it is equally employed by 
proponents of the shareholder primacy school, advocating the fiduciary 
obligations arising from managing another’s private property (Coelho et al., 2002; 
Greenwood, 1996; Jensen and Meckling, 1983; Hay, 1972).  Again, the temporal 
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context is important.  The economic boom of the Industrial Revolution had faded, 
the stock market crash of 1929 had ushered in the Great Depression and the 
markets were in shock (Ramirez, 2012; Reich-Graefe, 2011a; Tarver, 1968).  
Alongside the macroeconomic climate, the pattern of share ownership had rapidly 
dispersed.  At the turn of the century, directors (excluding relatives) owned an 
average 40 percent of equity in incorporated companies; by 1914 this had fallen 
to 20 percent (Pitts, 2002).  This change in demographics (and financial risk 
bearing entering non-traditional investment communities, see Sundaram and 
Inkpen, 2004) of share ownership led to a rethinking of private property rights and 
was the central refrain of the Berle and Means thesis (North, 1983).  Property 
rights theory had been grounded in the notion that business ventures were 
undertaken by individuals with their own assets (Boatright, 1994).  Berle and 
Means now observed that assets and their owners had become separated, 
shareholders were now simply risk-takers or “passive property owners”, and 
corporate managers had become risk-free decision makers (Hay, 1972; p62).  
The inquiry at the core of the text was how managers should run corporations 
and what duties of protection they owed their shareholders, as a matter of legal 
and moral legitimacy of management power (Hendry, 2001).  They conceived of 
this duty as a fiduciary one: 
 
“Taking this doctrine back into the womb of equity, whence it sprang, the 
foundation becomes plain.  Wherever one man or a group of men 
entrusted another man or group with the management of property, the 
second group became fiduciaries.  As such they were obliged to act 
conscionably, which meant in fidelity to the interests of the persons 
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whose wealth they had undertaken to handle.”  (Berle and Means, 1932; 
p336). 
 
In the subsequent Dodd-Berle exchanges for the rest of the 1930s the wisdom 
became more entrenched that management control was self-evident and 
acceptable to both the political and financial markets provided the suppliers of 
finance as passive private property to enterprise were protected (Hendry, 2001).  
The fiduciary duties management owed to shareholders should flow from societal 
requirements and public policy (Boatright, 1994).  Shares were not property used 
in production, nor the primary finance raising model.  They were a “channel for 
distributing income whose accumulation for capital purposes is not required [and] 
must conform to conceptions of civilization worked out through the democratic 
processes of the American constitutional government.”9.  This influential 
academic exchange either coincided with, or ushered in an era of managerial 
capitalism that would last from the 1930s to the 1970s (Mostovicz et al., 2011; 
Bratton, 2001; Hendry, 2001; Hay, 1972) or as Cheffins and Bank (2009; p1) 
conceived it, their “characterization of matters quickly became received wisdom”.  
Although alluded to in The Modern Corporation and Private Property, the nature 
and cost of the agent relationship between manager and shareholder would not 
become explicit in the economic and legal theory of the firm until the 1970s, led 
by the works of economist, Milton Friedman and scholars Michael Jensen and 
William Meckling.  Their combined influence would bring economics back into the 
boardroom and recast the identity of Berle and Mean’s “business statesman” 
                                            
9
 Berle and Means, supra note 2 at xxxviii, footnote 78 in Hutchison 2001, p1244 
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managers as institutional trustees into a far more instrumental characterisation.  
The theory of firm management left the literature of duty in business ethics and 
corporate law scholarship, and became entrenched in economics and finance 
literature as a model capable of mathematical determination. 
 
2.3.3  The firm and capital markets in the age of Milton Friedman 
 
Managerial capitalism within the fiduciary framework had developed reasonably 
uncontested in the academy and capital markets until the beginning of the 1970s 
brought new developments in economic and information cost theory (Hendry, 
2001; Bratton, 1994).  This recast the firm as an economic fiction rather than a 
societal institution, a nexus of contracts seeking efficient equilibrium for utility 
maximisers (Jensen, 2001).  Leading this thinking was Milton Friedman, an 
economist and statistician at the influential University of Chicago School of 
Economics and recipient of the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences (Rodin, 2005).  
On his death, The Economist described him as "the most influential economist of 
the second half of the twentieth century...possibly of all of it."10 
 
Friedman’s business ethics are grounded in the freedom of markets (and 
democratic laws) to create the best product for the customer, the best 
employment conditions and the most efficient returns for those who risk their 
hard-earned money (Wagner-Tsukamoto, 2007).  In 1970 he published his 
understanding of business ethics as management’s unswerving devotion to the 
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 Available at http://www.economist.com/node/8313925 (accessed 10 February 2014) 
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shareholder as owner of the corporation in influential rhetoric, questioning the 
notion of business responsibility in “eliminating discrimination, avoiding pollution 
and whatever else may be the catchwords of the contemporary crop of reformers.  
In fact, they are - or would be if they or anyone else took them seriously - 
preaching pure and unadulterated socialism.  Businessmen who talk this way are 
unwitting puppets of the intellectual forces that have been undermining the basis 
of a free society these past decades.” (Friedman, 1970; p1).  It is not permissible 
for managers to dilute legally acquired profits using moral justifications, as they 
are wrongfully appropriating assets they do not own (Rodin, 2005).  He assigns 
managers the transformational duty of attending only to the business of profit 
maximisation “while conforming to the basic rules of society, both those embodied 
in the law and those embodied in ethical customs” (Friedman, 1970; p1).  This 
era, says Boatright (2009) began the transition of manager from bureaucrat to 
shareholder partisan, participant and entrepreneur and the economic theory of 
fastening the manager’s motivations to the generation of shareholder profit, 
thereby decreasing the agency distance between Berle and Means’ owner and 
controller. 
 
The formalisation of economic agency theory was laid down in Ross’ 1973 
seminal treatise on both the moral hazard and allocation inefficiencies created by 
the information asymmetry benefiting the agent.  The firm behaved like the 
markets, stakeholders will contract with the firm until the cost is too high and 
substitution is available, with shareholders being the residual claimants of the 
agent’s value creation process (Bainbridge, 2006; Jones, 1995; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976).  A body of work has developed around the concept of the 
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rationally self-interested manager who requires controlling through market 
oriented mechanisms (Stieb, 2009; Jensen, 2001; Williamson, 1979).  These 
agency theory mechanisms include aligning management desires with those of 
shareholders through performance based remuneration, the board of directors 
who act as monitors of management on behalf of shareholders and the stock 
market being an external market mechanism capable of corporate control and 
monitoring (Lan and Heracleous, 2010; Donaldson and Davis, 1991). 
 
In 1972 Hay (1972; p71) theorised that further speculation over the shareholder 
owner and the profit principle was irrelevant unless changes were made to both 
economic and the legal theory: “Economic theory is underpinned by the utility 
(profit) maximisation motive and the courts have upheld this”.  Codified Anglo-
American governance systems and corporate law also began to reflect this belief 
(Aguilera et al., 2006; Greenwood, 1996).  Shareholder profit maximisation based 
on incentivised management alignment became the entrenched model of 
management in the “second era” of corporate governance (Mostovicz et al., 2011; 
Boatright, 2009) and the principal-agent literature proliferated as the primary 
apparatus for theorising about the firm, regardless of ethical criticism (see 
Boatright (2009; p472) on its role in misconduct, income inequality and “corporate 
social indifference”; Merino et al. (2010) on negative freedom of the sole 
economic objective; or Davis, (1973) on the decline in social expectations of 
corporate norms).  Blair and Stout (2008; p722) commented of the principal-agent 
obsession of the era, “when your only tool is a hammer, every problem tends to 
look like a nail,” before conceding that many influential academics continue to 
employ the model today.  However, Coelho et al. (2002; p2) mount a strong 
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defence for the “clear and unambiguous” responsibilities of management under 
the “only intellectually defensible” ethical paradigm available today.  Wagner-
Tsukamoto (2007; p213) uses Friedman’s logic to argue its salience for a 
reinterpretation of “active moral agency”.  Green (1993) reflects that Friedman’s 
belief in managers’ duties as the fiduciary for shareholder “owners” still dominates 
corporate law as the duties freely undertaken when the agent agrees to serve 
their principal.  Blair and Stout (2006; p722) speculate that under Thomas Kuhn’s 
paradigm shifting theory, “intellectual progress sometimes must await the arrival 
of new tools and technologies”.  Agency theory, they conclude became the 
primary intellectual tool available to scholars yet it fails to reflect fundamental 
elements in the law by distilling the complex firm down to a simple economic 
problem.  Agency theory, along with its dissenting theories, are examined in detail 
in Chapter 4.  However, it cannot be considered without reference to a further 
fundamental development in the agency theory of corporate governance; the 
changing nature of the up-to-now homogeneous, dispersed and vulnerable 
shareholder. 
 
2.3.4  The firm and capital markets post Reagan-Thatcher 
 
“In the wake of the Great Depression and the Second World War, with 
the Keynesian revolution still young, championing the free market was 
deeply unfashionable, even (or especially) among economists. Mr 
Friedman and kindred spirits - such as Friedrich von Hayek, author of 
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“The Road to Serfdom” - were seen as cranks.  Surely the horrors of the 
Depression had shown that markets were not to be trusted?”11  
 
The capitalist system is characterised by resources being owned privately and 
owners increase the productivity of these resources through cooperation and 
specialisation (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972).  The finance industry is a 
heterogeneous and complex system for achieving this private resource allocation 
(Porter, 2005).  Until recent decades, its theoretical role was to broker the 
transactions between business and society in three main guises: 1) orchestrating 
loans to purchase private property using interest bearing savings banks 
(Hartman, 1993); 2) facilitating shareholding in publicly listed firms as Berle and 
Mean’s passive private property stock markets; (Waring, 2006) and 3) uncertainty 
smoothing through insurance markets (Blackburn, 2006).  The Reagan-Thatcher 
era reinforced Friedman’s theory of untethering markets with a strong agenda of 
private property, market-led economic policy making, which in turn reinforced the 
principal-agent relationship between shareholders interacting through (stock) 
markets with their underlying firm agents (Hendry, 2001).  Dunford (2007) calls 
this era “finance-led” capitalism, which Hendry (2001) characterised by the rise 
of hostile takeovers, rapid capital growth and the advent of the large and powerful 
institutional shareholder.  These financial institutions were now controlling the 
majority of the equities issued on stock exchanges (from 10% in 1925 to 64% in 
the US this decade and 25% to 84% in the UK:  (McSweeney, 2008)).  Berle and 
Mean’s separated ‘owner’ quickly became one step further removed from their 
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 The Economist, 23 November 2006, Available at http://www.economist.com/node/8313925 
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managers.  This heightened agency problem arose through the fact that 
institutional investors are mostly agents themselves, with responsibility for the 
funds of others (Aglietta’s (2000) pooled and delegated savings of labour).  They 
are intermediaries picking stocks for owners who are likely unaware of the firms 
(including employees, customers, suppliers, communities) they are invested in, 
allowing the new agent a level of detachment that tolerates performance pressure 
or divestment decisions based solely on financial requirements of their pooled 
principals rather than the health of the company their principals ‘own’ 
(McSweeney, 2008).  This created two tiers of agency that separated the 
beneficiary and recipient of capital by another level of abstraction.  Karmel (2004) 
chronicles how the new shareholders’ agents were engaging with corporate 
managers in a way traditional shareholders had not.  She contends that 
managers quickly came under pressure from powerful institutional shareholders 
to produce ever stronger short-term performance results in the bullish market of 
the 1980s and 1990s. 
 
When the equities market collapsed in 2000, financial engineering became a 
route to maintain earnings growth and the consequent accounting scandals and 
accompanying implosions of giants such as Enron and WorldCom became 
inevitable (Carrington and Johed, 2007).  Managers may have been motivated 
by the self-serving theory of economic agency seeking to maximise personal 
utility, buckled to pressure from powerful institutional share blocks, or acted out 
of normative agency duties to the shareholder and his rightful profit.  Regardless, 
many accounts no longer reflected a true and fair view of the firm, and 
management failed to prevent the catastrophic losses that it wrought on all 
58 
 
stakeholders (including shareholders).  However, with this new breed of 
shareholder, coercive power and an instinct for self-preservation against losses 
should have ensured institutional investors were capable of efficiently monitoring 
their agents as they were remunerated to do, but failed (Karmel, 2004). 
 
These intermediaries are not only capable of boardroom influence; they are 
politically powerful and capable of influencing regulation (Karmel, 2004).  In the 
era they rose to prominence, shareholders were empirically and theoretically the 
firm’s primary corporate governance concern.  Hill (2010), McSweeney (2008) 
and Karmel (2004) call for a new corporate governance model that adequately 
acknowledges the new, expanding and powerful role played by financial 
intermediaries, grounded in establishing reciprocal duties for shareholders that 
prevent damage to the firm and its stakeholders. 
 
Institutional intermediaries present three new challenges to reimagining 
governance: 1) The theory must definitively determine the private property 
conundrum of firm ownership; 2) the theory must guide intermediary 
management’s appropriate relationship with their own shareholders; and 3) the 
theory must guide how their own governance structures should react to this 
shareholder’s demand for profit maximisation.  Intermediary profit maximisation 
for these shareholders can be achieved by wielding institutional power to drive 
potentially unsustainable performance from the assets they invest in. 
Alternatively, by increasing “the amount of targeted, or relative return withheld by 
the manager of assets for services provided that detach the targeted return from 
the risk premium paid by the owner of assets,” (The Pensions Regulator (2016) 
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calls this “wealth capture”).  In light of this evolution in the nature of the firm, 
Section 2.4 examines whether corporate governance theory has kept pace with 
the fundamentally different and powerful modern institutional shareholder. 
 
 
2.4  The implications of institutional intermediaries for corporate 
governance theory and practice 
 
The firm has evolved as a concept over the centuries in different jurisdictions, 
each with different compliance regimes, court decisions and social climates that 
have shaped the rights and obligations it holds (North, 1983).  Further, the 
evolution of corporate governance, a foundation concept in business ethics, has 
been influenced by the ontologies of multiple disciplines; including economics, 
law, finance and management (Ryan et al., 2010; Bebchuck and Weisbach, 
2010).  Gillan (2006) outlines the scope of its modern influence as including the 
role of antitakeover measures, board structure, capital market governance, 
compensation and incentives, debt and agency costs, director and officer labour 
markets, fraud, lawsuits, ownership structures, and regulation.  During the 
turbulent corporate landscape of the twenty first century as the complexity of the 
financial markets and the firm has accelerated, the traditional theories of 
corporate governance scholarship have become increasingly unrepresentative of 
a shareholder no longer resembling Berle and Mean’s dispersed and rationally 
apathetic individual (Clarke, 2010; Hutchison, 2011; Bebchuk and Weisbach, 
2010). 
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2.4.1  Definitions of corporate governance 
 
The classical economic definition of corporate governance was attributed by 
Clarke (2010; p78) to Jensen and Meckling (1976) as “[t]he prevention of the 
exploitation of those who supply the money by those who control it”.  Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) define it as the way in which suppliers of finance assure 
themselves a return on their investment.  LaPorta et al. (2000; p3) broaden 
participation, offering “how well investors, both shareholders and creditors, are 
protected by law from expropriation by the managers and controlling 
shareholders of firms.”  Gillan and Starks (1998) define corporate governance 
mechanisms as the system of laws, rules, and factors that control operations at 
a company.  Broader still from Mostovicz et al. (2011; p613); “[a] set of processes, 
customs, policies, laws and institutions affecting the way a corporation is directed, 
administered or controlled, and its purpose is to influence directly or indirectly the 
behaviour of the organisation towards its stakeholders.”  While the stakeholders 
are now explicit here, South Africa’s King Committee Review on corporate 
governance adopts a more philosophical tone (Fisher and Lovell, 2009; p295): 
 
“Corporate governance is concerned with holding the balance between 
economic and social goals and between individual and community 
goals…The aim is to align as nearly as possible the interests of 
individuals, corporations and society.” 
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However, in the UK, the practical understanding of corporate governance, 
expressed by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales is 
narrow and reasonably unambiguous: 
 
“A fundamental tenet of capitalism is that a company is an entity of joint 
enterprise between those who control it (i.e. the directors) and those who 
own it (i.e. the shareholders).  Directors are responsible for acting in the 
best interests of the company for the benefit of shareholders.  
Shareholders in turn, empower the directors to lead the company in a 
fiduciary capacity, whilst maintaining a degree of decision-making control 
through incorporation rights.  Agency theory applies where there is a 
separation of ownership and control and describes how misalignment 
can occur resulting in conflicts between the interests of those in control 
of the company and those who own it.  Mitigating these conflicts through 
legal and regulatory frameworks which define the responsibilities, rights 
and owners of directors and shareholders, is a key corporate governance 
objective.” (Waring, 2006; p16). 
 
Interpretation is important as shareholder investment is not attached to a lien over 
particular assets or contracts as many other stakeholders’ stakes are, and so is 
protected only by management assurance that the firm is prospering (Boatright, 
1994).  Thomsen (2005) refers to this problem as incomplete contracting, 
requiring non-market mechanisms to internalise good governance.  Many 
scholars concur with the dominant practitioner view that the shareholder is the 
beneficiary of corporate governance (Mostovicz et al., 2011; Moore and 
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Reberioux, 2011; Rossouw, 2009; Deakin, 2005; Letza et al., 2004; Ryan and 
Buchholtz, 2001; Koslowski, 2000).  However, the view has become ethically 
contested and Gillan and Starks (1998) see a broader role that incorporates other 
vulnerable financial suppliers.  As business ethicists, management, strategy and 
legal scholars begin to challenge this dominant paradigm of governance for 
shareholders, Ayuso and Argandona (2007; p4) propose a definition of 
governance as “the design of institutions that induce or force management to 
internalize the welfare of stakeholders.”  In the case of an institutional investor, 
this includes the clients whose funds they manage that are also not attached to 
a lean or contract.  This supplier of finance has been overlooked by corporate 
governance theory and practice. 
 
2.4.2  Challenges to an appropriate contemporary theory of 
corporate governance 
 
Corporate governance scholarship predicted the institutional investor, as 
illustrated by Berle as far back as 1928: 
 
“Suppose... trust companies were in the habit of accepting, on "custodian 
account," deposits of stocks from small shareholders, thereby gathering 
many small holdings into an institution commanding a block so large that 
protection was worthwhile, and that they also provided themselves with 
power to represent the depositors of stock.  Such institutions could easily 
keep themselves informed as to the affairs of the corporation... and, as 
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representing their clients, could take the action necessary to prevent or 
rectify violations of property rights.” (Berle, 1928; p76) 
 
Soon after, the corporate law scholar was awarded a Rockefeller grant stipulating 
interdisciplinary governance research and so enlisted Gardiner Means, an 
economics scholar.  Means’ empirical research showed the startling trajectory of 
corporate wealth concentrated into the hands of a small cadre of managers.  His 
concern at this unbridled power shifted Berle’s advocacy from one of corporate 
self-regulation and legal light touch to one of strict government control.  As 
Bratton (2001; p752) comments, “[c]orporate law thus met economics seventy 
years ago with results different from those usually attending such encounters 
today… Today economics tends to encourage lawyers to take deregulatory 
positions.”  Corporate legal positioning has reinforced economic theory trends to 
codify the firm as a nexus of contracts benefiting the responsibility free 
shareholder into the corporate governance cannon.  Berle’s predicted rise of the 
institutional shareholder with the power to enforce their own property rights failed 
to acknowledge the potential for destructive self-interest in the investor who is not 
invested with their own funds. 
 
In 2003 Armour et al. concluded that the governance system in the UK, far from 
stabilising around the norm of shareholder primacy, was in a state of flux.  The 
preceding sections have described that over the development of corporate 
governance during the managerial capitalist phase was strongly influenced by the 
fiduciary duties of managers at the helm of societal institutions; the business 
statesman.  In the 1980s and 1990s a dissenting economic theory of governance 
64 
 
became rapidly dominant.  The next section considers the often dualistic views 
the different academic disciplines of economics and corporate law have 
developed on the purpose of the firm, and in particular whether the shareholder 
is the firm’s primary obligation. 
 
2.4.2.1  The shareholder as owner view of the firm  
 
“Two hundred years of work in economics and finance implies that in the 
absence of externalities and monopoly (and when all goods are priced), 
social welfare is maximized when each firm in an economy maximizes its 
total market value.” (Jensen, 2001) 
 
This view is consistent with Friedman (1970), Coelho et al. (2002) and Stieb 
(2009) that maximising returns on shareholders’ private property assets is 
ethically consistent with utilitarianism, delivering the greatest good to the greatest 
number.  Sundaram and Inkpen (2004) turn their attention to developments in the 
US with the widely cited legal case, Dodge vs. Ford Motor Company, 1919.  When 
Henry Ford wanted to reinvest Ford Motor Company’s retained earnings into the 
company rather than distribute it to shareholders a minority shareholder brought 
a legal suit alleging his intention to benefit employees and consumers was at the 
expense of shareholders.  The court ruled “the business corporation is organized 
and carried on primarily for the profit of stockholders.  The powers of the directors 
are to be employed for that end.”12  This ruling alongside the establishment of the 
                                            
12
 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919):p4 
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Securities and Exchange Commission13 paved the way for a formalised corporate 
governance code of practice based on the foundation of shareholder ownership. 
 
The financial markets provide what corporate governance calls “external control” 
(the ability of the market to monitor and punish or reward the firm via manipulating 
its share price; Kadyrzhanova and Rhodes-Kropf, 2011).  Under the Anglo-
American stock market regime, the role of the markets is to value the firm as a 
contributor to its economy.  Consequently, owners can vote at the Annual General 
Meeting and can sell or increase their holding or take over the firm entirely based 
on their evaluation of firm performance (Gillan, 2006).  These powers provide the 
most robust argument for shareholders as owners of the firm.  This economic 
view is grounded in the logic of minimising agency costs through these monitoring 
and incentive mechanisms (Mostovicz, 2011; Lan and Heracleaous, 2010; 
Winkler, 2004).  The shareholder view of the firm has added new mechanisms 
for monitoring and incentivising their agent (monitoring through Arthurs et al.’s 
(2008) board of directors; Morgan’s (2002) reporting, regulatory and monitoring 
agencies; or Erkens et al.’s (2012) separation of CEO and chairman and 
incentivising through Spector and Spital’s (2011) incentive-based pay; or 
Goergen and Renneboog’s (2007) market for corporate control).  The firm is a 
legal fiction more appropriately viewed as a system or “nexus of contracts” in 
dynamic motion (Reich-Graefe, 2011a; Blair and Stout, 2008; Jensen, 1985; 
Jensen and Meckling, 1983).  It is a profit maximising mechanism that will 
rationally seek to externalise as many costs as possible to the sole benefit of its 
                                            
13
 Through the passing of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (see Gilson and Kraakman, 
1993 for detailed developments) 
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owners, forcefully argued by the Jensen and Meckling cannon as being the 
residual claims due shareholders (Ramirez, 2005).  This view is also grounded in 
the economic assumption that managers are self-interested agents, likely to 
advance their own wellbeing ahead of the principal whose assets they manage 
(Cheffins and Bank, 2009; Stout, 2003b; Hendry, 2001; Jensen and Meckling 
1983).  When faced with conflicting paths, managers must choose that which 
benefits the shareholder even at a cost to other stakeholders (Blair, 2003).  To 
do otherwise is an ethical abuse of another’s profits (Rodin, 2005; Coelho et al., 
2002; Hasnas, 2001; Friedman, 1970) or an unauthorised transfer of wealth from 
owner to other (Jensen and Meckling, 1983; North’s (1983) rent dissipation).  
However, when Jensen and Meckling (1983; p1981) says of the corporate 
purpose “investors are willing to hold wealth in the form of claims on such 
organisations, because (or to the extent that) management acts on their behalf”, 
the premise need not lead to the conclusion.  Investing in shares could be the 
simple advance of finance for a return on investment, as with debt. 
 
Distaste for the theory has intensified in the light of corporate and shareholder 
scandals as directors’ remuneration incentivise them to manipulate the share 
price without acknowledging market movements based on the economic health, 
change in consumer tastes or commodity prices, and pure market speculation 
(Fassin and Gosselin, 2011; Stout, 2007; Stout, 2003b).  Notions of 
trustworthiness, duty or professionalism are not acknowledged or valued in this 
view of corporate governance, acknowledging only self-serving motivations that 
may encourage a self-fulfilling prophecy (Ghoshal, 2005; Stout, 2003a).  Ramirez 
(2007) catalogues manager’s soaring salaries since the 1980s, blaming the stock 
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incentives for the 200 criminal probes into CEO backdated options immediately 
prior to the 2007 financial crisis.  He argues the view of aligned owners and 
managers through stock incentives is now embedded in law despite being neither 
politically or economically sustainable.  Ryan and Buchholtz (2001) remind us 
that the corporate governance scholarship has largely ignored the role or 
motivations shareholders bring to governance, surely they are responsible for 
allowing the over-compensation of their manager agents.  The frequent calls to 
increase shareholder power to curb management excess (see Bebchuk and 
Weisbach, 2010; Bebchuk, 2005; Monks and Sykes, 2002) present a radical 
change to the traditional view of corporate governance, but do not prevent 
substituting management excess with shareholder excess, and deny any other 
recipients governance protection from the firm.  It is also easy (perhaps 
purposefully easy) to misinterpret shareholders as the “suppliers of finance” in 
the finance industry, where trade in financial capital is the service of the business, 
making many stakeholders a supplier of finance (Triantis and Daniels, 1995).  As 
Stout (2003a) highlights this view of corporate governance may not be empirically 
predictive.  If not corporate governance codes cannot unambiguously assert that 
management are agents of shareholders.  Codifying extensions to shareholder 
powers may simply perpetuate a myth of the firm that has no basis empirically. 
 
2.4.2.2  Debunking the shareholder-as-owner model 
 
There are many empirical anomalies that threaten the shareholder as owner view 
the firm. Jensen and Meckling (1983; p327) proposes that the firm is an 
“equilibrium behaviours of a complex contractual system made up of maximising 
68 
 
agents with diverse and conflicting objectives,” managed for the shareholder as 
a principal by the management as an agent.  Lan and Heracleous (2010) believes 
the “large and growing” body of empirical research fails to support the agency 
view.  Some of the regularly described anomalies are outlined next. 
 
2.4.2.2.1  The firm as a juristic person 
 
The shareholder ownership concept continues to dominate corporate governance 
scholarship, and agency is still the chief economic problem of interest in corporate 
law (Moore and Reberioux, 2011; Stout, 2007; Blair and Stout, 2006; Winkler, 
2004; Armour et al., 2003; Bainbridge, 2002).  However, from its inception, 
Jensen and Meckling’s agency analysis failed to model the legal reality of the 
modern corporation.  Corporations are independent legal entities created by the 
state; a juristic person (Bainbridge, 2006).  The firm enjoys perpetual succession, 
and survives the death of any given shareholder (Crane and Matten, 2007).  The 
US courts have upheld the constitutional rights of the firm as person and South 
African courts consistently hold that under law no person “whether natural or 
juristic” can be owned (Fisher and Lovell, 2009).  The firm as a juristic person can 
sue or be sued (Verret, 2010; Iwai, 1999), hold and dispose of assets (Blair and 
Stout, 2008) and enter into contracts (Bainbridge, 2002) without recourse to 
shareholders, their purported principal. 
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2.4.2.2.2  Directors’ powers and duties do not resemble those of 
agents 
 
In Delaware in 1988 in Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp14 it was ruled that 
“[t]he shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon which the 
legitimacy of directorial power rests”.  Yet directors’ undelegated powers are 
handed to them through the incorporation documents that precede any offering 
of shares to the public (Lan and Heracleous, 2010).  These “sui generis” (unique 
in its characteristics) powers defy the principal-agent view of the firm and allow 
directors to control all aspects of the firm’s activity including the decision to return 
any capital (dividends) at all to shareholders (Blair and Stout, 2008).  Business 
strategy, executive appointments (including fees and salaries), preparation of the 
accounts, the declaration and distribution of dividends and deployment of 
corporate assets and earnings to stakeholders (creditors, employees, the local 
community, philanthropic causes) are made by directors with no legal 
requirement to consult the shareholder (Greenwood and Van Buren, 2010; 
Anabtawi and Stout, 2008; Bebchuk, 2007).  As long as directors refrain from 
abuses of power the business judgment rule legally protects their decisions from 
shareholder challenge (Blair and Stout, 2006).  As directors receive their powers 
from the law on incorporation and not from shareholders as agency implies; they 
cannot waive the duty to act in the best interests of the firm, even if the 
shareholder wishes it (Lan and Heracleous, 2010).  Also, under the law of agency, 
an agent owes the principal a duty of obedience yet directors are not required to 
                                            
14
 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988) in Karmel 2010, footnote 5. 
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follow shareholder mandates (Blair and Stout, 2006).  Directors’ legal powers and 
responsibilities more closely resemble those of trustees (Ryan et al., 2010; Blair 
and Stout, 2006).  Whereas honesty and transparency are moral duties in 
contracting, where it is assumed that parties meet as equals, trustees have 
enhanced duties by virtue of their dominant position (Blair and Stout, 2006). 
 
This dominant position has encumbered directors’ power with a strong statutory 
set of fiduciary duties.  It marries a duty of loyalty and of care, adjudicated by the 
exclusive benefit rule prohibiting the fiduciary owner from acting in their own 
interests (Dunning, 2012; Anabtawi and Stout, 2008).  Information asymmetry 
and power to control the firm’s assets hand directors an advantageous position, 
and thereby a duty to take special care of the beneficiary’s interests (Dunning, 
2012; Graafland and van de Ven, 2011; Lan and Heracleous, 2010).  They must 
review management decision making and ensure it is in the best interests of the 
firm (Section 172 of the UK Companies Act 2006 in Lan and Heracleous, 2010).  
A duty to the firm that is not required of the shareholder (Becker and Stromberg, 
2012; Anabtawi and Stout, 2008). 
 
The direction of this duty is to “the firm and its shareholders” and this conflicting 
recipient of the duty (shareholder or firm), provides the tension in governance 
research in corporate law (Ryan et al., 2010).  When taken together, the directors 
and officers seem more legally designed to be trustees of the juristic person of 
the firm than the agents of shareholders. 
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2.4.2.2.3  Shareholders’ powers and duties do not resemble those 
of principals 
 
If the corporation is akin to a “representative democracy” then shareholders would 
install directors and direct corporate decisions to serve their interests (Bebchuk, 
2005).  Yet much corporate law acts to limit shareholder power over corporate 
governance and corporate decision-making (Bainbridge, 2006).  Blair and Stout 
(2006) view shares as being vested with such limited legal rights that 
shareholders of public corporations have too little control to be considered owners 
and no power to direct their agents to be considered principals.  A principal can 
direct and easily remove an agent (Bebchuk, 2005; Greenwood, 1996).  
Bebchuck and Weisbach’s (2010) investigation of litigation brought by 
shareholders firmly supports the courts’ reluctance to undermine directors’ and 
officers’ powers unless the plaintiff can show negligence or abuse.  An 
enforceable duty to maximise value for shareholders is very rarely imposed on 
directors and the majority of the legal cases to protect finance have been brought 
on behalf of banks or other creditors and not shareholders (Stout, 2007).  In fact 
shareholders have very little opportunity to influence the firm even in major 
decisions such as winding up, key asset sales, or scaling down (Bebchuk, 2005).  
Laws addressing shareholder voting power remain weak (Bebchuck, 2007).  
Greenwood and Van Buren (2010) reference the ability to vote on the directors 
recommended, but not to nominate them or vote on most other activity.  
Shareholders have a private property interest over their own shares, and the 
decision to buy and sell, conversely they have no private property rights over the 
corporate assets (Karmel, 2004).  Nor are they able to use or direct the use of 
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these assets, a fundamental tenet of the private property rights of the principal 
(Freeman et al., 2004; Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Boatright, 1994).  
Shareholders’ liability is limited to their share ownership, contrasting with 
directors’ unlimited liability (Stout, 2007), they are unable to withdraw their own 
capital directly and their creditors cannot access the assets of the firm.  
Ultimately, as residual claimants to the firm, they cannot dictate dividend policy 
to ensure a return on their assets, if their assets were indeed the corporate assets 
(Lan and Heracleous, 2010; Blair and Stout, 2006).  These statutory positions 
depart from the economic agency theory of a principal, as does the view of 
agency law. 
 
Shareholders are also too unstable to be considered principals, changing identity 
daily as shares change hands.  This Bratton and Wachter (2013) say requires 
taking a fictional view of the shareholder, not an individual desiring specific 
behaviour from the firm they “own”, but a stylised and homogenised concept-
being, immortal and impatient, desiring only value maximisation.  La Porta et al. 
(2000) argued the legal view of the directors as trustees for the corporate 
personage is a more productive way of understanding corporate governance than 
the market systems view.  Trustees of the corporate person hold the mechanisms 
to both model and enforce governance; the marriage of a prescriptive and 
predictive theory.  They are also able to consider the humanistic view of firm 
behaviour, those of power, morality and obligation (Fisch, 2006; Greenwood, 
1996), removing the influence of the anonymous, avaricious shareholder. 
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Stout (2003a) believes this view will actually benefit shareholders as firms attract 
more long-term sunk cost investment.  The duty of obedience vested in legal 
agency is one of “unthinking faithfulness to a person, group or purpose, requiring 
the bearer to supress their own preferences, values and perspectives” (Fisher 
and Lovell, 2009; p295).  Sandbu (2012; p99) says of any legal agency obligation; 
“representing someone, in the morally relevant sense, will entail tending to the 
moral responsibilities of those one represents”; both views contradicting the 
economic agency view of management’s self-interest being suppressed through 
monitoring and incentives available to anonymous principals. 
 
2.4.3  Managers as trustees replacing managers as agents?  The 
evolution of fiduciary duties 
 
The literature on the object of managements’ fiduciary duties is reasonably 
consistent in acknowledging a duty owed to shareholders (see Anabtawi and 
Stout, 2008; Fisch, 2006; Gillan, 2006; Karmel, 2004; Armour et al., 2003; 
Hendry, 2001; Bratton, 1994).  Indeed, Coelho et al. (2002; p2) address “the 
fiduciary duty to firms’ owners is the bedrock of capitalism and capitalism will 
wither without it.” In their policy guide “Capitalism without owners will fail,” Monks 
and Sykes (2002; p1) wholeheartedly agree.  However, a growing body of work 
see these duties aimed at the firm, rather than the shareholder (see Atherton et 
al. (2011) for duties to the firm, Boatright (1994) for duties to the corporate assets, 
La Porta et al. (2000) to shareholders and creditors, or Greenwood (1996) to 
broader firm community wellbeing goals).  However, according to Anabtawi and 
Stout (2008) and Marens and Wicks (1999) the real world impact of the direction 
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of these duties has received little attention.  Instead they have meandered from 
common law, not as an elegant set of well-defined principles, but through the 
incremental adoption of vague doctrines then “selectively applied toward solving 
practical business problems or settling a variety of disputes” (Marens and Wicks, 
1999; p274), a path dependence that Ramirez (2007) described as dysfunctional 
and Reich-Graefe (2011a) agrees, providing no “modicum of predictive ability 
regarding director behaviour”.  Atherton et al. (2011) believe this is because the 
duties have lost their way from the strong ethical and religious origins directed at 
man’s behaviour in society in the race to adopt an egoist corporate governance 
view of the conniving agent and vulnerable principal. 
 
2.4.3.1  Why the direction of corporate fiduciary duties is 
important to the study of pension governance 
 
Corporate governance theory tells us that the corporate structure (external 
shareholders) and governance compliance regime of the firm will dictate the 
execution of their own fiduciary duties.  Fund management firms in the UK 
pension market exist in numerous geographies as publicly traded companies, 
wholly owned subsidiaries of publicly traded companies, employee-owned 
companies or limited liability partnerships, each with their different levels of 
‘owner’ separation.  Under the current legal regime governing pensions, despite 
strong moral obligations to members, pension trustees are unable to pass these 
duties to this agent with a potentially conflicting fiduciary objective. 
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If the shareholder were replaced by the firm as the trustee oriented object of 
corporate governance, strengthened fiduciary duties may provide the 
underpinning values business ethics scholarship is searching for in the corporate 
governance problem.  Trust law strongly dictates that one should not harm the 
beneficiary, even if it pays to do so, implying conceivably that management’s duty 
to the firm would be to the long-term protection of its all stakeholders (Atherton et 
al., 2011; Graafland and van de Ven, 2011).  From an empirical perspective self-
esteem, professionalism, corporate prestige and general desire to act honestly 
are notions incorporated in the monitored and legally enforceable discharge of 
vested fiduciary duties, and need not be motivated by incentive based 
remuneration (Key, 1999; Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Jones, 1995; 
Donaldson and Davis, 1991).  Indeed, Becht et al. (2011) observe that banks with 
lower levels of variable remuneration incurred fewer losses in the 2007 financial 
crisis.  The same phenomenon has not been observed in pension fund 
management literature.  From a theory perspective, Freeman (1994) believes 
managers and directors have fiduciary responsibility to numerous stakeholders, 
and that it is not optional, it is a moral obligation.  Lan and Heracleous (2010) 
argue that the law has provided not only the normative framework for the 
development of stewardship theories, it also has the instrumental power to 
sanction.  Twenty years ago Hartman (1993) called for the problem of the 
beneficiary of the fiduciary duty to be put to rest, branding both statutory and case 
law inadequate for protecting against directors’ inappropriate favouritism of 
shareholders.  However, as of today, both economics and the law concur that 
shareholders are owners of firms and beneficiaries of fiduciary duties (Anabtawi 
and Stout, 2008).  Perhaps most importantly this opinion was developed with 
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shareholders cast as citizens; homogenous and rationally apathetic individuals 
vulnerable to management abuse, an assumption Greenwood (1996) believes 
we can no longer hold.  In the fund management industry specifically, the legal 
and moral protection of the shareholders of funds managers leaves pension 
scheme members vulnerable to shareholder abuse.  When tracing the origin of 
pension funds, alongside with the corporate governance argument for protecting 
the suppliers of finance being the powerful institutional investor, it is the more 
defenceless principal which the ethical business should be protecting in Crespi’s 
(2003) battle to return the fiduciary concept to the achieving of desirable social 
objectives. 
 
 
2.5  Conclusion 
 
A social science theory should deliver scholars and practitioners a model for 
viewing their problem both prescriptively and predictively.  The path dependent 
development of firm theory has left contemporary Anglo-American governance 
scholars in broad agreement that the economic agency view of the firm, 
conceiving the shareholder as owner, has come to prevalence.  Whether this is 
a satisfying state for research is certainly not agreed and a myriad of historical 
and empirical anomalies are frequently documented.  Letza et al. (2004; p243) 
believe the current view of corporate governance is “over-abstracted and over-
static” and constructed on centuries-old social contexts bearing no relevance to 
the present day.  This history of protecting investors from management 
misappropriation left no room for reciprocal duties, and assumes they are not 
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motivated or powerful enough to conduct the same self-interested rent seeking 
attributed to management.  It also accords management no duties of morality or 
obligation, only assuming that they must be bought.  This chapter introduces the 
lens by which the tension between the fiduciary duties of fund managers can be 
viewed.  Many scholars deconstructed bank governance in the wake of the 
financial crisis (see Chapter 3) and found it to be different to that of other 
corporations.  Banks, like all financial intermediaries, manage supplies of finance 
as their corporate objective.  The finance industry is firmly rooted in the disciplines 
of economics, finance and accounting in a way that traditional industries are not.  
The economics of return on finance is the core business model (as opposed to 
return on production in traditional industry).  Interestingly, pension fund managers 
escaped the post-financial crisis academic scrutiny the banks endured.  Yet 
billions of uninsured pounds were wiped from the savings accounts of the UK’s 
pension members while the industry specific fee structure was retained.  Fund 
managers have not yet been found to owe special duties to pension clients 
(O’Brien, 2004).  This scenario, Ingley and van der Walt (2004; p540) point out, 
“is structural… and has less to do with law enforcement and more to do with the 
way companies are owned and run”.  The Kay Review (2012) found that the 
implications for the investment industry are profound, criticising the 
disproportionate rewards extracted from exploited pension funds for 
intermediation of the trillions of pounds in employee savings.  Monks (2002a; 
p116) observed the unusual fiduciary conflict of fund managers; “[w]hen 
fiduciaries have relationships such that ‘exclusive benefit’ is literally impossible, 
attention focuses on the conflict of interest between the fiduciaries and the plan 
beneficiaries.  Where they face potentially conflicting interests, the fiduciary may 
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need to step aside, at least temporarily, from the management of the assets.”  
Aglietta (2000; p146) concludes this has created a systemic “financial fragility 
which questions the hypothetical advantage of private pension funds.”  This 
chapter lays the background foundations for an empirical examination of the 
governance structures of fund managers to determine whether their corporate 
governance supports the maxims of the shareholder wealth maximisation model 
as ownership becomes separated from management.  If not, the study joins a 
growing body of research that explores and rejects the dominant shareholder 
theory and seeks to present a contribution to theory more representative of the 
real world grounded in the law of corporate agency, rather than the economics of 
agency.  If the theory is empirically supported, this fiduciary inquiry becomes 
whether society can tolerate a universal pension provision system governed for 
the benefit of a small, privileged group of fund manager shareholder principals. 
 
In an empirical examination of an agent with two principals, the chapter 
introduces ambiguity over whether one principal can even be conceived as such.  
This has important implications for the examination of pension governance.  
Chapter 3 presents an explanation of this second principal and the evolution of 
the fiduciary in finance ethics that supports their claim to a fiduciary duty from the 
fund managers as trustees of the firms that manage their assets. 
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Chapter 3 
Literature review:  The governance of 
pension funds management 
 
If you would understand anything, observe its beginning and its 
development ~ Aristotle, C4th BCE 
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3.1  Introduction 
 
The objective of this chapter is to establish the literature regarding the fiduciary 
management of pension assets in the UK.  The previous chapter explored the 
importance of Anglo-American corporate governance to the development of the 
stakeholder orientation of firms.  However, the recent finance industry 
development of the rise to power of financial intermediary institutions has been 
largely overlooked by contemporary corporate governance theorists (Aglietta and 
Reberioux, 2005).  These intermediaries are increasingly significant to the 
economy.  Financial services profits as a percentage of total corporate profits in 
the US were 10% in the early 1980s and had reached 40% in the mid-2000s 
(Crotty, 2009).  In 1980 Eugene Fama (1980) articulated their economic role (at 
the time mainly banks and insurance companies) as passive portfolio holders in 
frictionless competitive markets, with no institutional governance effects 
acknowledged.  Simultaneously and conversely, Clark (1981; p561) declared the 
third stage of capitalism; “the age of financial intermediaries has entered its 
golden period.”  He believed any clear, long-term pattern of change in the 
institutional arrangements for channelling capital had not been identified and 
interpreted; “One of the[ir] most intriguing features…is simply that they exist, and 
are begging to be placed in their historical context”.  By 1985 Fama’s (1985) 
interpretation had evolved with the assumption that information distortions in 
intermediation had important theoretical consequences.  This chapter describes 
pension asset management in general and financial intermediaries managing 
pension funds specifically to examine how it has disengaged from the 
assumptions of traditional finance theory and the theory of financial 
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intermediation.  These economic theories view capital as a veil, channelled 
distortion-free between parties in the real economy for production and 
consumption (Boatright, 2009).  It took the arrival of information economics to 
recognise that it is not money that matters in the financial intermediation, but the 
institutional behaviour of the parties that collect and provide that money (Van 
Liedekerke, 2013).  Finance ethics have concentrated on the consequences of 
wrong-doing (for instance insider trading, short selling or options revaluing: see 
Boatright, 2011; Boatright, 2000), limiting themselves to the level of individual 
morality and leaving institutional behaviour analysis to economists (Van 
Liedekerke, 2013).  The chapter examines the literature of financial 
intermediaries, pension management, finance ethics and fiduciary duties to 
explore whether financial intermediaries fulfilling their legal corporate governance 
obligations may contravene an expected fiduciary duty to pension savings. 
 
Financial intermediation theory assumes investors invest in the market directly, 
incurring a market-induced transaction cost for channelling pooled savings 
through the banking industry as borrowing and lending, or through the stock and 
commodities markets as investment in stocks (Zhao, 2013).  Corporate 
governance scholarship (Chapter 2) examines the fiduciary problem of 
shareholders protecting their private property from management abuse.  The 
underlying corporate governance objective - that the institutions entrusted with 
your money can be trusted to act in your interests - has overlooked the 
intermediary placing this money for a fee.  Allen (2001; p1166) argues “how can 
it be that when you give your money to a financial institution there is no agency 
problem, but when you give it to a firm there is?”  He concludes that both 
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corporate governance theory and financial intermediation theory have left a gap, 
the assumption that a publicly listed financial intermediary corporation has no 
agency problem.  Caprio and Levine (2002) register surprise that financial 
intermediaries have received such little corporate governance attention given 
their central role in capital allocation for economic functionality.  Corporate social 
responsibility scholarship - what responsibilities corporations owe to whom - has 
largely ignored the finance industry for almost 100 years (Wells, 2003).  Pensions 
academic Robert Monks (2002b; p119) observed, “the richest people do not run 
companies; the richest people run companies that manage investments”, 
demanding we question the value added by pension fund intermediation for the 
exorbitant cost.  While Harris and Souder (2004) and Lewis et al. (2010) suggest 
the root cause of financial scandals can be traced back to capital market norms 
of self-enrichment, the thesis takes a structural view.  Goulet (2002) derides such 
an objective as looking for just outcomes in an economic system that is 
structurally unjust.  However, the previous chapter’s exploration of the 
governance duties corporations owe shareholders concluded that in the Anglo-
American view of a firm, including a financial intermediary firm, fiduciary duties 
are owed to shareholders.  This chapter now challenges these duties by 
investigating the normative duties owed by intermediary corporations to the 
pension funds they manage.  It concludes that there is a conceptual conflict of 
interest for an agent balancing conflicting fiduciary claims. 
 
The first section of the chapter explains these changes in the finance industry 
and their consequences in changing structure of the cost of intermediation.  The 
second section outlines finance theory’s assumptions, still grounded in the 
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finance industry of the 1950s, and examines whether they are being violated by 
the cost model of the new intermediaries.  The final section describes the 
development of the fiduciary concept in finance, and how it may differ from the 
corporate governance codes of practice, or whether it even arises. 
 
 
3.2  The governance framework of occupational pension provision:  
The principal’s problem 
 
Clark (2004) sees the proper functioning of occupational pension schemes as 
vital to Anglo-American workforces, given the modest value of current state 
pensions.  Governments have come to rely on individuals making provision for 
their own retirement income requirements.  This places great reliance on the 
“competence and consistency” of financial decision making in the schemes their 
constituents belong to (Clark et al., 2007).  The government provides the 
framework in which these decisions occur.  Barr (2006) describes that in 2005, in 
response to the Myner Report15, the Pension Protection Fund was established 
(analogous to the Deposit Insurance required by retail banks), charging pension 
schemes a portfolio risk rated premium.  Schemes were forced to de-risk their 
portfolios or incur deficit-inducing protection premiums (Barr, 2006).  Within the 
legislative framework sit “nineteenth-century antecedents”, the individual pension 
trusts, where trustees have wide-ranging fiduciary powers consistent with English 
common law to establish “a robust, process-oriented decision-making framework 
                                            
15
 Described in Section 3.2.6.1 
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including administrative and oversight functions as well as due regard to the 
investment of pension fund assets” (Clark, 2004; p233).  Unlike most financial 
services providers, the historical trust origins of pension schemes hand specific 
fiduciary duties to trustees in their protection of beneficiaries (Clark, 2004).  When 
examining whether the industry structure supports trustee oversight, studies must 
consider the legal requirements of different pension scheme types that change 
the nature of the trust’s risk and decision-making framework. 
 
3.2.1  Description of the scheme types 
 
The oldest and most common pension scheme type is one that precisely defines 
the benefit a contributing member will receive on retirement or early death.  This 
defined benefit is independent of the member’s total contribution, or the 
investment performance of the fund’s assets.  Population aging combined with 
shorter average employment periods and ongoing poor performance in equity 
markets have put many of these schemes into deficit (Kutsch and Lizieri, 2005).  
Pension sponsors began to shut them down in favour of schemes defined only 
by the contribution a member makes in total.  While Petraki (2012) describes the 
difference as deceptively subtle, the consequences for trustee duties and the 
resulting financial benefit to members are demonstrably different. 
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3.2.1.1  Defined benefit schemes 
 
The definition of the Pensions Regulator of a Defined Benefit scheme (DB) is “a 
scheme in which the benefits are defined in the scheme rules and accrue 
independently of member contributions payable and investment returns.  Most 
commonly, the benefits are related to members' earnings when leaving the 
scheme or retiring, and the length of pensionable service.”16 (Also known as 'final 
salary' or 'salary-related' schemes).  This is the scheme most studied as it creates 
the most complexities for trustees and has a long performance data record 
(Petraki, 2012).  Its operation is akin to the insurance industry, where actuaries 
monitor the scheme’s liabilities, members are assured of the benefit they will 
receive, and trustees have separate control over the corresponding asset to 
manage as they deem appropriate provided they can honour the scheme’s 
liabilities (Kutsch and Lizieri, 2003). 
 
The DB commits to an employee’s lifetime annuity on retirement, financed 
through co-payments by the employee and the employer (the plan’s sponsor).  By 
law, the sponsor must maintain sufficient assets in the fund to cover all accrued 
vested benefits, even where the sponsor is insolvent (Blake, 2003).  The trustees 
handle a duty of matching the net present value of future benefits owing against 
the expected financial returns from the invested assets.  Matching shortfalls can 
be remedied by: 1) closing the fund to new members, although this means any 
gap remaining must be honoured by the sponsor (Mitchell et al., 2008); 2) 
                                            
16
 http://www.thepensionsregulator.gov.uk/Glossary.aspx 
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decreasing benefits entitlements, such as the public service migration to average 
rather than final salary benefits (Kutsch and Lizieri, 2005); 3) demanding the 
sponsor contribute a lump sum to the shortfall, although this is politically difficult 
for trustees given their employment relationship with the sponsor (Hess and 
Impavido, 2003); so 4) seek premium performance from the assets under 
management (Barr, 2006). 
 
3.2.1.2  Defined contribution schemes 
 
The definition of a defined contribution scheme is provided by the Pension 
Regulator as “a scheme in which a member's benefits are determined by the 
value of the pension fund at retirement.  The fund, in turn, is determined by the 
contributions paid into it in respect of that member, and any investment returns.”17  
(Also known as 'money purchase' scheme).  Its operation is akin to the banking, 
where members deposit savings and receive these back plus any return (loss) on 
investment achieved (deducted) by the trust. 
 
There are two important features of this scheme given that both the government 
and the employer have devolved the risk of securing retirement down to the level 
of individual.  Firstly, the contributing individuals are rarely investment 
professionals, and so rely on the investment decision-making of the trust 
(Rosada, 2013).  Secondly the linear relationship with salary does little to redress 
the poverty concerns that the lowest paid are the least able to afford retirement, 
                                            
17
 http://www.thepensionsregulator.gov.uk/Glossary.aspx 
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and the DC pension provides no insurance against contributions lost from 
investment losses (Barr, 2006).  According to Petraki (2012; p6) “since this shift 
from DB to DC is relatively recent there is still very little evidence whether DC 
pension funds are up to the challenge.  First reports coming from the US indicate 
that this is not the case.  Many DC plans are found to be rather inadequate to 
replace income at retirement.  In view of the widespread change toward DC 
pensions this is disquieting particularly as there are very few studies on DC funds’ 
performance.”  The duties of the trustees under a DC scheme shift from asset - 
liability matching to a duty of hyper-vigilance in investing and efficiency in 
administrating the fund giving the contributors the best chance of maximising their 
returns (Ryan and Dennis, 2003). 
 
3.2.1.3  Hybrid and other schemes 
 
Many large scheme sponsors operate a hybrid of DB and DC plans as they 
transition away from self-borne financial risk, or operate different plans for 
different sections of the workforce (Kutsch and Lizieri, 2005).  There are also 
schemes designed by the regulators to be less burdensome on small employees 
such as stakeholder plans18 and Group Personal Pension Plans (GPPP)19.  The 
onus is entirely on the member to assess whether the cost and suitability of the 
plan meets their needs and the employer is not obligated with a duty of care to 
protect the member (Barr, 2006). 
                                            
18
 http://www.thepensionsregulator.gov.uk/employers/about-stakeholder-pensions.aspx 
19
 http://uk.practicallaw.com/7-107-6670?service=pensions 
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3.2.2  Implications of risk shifting towards the individual 
 
Finance theory revolves around the analysis of the relationship between financial 
risk and reward.  It makes the assumption that parties have perfect information 
about the financial risk they are assuming and that the anticipated reward 
adequately compensates this burden (Allen and Santomero, 2001).  In the case 
of pension schemes it can also be inter-generational, as current contributing 
members bear the future risk that their benefit will default, not borne by current 
benefit recipients (Cui et al., 2009).  As neo-classical economic thinking drove 
the global shift towards pension privatisation (Dixon and Hyde, 2003), what is 
critical to understand from a finance theory perspective is who bears downside 
risk and are they aware of their consequential exposure, or as Barr (2006; p8) 
interprets, “encouraging risk to where it is best managed.”  Between 1948 to the 
early 1980s the risk of a pension shortfall lay with the public purse (Clark and 
Urwin, 2007).  As pension management devolved to occupational schemes, the 
sponsor shouldered the risk of shortfall.  Occupational trusts do not benefit from 
limited liability, and so the risk of shortfall to the sponsor cannot be externalised 
or transferred to the public through bankruptcy protection (Joly, 2010).  To avoid 
a shortfall in a DB scheme (as all costs, including investment losses and 
administrative costs are absorbed) the sponsor must ensure that the pension 
scheme is expertly governed as the promised benefit to the member is 
contractual (Clark, 2004).  Indeed, there is a strong correlation between pension 
governance and fund performance (Ambachtsheer et al., 2007).  The other 
means the sponsor has available to avoid a shortfall is to shift the financial risk to 
members by switching to a DC scheme, the frequency of which is increasing 
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(Clark, 2004).  Here the financially unsophisticated and resource constrained 
member bears the risk in a scheme whose governance and trustee duties rely on 
the sponsor to procure contracts for financial asset management where the return 
on investment performance is not underwritten by them, only the cost of 
administrative provision (Clark, 2004).  A further devolution of financial risk to the 
individual is through the rise of individual accounts (GPPP or stakeholder plans).  
These plans are commercially operated by for-profit corporations and they charge 
the highest administration fees of the scheme options presented (Barr, 2006). 
 
Risk management is at the heart of finance theory and yet the reality of who bears 
the risk, who receives the return on investment, and how equitable that 
distribution is receives no attention from the theory (Kolb, 2011).  The average 
administration fee for a UK scheme is 1% of contributions, or an average of 20% 
of contributions over a typical contributions lifetime (Barr, 2006).  This 
administration fee on gross contributions is additional to the cost borne by 
members for intermediating the scheme’s assets.  Where the member has peace 
of mind that their benefit is defined, this may represent a justifiable price for the 
security that the sponsor bears the financial responsibility for ensuring the benefit.  
Within the context of risk shifting in pension management, the chapter examines 
the fiduciary responsibilities (if any) the intermediaries contracted by UK pension 
schemes has to manage their assets to maintain the integrity of the risk/reward 
relationship for the asset owners. 
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3.3  The relationship between risk and reward in capital markets 
 
This Section describes the theory of the financial system to contextualise how 
pension asset management should operate if either finance theory or agency 
theory is to be prescriptive and predictive.  This requires an understanding of the 
historical developments in theoretical assumptions that have shaped the nature 
and role of markets in today’s society (Ardalan, 2007).  The financial system has 
three functions: 1) a payment system for the exchange of goods and services as 
the coordinating pricing mechanism; 2) a mechanism for pooling funds to 
undertake large-scale investment; and 3) a transfer mechanism for economic 
resources to move through time, by managing risk and uncertainty (Merton, 1995; 
Black and Coffee, 1994).  Economic theory perceives rational, perfectly informed 
and risk-averse investors place their own savings into financial assets available 
for sale in frictionless markets (Ardalan, 2007).  Illustrated by Boatright (2000), a 
glut of grain at harvest will depress prices for the farmer; a shortage will raise 
them for the miller.  Instead of waiting until the harvest and exchanging at the 
market price they might agree a price in a contract that solves two problems; 
creating long term financial relationships and managing a lack of knowledge 
about the future where the agreement allows both parties to satisfy their utility.  
The relationship between the required return and the risk each party is prepared 
to take on in the attempt to achieve satisfaction encapsulates the study of finance 
(Allen, 2001). 
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3.3.1  The function of the financial system 
 
Academic research in finance begins with the efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 
1991; Fama, 1970).  According to Fama (1970; p383) “The primary role of the 
capital market is allocation of ownership of the economy's capital stock. In 
general terms, the ideal is a market in which prices provide accurate signals for 
resource allocation: that is, a market in which firms can make production-
investment decisions, and investors can choose among the securities that 
represent ownership of firms' activities under the assumption that security prices 
at any time "fully reflect" all available information.”  Fama (1991) reiterated this 
view, individuals conduct financial transactions as rational economic agents in 
unfettered markets with the assumption that no interests conflict.  Each individual 
is legitimately pursuing self-interest and no one party has any obligation to serve 
the interests of another (Boatright, 2000).  The individual goal of each transaction 
is an inter-temporal or substitution transfer of consumption (Benston and Smith 
Jr, 1976).  The financial system is thereby the continuous aggregated series of 
discrete, costless exchanges between coequal counterparties that can be revised 
as better opportunities arrive (Clark, 2004).  Parties trade financial instruments 
(currency, stocks and bonds, futures, derivatives, etc) in accordance with their 
individual appetites for the risk of achieving a desired future return on investment 
(Zhao, 2013).  The result of these counterparty negotiations, when all buyers and 
sellers reach agreement, is the price of the instrument at which market clears of 
buying and selling opportunities (Heath, 2006).  The hypothesis asserts that the 
speed at which the price is reached indicates the liquidity of the instrument, its 
readiness to be traded as evidence of the market’s efficiency (Boatright, 2000). 
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There is considerable debate about the empirical and logical plausibility of this 
model (Clark, 2004).  Many scholars challenge the conventional assumption of 
the omniscient, rational economic actor (from psychology (Thaler, 1985), 
corporate law (Stout, 2003a) or information economics (Spithoven, 2005)), 
suggesting that people act inconsistently with the economic assumption of utility 
maximisation.  Parties should not buy or sell when they cannot ascertain that the 
characteristics of the good bears collinearity with the price, and finance theory 
assumes perfect information (Spithoven, 2005).  This raises two questions for 
utility maximisation theory and the function of the financial services industry: 1) 
are markets actually efficient in allocating financial resources in the presence of 
imperfect information?; if so 2) why do financial intermediaries exist, imposing 
transactions costs to either buyer or seller that belies the efficiency hypothesis as 
a cost neither would agree to bear? 
 
3.3.1.1  Why financial intermediaries exist in theory 
 
The only way that financial intermediaries can exist in a perfectly efficient 
economy is if they catalyse efficient distributions.  If every party in the market is 
rationally utility maximising and perfectly informed, the transaction costs imposed 
by the financial middleman decrease efficiency and violate the concept of the 
markets as purely channels (Altman, 2000).  The theory of financial 
intermediation assumes intermediaries are information aggregators in a market 
afflicted with information imperfections (Chan, 1983).  By relaxing the perfect 
information assumption, financial intermediaries may have evolved to induce 
efficient allocations, stewarding buyer and seller both to a higher welfare state.  It 
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is a premise that can retain validity only if both the buyer and the seller believe 
their utility has been maximised at the lowest marginal cost of intermediation. 
 
Given financial institutions are some of the largest corporations in the world, it is 
curious that they have been assumed away as a channel with no effect on real 
economy transactions (Allen, 2001).  At a macroeconomic level finance theory 
has traditionally concentrated on the role of money in facilitating production and 
consumption patterns in the real economy, with the finance sector simply 
providing a platform for exchange (Liedekerke, 2013).  Until relatively recently 
economists neglected to acknowledge the institutions of the financial system or 
credit them with any influence over behaviour in the finance industry (Liedekerke, 
2013; Levine, 2005).  It was not until the mid-1970s that an important new theory 
of the problem of agency caused information economics to begin to recognise 
the flaw in the premise that markets generated perfect information (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976).  In 1976 Benston and Smith Jr. (1976; p215) observed that “a 
proper framework has yet to be developed for the analysis of financial 
intermediation.  The traditional macroeconomic analysis views financial 
intermediaries as passive conduits through which monetary policy is effected.  
Even when a more micro view is taken the analyses are often restricted to 
studying the effect on the rate of change and allocation of money and credit of 
required and desired reserve ratios, ceiling rates imposed on loans and deposits, 
etc.” They further observed that the popularly deployed Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM), approximately 20 years old at this stage, modelled the portfolio 
of riskless and risky assets best able to achieve the utility maximising 
consumption desires of the consumer, yet incorporated no transactions costs in 
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establishing the portfolio (mainly developed by the ground-breaking work of 
Treynor (1961) and Sharpe (1964)).  It was not until 1985 that Eugene Fama cast 
banks as financial intermediaries with solutions to information distortions that had 
become a real instrument with real economy consequences that the CAPM could 
not capture (Fama, 1985). 
 
Theorists quickly began drawing conclusions that intermediaries developed as 
facilitators of financial exchange, solving the structural asymmetric information 
problems between the market and the investor.  The role of the financial 
intermediary was one of information aggregation and exchange facilitation 
(market making) and the efficiency of this value-adding transaction cost could be 
described as a solution to an agency problem (Pacces, 2000).  Contracting 
parties never necessarily met in person and the complexity of financial 
transactions was escalating to the extent that a third party mediator was required 
(Boatright, 2000).  Liedekerke (2013) defines this as the cost of channelling funds 
from ultimate savers into the hand of good borrowers, including screening, 
monitoring and accounting.  Since financial intermediaries are also firms, and the 
accuracy and efficiency of their services are opaque, they should be analysed 
with the microeconomic tools that have been employed to analyse other 
industries, to determine the optimal institutional design (Stewart, 1990; Benston 
and Smith Jr, 1976).  It is not the study of money that is important, but the parties 
who collect and provide money, and their conduct that has decisive 
consequences for the real economy, as the 2007 financial crisis painfully 
demonstrated (Liedekerke, 2013). 
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3.3.2  The financial services industry development over time: The 
uncoupling of risk and reward 
 
At the most basic level the financial system is the function of allocation of 
economic resources between surplus funds (savers) and deficit funds 
(borrowers) (Allen and Santomero, 2001).  Its conceptualisation has changed 
over time, and with increasing rapidity, that many scholars believe theory and 
reality are parting ways (Spithoven, 2005; Clark and Wojcik, 2003; Clark, 1981).  
As the evolution of the firm was discussed in Chapter 2, with its consequences 
for corporate governance theory, Clark (1981) similarly charted four stages 
(generations) of capitalism that have shaped the function of the finance industry.  
The first was the pre-Berle and Means bourgeois capitalist (promoter-investor-
manager, or “robber baron”) characterised by a low liquidity banking-led finance 
industry.  The second generation was shaped by the work of Berle and Means 
(1932) where public investors enter the finance industry via the fledgling stock 
markets.  The third stage of capitalism saw a new market entrant, the institutional 
investor.  While the second stage of capitalism separated corporate ownership 
and control, the third stage of capitalism split the ownership function between 
those who supply the capital and those that invest the capital.  It was during this 
stage that the theory of investing developed, including Modern Portfolio Theory 
(Hogan, 1994).  This was the professionalisation of the investment function, 
characterised by the shift of all financial claims (stocks, bonds and other 
instruments) from household level to institutional level (illustrated in Figure 3.1).  
When Clark (1981; p565) was writing in 1981 he was predicting the fourth post 
World War II stage, describing it as “already discernible in its infancy”, and 
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labelling it the “professionalization of the savings-decision function”, made up of 
group health and life insurance policies and the rapid growth of employee pension 
plans. 
 
Figure 3.1. The agency structure of the financial services industry 
Supplier  Intermediary  User 
 Institutional 
investor 
   
     
  Pure intermediary   
Individual 
investor 
 Broker  Corporation 
Government 
  Investment bank   
  
 
  
  
Commercial Bank 
  
Principal Agent    
Source: Palazzo and Rethel, 2008 
 
This mirrors the four stages of development of the firm from Chapter 2.  The 
following Section describes the fourth stage development of the markets; the rise 
of the institutional investor in pension funds management. 
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3.3.2.1  Post-deregulation financial services industry:  The boon 
to the financial services industry of social security savings 
 
In October 1986 the Thatcher government deregulated the finance industry in the 
UK (Davies et al., 2010).  It heralded several important changes in the City of 
London; the modern retail bank, the merging of brokers and market makers and 
the new financial products of aggregated intermediaries’ services that has given 
rise to the descriptor “financial capitalism”20.  Britain's regime change brought an 
influx of US firms who challenged the old City cliques.  With them came deep-
seated conflicts of interest in financial management introducing "the idea that, 
instead of being client-based, it was a transaction-based business.  You change 
from long-termism to short-termism, from looking after the long-term interests of 
your client to making the biggest buck out of today's deal."21  Steward and 
Goodley (2011) believe that the growing economic dominance of finance, 
accelerated by deregulation, helped to bring about profound changes in the UK's 
economy as responsible for creating an “out-of-kilter” economic model as the 
finance economy rose quickly to dwarf the manufacturing-led real economy.   
 
In order to manage the rapid evolution in global pools of wealth, the financial 
services industry created a new intermediary, the fund manager (Walter, 2009) 
(alternatively asset manager (Clark and Urwin, 2007) or investment manager 
(Strieter and Singh, 2005)).  Acknowledging the social and political importance of 
                                            
20
 Aglietta and Reberious (2005) see this term describing financial product development designed 
to maximise the shareholder value of the issuing financial intermediary. 
21
 Tony Greenham, Founder of the New Economics Think Tank, quoted in Stewart and Goodley 
(2011; p2) 
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safeguarding the funds these institutions manage, the institutions entrusted with 
them should be conceived of as providing social services to the originating 
members that is not risky profit maximisation, but lowest cost “or maximum 
benefit for a specific cost” portfolio management (Handley-Schachler et al., 2007; 
p625).  Given the fund manager’s task is risk free - the application of expertise to 
selecting a portfolio of assets that provides an appropriate return on investment 
relative to market conditions - its cost and value creation is of critical significance 
to the pension trustees in discharging fiduciary duties (Holland and Johanson, 
2003).  Harris and Souder (2004) see efficiency as the fundamental value 
proposition of these new intermediaries.  The theory of financial intermediation 
would imply any loss of efficiency through the addition of a further intermediary 
should be minimised through substitution seeking in frictionless markets.  Indeed, 
Streiter and Singh (2005) suggest that the increasing presence of foreign 
companies has intensified competition, increasing substitution opportunities.  
Dyck and Pomorski (2011), Coats and Hubbard (2007) and Latzko (1999) 
observed that competition and low barriers to entry in the mutual fund industry 
continue to drive participation costs down.  However, while economic rationality 
would also infer encouraging a race to the bottom in the cost of intermediation, 
they find evidence of increased devotion to sales methods, distribution and 
customer service instead.  Malkiel (2013, p98) is uncompromising in his 
assessment of fund management value creation, declaring it a “dead weight loss 
for investors”. 
 
According to Malkiel (2013), between 1980 and 2006, the financial services 
sector of the United States economy grew from 4.9 percent to 8.3 percent of GDP 
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with a substantial share of that increase comprised of increases in the fees paid 
for funds management.  In 2012 financial services accounted for 9.4% of the UK 
GDP, growing from 7% in 1997 (Maer and Broughton, 2012).  Despite the 
economies of scale that should be offered through collectivised management, fee 
structures have actually risen over time to a substantial percentage of the assets 
managed (Malkiel, 2013).  Fund management fee structures are asset-weighted, 
also called an asset based fee structures (Lynch and Musto, 1997).  In its most 
basic iteration, if a fund manager has two clients, one with £10 million in assets 
under management and the other with £100 million, and a 1% fee structure, the 
first will pay £100,000 per annum and the other £1 million, for potentially identical 
portfolios and identical performance achieved.  Lynch and Musto (1997) call this 
an illogical application of agency theory that bears no relationship with risk, 
arguing a returns-based contract would be more appropriate.  In more complex 
iterations, Allen (2001; p1168) describes the “Sandy Grossman effect”, founder 
of the first hedge fund allowing others to take advantage of his unique investment 
ability; the primary role of these intermediaries is to make investors do better than 
they otherwise would.  However, hedge funds famously established the ‘2+20 
rule’, charging pension clients 2% of assets under management and 20% of 
returns on investment (with no corresponding penalty for losses) (Walter, 2009). 
 
How should trustees assess the value for cost as their fiduciary duty dictates?  
Whitwell (2013; p1) outlines three empirical dimensions for analysing the 
appropriateness of fund management fees: 1) nominal returns; 2) risk; and 3) 
added value.  The first dimension, nominal returns, he says is simple: “Did you 
make us money or not?”, yet this question is deceptive in an industry that has 
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managed to deflect responsibility for losses: “Although our return was -10%, our 
benchmark, the SandP 500 Index, was down 20%, so actually you did fantastic; 
we helped you outperform by 1,000 bps!”  (Whitwell, 2013; p1).  The second 
dimension of the fee structure analysis is risk.  Investment managers have made 
the same case to potential investors as managers to shareholders, that 
performance fees align investor and manager interests because the fund 
manager earns a performance fee only if the fund produces new gains (Holland, 
2011).  This claim misrepresents risk accounting.  If the investment loses money 
the investor alone suffers the loss of capital yet shares their reward 
disproportionately (Ryan and Dennis, 2003).  Evaluating the last dimension, 
added value is the degree to which returns beat their benchmark. It is theoretically 
appropriate to pay intermediary fees for the added value component of the returns 
(alpha) above market average returns (beta) (Hoepner and Zeume, 2009).  
However, pension trustees are routinely guilty of two types of costly mistakes.  
First, they often pay alpha fee levels on beta returns for long periods of 
underperformance (Whitwell, 2013).  Second, they conservatively miss out on 
more value-added investment opportunities that rationally come with higher fees 
(Ryan and Dennis, 2003).  Whitwell (2013; p3) concludes “we frequently pass 
judgment on nominal fees before we even spend one minute assessing the three 
empirical dimensions of absolute returns, risk, and added value.  In logic and 
statistics, this error is known as a Type II error, and it is one of material 
consequence in the business of asset management.” 
 
This has placed the onus entirely on the pension trustees to determine the fair 
price for investment performance (reward sharing) given the risk borne.  Business 
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ethics in finance focuses on what, if any, fiduciary obligation arise between the 
parties in a private property transaction.  In this case, given the asset exposure 
and information asymmetry the trustee is subject to, a fiduciary duty may be 
determined to belong to the fund managing agent.  This duty would presumably 
extend to ensuring their client receives an appropriate proportion of the return on 
investment when setting fee structures. 
 
 
3.4  Finance industry ethics:  The fundamental role of the fiduciary 
duty 
 
Any consideration of the role the finance industry currently serves as business 
contributing to society must acknowledge the role assigned to it by the discipline 
of business ethics as a functioning entity contributing to the larger aims of a 
political democracy (Glac, 2010). This is the firm’s social licence to operate within 
the host society, a concept which scholars over decades have struggled to define 
(Glac, 2010; Flynn and Werhane, 2008; Iwai, 1999; Davis, 1973; Coase, 1960).  
The granting or abuse of a social licence to operate is still surrounded by 
confusion over the rightful place business ethics holds in the study of business 
behaviour.  Trevino and Weaver (1994) differentiate between BUSINESS ethics 
and business ETHICS. The first is the study of business behaviour originating out 
of business disciplines.  These include investigations into corporate social 
responsibility, responsible investing, the theory of the firm, or corporate 
governance.  The latter originates from the examination of morality of the human 
individuals in business dealings.  At its core, all business ethics explores the 
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appropriate behaviour business should exhibit towards the citizens whose lives 
and rights they invariably affect (Silver, 2012).  Dobson (1999) describes this as 
25 years of business ethics theory built on the back of 2,500 years of moral 
philosophy used to classify the business profession into frameworks of either 
amoral (instrumental), immoral (illegal) or moral (normative) decision making. 
 
Pension funds are compelled as fiduciaries to act as trustees for contributing 
beneficiaries for the “exclusive purpose of providing benefits to them and 
defraying administrative expenses” (Greenwood, 1996; p28).  They have become 
“guardians of the investing public” promising explicit (often defined) guarantees 
of future income (Waring, 2006; p12).  Beneficiaries are typically not wealthy 
individuals and the trust’s duty is to collateralise modest contributions into 
maximum long-term assets values (Monks, 2002b).  To discharge the duty to 
defray expenses, pension funds must ensure that fund managers’ fee for handling 
their beneficiary’s money represents a fair price for members (Kay Review, 2012).  
When casting an ethical light on financial intermediaries however, Harris and 
Souder (2004; p201) see the need to examine why there are not a “few bad 
apples”, but a “widespread and systematically inter-connected nature of ethical 
lapses threatening the markets in a fundamental way.”  This section focuses on 
the development of the fundamental financial principle of fiduciary trust and duty, 
and whether the fund manager has a duty to the pension trust to assist in their 
fiduciary objectives to beneficiaries. 
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3.4.1  The origins and development of fiduciary duties 
 
To understand the role of trust and confidence in economic exchange, in the 
absence of government intervention or social convention any transaction involves 
some form of cooperative behaviour (Jones and Felps, 2013).  The legal 
formalisation establishing and enforcing cooperative behaviour is the principle of 
fiduciary responsibility (Cosimano, 2004).  Atherton et al.’s (2011; p8) historical 
definition of the fiduciary is “an essential code of conduct for those who have been 
entrusted to care for other peoples’ property, carry out transactions, work for 
another, or aid persons who were vulnerable and dependent upon others.”  The 
concepts of fiduciary duty originated in the common law of Trust and Agency for 
cases involving one person entrusting property to another, but this concept has 
expanded over time to mediate situations in which one person relies on another’s 
superior knowledge or skill (Boatright, 2000).  Whereas honesty and 
transparency are moral duties in contracting, where it is assumed that parties 
meet as equals, trustees have a higher duty by virtue of their dominant position 
(Blair and Stout, 2006).  Information asymmetry and power to control another’s 
assets gives the fiduciary trustee the advantageous position, and thereby a duty 
to take special care of the beneficiary’s interests (Dunning, 2012; Graafland and 
van de Ven, 2011; Lan and Heracleous, 2010).  The legal requirements of 
fiduciary duty (from the Latin fiducia, or trust) are imbued with the strongest duty 
of moral care trust law provides (Anabtawi and Stout, 2008; Aguilera et al., 2006).  
Indeed, many scholars see the origins of this duty emanating from the Old and 
New Testaments (Atherton et al. (2011) provide a comprehensive history of this 
moral development).  The law marries a duty of loyalty and of care, adjudicated 
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by the exclusive benefit rule prohibiting the fiduciary agent from acting in their 
own interests (Dunning, 2012; Anabtawi and Stout, 2008).  Technically, this duty 
to act in another’s interest means without gaining any material benefit except with 
the knowledge and consent of that person (Boatright, 2000).  The courts assess 
the degree to which the beneficiary has placed trust and confidence in the agent, 
which depends on extent of the responsibilities delegated, when assigning a 
fiduciary duty.  Where an agent is given discretion in decision making, the law 
would suggest that the agent is deemed a fiduciary with respect to performance 
of that discretionary act (Yaron, 2005).  To assess whether a fiduciary relationship 
arises at institutional level between the pension client and the fund manager 
engaged, the law would have to take a view on how much discretion fund 
managers have over the treatment of the pension client’s assets, and how much 
power they have to impose contractual conditions that are advantageous to 
themselves. 
 
3.4.2  The fiduciary duties of pension trustees 
 
The trust structure as a legal institution matured in the UK through the nineteenth 
century as a vehicle to preserve and transfer generational wealth (Clark, 2004).  
The law provides the trustees considerable discretion outside the scrutiny of the 
regulatory authorities, to act in authority for beneficiaries, placing great reliance 
on the responsible decision-making of the trustees.  Clark (2004; p236) describes 
this as “neither a contractual relationship nor a strictly commercial relationship – 
it was (and is) a form of obligation”.  The burden of this obligation placed on 
trustees is a fiduciary duty (obligation of loyalty) placed on the board of trustees 
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directed towards the beneficiary members when investing their assets (see LCR, 
2013b).  In reality the fiduciary duties of pension trustees and corporate fiduciary 
obligations rarely interact, and while corporate governance scholarship 
proliferates (Ingley and van der Walt, 2004), the governance best practice of the 
fiduciary trustee remains under-examined (Joly, 2010; Ambachtsheer et al., 
2007; Clark, 2004).  In the finance industry, where the pension fund trust’s 
contract with a fund management corporations, the fiduciary duties of the pension 
trust and their endowed fund management agent would seemingly come into 
direct competition, should the agent have “detached and powerless [external] 
shareholders”22.  So do fiduciary obligations arise from the fund manager to the 
pension trust under a funds management contract?  The degree of reliance 
perceived by the courts is the determining factor; where the power in the 
relationship puts the principal at risk, and where a fiduciary relationship is found, 
agents have an obligation to act in the fully disclosed best interests of the principal 
(Yaron, 2005).  Kay (2012) believes the contract has the flavour of a fiduciary 
relationship (see Section 3.5).  Mehran and Stulz (2007, p271) present empirical 
evidence that financial institutions can gain by taking actions that are 
unfavourable to the counterparty, to the “detriment of the efficiency of capital 
markets and the welfare of customers.” 
 
Fiduciary duties in financial advisers are embedded at individual (rather than firm) 
level through the self-regulating professional association requirements of the 
financial professional member (Dunfee and Gunter, 1999; Ettore, 1996).  Palazzo 
                                            
22
 As discussed in Chapter 2, owner-managers do not suffer the separation problem and 
subsequently hold fiduciary duties to the entity they govern 
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and Rethel (2008; p194) describe these: “The main duties of professionals are to 
perform services with competence and due care, to avoid conflicts of interest, to 
preserve confidentiality, and to uphold the ideals of the profession".  However, 
the likelihood of a fiduciary relationship being explicitly identified at the 
institutional level is intensified by a special trust nature of the pension principal 
(Palazzo and Rethel, 2008).  Boatright (2000; p201) describes this institution level 
conflict of interest as inherent in the industry: 
 
“Financial services could scarcely be provided without raising conflicts of 
interest.  In acting as intermediaries for people’s financial transactions 
and as custodians of their financial assets, financial service providers are 
often forced to choose among the competing interests of others – and 
weigh those interests against their own.” 
 
In choosing the principal the fund manager wishes to signal their fiduciary primacy 
to, Goodpaster (1991) sees two operational possibilities: strategic and multi-
fiduciary.  He sees the first as calculated self-selecting obligations (business 
without ethics) and the other an impossible conundrum of the man with two 
masters (ethics without business).  Statutory clarification of the fiduciary duties in 
the supply chain has been resisted by the UK pensions industry, fearing a 
proscriptive narrowing of discretion in investment decision making23.  
Government clarification has also been reluctant, despite several parliamentary 
review recommendations, the subject of the next section.  This leaves the 
                                            
23
 http://www.professionalpensions.com/professional-pensions/analysis/2325571/industry-split-
on-fiduciary-duty-legislation 
110 
 
interpretation of any fiduciary duties arising to the courts and precedent nature of 
their development to date. 
 
 
3.5  The political framework examining fiduciary intermediation 
 
“Many of these [fund management] charges are ‘‘invisible’’ - the 
brokerage costs are uncontrolled, are never segregated and reported as 
such, and are accounted only as a reduction in the market value of the 
portfolio.  In American terms, management and brokerage fees from 
pension accounts must total close to US$50 billion.  This is an important 
source of revenue to a great many important people.” (Monks, 2002a; 
p119) 
 
There have been numerous government commissioned inquiries into tangential 
aspects of the corporate governance of the investment supply chain (for instance 
Cadbury Report, 1992; Hampel, 1998; Higgs Report, 2003), however there were 
two that specifically addressed pension governance.  In 2001 HM Treasury’s 
Myners Report on pension fund governance and the relationship with funds 
management was published as Institutional Investment in the UK: A Review 
(Clark, 2004).  A decade later the government commissioned Professor John Kay 
to undertake a review of the mechanisms of control and accountability provided 
by UK equity markets, and the behaviour of the agents in that process, published 
in 2012 as the Kay review of UK equity markets and long-term decision making: 
final report (Clark, 2013).  This section briefly considers the findings of these 
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reviews as officially sanctioned government analysis of privatised pension 
governance. 
 
3.5.1  The Myners Report 
 
Paul Myners, previous Financial Services Secretary for HM Treasury, delivered 
his findings on institutional investment in the UK in 2001.  On the point of pension 
governance, he reported that pension trustees lack the expertise necessary to 
make independent judgements on the management of their assets and had 
become dependent on consultants and asset managers in the financial services 
industry.  Yet the feedback from the consultants and asset managers was that 
trustees were highly risk adverse, preferring convention to strategic risk 
management or financial innovation (Clark, 2004).  Myners further noted that few 
trustees had financial education or took training beyond 12 months post 
appointment, and spent little time preparing for fund investment decisions (Clark, 
2004). 
 
The review made the following recommendations for establishing: 
 
• A set of principles for institutional investment decision-making; 
• The replacement of the Minimum Funding Requirement with a scheme-
specific regime based on transparency and disclosure; 
• Incorporation of the US Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA) principles on shareholder activism into UK law, making 
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intervention into companies, where it is in shareholders' and beneficiaries 
interests, a duty for fund managers; 
• A Law Commission clarification of the legal ownership of surplus pension 
fund assets; and 
• Reduction of the rate of tax on withdrawal of the surplus (Myners 2001). 
 
The government responded if favour of legislation on all issues.  However, in 
2007 the National Association of Pension Funds undertook a review of the 
implementation progress, titled Institutional Investment in the UK:  Six years on, 
finding: 
 
“The environment in which pension funds are operating has changed 
significantly since the Principles were first published in 2001.  Then, many 
schemes were in surplus and the focus was on how to expand 
institutional investment into areas such as venture capital.  Six years on 
that scenario has been turned on its head.  Now the focus is on deficit 
correction, the strength of scheme sponsor covenants and scheme 
specific funding… In response sponsors have closed schemes or 
increased contributions and there has been a shift in investments from 
equities to bonds” (NAPF 2007; p6). 
 
NAPF (2007; p6) also found that no agreement had been reached on assessing 
fund management performance or outsourced financial services provider 
performance.  Then concluded, “In this new world of pensions, some of the 
Myners Principles appear less relevant…the spread of financial innovations has 
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obliged trustees to delegate more to advisers, which runs counter to the 
Principles (intended to ensure that trustees can engage with, and if necessary 
challenge advisers and consultants).”  Robert Monks commented on the Myners 
Report in 2002 (2002a) as being “perhaps the most important single development 
in the evolution of corporate governance in the Anglophone world.  Bad 
governance in times past may have been ruinous to the rich; today it is a crime 
against the security of the pension promise.”  Ten years later Professor John Kay 
would re-examine pension governance once more. 
 
3.5.2  The Kay Review 
 
The fiduciary duties of pension plan sponsors and trustees are in little dispute; 
under Trust law and the Pensions Act 2008 they owe strong duties to their 
intergenerational beneficiaries.  One of these duties is to invest the contributions 
of members with attention, expertise and care.  To fulfil this duty, they outsource 
the pooled contributions to financial experts, specifically, the corporate 
intermediaries of the finance sector who have evolved quickly to serve this 
function for pensions (Clark, 2013). 
 
In the 2012 Parliament Review commissioned economist Professor John Kay 
with the following Terms of Reference: 
 
“To examine the mechanisms of corporate control and accountability 
provided by UK equity markets and their impact on the long term 
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competitive performance of UK businesses, and to make 
recommendations” (Kay, 2011; p1). 
 
Specific to the focus of this chapter, the Review was to consider: 
 
• Whether the current legal duties and responsibilities of asset owners24 and 
fund managers, and the fee and pay structures in the investment chain, 
are consistent with asset owners’ long term objectives; and 
 
• Whether there is sufficient transparency in the activities of fund managers, 
clients and their advisors, and companies themselves, and in the 
relationships between them (Kay, 2011; p2). 
 
Professor Kay (2012) bestowed fiduciary expectations on the behaviour that 
financial intermediaries managing pension funds should afford their clients, as 
such: 
 
“Fiduciary standards require that the client’s interests are put first, that 
conflict of interest should be avoided, and that the direct and indirect 
costs of services provided should be reasonable and disclosed.  These 
standards should not require, nor even permit, the agent to depart from 
generally prevailing standards of decent behaviour.  Contractual terms 
should not claim to override these standards.”  (Kay, 2012; p12) 
                                            
24
 Pension schemes – ie. Owners of shares or bonds 
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He noted that fiduciary duties are a legal concept created by case law and so 
while clearly bestowed on pension trustees, there remained uncertainty over 
whether they arose to others in the investment chain when managing social 
savings.  The Law Commission Review (LCR, 2013; p34) interpreted the fiduciary 
standard owed by the fund manager as “ensuring that the direct and indirect costs 
of services provided are reasonable and disclosed, and that conflicts of interest 
are avoided wherever possible, or else disclosed or otherwise managed to the 
satisfaction of the client or beneficiary”.  This fiduciary flavour to the relationship 
differed from the opinions of pension trustees; the review finding that “many 
trustees were aware of their status as fiduciaries, which resonates with a sense 
of altruism.  Trustees contrasted their special status as fiduciaries with the focus 
of others in the investment chain on making money” (LCR, 2013b; p23).  The 
Myners Report and Kay Review both found room for improvement in the cost of 
outsourcing funds management to the financial services industry, costs neither 
visible to members, nor explicitly consented to.  Social responsibility in pension 
governance should demand these costs should represent transparent value for 
money. 
 
Beneficiaries knowingly sacrifice approximately 1 per cent of their contributions 
to the trust for administering their assets (Barr, 2006).  They have no way of 
knowing how much more they are sacrificing for this administration to be 
outsourced.  These views are echoed by Hess and Impavido (2003) who believe 
trustee boards have a demonstrable need to be strong and well-functioning to 
protect beneficiaries from outside exploitation.  Both the Myners Report and Kay 
review placed exploitative conflicts at the feet of the financial services industry 
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who manage the trust assets.  Monks (2002a, p119) is a strong critic of the profits 
derived in financial services from the pension assets pool, invisible to 
beneficiaries and accounted for only as a reduction in the market value of the 
pool.  He is particularly scathing of government apathy: “The ugliest truth is that 
government has continually and conspicuously failed to enforce the law of the 
land and, thereby, has enabled and condoned the conflicts of interest that 
envelope the institutional ownership world.  Look at the web of mutually self-
supporting interests.  Somebody is missing from this cozy circle - who is it? It is 
the beneficiaries of the pension schemes whose neglect is the continuing 
disgrace of government.” 
 
3.5.3  The nature of fund management contracts 
  
Recently, there has been growing concern that fund managers are adopting 
extremely similar investment strategies (Ljungqvist et al., 2007).  One possible 
explanation for the phenomenon may be found in the remuneration schemes 
based on relative performance (Eichberger et al., 1999).  This form of fund 
management contract may be more desirable for the fund manager than the 
pension trustee.  In an empirical study of allocation mechanisms for public goods, 
Moreno and Moscoso (2012) found that allocations strongly favour the dictator, 
resulting in conflict between allocation incentives and other desirable 
characteristics such as fairness, equity or distributive justice.  The fund manager 
may be acting dictatorially when making the investment decisions obtaining high 
rewards when things go well and incredibly limited penalties when they do not 
(Allen, 2001).  Klumpes and McCrae (1999) found that the size of fees relative to 
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nominal returns significantly reduced the periodic net income to pension funds 
over the period of the study.  Further examination of the relative merits of these 
findings requires distinction between the two main styles of funds management.  
Ryan and Dennis (2003; p317) describe: 
 
“The passive fund manager's portfolio is partially or completely matched, 
or "indexed," to a market standard, such as the SandP 500.  The 
advantages of this technique include lower administrative and transaction 
costs, given that stocks are seldom bought or sold.  However, passive 
investing also diminishes the potential for higher-than-market returns, as 
these funds bear little or no idiosyncratic risk.  Conversely, the active fund 
manager's portfolio consists of particular stocks and securities chosen for 
their projected potential to maximize fund value.  The active fund 
manager constantly evaluates the present status of the financial market 
and individual stocks, making frequent buy and sell decisions that tend 
to incorporate a moderate to high degree of firm-specific, idiosyncratic 
risk.  While this fund management technique offers the possibility of 
above-market returns, it is also characterized by more erratic returns, 
along with higher management fees and transaction costs.” 
 
Harrison (2013)25 describes the typical passive fee structure: “Most common is a 
base fee expressed as a percentage of assets and scaled with fees descending 
as assets increase, so greater assets merit a lower fee.  These include most 
                                            
25
 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a1c40ac2-9558-11e2-a4fa-00144feabdc0.html#axzz48izt3nUJ 
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management fees but exclude trading costs.  The driver to a base fee is the 
performance of the overall markets not manager skill.”  The ability the fund 
management industry has generated to demand a percentage of the total asset 
base per annum that “exclude trading costs” and does not require “manager skill” 
seems to violate the three dimensions of Whitwell’s analysis.  By extracting a 
proportion of the asset base the fund manager had no role in amassing, passing 
on the additional cost of underlying intermediation applying no additional 
information aggregation value and bearing no risk of ROI losses, the service 
seems to contravene the theory of financial intermediary existence (in reducing 
information or transaction costs, or creating liquidity (Palazzo and Rethel, 2008)).  
Harrison (2013) then explains the active fund managers’ structure; “a variable 
performance fee normally applies not to all the assets but to the outperformance 
above a floor or hurdle.  Meaning returns above that are attributed to manager 
skill… tend to be vastly more expensive, often commanding 2 per cent base fees 
plus 20 per cent performance fees.”  The fact that inventor of CAPM, William 
Sharpe observed that “under plausible circumstances, a person saving for 
retirement who chooses a low-fee over high-fee investments could have a 20 per 
cent higher standard of living in retirement” (quoted in Snyder, 2013) is contrary 
to his theory of the risk/reward relationship, yet consistent with Moreno and 
Moscoso’s (2012) dictator hypothesis.  According to Scott (2010) the fee model 
overcompensates fund managers in rising markets, implies no sharing of 
economies of scale with the pension client and bears no relation to the value 
added by the manager.  Monks (2002a; p119) also cogently points out, “many of 
these charges are ‘‘invisible’’ – the brokerage costs are uncontrolled, are never 
segregated and reported as such, and are accounted only as a reduction in the 
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market value of the portfolio.  In American terms, management and brokerage 
fees from pension accounts must total close to US$50 billion.  This is an important 
source of revenue to a great many important people.” 
 
This section outlined the considered opinions of academic commentators.  It does 
not consider the opinion of the pension schemes or fund managers themselves.  
It would be rational to hypothesise that were tension to arise in unfair contracting 
between the principal and the agent, the conflict would be observable in the 
industry media (a proxy for the opinions of both parties) or with the law makers, 
in adjudicating the conflict to a resolution on who owes whom a duty in the 
management of funds.  The next section examines the outputs of these subsidiary 
parties. 
 
3.5.4  Fund manager contracts concluded in law and portrayed in the 
media 
 
The courts assess the degree to which a beneficiary has placed trust and 
confidence in an agent, which depends on extent of the responsibilities 
delegated, when assigning a fiduciary duty (Anabtawi and Stout, 2008).  Where 
an agent is given discretion in decision making, the law would suggest that the 
agent is deemed a fiduciary (Yaron, 2005).  To assess whether a fiduciary 
relationship arises at institutional level between the pension client and the fund 
manager engaged, the law would have to take a view on how much discretion 
fund managers have over the treatment of the pension client’s assets, and how 
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much power they have to dictate contractual conditions that are advantageous to 
themselves. 
 
In March this year Investment and Pensions Europe Magazine (Maton, 2016) 
asked what the going rate for asset management fees was.  He concluded that 
“despite calls for a greater level of alignment between asset managers and 
pension funds, alternative fee models have not yet taken off.”  He continues, 
“Trustees outsource more and more of the key decisions about how a fund is 
invested, but cannot renounce their fiduciary duties: in other words, they delegate 
power without responsibility. Whatever one's views about the specific services 
labelled as 'fiduciary management', there's no doubt that this is a wider trend - 
and one that raises fundamental questions about the nature of the fiduciary 
relationship.” 
 
The key characteristics of the fiduciary relationship, according to the UK Law 
Commission (1995), are vulnerability and dependency on the part of the principal, 
and discretion and power to act on the part of the agent.  According to Berry in 
Investments and Pensions Europe magazine (2011) “On this basis, it seems 
reasonable to conclude - as, indeed, the Law Commission did - that anyone given 
responsibility over key decisions about the management of somebody else's 
money is a fiduciary. That includes asset [fund] managers.” 
 
Plender (2012) comments in the Financial Times on March 11, 2012 of the 
progress of the Kay Review into the fiduciary duties of intermediaries: “The 
biggest challenge will be to find a framework of incentives that eliminates the 
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mismatch between the fund managers’ business model and the interests of 
companies and beneficiaries.  Because, as Prof Kay rightly observes, the metrics 
on which the asset management industry measures its performance are all 
wrong”.  The media has stated that the statutory tolerance for fund managers 
evading of fiduciary duties to clients may be waning.  On April 29, 2010 the 
Financial Times (Guerrera and Masters, 2010) reported on the US Senate Sub-
Select Committee investigation of Goldman Sachs selling of mortgage backed 
securities in lead-up to the 2008 financial crisis:  "Perhaps the most interesting 
signal came during Senator Collins' questions.  They suggested she is 
considering whether SEC regulated broker-dealers ought to be subject to 
fiduciary duties for clients. Her press statement also signals that she is interested 
in exploring fiduciary duties for broker dealers . . . If this idea from a senior 
Republican gains any traction it could dramatically change the way broker dealers 
and Wall Street firms do business." 
 
Nevertheless, from the standpoint of the tension between the fiduciary obligations 
to pension asset management versus fund manager corporate governance, 
Guerrera and Masters (2010) reported that following the press statement 
Goldman's shares rose more than 2 per cent in New York that day, adding $850m 
to its market capitalisation when no fiduciary duty was established.  This is key to 
the proposition of the thesis; that the agent has conflicting principals.  On the 
basis of these media commentaries it would appear that fiduciary agency has not 
been established in financial intermediaries. 
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3.5.4.1  Legal Sources 
 
The two sources of legitimate law making evidence are databases of case law 
and databases of legislation over time.  The sources selected for the 
characteristics of completeness and industry representativeness were the British 
and Irish Legal Information Institute (BAILII) for case law and the Government 
Legislation Portal (legislation.gov.uk) for statute law. 
 
3.5.4.2  Rationale for Industry press selection 
 
The role of the media in shaping pension trustee and fund manager behaviour 
has not been examined in the literature. According to the Pension Professionals 
(2016), statutory clarification of the fiduciary duties of fund managers has been 
resisted by the UK pensions industry, fearing a prescriptive narrowing of 
discretion in investment decision making.  According to an Investment and 
Pensions Europe Journal article (Lokhandwala, 2014), “viewing fiduciary duty as 
legal duty ‘first mistake’ in asset management.”  The article went on to quote Head 
of EMEA for BlackRock as saying “It is a trust people put in us as asset managers. 
If you start on the legal side and putting it into contracts, we are going to lose 
clients again.”  Two media sources with different readership demographics were 
examined:  1) the European focused industry journal Investments and Pensions 
Europe (IPE), with specialist content and an overwhelming trustee demographic; 
and 2) Financial Times (FT) which caters to a broader range of perceptions of the 
function of the pensions industry. 
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As illustrated by Figure 3.2, the trend in speculating on the fiduciary agency 
relationship is increasing in volume in the IPE, when it is decreasing or static in 
the other categories.  The FT peaked in volume around the time of the 2007-2008 
financial crisis, however the number of articles published are less than half that 
of the media associated with pension trustees and the number of total references 
to fiduciary fund management is only 19.3% of the IPE.  Closer inspection of 
these articles in the next Section will determine whether they are thematically 
different, as their alternative audiences may imply. 
 
Figure 3.2 Volume of cases and articles per year by category 
  
 
With regards to the determinates of the fiduciary relationship, the volume of case 
law peaked in 2013.  There were 133 cases in the search results on the BAILLI 
website, however searching the content revealed only 15 cases that included all 
subsequent search references (less than one case a year).  This paucity of case 
law is evidence of the nature of cases coming before the courts.  They are not 
explorative but combative in intent, when one counterparty takes fiduciary issue 
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with another.  The courts express wariness in judgements to maintain the 
historical roots of the duty in an industry that has become far more complex than 
at the time of the duty’s origins.  This makes interpreting the intention of the courts 
less challenging, as each follows thematically from the previous case, but also 
convoluted as they express and explore both sides of the fiduciary debate.  
However, the conclusive evidence for the status of the financial intermediary duty 
to the client is in the progress of legislation.  In 2013 MP Phil Wilson introduced 
a Bill to parliament entitled Investment Management (Fiduciary Duties).  It was 
debated on 5th February 2014, commencing with the refrain: 
 
One place where trust and professionalism are vital is in the financial and 
investment services industry, but here is the problem: the agent of the 
agent of the saver can lose sight of the ultimate customer’s best interest. 
Nowhere is that clearer than in the investments of our pension industry, 
which is worth more than £2 trillion, or 135% of the size of the UK 
economy. With those statistics in mind, and with auto-enrolment bringing 
an additional 11 million savers into the system—many of them low-paid—
the industry has a great responsibility to get it right. (House of Commons 
Hansard, 5 February 2014 Column 277). 
 
In 2004, shortly after the equities crash instigated by the fall of giants Enron, Tyco, 
World Com and others, the Financial Times wrote (Fuller, 2004; July 9): 
 
“Jack Brennan, chairman of Vanguard, the US mutual funds group, set 
out his five principles for success in running money for individuals at a 
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fund forum in Monaco this week.  These were: it is never about "my firm" 
but about what's best for the client; never about the short-term but about 
long-term results for the client; never about selling but about fiduciary 
duty to the client; never about meeting the letter of the law but about 
a culture of integrity; never measured by assets under management 
but by the depth of the client's trust. 
 
One fund manager told me that he had heard it all before, but maybe it 
had more resonance now. That is the understatement of the year.” 
[emphasis added] 
 
If the media believe the fund manager is a fiduciary to the pension client, this is 
not supported by case law or legislation.  Nor does the media narrative reference 
litigation or legislative contemplation of the pension asset fiduciary.  The two 
subsidiary parties in funds management are divorced in their analysis of the 
issue.  The following Section outlines the current legal status on the fiduciary in 
financial intermediation. 
 
3.5.4.3  Financial intermediary fiduciary duties in the law 
 
Table 3.1 examines the individual cases from the BAILLI search results to 
determine the focus of the cases and the courts’ development of the fiduciary 
concept.  Fifteen cases were examined and categorised as follows: 1) fiduciary 
duties of the director to the corporation (corporate fiduciary); 2) fiduciary duties of 
the public official to public assets (public fiduciary); 3) fiduciary duties of the 
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investment manager to the asset owner (investment fiduciary); and 4) other 
fiduciary duties (other fiduciary).  It also records the word count frequency for 
“fiduciary” to indicate the importance the duty held to the case. 
 
Table 3.1 The BAILLI Search result classifications of cases by fiduciary focus 
Case Fiduciary classification Word frequency 
Republic of Brazil v Durant [2012] JRC 211 (16 
November 2012)26 Public fiduciary N=23 
Barclays v Equity [2014] JRC 102D (2 May 
2014)27 Investment fiduciary N=48 
AP-Fonden v Bank of New York Mellon SA/NV 
& Ors [2013] EWHC 3127 (Comm) (16 October 
2013)28 
Investment fiduciary N=55 
Certain Limited Partners in Henderson PFI 
Secondary Fund II LLP v Henderson PFI 
Secondary Fund II LP & Ors [2012] EWHC 3259 
(Comm) (16 November 2012)29 
Investment fiduciary / 
Corporate fiduciary N=3 
Doohan & Anor -v- Irish Life Assurance PLC & 
Anor [2015] IEHC 789 (01 December 2015)30 Investment fiduciary N=6 
Excalibur Ventures LLC v Texas Keystone Inc 
& Ors (Rev 1) [2013] EWHC 2767 (Comm) (13 
December 2013)31 
Investment fiduciary N=60 
F&C Alternative Investments (Holdings) Ltd v 
Barthelemy & Anor [2011] EWHC 1731 (Ch) (14 
July 2011) 
Corporate fiduciary N=147 
Fyffes Plc v DCC Plc & Ors [2005] IEHC 477 (21 
December 2005) Corporate fiduciary N=37 
Greck v. Henderson Asia Pacific Equity 
Partners & Ors [2008]32 Corporate fiduciary N=1 
                                            
26
 http://www.bailii.org/je/cases/JRC/2012/211.html (accessed 21 June 2016) 
27
 http://www.bailii.org/je/cases/JRC/2014/102D.html (accessed 21 June 2016) 
28
 http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Comm/2013/3127.html (accessed 21 June 2016) 
29
 www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Comm/2012/3259.html (accessed 21 June 2016) 
30
 http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2015/H789.html 
31
 http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Comm/2013/2767.html 
32
 http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/2008/CSOH_2.html (accessed 21 June 2016) 
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Independent Trustee Service Ltd v GP Noble 
Trustees Ltd & Ors [2010] EWHC 1653 (Ch) (01 
July 2010)33 
Investment fiduciary N=7 
Keith v. Chambers & Ors [2002] ScotCS 257 (11 
September 2002)34 Corporate fiduciary N=86 
Koger Inc. & Anor -v- O'Donnell & Ors [2010] 
IEHC 350 (8 October 2010)35 Corporate fiduciary N=6 
Murphy v Rayner & Ors [2011] EWHC 1 (Ch) 
(18 January 2011)36 Other fiduciary N=24 
Nestle v National Westminster Bank [1992] 
EWCA Civ 12 (06 May 1992)37 Public fiduciary N=1 
Vigeland v Ennismore Fund Management Ltd & 
Anor [2012] EWHC 3099 (Ch) (07 November 
2012)38 
Corporate fiduciary N=8 
 
There are seven (44%) corporate fiduciary cases, 6 (38%) investment fiduciary 
cases, 2 (12%) public fiduciary cases and 1 (6%) involving the fiduciary of carers.  
However, with the use of language being an indicator of the courts’ time in 
exploring the definition, corporate directors’ and officers’ fiduciary duty dominates 
the word count frequency (288, 62%).  The cases that investigate the fiduciary 
duty in investing made less of an impact on the court’s time, with 131 (28%) 
counts.  Public and other tied with 24 (5%) counts. 
 
The courts have had more demand placed on them to identify a breach of 
director’s duties than other forms of fiduciary duty.  In the cases that examined 
fiduciary duties in investing, the courts’ interpretation is aligned with the trustees’ 
                                            
33
 http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2010/1653.html (accessed 21 June 2016) 
34
 http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/2002/257.html (accessed 21 June 2016) 
35
 http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2010/H350.html 
36
 http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2011/1.html 
37
 http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/1992/12.html 
38
 http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2012/3099.html 
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perceptions that there is no clear understanding regarding when a fiduciary duty 
arises in the management of assets.  In Barclays v Equity [2014] JRC 102D (2 
May 2014) the presiding judge opened the ruling with an observation of fiduciary 
duties in trust entities: “There is some academic and professional literature 
exploring these questions, not all of it unanimous in its conclusions, but little 
judicial authority” (Para.1).  His interpretation was straightforward: 
 
I pointed out during the hearing that the phrase “fiduciary duty” is used in 
a variety of meanings, not always in the strict sense insisted on by Millett 
LJ in the Mothew case.  Advocate Harvey-Hills also referred to Vestey’s 
Executors v IRC [1941] 1 All ER 1108, a decision of the House of Lords 
in which duties in regard to investment (to be executed, as it happens, by 
“authorised persons” who were not the trustees of the relevant 
settlement) were held to be fiduciary. What he says is that the plaintiffs’ 
claim under this heading is based on a wider meaning of the phrase than 
the more specific meaning identified in Mothew.  (Para. 78) 
 
In the case of the unit trust in question he deliberated that any person authorised 
to execute a transaction on behalf of the trust was a fiduciary, and this included 
managers as well as trustees.  He also observed that this duty cannot be 
disavowed by the contract between the manager and the trust.  Conversely, in 
the AP-Fonden v Bank of New York Mellon (16 October 2013), the bank “did not 
owe fiduciary duties to AP” (Para. 469) despite being the pension scheme’s 
security bond manager and holding bonds they knew were in financial distress.  
Indeed, Doohan v Irish Life Assurance PLC [2015] IEHC 789 (1 December 2015) 
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states that “the fiduciary duty is coextensive with, but no greater than, their 
contractual duty and duty of care.”  Where a contract is in place, as is the case 
with the fund manager and pension trust, the law assumes that the duties of the 
parties are set out in the contract.  A fiduciary duty is not necessary.  This was 
reiterated in Excalibur Ventures LLC v Texas Keystone Inc & Ors (Rev 1) [2013] 
EWHC 2767 (Comm) (13 December 2013, Para. 1161): 
 
The circumstances in which someone will be classified as a fiduciary are 
not precisely defined. I am content to proceed on the basis of the 
summary in Chapter 7 of Snell's Equity, approved in Ross River Ltd v 
Waverly Communications [2012] EWHC 81 at [235]-[238] per Morgan J 
that (i) a fiduciary is someone who has undertaken to act for or on behalf 
of another in a particular matter in circumstances which give rise to a 
relationship of trust and confidence; (ii) the concept captures a situation 
where one person is in a relationship with another which gives rise to a 
legitimate expectation, which equity will recognise, that the fiduciary will 
not utilise his or her position in a way which is adverse to the interests of 
the principal. 
 
The case went on to say “whilst fiduciary relationships may arise in a commercial 
relationship, this is uncommon, not least because it is normally inappropriate to 
expect a commercial party to subordinate its own interests to those of another 
commercial party. But if that expectation is not inappropriate in the circumstances 
of the relationship, then fiduciary duties will arise."  This was later reiterated: 
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Unless the particular agreement establishes a relationship of trust, one 
will not spring from a finder's contract in and of itself, for without some 
agreed-to-nexus, there is no relationship of trust and, thus, no duty of 
highest loyalty. 
 
Before courts can infer and superimpose a duty of the finest loyalty, the 
contract and relationship of the parties must be plumbed. We recognize 
that "[m]any forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those 
acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. 
(Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N Y; Para. 458). 
 
Chief Judge Cardozo's oft-quoted maxim is a timeless reminder that "[a] trustee 
is held to something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty 
alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive. If the parties find 
themselves or place themselves in the milieu of the "workaday" mundane 
marketplace, and if they do not create their own relationship of higher trust, courts 
should not ordinarily transport them to the higher realm of relationship and fashion 
the stricter duty for them? Courts look to the parties' agreements to discover, not 
generate, the nexus of relationship and the particular contractual expression 
establishing the parties' interdependency."  (Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 NY; Para. 
464). 
 
This view supports F&C Alternative Investments (Holdings) Ltd v Barthelemy & 
Anor [2011] EWHC 1731 (Ch) (14 July 2011: Para. 223): “In commercial contexts, 
care has to be taken in identifying any fiduciary obligations which may arise that 
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the court does not distort the bargain made by the parties.”  Pacific Equity 
Partners & Ors [2008] agrees that it is not the role of the court to impose 
conditions on contracting parties.  As do Excalibur Ventures LLC v Texas 
Keystone Inc. (Para 162): "If Wellington wanted fiduciary-like relationships or 
responsibilities, it could have bargained for and specified for them in the contract." 
 
The courts have been clear in one matter, the contract is the area under 
investigation when examining the nature of the principal-agent relationship.  
Unlike company directors and officers, who have externally applied fiduciary 
duties, the courts have consistently found no duties existing outside investment 
contracts.  Given the undeniable fiduciary nature the trustees hold to the pension 
beneficiaries it has been left their responsibility to write the duties into fund 
management contract.  The courts would then be able to take a view on whether 
this presents an untenable fiduciary conflict for the directors and officers of fund 
management firms. 
 
3.5.4.4  Fiduciary duties to investment agents in legislation 
 
The first reading of the Bill entitled “Investment Management (Fiduciary Duties) 
Bill 2013-201439 took place on 5th February 2014.  Member of Parliament for 
Sedgefield Phil Wilson (Lab) commenced, “That leave be given to bring in a Bill 
to place a fiduciary duty on those involved in managing an investment to act in 
the best interest of investors, including pension savers, in a transparent and 
                                            
39
 http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2013-14/investmentmanagementfiduciaryduties.html 
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accountable way; and for connected purposes.” (IMFD Bill 2014; Column 277).  
Mr Wilson outlined why he believed the Bill was imperative.  He made the 
observation that agents of agents lost sight that the money being managed is the 
pensions savings of the hard-working people of our economy.  Crucially, he 
emphasised the necessity for a fiduciary duty to control costs: “The Bill would 
also ensure that fees paid to pension managers and other intermediaries should 
be transparent, including an explanation of how much they are and why they are 
necessary. The Office of Fair Trading has discovered 18 different charges levied 
on pension funds, many of which we are not even told about. All of this matters 
because it is unacceptable for fees to eat up as much as 40% of a pension pot.” 
(IMFD Bill 2014; Column 278).  Sadly, the Parliament.UK website concludes, 
“The Bill failed to complete its passage through Parliament before the end of the 
session.  This means the Bill will make no further progress.” (See footnote 27). 
 
There is general agreement between statute law and case law that fund 
managers do not have separate fiduciary duties.  The duties of the agent are 
those laid out in the contract and rely on the principal’s ability to negotiate with 
large financial institutions.  The Law Commission Review into Fiduciary Duties 
for Investment Intermediaries (LCR, 2013; p206) summarised the situation 
eloquently: “There are major difficulties in relying on “judge-made” law to control 
complex and fast-moving financial markets. Judges can only decide the cases 
brought before them. Very few cases are brought – and those most vulnerable to 
poor practice may be those least able to mount legal challenges. Further, rules 
are developed only after the event – often long after the event.”  The duties in 
trust investing are unambiguous and concern the very nature and function of a 
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trust as fiduciary for the beneficiary.  However, when the trust enters a contract 
with a management firm all legal sources agree that currently only the duties 
specified in the contract are binding on the agent. 
 
3.5.5  Continued discord between the industry subsidiaries 
 
There is clearly a need to explore whether fiduciary obligations are really being 
understood and fulfilled (Berry, 2011).  Statutes define the fiduciary duties of 
company directors (Companies Act, 2006).  Common law imposes demanding 
fiduciary obligations on the trustees of pension funds (Verret, 2010).  Ultimately, 
legal clarity can only come from regulators, governments or the courts, but there's 
also a need for self-examination within the industry about what it means to be a 
fiduciary in an outsourced capacity. 
 
Against this backdrop, pension fund trustees rely upon the financial expertise of 
these agents in making decisions on investing their assets (Coco and Ferri, 
2010).  This has often included relying on the assumption that they are fiduciarily 
obligated.  The primary duty to safeguard the pension’s assets invariably hands 
the fund manager a custodian role with broader public implications to the private 
property of workforce contributions (Palazzo and Rethel, 2008).  However, in the 
industry literature analysis of statute and common law for evidence of the legal 
frameworks supporting fiduciary duties, both law makers communicated that any 
intention for fund managers to adopt a fiduciary agency over pension assets is 
absent. 
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In 1984 a case was brought by Arthur Scargill, the leader of Britain’s main mining 
union seeking the end of coal board investments in overseas businesses. The 
judge rejected Scargill’s claim on the basis that the duty of trustees is to increase 
the fund’s value for its beneficiaries, regardless of their moral or political views 
(McDonnell, 2003).  According to the perceptions of the Kay Review (2013; p12) 
“such rigour and relative clarity is rare” in legal findings.  Kay concludes common 
law fiduciary obligations may exist in other areas of finance but the extent is 
uncertain, and contracts such as those of fund managers, often attempt to 
exclude fiduciary obligations. “For most people outside the financial services 
sector, it is obvious the only people you can trust with your money are those who 
are willing to pursue your interests rather than their own. The public would be 
surprised that the imposition of fiduciary standards on those who work in advisory 
or discretionary roles should even be controversial.” (Kay, 2013; p56). 
 
In 2014 the Financial Times reported that fund managers were coercing pension 
funds into signing non-disclosure agreements (Marriage and Newlands, 2014).  
In the article David Blake, director of the Pensions Institute at Cass Business 
School in London, said: “Local authorities are not allowed to compare fee deals, 
and that is an outrage. It should be made illegal that fund managers demand an 
investment mandate is confidential.”  In defence of fund managers, Daniel 
Godfrey, chief executive of the Investment Management Association, rebutted 
“Companies also have the commercial right to require commercial arrangements 
to be confidential.”  This is in keeping with the trend of current case law, but 
departs from the spirit of a fiduciary duty to transparency. 
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Trustee oriented media often states there is a fiduciary duty arising in the fund 
manager agent, despite evidence to the contrary in the legal sources.  
Conversely, the litigation and legislation on fiduciary duties were not found to be 
reported in the media. 
 
Case law has consistently upheld that the duties owed by the fund manager are 
those found in the funds management contract alone.  To this point, the 
investment community (FT) has been more vocal about the need to review fee 
structures than the trustee community.  This, alongside the surprising 
predominance of communication on fiduciary management suggests that 
trustees are concentrating on working with fund managers to take on the power 
(yet not responsibility) of their duties rather than exercise them in restraining the 
fund manager contract. 
 
In 2016 the IPE reported that the Transparency Task Force had been formed to 
call for fiduciary duties to be imposed on fund managers, particularly in relation 
to fees (Williams, 2016).  The fund management industry was reported as 
warning against imposing a fiduciary duty on the industry, repeatedly arguing it 
was not a legal principle but rather a set of morals.  This is contrary to the opinion 
of the courts and parliamentary reviews and debate, who contend that any moral 
obligations should be explicit in the contract between commercial parties.  The 
state of the fiduciary duty of the fund manager clearly continues to be the source 
of much ambiguity among pensions practitioners and the lack of cooperative 
policy making and practice between the standard setters and compliers will not 
alleviate this research problem, only continue to emphasise its importance.  
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Further research will be a valuable in continuing the investigation of fund 
management as more industry and state review pressure comes to bear, in 
particular, revisiting the industry discussion after the publication of the Financial 
Conduct Authority review on asset management pricing due out in 2017. 
 
 
3.6 Conclusion and implications for the research 
 
If fund managers on aggregate have harnessed the ability to dictate contractual 
terms that bear no theoretical relationship with the value to be gained by the use 
of financial intermediation, pension trustees have a responsibility to impose 
discipline on the agent (Clark, 2004).  However, they must be empowered to do 
so.  Clark’s (2013; p58) analysis of the Kay Review concluded “the key 
recommendations, aimed at applying a stronger conception of fiduciary duty to 
investment managers, will have little impact if asset holders40 are not effective 
clients of the global financial services industry.”  The chapter paid particular 
reference to institutional governance in recognition that it is not money that 
matters in the financial intermediation, but the institutional behaviour of the parties 
that collect and provide that money (Liedekerke, 2013).  For this behaviour to be 
appraised effectively there will need to be consensus on two material issues.  
Firstly, the appropriate relationship between the risk and reward and how financial 
intermediaries should be evaluated as efficient resource allocators to be deemed 
legitimate.  Secondly, the current state of fiduciary responsibility - for what and to 
                                            
40
 Asset holders (also asset owners) are pension funds, the beneficiary owner of the assets. 
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whom?  The academic literature has concentrated on the responsibilities pension 
funds have to control fund managers, but is quiet on the responsibilities fund 
managers have to act in fiduciary agency to the principals whose funds they 
manage.  The industry literature is ambiguous.  Much of the industry press 
exhorts the need, and actual existence of this reciprocal duty.  However this is 
almost unanimously contradicted by both sets of law makers. 
 
The next chapter builds a conceptual framework for considering the behaviour of 
the fund manager.  If the fees charged for fiduciary asset management are no 
longer reflective of the relationship between risk and reward as finance theory 
would suggest, then its viability as a contemporary theory must be questionable.  
The theory of the fund manager as agent with the egoist perquisite assumptions 
upon which economic agency theory is founded may be a more predictive 
empirical representation of the industry’s function.  The contribution to this theory 
is exploring which principal the agent is signalling their exclusive best efforts to; 
the principal with the statutory fiduciary rights or the principal with ambiguous 
fiduciary claims despite unlimited liability.  If the former, then can be argued that 
fund managers are acting judiciously by over-charging pension trusts in the profit-
making best interests of their shareholders given there is no legal precedent of a 
duty of exclusive best interest arising to the pension principal. 
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Chapter 4 
Conceptual framework:  The theories 
employed to examine pension agency 
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4.1  Introduction 
 
Chapters 2 and 3 described the development of the pensions industry as the 
contemplation of two principals with assets reliant on their financial intermediary 
agent.  The first was the shareholder of a funds management corporation.  The 
second was the client of the corporation; the pension fund asset holder.  This 
chapter brings these interacting entities together into a conceptual framework 
grounded in the apposite theories of academia.  It illustrates the pension 
phenomenon through the lens of these theories, with the intention of establishing 
the conceptual foundation for the research design. 
 
It was not until 1948 that parliament passed the National Assistance Act 1948, 
establishing the universal entitlement to social retirement security.  The age of 
eligibility for the retirement pension was set at 65 years when average life 
expectancy was 60 years (Harris, 1996).  In the mid-1980s, as part of a 
programme of deregulation, the Thatcher government enacted the Social 
Security Act in 1986, significantly cutting back State pension funding 
commitments and widening private provision through personal contributions-
based retirement insurance (Blackburn, 2006).  With current life expectancy 
averaging 80 years in the UK, prospective retirees have the challenge of 
sacrificing sufficient current earnings to investments supplementing a deficient 
State pension for the average 15 years of life post work, while retaining an 
acceptable present-day standard of living.  The role of UK occupational pension 
schemes is to invest their member contributions to achieve the necessary return 
on investment for that undertaking to be realised. 
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As discussed; the vast majority of trustees operate in a voluntary capacity, 
possessing no specialist financial management expertise, and accordingly 
outsource their members’ funds to professional fund management firms.  In doing 
so they establish a principal-agent relationship characterised by the principal 
incentivising and monitoring the agent in order that the agent acts according to 
their wishes (Holland, 2011). 
 
Agency theory rests on the economic assumption of self-interested agents, and 
the mechanisms principals must employ to ensure agents act in the best interest 
of their assets (Hasnas, 1998).  However, as Chapter 2 illustrated, the duties fund 
managers owe to their shareholders are codified, and may encourage them to 
enter into inefficient contracts with pension clients that over-reward and under-
monitor their effort and expertise for the benefit of fiduciarily protected 
shareholders.  This conflict of interest that sets the fiduciary duties held to 
shareholders against the agency duties held to a client vulnerable to information 
asymmetry and imperfect monitoring opportunities was illustrated by the 
significant losses suffered by pension schemes through the 2007-2008 financial 
crisis where the government commissioned Kay Review noted: 
 
“The long term public goal for equity markets is in securing the public 
purposes of high performing companies and strong returns to savers 
through an effective asset management industry, and in ensuring that the 
profits earned by companies are as far as possible translated into returns 
to beneficiaries by minimising the costs of intermediation… It would 
seem fair to say that equity markets today serve the needs of the 
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players in these markets better than they serve either those who put 
up the money or the businesses wanting finance to support growth.”  
(Kay Review, 2012; p6) [Emphasis added] 
 
In the contextual background of fiduciary finance, the chapter describes the 
rationale for employing an agency theory prism for the analysis of fiduciary 
pension assets management, after assessing finance theory and stakeholder 
theory.  It concludes that fund managers have established an industry norm of 
remuneration based on absolute size of assets, rather than (or sometimes 
inclusive of) return on investment performance (O’Brien, 2004).  This 
counterintuitive practice assumes they are free of agency conflicts and always 
value-adding when establishing the efficient cost of intermediation.  Agency 
theory also posits the additional assertion that the fund manager is governed in 
the profit-maximising best interests of their shareholders (Beltratti, 2005). This 
suggests a conflicted relationship, or correlation between cost of intermediation 
(fees for asset management) and shareholder profit pressure.  The chapter 
concludes that agency theory presents a more accurate reflection of the fiduciary 
behaviour fund managers exhibit in pension asset management as the guide to 
the research design. 
 
 
4.2  The theoretical foundations for the thesis and research design 
 
Neither agency theory nor stakeholder theory are designed for multiple principals 
of the agent in the literature.  They typically consider that one agent has one 
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principal (or principals not in conflict) or that one entity has stakeholders, all with 
no stakeholders of their own.  Neither provides the theoretical guidance for 
interactions between a firm/agent and two incompatibly motivated principals, both 
with fiduciary claims over the agent.  To explore the agency governance effects 
these theories may exert on funds management industry inquires requires 
examination of the characteristics upon which these theories have been built. 
 
Dobson (1999) sees agency theory as the worst philosophical justification for 
corporate decision making, seeing a management scapegoat from having to 
reconcile diverse moral perspectives, instead promoting reliance on the market 
mechanism to translate moral concerns into economic signals.  Coco and Ferri 
(2010) see its assumption of shareholder wealth maximisation correlating with 
the unsustainable risk taking that led to retail bank failure in the financial crisis of 
2008.  However, Beck (2005) argues that corporate governance rules are 
distributively neutral and provides evidence to support the claim that regulatory 
alternatives may not positively affect distributive justice for stakeholders any more 
successfully.  Macey and O’Hara (2003; p94) said of stakeholder governance, 
“when directors must not only decide what their duty of loyalty mandates, but also 
to whom their duty of loyalty runs (and in what proportions), poorer decisions can 
be expected.”  Yet Relano (2011) compares the performance of social and 
traditional banks, finding social banks with a stakeholder focus prove surprisingly 
competitive.  The fund management business model is different as their 
shareholders are not bearing the risk of poor corporate performance, they get 
remunerated as a percentage of assets under management regardless of results.  
This presents a challenge for the existing theories of firm behaviour.  Freeman 
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(1994) calls for a new academic theory that resituates the raison d'être of the firm.  
The conceptual framework developed in this chapter proposes that agency theory 
can be modified to accommodate the fund management business model. 
 
4.2.1  The choice of theory for the research frame for interpreting 
firm behaviour 
 
In a positivist inquiry, the research should commence with a theory best suited to 
the research questions in order to determine whether the deductive reasoning of 
the theory and empirical observations of the research phenomena follows as a 
logical consequence, i.e. the observation has been predicted and so the rule and 
explanation of the theory can continue to be inferred (Yin, 2009).  This requires a 
theory capable of such testing.  This section compares agency theory and 
stakeholder theory as competitors to the traditional view of the finance industry 
through finance theory in order to establish rationale for the theory framing the 
research design. 
 
4.2.2  Stakeholder theory and legitimacy theory 
 
In 1984 Freeman published a landmark thesis, “Strategic Management: A 
Stakeholder Approach.”  It was written as both a criticism of, and antidote to, the 
dominant theory of corporate governance, shareholder theory.  Concerned that 
“managerial capitalism” or the dominant position shareholder wealth building 
occupied in the efforts of management, Freeman reframed ma
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obligations to all stakeholders, being “any group or individual who can affect or is 
affected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives,” (Freeman, 1984; 
Freeman et al., 2004).  Key (1999) accords Freeman’s 1984 work as the closest 
attempt at developing a new theory to challenge the old.  The interests of 
“legitimate” stakeholders hold intrinsic value and no one group can assume to 
dominate the rights of others when it comes to management decision making, 
contrary to the existing paradigm of shareholder bias.  Jones and Wicks (1999) 
view stakeholder theory as a group of narrative stories about firm behaviour 
(unlike the customary social science one-view theory), logically embedded in 
sociology, or normative business ethics.  Numerous authors have referred to 
stakeholder theory as Kantian capitalism (Wicks, 1998; Bowie, 1998), able to 
install moral imperatives within the business construct.  A central tenet of 
stakeholder theory is that the firm remains viable, and managers who prioritise 
impractical normative behaviour are not “advancing the stakes of all 
stakeholders” (Jones and Wicks, 1999).  Stakeholders would not gravitate to a 
financially unviable firm.  Freeman (1994) explains a stake as being equity, 
economic or influence in nature.  Key (1999) describes these as forms of power 
that may provide the theory logic required, however she concludes that Freeman 
has not provided this as the basis for explaining firm behaviour.  Mitchell et al. 
(1997) concur that Freeman offers no explanatory power over whom and what 
the manager should pay attention to.  They use risk (of harm both to the firm and 
the stake) as being the basis of a “legitimate” stake rather than any participant in 
an exchange relationship with the firm.  Reviewing the stakeholder literature, they 
summarise scholarly attempts to define legitimate claims as contract, exchange, 
legal title or right, moral rights, at-risk status or moral interest.  Their counter 
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proposed definition of whom and what managers attend to is power to influence 
the firm, regardless of legitimate stake. 
 
Stakeholder theory has been criticised on several grounds; 1) the obligations of 
the agent to the principal are singular and greater than those to third parties 
(Freeman, 1994); 2) traditional value maximisation gives managers a clear and 
principled objective (Jensen, 2001); 3) the theory leaves managers and directors 
unaccountable through traditional (legislative and reporting) means by claiming 
stakeholder fiduciary demands for aberrant results of their resource distribution 
(Jensen, 2001); 4) it makes the assumption that business as usual pays no heed 
to any constituent or influence, either internal or external (Key, 1999); 5) it lends 
legitimacy or power to a variety of special interest groups without retaining the a 
set of principles to reject claims (Jensen, 2001) and 6) it has a firm centric view 
that implies the firm’s environment (society) is a single (static) stakeholder (Key, 
1999). 
 
Stakeholder theory, according to Stieb (2009), is arguably one of the most 
prominent to arrive at business management from the school of philosophy.  
Taking a possibly contentious view, he sees Freeman’s 1984 treatise and 
subsequent attempts to clarify its explanatory and predictive power not as a 
theory of the firm but as a philosophical call to “redistribute the wealth [to] offer 
solace and compassion”.  It does not, he says, offer guidance on who should be 
given more decision making power, nor on who is empowered to redistribute 
decision making power.  The ability to trust those who manage money is the 
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simple foundation of the fiduciary concept in finance disregarded by stakeholder 
theory. 
 
Jones and Wicks (1999; p206) use Bacharach’s definition of theory as “a 
statement of relations among concepts within a set of boundary assumptions and 
constraints”.  It must possess sufficient explanatory power and be logically 
falsifiable.  Key (1999; p317) applies Mills description of a theory as a “systematic 
attempt to understand what is observable in the world” and notes that a good 
theory has both explanatory and predictive power.  While parsimony is desirable, 
it is not essential as social system complexity resists modelling.  Logic, however, 
is essential and Goodpaster (1991) notes that attempts to build on introduction of 
ethical values as the underlying logic in stakeholder theory may not provide the 
logic to explain firm behaviour, normative ethics being prescriptive rather than 
explanatory or predictive.  Freeman (1994) acknowledges that stakeholder theory 
is pragmatic; less about “what is true” in favour of “how should we live”.  Freeman 
(1994; p12) elaborates, “for too long philosophers, ethicists, liberal theorists and 
others have looked down their noses at business as not worthy of serious 
intellectual attention”, concluding “there is no such thing as stakeholder 
theory...[but] a genre of stories about how we could live”.  While possibly not 
designed to be theory, it is a way of thinking about the firm that challenges the 
dominant paradigm of agency theory.  According to Key (1999) “current 
conceptualizations of stakeholder theory do not meet the requirements of 
scientific theory.”  Miles (2015; p1) concurs, stakeholder theory is not a theory 
but a collection of narratives that are “highly problematic for theory development 
and empirical testing.” 
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4.2.3  Agency theory 
 
The problems of agency and the separation of ownership and control conundrum 
have been recognised as far back as Thomas Hobbs (for a description of the 
social contract theory offered in Leviathan (1651), see Sandbu, 2012) and Adam 
Smith (for an analysis of the separation of ownership and control in An Enquiry 
into the Nature and Causes of The Wealth of Nations (1759), see Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976), and has been studied by scholars in accounting, economics, 
finance, political science, organisational behaviour and sociology (Eisenhardt, 
1989).  In 1972 two scholars from Pennsylvania University began work on the 
theories of agency, unknown to each other; Stephen Ross ((1973) an economist) 
and Barry Mitnick (2012; 1973) an organisational behaviour scholar).  Ross’ 
economic theory of agency quickly came to dominance and was later powerfully 
entrenched when in 1976 Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) seminal work outlined a 
theory of agency as a set of parsimonious economic principles that overlooked 
Mitnick’s behavioural consequences, and continues to influence contemporary 
finance and corporate governance thinking in academia, accounting standards 
and corporate law. 
 
4.2.3.1  The definition of agency theory 
 
Agency theory describes relationships in which “one party (the principal) 
delegates work to another (the agent) who performs that work” (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
p60).  Agency relationships exist in all parts of society such as the politician and 
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constituent (Culpan and Trussel, 2005), the lawyer and client (Blair and Stout, 
2006), the doctor and patient (Langer et al., 2009) or the firm manager and 
shareholders (Jensen, 2001).  The agency problem is mainly articulated as the 
principal and the agent having 1) conflicting motivations that either agent or 
principal bears the cost of mediating and monitoring (Donaldson and Davis, 
1991); 2) different risk propensities (Jones, 1995); and 3) information asymmetry 
benefiting the agent (Ross, 1973).  Under this model it is the principal’s problem 
of adverse selection when entering the relationship at being unable to properly 
estimate potential for performance through lack of information (Cormier et al., 
2011).  As the relationship progresses the principal faces the moral hazard of 
being unable to impose or afford monitoring mechanisms on the agent to detect 
underperformance, perquisites (undue rewards) or overpayment (Myerson, 
2012).  Khan (2006) sees these conflicts of interest being mediated in the theory 
by the power of the principal, as a dominant principal over a submissive agent in 
negotiating terms.  The unit of analysis between the agent and the principal is the 
contract and so the focus of the theory is on the most efficient contract governing 
the principal-agent relationship.  According to Eisenhardt (1989; p58) 
“Specifically, the question becomes, is a behaviour-oriented contract (eg. 
salaries, hierarchical governance) more efficient than an outcome-oriented 
contract (eg. commissions, stock options, transfer of property rights, market 
governance).”  See Table 4.1 for the assumptions of agency theory. 
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Table 4.1 Agency theory overview 
KEY IDEA Principal-agent relationships should reflect efficient organisation of 
information and risk-bearing costs 
UNIT OF ANALYSIS Contract between principal and agent 
HUMAN ASSUMPTIONS Self-interest, bounded rationality, risk aversion 
ORGANISATION 
ASSUMPTIONS 
Partial goal conflict among participants, Efficiency as the 
effectiveness criteria, information asymmetry between principal and 
agent 
INFORMATION ASSUMPTION Information as a purchasable commodity 
CONTRACTING PROBLEMS Agency (moral hazard and adverse selection), risk-sharing 
PROBLEM DOMAIN Relationships in which the principal and agent have partly differing 
goals and risk preferences (eg. Compensation, regulation, leadership, 
impression management, whistleblowing, vertical integration, 
transfer pricing. 
Source:  Eisenhardt, 1989; p59 
 
The next section examines how agency theory came to be shaped by various 
academic disciplines, specifically economics and corporate law.  These 
disciplines bring different perspectives to rent seeking and externalities in agency 
theory. 
 
4.2.3.2  Agency theory interpreted through economics 
 
The agency problem manifests the moment principals believe agents have 
deviated from their interests (Dunning, 2012).  The formalisation of economic 
agency theory laid down in Ross’ 1973 seminal treatise addresses both the moral 
hazard and allocation inefficiencies created by the information asymmetry 
benefiting the agent.  In 1976 Jensen and Meckling outlined the economic 
argument for binding agent motives to the principal’s gain through incentives and 
monitoring.  Principals will contract with the agent until the cost is too high and 
substitution is available, with the principal being the residual claimants of any 
value creation in the process (Bainbridge, 2006; Jones, 1995; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976).  A body of work has developed around the concept of the 
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rationally self-interested agent who requires controlling through market oriented 
mechanisms (Stieb, 2009; Jensen, 2001; Williamson, 1979).  These mechanisms 
include aligning the agent’s desires with those of the principal through 
performance based remuneration, monitoring and the market for competition 
(Lan and Heracleous, 2010; Donaldson and Davis, 1991).  Theoretically this 
easily describes the pension trust handing its assets to the fund manager. 
 
Economic theory is still underpinned by the utility (profit) maximisation motive and 
the courts have upheld this (Hay, 1972).  Distaste for agency theory has 
intensified in the light of agent incentives failing to take account of notions of 
trustworthiness, duty or professionalism, acknowledging only self-serving 
motivations (Ghoshal, 2005; Stout, 2003a).  Agency theory became the primary 
intellectual tool available to scholars in the finance industry, yet it fails to predict 
fundamental elements in the law by simplifying the economic problem down to 
getting agents to act as principals require of them (Blair and Stout, 2006).  In the 
case of the fund manager with two principals, the agency relationship is twofold.  
Shareholders will monitor and incentivise the fund manager to maximise 
shareholder value.  Pension clients will monitor and incentivise them to maximise 
residual claims from the value creation of their assets under management.  The 
contract between the pension client and the fund manager at any given time is a 
bellwether of the influence this principal exerts over the economic behaviour of 
the agent and may not fully reflect the investor relationship the fund manager 
develops with their shareholders to maximise the profit of the financial 
intermediary. 
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4.2.3.3  Legal contradictions in economic agency theory 
 
The story of the chimney and the wall;  Coase (1960) used the legal case of 
Bryant v. Lefever41 to illustrate the different resource allocation viewpoints arrived 
at by economics and the law.  The plaintiff and defendant were neighbours, both 
in similar houses.  Until 1876 the plaintiff was able to light fires in the house.  After 
the defendant rebuilt a taller house, smoke from the fires no longer escaped the 
plaintiff’s chimneys, causing a nuisance.  The Judge ruled that the plaintiff had 
no right to the passage of air, the defendant had done nothing wrong in rebuilding 
their house and the plaintiff caused the nuisance to himself by lighting the fires 
for which he had not provided an effective means of escape.  No damages were 
awarded to the plaintiff.  While judges must apply the law to legal liability, when 
viewed from an economic perspective the nuisance was caused by both the wall 
and the fire as in the absence of either there would be no nuisance.  To achieve 
optimum resource allocation (or maximum utility), both should account for the 
nuisance in decision making otherwise it remains an externality imposed by one 
party on another.  The defendant must compensate the plaintiff for half his losses 
to achieve resource efficiency (and internalising the externality).  Reasoning 
employed in the courts often seems irrelevant to the economic pursuit of 
maximising the value of overall production (“not what shall be done by whom, but 
who has the legal right to do what” in Coase, 1960; p15).  When property rights 
are clear and market transactions are nil, legal outcomes should be predictable.  
                                            
41
 Bryant v Lefever (1879), 4 CPD 172 
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When this is not the case, legal activity (either via the courts or government) 
influences economic activity. 
 
There is no question that the fund manager is the agent of the pension client.  
Sandbu (2012; p106) says of any agency obligation; “representing someone, in 
the morally relevant sense, will entail tending to the moral responsibilities of those 
one represents,” in criticising the normatively neutral utility principle of economic 
agency.  The duty of obedience vested in legal agency one of “unthinking 
faithfulness to a person, group or purpose, requiring the bearer to supress their 
own preferences, values and perspectives” (Fisher and Lovell, 2009; p302) as 
opposed to the economic agency relationship which requires incentivising and 
monitoring to align these interests.  Information asymmetry and power to control 
the pension’s assets gives the fund manager the advantageous position, and 
thereby a duty to take special care of the principal’s interests (Dunning, 2012; 
Graafland and van de Ven, 2011; Lan and Heracleous, 2010).  Honesty and 
transparency are moral duties in contracting, where it is assumed that parties 
meet as equals, however where one party has an inherent power or information 
advantage and the other is vulnerable, the law hands agents higher duties to 
prevent their dominant position harming the vulnerable party (Blair and Stout, 
2006).  While legal theory makes a strong case for fund managers to be viewed 
as fiduciary agents of the pension fund’s substantial wealth, there is no formal 
fiduciary relationship between them.  This leaves the contract as a potential 
manifestation of economic agency theory with the accompanying hazards to the 
principal vulnerable to an agent maximising their wealth capture. 
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4.3  Agency theory as the conceptual framework for the research 
design 
 
Daily et al. (2003) urge that agency theory continues to, but need not dominate 
studies of corporate governance.  For this research financial intermediation 
theory, stakeholder theory, transaction cost theory and finance theory are similar 
contenders.  However, empirical testing of agency theory shares a strong body 
of work in the literature to support the research design (see Table 4.2 for a 
taxonomy).  Given there is little evidence in the literature for empirical testing of 
the corporate governance of financial intermediaries, using the established 
corporate governance ontology makes the novelty of a fund management 
institution examination less undetermined.  The contribution this brings to the 
ontology is an additional study of an underexplored industry to the body of work 
and the theoretical discussion of the agency theory dominance of institutional 
governance. 
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Table 4.2 A taxonomy of empirical studies of agency theory in the corporate governance 
and business ethics literature 
AGENCY 
CHARACTERISTIC 
EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
AGENCY COSTS Yu, 2012; Howorth & Moro, 2012; Lassoued & Elmir, 2012; Mande et al., 2012; 
Francis et al., 2011; Renou, 2008; Khan, 2006; Hutchison & Gul, 2003; Mutairi et 
al., 2001; Rao & Neilsen, 1992; Kim & Sorensen, 1986; Easterbrook, 1984. 
AGENT EFFICIENCY Chan et al., 2013; Rossi, 2010; Fogarty et al., 2009; Lee, 2009; Arthurs et al., 
2008; Zyglidopoulos et al., 2008; Arnold & Lange, 2004; Lie, 2000; Due, 1959. 
ALTERNATIVE 
THEORY 
COMPARISONS 
Heracleous & Lan, 2012; Laan et al., 2008; Van der Laan et al., 2007; Culpan & 
Trussel, 2005; Coombs & Gilley, 2005; Yoshimori, 2005; Ogden & Watson, 1999; 
Clarkson, 1995; Wray et al., 1994; Donaldson & Davis, 1991; Reidenbach & 
Robin, 1990; Oviatt, 1988. 
BUSINESS ETHICS / 
SUSTAINABILITY 
Freeman & Groom, 2013; Becker & Stromberg, 2012; Moore, 2012; Yu & Ting, 
2012; Eccles et al., 2011; Fernando & Chowdhury, 2010; Haddock-Fraser & 
Tourelle, 2010; Rost et al., 2010; Kaptein, 2008; Fernando et al., 2008; James Jr, 
2006. 
INCENTIVES Fleming & Schaupp, 2012; Chapman & Kelliher, 2011; Fahlenbrach et al., 2011; 
Mainelli, 2009; Grabke-Rundell & Gomex-Mejia, 2002; David et al., 1998; Ittner 
et al., 1997; Zajac & Westphal, 1994. 
INFORMATION 
ASYMMETRY 
Eckerd & Hill, 2012; Fakhfakh et al., 2012; Jung et al., 2012; Hoffman & Fieseler, 
2012; Gibilaro & Mattarocci, 2011; Cormier et al., 2011; Lehtimaki etal., 2011; 
Drobetz et al., 2010; Ming Te l et al., 2010; Yeoh, 2010; Waller & Lanis, 2009; 
Gibson & O'Donovan, 2007; Martin & Nisar, 2007; Arcot & Bruno, 2006. 
MORAL HAZARD Davison & Stevens, 2013; Yusuf, 2011; Garcia-Meca & Sanchez-Ballesta, 2009; 
Anderson et al., 2008; Long & Driscoll, 2008; McCarthy & Puffer, 2008; 
Westphal, 1999; Millon & Thakor, 1985. 
OWNERSHIP 
STRUCTURES 
Jiraport et al., 2012; Renders & Gaeremynck, 2012; Frank & Sundgren, 2012; 
Kathyayini & Rao, 2012; Osemeke, 2012; Ting, 2011; Margaritis & Psillaki, 2010; 
Yeh, et al., 2008; Goergen & Renneboog, 2007. 
RISK Cooper & Uzun, 2012; Klimczak, 2008; Berger & Bonaccorsi de Patti, 2006; 
Bloom & Milkovich, 1998. 
 
The appropriate unit of measurement for analysis of the effect the agent has over 
a pension principal is the net outcome of the investment performance achieved 
by the fund manager after all fees and charges (Lan and Heracleous, 2010).  
Economic agency theory hypothesises that the pension trust will incentivise the 
fund manager to the extent that it is in the efficient best interest of the agent to 
deliver this optimally (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  Pension trusts are compelled 
by law to act for contributing beneficiaries for the “exclusive purpose of providing 
benefits to them and defraying administrative expenses” (Greenwood, 1996; p28; 
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see Cowan v Scargill for the landmark case law on duties).  To discharge the 
latter duty, pension funds must ensure that the fund managers’ fee for handling 
their assets represents a fair price for members (Kay, 2012).  Depending on 
where the fund manager sits on the governance spectrum, they are presented 
with a conflict of interest that pits their fiduciary duties to shareholders against 
their agency duties to a client vulnerable to information asymmetry.  The LCR 
(2013, p21) interpreted the fiduciary standard owed by the fund manager as 
“ensuring that the direct and indirect costs of services provided are reasonable 
and disclosed, and that conflicts of interest are avoided wherever possible, or 
else disclosed or otherwise managed to the satisfaction of the client or 
beneficiary.”  Conversely, in its consultation with pension trustees, it found that 
“many trustees were aware of their status as fiduciaries, which resonates with a 
sense of altruism.  Trustees contrasted their special status as fiduciaries with the 
focus of others in the investment chain on making money” (LCR, 2013, p7).  This 
sentiment is endorsed by the Nicholl and Brown (2013; p7) survey into investment 
management fees, concluding that disclosure may be an issue for pension trusts 
“particularly as the[se] fees are high in relation to the returns achieved”.  In 
contrast the Investment Management Association asserted fund managers’ rights 
to pressure pension trusts into non-disclosure agreements regarding fees; a 
development David Blake of The Pensions Institute describes as “an outrage” 
(Sharman, 2014).  This agency problem of the conflicting fiduciary beneficiary of 
the agent’s efforts has been described by Blackburn (2006) as inviting the 
systematic failure of modern day pension provision. 
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4.3.1  Agency and finance theory in financial intermediation 
 
As an institutional investor in their own right, pension funds benefit from regular 
inflows of funds, yet the majority of their investment activities are delegated to 
professional financial intermediaries.  This creates a chain of agency 
relationships (Klumps and McCrae, 1999; see Figure 4.1).  This chain of agency 
relationships is rarely acknowledged in empirical studies evaluating the financial 
performance of pension funds (Holland, 2006).  These studies typically use 
CAPM-based measures of performance to analyse the absolute and risk adjusted 
rates of return earned through the investment of pooled fund assets, with the 
assumptions of perfectly elastic demand for the underlying assets and 
informationally efficient stock markets (Klumps and McCrae, 1999). 
 
Figure 4.1 The chain of agency wealth capture of ROI in pension fund management 
 
Source: Author 
Pension contributor
Salary sacrificed 
contributions made to 
retirement insurance as 
either a defined benefit, 
or defined contribution 
based on ROI
Pension trust agent
Charges the contributor 
an administration fee for 
operating the pension 
scheme (including 
monitoring the fund 
manager through 
accounting, legal and 
external consulting 
services
Funds Manager agent
Charges the pension trust 
a performance related 
fee for funds 
management that 
incentivises the agent to 
perform in the pension 
trust's best interest
Intermediary market
Charges the funds 
manager transactions 
costs to enter the market 
(passed on to the pension 
trust)
159 
 
Holland (2011) sees this adherence to CAPM modelling in pension performance 
as no longer representative of the investing reality.  In reality, pension trustees 
subject their fund assets to multiple sets of intermediation costs, even while 
applying their own.  Cox et al., (2004) found fund managers with less competition 
when courting clients produced weaker financial results.  Ippolito and Turner 
(1987) found average pension performance significantly underperforms both the 
SandP 500 Index and equivalent mutual funds.  Lakonishok et al. (1992) uncover 
evidence of distortion in fund management investment behaviour such as lock-in 
strategies.  Christopherson et al. (1997) and Brown et al. (1997) both found that 
US and UK pension funds retained fund managers even when CAPM modelling 
suggested negative returns for doing so.  This pension trustee tolerance for 
underperformance, as both Holland (2011) and Klumps and McCrae (1999) 
suggest, is in keeping with the expectations of economic agency theory, yet has 
departed from the rational investor behaviour predicted by finance theory to the 
detriment of pension contributors and any measure of the contributors’ wellbeing.  
Table 4.3 takes agency theory assumptions and compares them with the finance 
theory perspective. 
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Table 4.3 The conflicting theoretical views of the principal-agent contract 
CHARACTERISTIC FINANCE THEORY AGENCY THEORY 
FUND MANAGEMENT 
RELATIONSHIP 
GOAL 
INCONGRUITY 
Parties meet as equals 
and will only contract 
when both goals are met 
by the contract 
(Mehran and Stulz, 
2007) 
The principal must 
incentivise and monitor 
the agent to align their 
effort with the 
priŶĐipal͛s iŶterests.  
The contract will be 
either behavioural 
based (professional 
fee) or outcome based 
(performance pay) 
(Eisenhardt, 1989) 
The outcome based 
contract (for passive or 
active management) 
incentivises the agent to 
invest assets to beat the 
market 
(Whitwell, 2013) 
INFORMATION 
ASYMMETRY 
Both parties are 
perfectly informed 
(Chan, 1983) 
Information asymmetry 
benefits the agent, 
leaving the principal 
vulnerable to adverse 
selection and moral 
hazard 
(Walter, 2004) 
The pension trustees are 
unsophisticated investors 
reliant on the financial 
expertise of the agent will 
little ability to monitor or 
assess the actions of the 
agent 
(Clark, 2004) 
RISK ALIGNMENT Risk is fully anticipated 
and born by the party 
with the most appetite 
in anticipation of higher 
rewards yet prepared to 
taken on the downside 
scenario 
(Kolb, 2011) 
The agent is assumed 
to be more risk adverse 
than the principal and 
must be incentivised to 
shoulder risk they 
would otherwise shirk 
(Caprio and Levine, 
2002) 
The fund manager bears 
little risk; the contracted 
fee provides for a 
percentage of the assets.  
The pension fund risk is to 
the full amount of the 
assets managed 
(Eichberger et. al., 1999) 
FAIR PRICE The price is that which 
the parties agree for the 
contract to take place 
and is distributively 
neutral 
(Allen and Santomero, 
2001) 
In performance-based 
compensation 
contracts, earnings are 
expected to provide 
accurate information 
on managerial effort  
(Wesley and Ndofor, 
2013) 
The key recommendations 
of the Kay Review (2012), 
aimed at applying a 
stronger conception of 
fiduciary duty to 
investment managers, will 
have little impact if asset 
holders are not effective 
clients of the global 
financial services industry. 
(Clark, 2013) 
OWNERSHIP 
STRUCTURE 
Prevailing stock prices 
will reflect all 
information currently 
publicly available in 
relation to any 
company, as stated by 
the efficient capital 
markets hypothesis 
(ECMH) in finance 
theory 
(Moore and Reberioux, 
2011) 
Economic ownership 
structure is a nexus of 
contracts with 
shareholders as 
residual claimants. 
(Jensen and Meckling, 
1976) 
Redefining the principal 
from shareholders to the 
corporation, redefining the 
status of the board from 
shareholders͛ ageŶts to 
autonomous fiduciaries, 
and redefining the role of 
the board from monitors to 
mediating hierarchs will 
enable fiduciary financial 
intermediation. 
(Lan and Heracleous, 2010) 
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FIDUCIARY DUTY Advances in both 
behavioural finance 
theory and in empirical 
testing have suggested 
that securities markets 
may be more flawed 
than systematic 
previously believed in 
protecting fiduciaries 
(McDonnell, 2003) 
 
Corporate scholarship 
is premised on the 
shareholder primacy 
norm – a norm that 
was developed in the 
context of fiduciary 
principles. 
(Fisch, 2004) 
͞The British goǀerŶŵeŶt͛s 
response to the final report 
of the Kay Review was 
lukewarm, deferring on its 
recommendations on 
fiduĐiary duty.͟ 
(Clark, 2013; p54) 
Adapted from (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 
The relative neglect economic and finance theory has shown the institutions of 
the finance industry may be partly to blame for why its behaviour has not been 
exposed to the assumptions of agency theory.  Using agency theory to explore 
the relationship between the pension fund and the fund manager is a well-
supported research design in the literature of parallel industries, particularly in the 
research of corporate governance.  The economic agency relationship between 
agent and principals can be conceptualised by Figure 4.2.  The corporate 
governance characteristics of the fund manager are proposed to legitimately 
decrease the flow of pension assets. 
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Figure 4.2 The fiduciary governance decision of the fund manager determining shareholder 
wealth maximisation income withheld from the return on investment of pension assets 
 
Source: Adapted from Holland, 2011  Flow of pension assets   
Wealth capture of pension assets 
 
Holland (2011) investigated the reasons for pervasive and systematic fund 
management doctrine of fees as a percentage of assets under management 
regardless of service performance to illustrate the limits of conventional finance 
theory in explaining fund manager behaviour.  Figure 4.2 adapts Holland’s (2011) 
qualitative grounded theory study of fund manager corporate governance along 
with Reich-Graeffe’s (2011a) concept of management behaviour influenced by 
their governance characteristics to construct a conceptual framework for the 
research.  Holland’s (2011; p159) work in his own words has created a “new way 
to use theory and literature in a coherent analytic framework to interpret the 
empirical phenomena” of fund management governance. 
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4.4  The characteristics of the agent’s principals 
 
One of the acknowledged founders of agency theory, Stephen A Ross (Ross, 
1973; p134) described the agency relationship as one of the “oldest and 
commonest codified modes of social interaction,” suggesting consequential 
knowledge should be of great importance to the study of business.  While Husted 
(2007; p178) said that the study of business ethics cannot be reduced to simple 
mechanics, “proper design of incentives and structures needs to be taken into 
account.”  He continues, “the point of the principal-agent model is to help scholars 
and practitioners to identify relevant organizational mechanisms and allow them 
to design those mechanisms so that they support ethical objectives.”  These 
mechanisms have been developed in agency theory to include internal incentives 
(e.g. executive remuneration) and external monitors (e.g. the market for 
corporate control) described in Chapter 2.  This study, limited by publicly available 
data, yet consistent with Heracleous and Lan’s (2012) recommendations, uses a 
limited set of external characteristics to explore what governance trends can be 
inferred in UK pension financial intermediation.  Agency theory in corporate 
governance has been developed and empirically examined in the academic 
literature using a set of foundational assumptions: 1) the separation problem of 
powerful management controlling public corporations with weak and dispersed 
shareholder owners (ownership structure) (Kangis and Kareklis, 2001); 2) the 
comparative assumption that the primacy of shareholder rights is more 
entrenched in Anglo-American economic regimes (governance compliance 
regime) (Iwai, 1999); 3) The size of the agent delivering coercive power over the 
vulnerable principal (Chan et al., 2009; Chen, 2004); 4) the principal’s problem of 
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an inability to monitor whether the agent is providing value at capacity (moral 
hazard) (Yusuf, 2011); and 5) the principal’s problem of selecting an under-
performing agent due to information deficiencies benefiting the agent (adverse 
selection) (Mande et al., 2012). 
 
4.4.1  Ownership structure effect on governance for the 
shareholder 
 
In 1983 a seminal article by Eugene Fama and Michael Jensen observed that the 
separation of decision and risk-bearing functions in listed firms required very 
different management monitoring and incentives to that of partnerships.  In 1988 
Oviatt called for further research on whether institutional investor shareholders 
affected firm shareholder wealth, observing that understanding the effect of 
changes in ownership structures was becoming increasingly important. 
Ownership structures have been recognised as a central agency characteristic 
by numerous scholars (Kangis and Kareklis, 2001; Byrd et al., 1998; Steiner, 
1996; Kim and Sorensen, 1986).  Kangis and Kareklis (2001) found significantly 
closer alignment between manager motivations and corporate objectives in 
private banks over public banks.  Erkens et al. (2012) found financial institutions 
with institutional ownership took on more risk and incurred greater losses during 
the 2007 - 2008 financial crisis.  Laeven and Levine (2007) find that large financial 
conglomerates are undervalued by shareholders compared to smaller specialist 
intermediaries, concluding agency costs of monitoring unwieldy conglomerates 
outweigh diversification advantages.  Conversely, Berger and Bonaccorsi de Patti 
(2006) found block or institutional ownership in banks lowered the agency 
165 
 
monitoring costs.  Goergen and Renneboog (2007) investigated the ownership 
change from initial founder shareholder to the disciplining role of the market for 
corporate control before and after IPO, finding a significant positive and sustained 
effect on firm value.  These and similar studies imply that ownership structures 
have an important effect on firm behaviour, have an important effect on behaviour 
in the finance industry specifically, and had a role in the wealth destruction of the 
financial crisis.  In keeping with the Reich-Graefe (2011a) hypothesis, the 
ownership structure of professional fund managers is presumed to influence their 
profit maximising behaviour to the benefit of the shareholder. 
 
Proposition 1: Total pension funds per member will be lower when managed by 
fund managers with external shareholders (Berle and Means, 1932) ownership 
structures. 
 
4.4.2  Political regime effect on governance for the shareholder 
 
Comparative corporate governance and the study of the geography of corporate 
governance is gaining momentum as an important tool for dynamic analysis.  
Different political regimes, incorporation environments, cultural norms and legal 
histories all impact the governance structures of firms (Clarke, 2010).  Bebchuk 
and Roe (1999; p127) call this “path dependence” and advise students of 
corporate governance that its incorporation into research is critical to 
understanding firm behaviour.  Arcot and Bruno (2006) outline the effects of the 
legislative history of corporate governance regime in the UK on compliance 
behaviour. Armour et al. (2003) examine the mediating influence the European 
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Union has had on UK corporate governance compared with the unrelenting 
shareholder primacy view of the United States.  Moore and Reberioux (2011) 
believe it important to compare the influence of the UK on European structures.  
Renders and Gaeremynck (2012) analyse the effect of corporate governance on 
principal-principal conflicts in European companies.  Roberts (2005) compares 
Anglo-American corporate governance models with those in China.  Iwai (1997; 
p40) says “what goes under the name of capitalism differs widely from country to 
country, even among advanced industrial societies.  Nowhere is this difference 
more marked than between America and Japan in regard to the ‘purpose’ of a 
corporation.”  Ryan and Schneider (2003) and McDonnell (2003) note 
fundamental governance differences at incorporation lead to different 
manifestations of the firm across state borders in the United States (the Delaware 
effect). 
 
While pension schemes in the UK share the same governance regime the 
professional fund managers handling their assets are global and subject to their 
own regulatory, cultural and historical pressure.  The pension mandate to the fund 
manager must comply with the two UK regulatory bodies42 and the Pensions Act 
2008 (LCR, 2013; Freshfields et al., 2005), yet fund managers are left largely 
unfettered in decisions on portfolio risk, fee structure and contractual exit.  
Bebchuck and Weisbach (2010) specifically analyse cross-border investments in 
global capital markets from the view of their different governance regimes.  Salter 
                                            
42
 The Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority  
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(2012) sees the Anglo-American corporate governance regime as moving 
relentlessly towards short-term shareholder value maximisation at the cost of 
long-term firm value creation.  Bogle (2009; p16) agrees, putting America ahead 
of the UK in developing a financial culture of abuse of trust, or shift from “there 
are some things that one simply does not do”, to one of “if everyone else is doing 
it, I can do it too.”  To this point, Rossouw (2009) takes an ethical perspective to 
each continent’s governance tendencies to describe the relationships companies 
in Europe, Asia and Africa share with society compared with the Anglo-American 
economies.  Gray (2008) points to Canada’s interlocking directorates for its 
surprising departure from the Anglo-American model in favour of stakeholder 
governance.  The geographical influence of the fund manager’s headquarters will 
influence their shareholder wealth maximising behaviour. 
 
Proposition 2: Total pension funds per member will be lower when managed by 
fund managers located in dominant shareholder-agency economic environments. 
 
4.4.3  Size of the fund manager’s assets effect on governance of 
the fund manager 
 
Studies of mutual funds have found that not only do performance differences exist 
in funds of different size, they persist over time (Brown and Goetzmann, 1995; 
Goetzmann and Ibbotson, 1994; Grinblatt and Titman, 1992).  Prather and 
Middleton’s (2002) study of mutual funds finds performance can be attributed to 
team decision making in large funds being superior to individual decisions.  Eberl 
and Schwaiger (2005) found that corporate brand reputation has a significant 
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effect on future financial performance in German companies.  Firer and Williams 
(2003) found strong evidence for a link between physical corporate capital and 
financial performance.  Conversely, a meta-analysis by Capon et al. (1990) 
suggested that growth was a predictor of performance, rather than size. 
 
Further evidence has been published of financial performance having a positive 
relationship with customer loyalty (Smith and Wright, 2004) and effective human 
resource management (Huselid et al., 1997), both further resourced in larger fund 
managers. 
 
Proposition 3: Total pension funds per member will be lower when managed by 
larger fund managers. 
 
4.4.4  Principals avoiding moral hazard  
 
A foundation concept of agency theory is the ethical and economic problem 
arising from incomplete or asymmetric information (Husted, 2007).  Information 
asymmetry need not be a problem where the agent and principal’s interests are 
perfectly aligned and benefits flow to the principal (Caers et al., 2006).  However, 
a moral hazard arises when 1) the agent’s true dedication to the principal is 
concealed or unobservable (Yusuf, 2011; Bosse and Phillips, 2011); 2) the 
principal suspects that the agent is egoistic (Lin and Huang, 2011); or 3) the agent 
owns performance information not in their best interests to divulge (Woodbyne 
and Taylor, 2006).  To prevent this, the principal provides contractual incentives 
(Fogarty et al., 2009), or incurs monitoring costs (Caers et al., 2006) to ensure 
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they receive the entire benefit of the agent’s effort.  Myerson (2012; p847) warns 
that moral hazard lies at the heart of financial intermediation in all capitalist 
economies: 
 
“A successful economy requires industrial concentrations of capital that 
are vastly larger than any typical individual’s wealth, and the mass of 
small investors must rely on specialists to do the work of identifying good 
investment opportunities. So the flow of capital to industrial investments 
must depend on a relatively small group of financial intermediaries, in 
banks and other financial institutions, who decide how to invest great 
sums of other people’s wealth. But individuals who hold such financial 
power may be tempted to abuse it for their own personal profit. To solve 
this problem of financial moral hazard, a successful capitalist economy 
needs a system of incentives for bankers and other financial 
intermediaries that can deter such abuse of power.” 
 
This describes Hall’s (2007; p718) problematic and secret nature of “knowledge 
rich communities of practice” such as financial intermediaries.  Further potential 
for moral hazard arises in financial intermediation as agents take risks without 
bearing the consequences (Mainelli, 2009).  In order to transfer some risk to the 
agent, intermediary contracts are outcome (contingency) based rather than effort 
(fee) based, however this rent shift need not occur if monitoring was perfect 
(Caers et al., 2006).  Herein lie agency theory’s multiple ethical dilemmas 
summarised by Dees (1992) as 1) obligations are ignored; 2) the agent is 
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portrayed as untrustworthy; 3) fairness is unaccounted for; and 4) ethical norms 
are absent. 
 
Moral hazard in the finance industry has been empirically examined.  Howorth 
and Moro (2012) studied the relationship between banks and Italian firms 
concluding heavy monitoring implies a lack of trust.  Myerson (2012) believes the 
liquidity freeze in the 2007 financial crisis was amplified by mere concerns over 
the potential for moral hazard in intermediation.  Drobetz et al. (2010) examined 
its role in leading to excessive cash holding.  Yusuf (2011) studied agent 
opportunism and private information in insurance brokers, with the effect on rising 
premiums.  Massa and Rehman (2008) found financial conglomerates exploit 
privileged inside information to boost self-owned mutual funds returns.  Hall 
(2007) found Wall Street banks form information networks for self-dealing.  
Engelberg et al. (2011) however, credit interpersonal information linkages 
between banks and loan recipients as providing better information and better 
monitoring thereby lower interest rates.  Lin and Huang (2011) concur for 
Taiwanese banks.  Becht et al. (2009) credit the outperformance of the Hermes 
Focus Fund as being due to private information rather than stock selection.  Jung 
et al. (2012) find a positive relationship between analysts’ information acquisition 
efforts and firm performance.  However, information asymmetry can be used by 
agents to redistribute value away from the principal (Jacobides and Crosons, 
2001).  When the agent has powerful owners and small clients, incapable of 
extensive monitoring, the client is in moral hazard. 
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Proposition 4: Total pension funds per member will be higher when pension 
clients are larger, avoiding wealth capture by the agent. 
 
4.4.5  Principals avoiding adverse selection 
 
Information is knowledge at a particular time of the values of different constructs 
that influence decisions (Husted, 2007).  Adverse selection is the phenomenon 
where the principal is unable to observe the characteristics of the agent prior to 
contracting with them (Caers et al., 2006).  The term originated in the insurance 
industry as the insurance firm’s inability to evaluate the health of a customer 
before providing insurance (Husted, 2007).  Mainelli (2009) describes a smart 
person who is intellectually below average for a job yet smart enough to secure 
an above average salary as adverse selection.  It creates frigidity over entering 
into a contract with trust (Howorth and Moro, 2012). Engelberg et al. (2011) found 
firms with credit ratings of BBB or above were able to secure interest rate 
concessions on loans, yet those with lower or non-existent ratings were punished 
above the interest rate.  It makes the cost of external financing higher (Drobetz 
et al., 2010), and encourages firms to hold excess cash (Myers and Majluf, 1984).  
Gorton (2009; p4) argues that a bank’s essential function is to provide 
“informationally-insensitive” debt to investors who have no access to privileged 
information.  Jiraporn et al. (2012) report the quality of corporate governance 
shared an inverse relationship with adverse selection in stock selection on the 
Singapore Stock Exchange.  Mande et al. (2012) report equity financing is sought 
by firms after strong results are confirmed by high quality auditors, in a bid to 
signal to market they will not suffer adverse selection.  For pension clients to 
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avoid adverse selection they must choose fund managers they trust are capable 
of producing the highest returns.  A method of insuring against a single adverse 
selection is to hedge the performance against numerous fund managers, limiting 
exposure to a single poor selection and creating private knowledge on the 
realistic expectations of contract positions and relative performance. 
 
Proposition 5: Total pension funds per member will be higher when pension 
clients have more agents, avoiding adverse selection of an underperforming 
agent. 
 
4.4.6.  The assets under management per member:  Establishing 
the rationale for the proxy variable:  The dependent variable 
 
The total assets under management of any given pension scheme will be 
determined by many factors aside from the taxonomy of scheme alone.  These 
will include the age of the scheme, the number of members and size of their 
contributions, the ratio of active to retired members, and whether the scheme is 
in deficit as material examples.  Another material factor is the scheme’s 
investment track record and crucially, how many fees and withdrawals are being 
paid for the investment performance returned by the scheme’s fund managers.  
To faithfully compare these net returns across the heterogeneous population of 
the 2,154 pension schemes, their assets under management must be 
standardised into a fungible unit of measurement.  The members of any given 
pension scheme are workforce participants reliant on the net returns of their 
pension assets under management for their retirement security, and yet each 
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member in the pension population belongs to a scheme with a variety of different 
characteristics to the next.  Limited by the transparency the data and public 
information allows, the logical fungible unit of measurement, or dependant 
variable, is the amount of assets allocated to a single member at the time of the 
data capture: 
 
Assets Under Management per Member [AUMPM] = 
 
Total pension assets under management 
Total members 
 
 
 
4.5  The conceptual framework accommodating the propositions 
 
Figure 4.3 adapts Reich-Graefe’s (2011a) corporate governance model of the 
attention the agent pays to the owner and client principal in line with these five 
proposed constructs in the previous sections (Section 4.4.1-4.4.6).  It forms the 
conceptual framework for the research methodology outlined in Chapter 5.  The 
premise is that as the corporate governance of the fund manager shifts along the 
spectrum of shareholder ownership and shareholder primacy governance 
orientation, the fees capture by the fund manager will negatively affect the assets 
of the contributing members.  The four quadrants of the framework represent the 
different combinations of governance proposed, and are described below. 
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Figure 4.3 Deconstructing Corporate Governance: Conceptual framework of the principals’ 
influence over the agent’s decision to wealth capture  
 
 
Interpretation of the four quadrants: 
1. The publicly listed fund manager will decision-make in favour of 
shareholders in the shareholder decision-controlling Anglo-American 
corporate governance regime (market oriented governance).  This will be 
mitigated by the size of the pension scheme and the number of fund 
managers the pension scheme engages. 
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2. The privately owned fund manager will have discretion to decision-make 
in favour of pension clients despite the shareholder decision-controlling 
Anglo-American corporate governance regime.  This will be intensified by 
the size of the pension scheme and the number of fund managers the 
pension scheme engages. 
3. The publicly listed fund manager will decision-make in favour of 
shareholders despite the stakeholder decision-controlling European 
corporate governance regimes.  This will be intensified by the size of the 
pension scheme and the number of fund managers the pension scheme 
engages. 
4. The privately owned fund manager will have discretion to decision-make 
in favour of pension clients in the stakeholder decision-controlling 
European corporate governance regime (polity oriented governance).  
This will be intensified by the size of the pension scheme and the number 
of fund managers the pension scheme engages.  
 
The conceptual framework in Figure 4.3 represents the theoretical models of 
agency in the corporation described by Reich-Graeffe (2011a; p341), focusing on 
corporate governance attempts to answer a deceptively simple, but 
fundamentally elusive question: “Whose interests ultimately control those in 
control of the corporation?”  The question remains contentious within the models 
developed to date by corporate scholars (Bainbridge, 2006).  The conceptual 
framework prescribes that the principal of primary benefit in the pension asset 
management contract depends on the governance characteristics of the 
underlying funds management agent. 
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Based on the conceptual relationships proposed in Figure 4.3 the pension 
principal can resist exploitative contracts when they dominate the fund manager:  
either they are larger (overcoming the moral hazard of agency) or when they 
engage in multiple contracts (overcoming the adverse selection problem of 
selecting the wrong agent).  This framework of the agency of the fund manager 
informs the research design and methodology in Chapter 5.  The contributions of 
the conceptual framework are to support the rare empirical examinations of an 
industry that the Myners Report (2001), the Kay Review (2012) and the Law 
Commission Review (2013) all recommend needing efforts to close the gap 
between legal agency ideals and the economic agency reality. 
 
 
4.6  Conclusion 
 
The Chapter has established the conceptual framework for using agency theory 
to consider multiple principals.  In agreement with Bratton and Wachter (2013) 
and Jones (1983), it calls for a remodelling of agency theory incorporating an 
explicit place for distributive justice or consideration of another stakeholder that 
will allow fiduciary duties to be imposed more readily on multiple principals.  
Kuhn’s characteristics of a paradigm are: 1) a unifying or integrating theme; 2) 
substantial orthodoxy in the basic parameters of research; and 3) predictive or 
explanatory capability.  Stakeholder theory has made a legitimate contribution to 
the business ethics literature, however fails to fulfil Kuhn’s characteristics for a 
paradigm shift in theory, nor guides the director as to which stakeholder is or 
should be more privileged.  Using a paradigmatic view of multi-agency theory 
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governing the behaviour of the fund manager may provide the path towards a 
progressive agency theory that evolves beyond the economic parsimony of 
egoism. 
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Chapter 5 
Research design, methodology and 
methods 
 
It is worth remembering that what we observe is not nature itself, but 
nature exposed to our method of questioning ~ Werner Heisenberg, 
Founder of Quantum Mechanics (in O’Leary, 2010; p.90) 
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5.1  Introduction 
 
This Chapter outlines the post-positivist philosophy underlying the development 
of a research design.  It describes why this epistemology is appropriate both to 
the research questions and to the generation of plausible knowledge.  It then 
designs sequential quantitative methods within a methodology framework to 
examine the overarching propositions.  In order to validate the research design 
and the methods of testing, the Chapter refers to the literature empirically testing 
agency theory.  The population of the UK registered with occupational pension 
schemes, composed by the Office of National Statistics (ONS) annual survey, is 
compared against the sample the analyses chapters will draw on to ascertain that 
the sample is representative of the ONS population.  The methods are developed 
in line with the requirements that post-positive research is neutral, authentic, 
dependable, transferable and auditable.  The objective of this chapter is to 
produce the robust framework logically connecting agency theory from the 
literature chapters with the selected methods for testing it. 
 
 
5.2  Philosophy, epistemology and ontology:  The researcher situated 
in the research 
 
The research strategy develops to fit the questions posed by the researcher.  It 
must comply with the researcher’s interpretation of how things are currently 
understood and categorised (their ontology) and how we have come to develop 
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legitimate rules for knowing (their epistemology) (O’Leary, 2010).  Marrying the 
existing ontology of the field with the researcher’s epistemology creates the 
intersection of the researcher’s philosophy, the strategy for inquiry and the 
specific methods employed to operationalise the inquiry (Creswell, 2009).  
Relativism is the belief that there is no universal understanding of truth, it will be 
constructed by the researcher in relation to their own socio-historic context.  
Reflexivity is the acknowledgement that the research is to a certain extent the 
researcher’s social construction, moderated by a valid methodology to contribute 
to the ontology of the discipline (O’Leary, 2010; Vogt, 1993).  In order to 
acknowledge this potential weakness of the researcher’s prism, its design must 
ensure that certain credibility indicators are made plain and accounted for (see 
Table 5.1).  In this way the research design provides the assurance that the 
process of knowledge production is legitimate and reliable, but also 
acknowledges that unlike in the natural sciences, controlled experimental 
methods are rarely available to the researcher in the fluid world of the social 
sciences (O’Leary, 2010).  The methods of collection and analysis nested in the 
research framework should be capable of the assurance this process was 
adhered to; that the research is neutral, replicable and auditable, yet recognise 
there will be subjectivity and this is valid provided it is transparent. 
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Table 5.1 Credibility indicators by issues and paradigm 
POSITIVIST INDICATORS POST-POSITIVIST INDICATORS 
Have subjectivities been acknowledged and managed? 
Objectivity 
Conclusions based on observable phenomena; 
not influenced by emotions, personal prejudices 
or subjectivities 
Neutrality 
Subjectivities recognised and negotiated in a 
manner that attempts to avoid biasing 
results/conclusions 
Subjectivity with transparency – acceptance and 
disclosure of subjective positioning and how it 
might impact on the research process, including 
conclusions drawn 
Has ͚true esseŶĐe͛ ďeeŶ Đaptured? 
Validity 
Concerned with truth value, ie. whether 
ĐoŶĐlusioŶs are ͚ĐorreĐt͛.  Also ĐoŶsiders ǁhether 
methods, approaches, and techniques actually 
relate to what is being explored 
Authenticity 
Concerned with truth value while recognising that 
multiple truths may exist. Also concerned with 
describing the deep structure of experience 
/pheŶoŵeŶa iŶ a ŵaŶŶer that is ͚true͛ to the 
experience 
Are methods approached with consistency? 
Reliability 
Concerned with internal consistency, ie, whether 
data/results collected, measured or generated are 
the same under repeat trials 
Dependability 
Accepts that reliability in studies of the social may 
not be possible, but attests that methods are 
systematic, well documented and designed to 
account for research subjectivities 
Are arguments relevant and appropriate? 
Generalizability 
Whether findings and/or conclusions from a 
sample, setting, or group are directly applicable to 
a larger population, a different setting or to 
another group 
Transferability 
Whether findings and/or conclusions from a 
sample, setting, or group lead to lessons learned 
that may be germane to a larger population, a 
different setting, or to another group 
Can the research be verified? 
Reproducibility 
Concerned with whether results/conclusions 
would be supported if the same methodology was 
used in a  different study with the same /similar 
context 
Auditability  
Accepts the importance of the research context 
and therefore seeks full explication of methods to 
allow others to see how and why the researchers 
arrived at their conclusions 
Source:  O’Leary (2010; p43)  
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This thesis adopts a post-positivist philosophy, described in the next section, with 
the rationale that: 1) the research aim and objectives seek to find relationships in 
a novel empirical phenomenon that are postulated to exist in the literature.  This 
novelty is one of the contributions of the research; and 2) the ontology of agency 
theory research remains firmly imbedded in the post-positivist philosophy, so the 
research is complying with ontological norms. 
 
5.2.1  Researching in a post- positivist paradigm 
 
The two main philosophies upon which social science research is based are the 
schools of positivism (or post-positivism: Creswell, 2009) and interpretivism 
(Parsa, 2001).  Whereas interpretivism is associated with qualitative social 
science reasoning (collaboratively constructing a meaningful reality), positivist 
research is grounded in the scientific method (hypo-deduction or 
experimentation).  It is the deterministic philosophy that causes probability 
determined outcomes, and involves the rigorous and controlled search for cause 
and effect, or the key determinant of a change in the object of the inquiry (O’Leary, 
2010; Creswell, 2009).  It starts with a theory to test and collects data that either 
supports or rejects the theory in an iterative process until a revised theory can be 
supported by empirical evidence (Creswell, 2009).  A theory in this process is a 
“set of interrelated constructs (constructs), definitions and propositions that 
presents a systematic view of phenomena…specifically how and why the 
constructs and relational statements are interrelated” (Creswell, 2009; p51:  See 
also Figure 5.1). 
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Figure 5.1 The deductive method of quantitative research 
Researcher tests or verifies a theory 
 
Researcher tests hypotheses or research questions from the theory 
 
Researcher defines and operationalises constructs defined from the theory 
 
Researcher measures or observes constructs using an instrument to obtain scores 
Source: O'Leary (2010; p125) 
 
As knowledge is man-made, and therefore fallible this does not “prove” the 
theory, it simply finds no evidence to reject it (Creswell, 2009).  Matere and 
Ketokivi (2013) outline the criteria for sound scientific reasoning with an example: 
1) these beans are from this bag (the explanation); 2) All the beans in this bag 
are white (the rule); and so 3) These beans are white (the observation), where 
the observation necessarily follows as a logical consequence of the rule and 
explanation; that is the observation has been predicted and so the rule and the 
explanation can continue to be inferred.  In the study of pension governance via 
the prism of agency theory, finding a correlation is not a discovery of cause and 
effect, there are other factors that determine the cause of the correlation, and as 
controlling the real world environment is not practical it cannot attribute a cause 
or rule out a coincidence (O’Leary, 2010).  In the quantitative analysis of this 
phenomenon, the post-positive result of significance is correlations that are 
statistically strong enough to infer a trend or coordinated movement between two 
constructs (Creswell, 2009).  This limitation to interpretation will be reflected in 
the analysis of results. 
186 
 
Based on the theory of agency in the literature established previous chapters, the 
Chapter develops a research design of methods that are appropriate for studying 
the corporate governance of the fund manager agents. 
 
 
5.3  The methodology operationalising the conceptual 
framework 
 
Chapter 4 provides the framework supporting the research design (Figure 4.3).  
It establishes the use of agency theory in a multi-principal environment.  This 
section institutes the process of operationalising the concept into the methods 
that allow empirical assessment. 
 
The ends (Y) axis represents the decision control over prioritising the shareholder 
principal.  This implies that shareholders in geo-political regimes with more 
corporate governance protection can influence their publicly listed agent to act in 
their fiduciary best interests.  Alternatively, the means (X) axis represents the 
decision making the agent makes on behalf of its pension principal, depending 
on the corporate governance influence exerted as firms become increasingly 
externally owned.  These two effects are proposed to be mediated by the 
principal’s ability to monitor and incentivise the agent according to the 
characteristics of agency theory.  This prediction of fund management behaviour 
is adapted from Reich-Graeffe’s (2011a) corporate governance model of 
shareholder versus management primacy, where managers with primacy have 
the discretion to resist shareholder fiduciary pressure in protection of other 
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entitled stakeholders.  This conception as an empirical application to the fund 
management phenomenon represents an important contribution the thesis. 
 
5.3.1  Converting the conceptual framework into a research 
design 
 
Chapter 4 rationalised a post-positivist use of agency theory for the analysis of a 
financial intermediation phenomenon.  Chapter 3 suggested that finance theory 
assumes away an agency problem whereas Chapter 2 assumes all principals will 
encounter them.  The majority of empirical research into the financial 
intermediation of pension assets has been constructed around finance theory to 
determine whether specific traits of an asset class or investment style result in 
superior returns on investment.  These have included fund managers employing 
traditional versus sustainable investment management (such as compensation 
for risk in Mǎnescu (2011) or mean risk-adjusted performance in Gill (2006)).  
They have also examined active versus passive investment strategies (such as 
the cost of active investing in French (2008) or the measure of active investing 
skill in Berk and Van Binsbergen (2015)).  While an abundance of studies 
examine the connection between corporate governance characteristics and 
investment performance in the traditional economy, pension fund management 
has avoided this scrutiny.  As the objectives of the research are to study the 
corporate governance of fund managers and any correlation with fiduciary 
conflict, Figure 5.2 introduces the decision logic for converting the conceptual 
framework into stage one of a research design. 
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Figure 5.2 Identifying the theory for empirical research into pension fund management 
Are there transaction costs in pension funds management? 
  
Yes No 
Financial intermediation theory 
Are the transactions fees and charges levied by 
corporate institutions? 
Modern Portfolio Theory 
  
Yes No 
Corporate governance theory 
Does the corporate governance of these institutions 
influence the transactions costs levied? 
Efficient market makers theory (banks and markets) 
  
Yes No 
Agency theory (observed data) 
Do shareholder wealth maximising characteristics 
result in poorer asset performance? 
Homogenous efficient intermediation of the 
underlying investment portfolio 
  
Yes No 
 
Agency theory (survey data) 
Do trustees triangulate the observed results?  Is there a correlation between the funds management 
corporate governance characteristics and trustee perceptions of net performance value? 
Source:  Author 
 
 
5.4  The research design 
 
Research design is the plan that brings the broader philosophical questions of 
researching in a particular paradigm to the specific questions set out by the 
researcher, culminating in the plan that will legitimise knowledge production 
through a well-considered process that acknowledges the responsibilities and 
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controversies of knowledge production (O’Leary, 2010).  The objective of a post-
positivist research design is to test a theory rather develop it and the research 
design framework is the organising model for the research questions that do this 
(Creswell, 2009).  In quantitative studies the literature is used deductively as the 
basis for advancing the research objectives into the design format (Creswell, 
2009; Chapters 2, 3 and 4 form this deduction).  The design is organised into a 
methodology, being the “overarching macro-level frameworks that offer principles 
of reasoning associated with particular paradigmatic assumptions that legitimate 
various schools of research methodologies provide both the strategies and 
grounding for the conduct of a study” (O’Leary, 2010; p89).  In order to 
operationalise the methodological framework, the methods are the “actual micro-
level techniques used to collect and analyse data.  Methods of data collection 
include interviewing, surveying, observation and unobtrusive methods” (O’Leary, 
2010; p89).  Figure 5.3 summarises the design of the research and cross-
references detailed descriptions of these methods. 
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Figure 5.3 The methodology operationalising the objectives of the thesis 
OBJECTIVE 1 
 
To describe the various corporate governance structures of the professional fund managers 
with UK pension clients. 
The data required for this objective is described in Section 5.5.1.  Descriptive statistics of the governance structures 
of professional fund managers in the UK by the governance constructs are described Chapter 6 as: 
1. Ownership structure; 
2. Geo-political reporting regime; and  
3. Assets under management. 
OBJECTIVE 2 To investigate whether different corporate governance characteristics of professional fund 
managers correlate with the total asset outcomes of their pension clients, and whether 
particular pension client attributes mitigate any negative corporate governance correlations. 
The empirical investigation of evidence of the corporate governance of a fund manager relationship with the assets 
per member of the pension clients they manage tested using the characteristics of agency theory. 
The method and propositions outlined in Section 5.6 and the results displayed in Chapter 6. 
OBJECTIVE 3 To investigate whether pension clients perceive that the corporate governance of the fund 
manager may influence the fiduciary sustainability of asset management for their inter-
temporal contributors. 
A survey of pension trustees based on the table of constructs developed in Chapter 7 guided by the results from 
the empirical analysis of objectives 1 and 2.  The survey is attached as Appendix IV and was administered between 
January and June 2015. 
The method is described in Section 5.7 and the results discussed in Chapter 7. 
OBJECTIVE 4 To determine whether pension clients believe the fiduciary duties of professional fund 
managers influences the delivery of sustainable wealth management. 
See Objective three. 
The method and results are discussed in Chapter 7. 
DISCUSSION 
The implications of the combined findings from the research outcomes of objectives 1 to 4 are discussed and the 
ramifications for the sustainability of funds management deliberated in Chapter 8. 
 
The design proposes a sequential process of three data collection methods.  The 
first is composed of historical observations of the corporate governance 
characteristics of fund managers appointed by UK registered pension schemes, 
and their relationship with the characteristics of the scheme, in order to explore 
the first two objectives (Chapter 6).  These findings will be incorporated into a 
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survey of pension trustees, to determine whether the trustees from this sample 
view their relationship with the fund manager(s) they have engaged as 
resembling one of fiduciary agency, given the embedded vulnerability of 
information asymmetry (Chapter 7).  Figure 5.4 illustrates why this series of 
methods in essential to properly capturing the socially constructed understanding 
of pension funds management.  Triangulation of the results and their combined 
implications are discussed in a separate chapter (Chapter 8). 
 
Figure 5.4 The sequential research methods capturing the funds management population 
Appendix I 
 
 
Pension funds governance 
population 
 
ONS Data 
Chapter 6 
Pension asset governance 
level 
 
Analysis of pension association 
published data  
Chapter 7 
Pension governor level 
 
Attitudinal survey of pension trustees  
 
 
The analysis chapters are designed to complement one another by adding depth 
and breadth to the understanding of the fiduciary agent from the viewpoint of 
impact on the pension governance.  This commences with the official government 
statistics overview for an appreciation of the breadth of the industry and 
concludes with a limited survey of trustees for the granular understanding of 
fiduciary agency at individual level. 
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5.4.1  The contribution of a sequential design  
 
The data retrieved from the National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF) 
Directory of Pension Funds and their Advisors (Wilmington, 2013; Chapter 6) are 
combined with the corporate governance constructs researched from the 
websites of the fund managers listed in the Directory.  This creates a proprietary 
dataset as a contribution to the empirical observation of the merged properties of 
the agent and the two principals hitherto unavailable in research.  The findings 
inform the creation of propositions that generate the questions to pension trustees 
in a directed survey.  Through this sequential process the survey questions can 
reflect any correlations between the corporate governance constructs of fund 
managers and the agency constructs of pension trusts.  Fundamental to the 
contribution, the survey data provides trustee perceptions on the possible cause 
of any relationship, something that cannot be determined by the first dataset.  In 
this design, the first dataset is playing an identification role, and the second a 
confirmatory (confounding) role. 
 
 
5.5  Analysis Chapter 6:  Meeting the Research Objectives 1 and 2 
 
The first analysis chapter conducted extensive research to determine the 
conjoined pension and corporate governance information available in the public 
domain.  This became crucial in determining not only what characteristics were 
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empirically measurable, but those that can be shared across all sets of analysis 
sequentially. 
 
5.5.1  The construction of the first dataset 
 
The Wilmington Directory of Occupational Pensions and their Advisors (2013) 
describes the occupational pension schemes in the UK by scheme type, number 
of members, assets under management and the advisors they engage as 
consultants, custodians and fund managers.  It also provides the name and 
contact email for a trustee of each scheme.  The Directory is produced in 
association with the National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF; now 
Pensions and Lifetime Savings Association), the national industry association.  
The data were exported from the Directory manually into Microsoft Excel 2010 
and IBM SPSS v.21 between September 2013 and January 2014. 
 
This process resulted in the creation of two bespoke datasets; the first 
cataloguing 502 fund managers servicing UK pension investments by name and 
services offered only.  Each fund manager’s website yielded the analytical 
constructs of ownership structure (legal entity), headquarters and assets under 
management.  The second dataset recorded 2,154 pension schemes.  The 
pension schemes were described as the scheme type (Defined Benefit Open, 
Defined Benefit Closed, Hybrid and Defined Contribution), membership type 
(active or passive), assets under management, and identity of fund managers 
engaged. 
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Crucially, the dataset allowed the link between the pension scheme 
characteristics and the governance characteristics of the individual fund 
managers they engage to be manifest.  This data creation that allows the 
relationship to be observed is essential to the research objectives and not a 
publicly available source of information.  The main challenge to data creation was 
the high level of variability number of fund managers engaged, with pension 
schemes appointing between 0 and 67 fund managers.  The challenge this 
presents the analysis when the two databases were converged is discussed in 
Chapter 6. 
 
 
5.6  Principal One:  The governance constructs and possible decision 
control of shareholders over the agent 
 
A foundation concept of agency theory is the ethical and economic problem 
arising from incomplete or asymmetric information (Husted, 2007).  Information 
asymmetry need not be a problem where the agent and the principal’s interests 
align perfectly and the benefits flow to the principal (Caers et al., 2006).  However, 
it can be used by agents to redistribute value away from the principal (Jacobides 
and Crosons, 2001).  A multiple principal environment can confuse to whom 
agents should signal their fiduciary efforts (Fogarty et al., 2009; Arthurs et al., 
2008).  The literature review in Chapter 2 concluded that the corporate 
governance of the agent is material to directing their behaviour, and questioned 
whether management of fund manager firms can be considered agents of both 
shareholders and clients (Heath, 2009). 
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In an industry beset by asymmetric information, over-the-counter deals and 
bespoke contracting, data on the corporate governance of fund managers is 
difficult to obtain (see Blake, 2014).  The empirical description of the governance 
structures of UK fund managers identified in the Wilmington Directory formed 
three important constructs mandatorily available in the public domain: 1) 
ownership structure; 2) corporate headquarters; and 3) assets under 
management.  The method for collecting and categorising these data are 
described in Table 5.2. 
 
Table 5.2 Table of fund manager governance constructs 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION VARIABLE ID CATEGORISATION EXPECTED EFFECT 
FUND MANAGER IDENTITY FMID See Appendix III for list  N/A 
FUND MANAGER 
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 
FMOS Categorical variable: 
1 = publicly listed entity 
2 = privately owned entity 
3 = employee owned entity 
4 = partnership entity 
5 = other / defunct 
See Section 5.6.1 
FUND MANAGER 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
COMPLIANCE REGIME 
(REPORTING REGIME) 
FMRR Categorical variable: 
1 = United States 
2 = United Kingdom 
3 = Asia Pacific 
4 = Europe Other 
5 = European Union 
See Section 5.6.2 
FUND MANAGER ASSETS 
UNDER MANAGEMENT 
FMAUM Normally distributed scale See Section 5.6.3 
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5.6.1  The proposed effect of ownership structure on the fund 
management corporate governance (Fund Management 
Ownership Structure [FMOS]) 
 
The categories of ownership structure are reasonably heterogeneous and 
presumed in the literature to have influence over their profit maximising 
behaviour.  As ownership becomes separated from management and the agent’s 
principal of fiduciary concern becomes their external owner(s) rather than an 
internal firm owner’s own fiduciary duty to the firm itself.  This expected agency 
observation is hypothesised in Figure 5.5. 
 
Figure 5.5 The principal-agent tipping point in the corporate governance spectrum of fund 
managers 
Description Micro 
business 
Small Enterprise Medium 
Enterprise 
Private equity/ 
conglomerate 
Publicly listed 
Structure Sole trader Partnership Employee 
owned 
PTY/LLC PLC/INC 
      
Governance  Owner / manager External owner Dissipated 
owner 
Primary principal Pension trust   Shareholder 
Source:  Author 
 
A partnership or sole trader encumbered with the legal liability to remain a going 
concern may presume that client maintenance is the best way of achieving this 
fiduciary objective.  Conversely, a conglomerate or publicly listed corporation has 
a conflicting, legal and fiduciary corporate governance obligation.  Agency theory 
would predict that as ownership becomes external, the agent will appropriate the 
client’s performance returns in the form of higher fees and charges. 
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5.6.2  Fund manager corporate governance compliance regime 
(Fund Management Reporting Regime [FMRR]) 
 
The geographical influence of the fund manager’s corporate governance 
legislative compliance regime asserts growing pressure in the corporate 
governance literature as an important area of research.  The effect it exerts on 
the fund manager’s relationship with the principal (shareholder) and consequently 
the instrumentality of the relationship with the other principal (pension client). 
 
The fund manager corporate governance compliance regimes were cross 
referenced for current validity with the Financial Conduct Authority Register 
(2014) to ensure the accuracy of the data sample43.  Where the entity is operating 
as a satellite in the United Kingdom for pension fund management, the reporting 
regimes were interpreted as the country of the corporate headquarters.  These 
were characterised as a spectrum of Anglo-American shareholder primacy 
regimes (United States and United Kingdom) through to more paternalistic 
stakeholder regimes (Asia Pacific, Europe Other, and European Union) in line 
with the Chapter 4 conceptual framework. 
 
Consideration is given in the analysis Chapter 6 to combining Europe, EU and 
Asia Pacific as the more paternalistic stakeholder regimes in order to enhance 
comparability with the US and UK categories.  From the conclusion in the 
                                            
43
 The FCA keeps a register of fund managers licenced to manage investment funds 
(https://register.fca.org.uk/).  All of the fund managers listed in the Wilmington Pensions Directory 
(2013) had FCA approval to manage funds at the time of analysis except for the cases researched 
as defunct in the proprietary database.  See Section 6.3 for details. 
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Chapter 2 literature review, the expected observation would be the relationship 
described in Figure 5.6. 
 
Figure 5.6 The principal-agent tipping point in the geo-political reporting regime of fund 
managers 
Description Stakeholder oriented legislative regimes Shareholder oriented regimes 
Legislative 
geography 
EU Europe Other Asia Pacific UK USA 
      
Governance  Stakeholder prominence Shareholder prominence 
Primary principal Pension trust   Shareholder 
Source: Author 
 
The literature posits that fund managers in less rigid shareholder primacy 
reporting regimes will be capable of enhanced fiduciary agency towards pension 
schemes in the form of lower incentives for performance.  This is characterised 
in the conceptual framework as enhanced managerial discretion to the right of 
the X axis. 
 
5.6.3  Assets under management effect on the fund management 
entity (Fund Management Assets Under Management [FMAUM]) 
 
While much of the research into investment decision making studies the 
relationship between stock selection and timing policies, little research has been 
published on the relationship between fund size and net fund performance.  Fund 
yield trackers such as Morningstar44 track and rate yields on the funds that fund 
                                            
44
 http://www.morningstar.co.uk/uk/research/funds 
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managers run, and show great variability between them.  What it fails to capture 
is the cost of purchasing these investment services.  Large fund management 
corporations will have the resources to entice the best investment talent, the best 
human resources management, the most physical capital and pursue aggressive 
growth and client acquisition strategies.  Yet pension schemes may be 
purchasing the brand reputation of large fund manager at a price premium as a 
method of justifying risky investment decisions and hence fulfilling their fiduciary 
duty to members. 
 
The results of these three constructs are described in Chapter 6.  Figure 5.3 
outlined the intention of the research design to apply this Directory dataset to the 
first two objectives.  The next section outlines the method by which the data will 
be analysed in fulfilment of the first and second objective. 
 
 
5.7  Principal 2:  Pension clients and decision making influence 
 
The conceptual framework proposes that the pension client principal be more 
capable of monitoring and incentivising their agent when they are less vulnerable 
to the agent.  This, according to Mitchell et al. (1997), can be determined by 
power, dependence and reciprocity.  When the characteristics of the pension 
principal are dominant over the agent in these areas, the principal may be 
capable of demanding fiduciary agency despite the existence of the agent’s 
shareholders.  The Thesis contends that the observable characteristics aligned 
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with this theory are the size of their assets under management (power) and the 
number of fund managers they engage (resisting dependence). 
 
5.7.1  Pension scheme assets under management [PSAUM] 
 
The pension principal should also possess characteristics that may allow them to 
monitor and incentivise the agent.  These include (yet not limited to) the pension 
scheme’s own financial clout (assets under management) assisting them in 
resisting the moral hazard of too few resources to monitor and influence.  These 
constructs surmise on the interrelation of the pension principal’s power to demand 
fiduciary obedience from their agent in the face of variability in the fund manager’s 
corporate governance characteristics. 
 
5.7.2  Negotiating the uncertainty of adverse selection with 
multiple fund managers (Pension Scheme Multiple Fund 
Managers [PSMFM]) 
 
For pension clients to avoid adverse selection they must a priori choose fund 
managers they trust are capable of producing the highest post-fee returns.  A 
method of insuring against a single adverse selection event is to hedge the 
performance amongst numerous fund managers, limiting exposure to one poor 
selection and creating private knowledge on the realistic expectations of contract 
positions and relative performance (benchmarking across fund managers).  
Pension schemes with multiple fund managers should outperform those with few 
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or one as their ability to monitor for underperformance is enhanced.  This 
construct proposes the interrelation of the pension principal’s power to demand 
fiduciary obedience from multiple agents in the spirit of competitive advantage. 
 
It is possible that from an agency theory perspective the principal of note is the 
pension scheme, and this principal should possess characteristics that allow it to 
monitor and incentivise their agent to act in their exclusive best interest.  Table 
5.3 links the corporate governance constructs of the fund managers with the 
proposed characteristics of the pension scheme.  The Chapter 6 analysis looks 
for relationships between these constructs based on the measure of assets per 
single member to propose that larger pension schemes are better acting as 
principals. 
 
Table 5.3 Agency characteristics of the pension scheme and fund manager owner 
AGENCY CHARACTERISTIC VARIABLE PROPOSAL 
Goal incongruence  
(Eisenhardt, 1989) 
Ownership structure  Pension funds per member are lower 
when managed by fund managers with 
external shareholding. 
Ownership (Clarke, 2010) Geo-political 
reporting regime 
Pension funds per member are lower 
when fund managers are housed in 
dominant shareholder primacy 
governance regimes. 
Risk aversion (Erkens et al., 
2012) 
Assets under 
management 
Pension funds per member are lower 
when managed by large fund managers to 
avoid risk45. 
Information asymmetry (moral 
hazard) (Myerson, 2012) 
Pension fund assets 
under management 
Pension funds per member are higher in 
larger pension clients capable of 
monitoring. 
Uncertainty (adverse selection) 
(Jiraporn et al., 2012) 
Multiple fund 
manager 
engagement 
Pension funds per member are higher 
when pension clients have multiple fund 
managers. 
                                            
45
 Smaller pension schemes engaging marque brands to mitigate their exposure to fiduciary 
liability 
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The results of these predictions are presented in Chapter 6. 
 
 
5.8  Applying the Objectives 1 and 2 results to Objectives 3 and 4 
 
Figure 5.3 outlined the intention of the research design to apply the results from 
the previous two objectives to the next two objectives, guiding the formation of 
the survey of pension trustees. 
 
This section outlines the method by which the data was collected and analysed 
in fulfilment of the next two objectives: 
 
Objective 3:  To investigate whether pension clients perceive that the corporate 
governance of the fund manager matters to the fiduciary governance of asset 
management for their beneficiaries; and 
Objective 4:  To determine whether pension clients believe the fiduciary duties of 
professional fund managers conflict with the delivery of fiduciary asset 
management. 
 
The survey was created in accordance with research methods guidance on the 
production of reliable results, discussed in the next section.  The survey (attached 
as Appendix II) was administered between January and June 2015. 
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5.8.1  The method of survey research 
 
The attitudinal survey was designed to triangulate results from the analyses of 
the other two methods.  It was intended as a tool to examine the perceptions 
pension trustees hold regarding the fiduciary management of their assets.  To 
achieve this intention requires survey validity, considered in Bernard’s (2006) 
nine steps for questionnaire development: 
 
1. Establish what information is required: 
Information in support of Objectives three and four is conceptualised into 
constructs which are the basis for the survey questions in Chapter 7. 
2. Define the target respondents: 
The dataset from Objectives 1 and 2 included the name and contact email 
for 1,243 pension trustee contacts.  Contacts were removed where they 
disclosed consultant engagement such as AON Hewitt or Mercer rather 
than fund manager engagement. 
3. Choose the method(s) of reaching your target respondents: 
The 1,243 respondents were emailed individually between January and 
June 2014.  Chapter 7 outlines the process of survey delivery. 
4. Decide on question content: 
The transformation from constructs to questions is described in Tables 5.8 
to 5.11. 
5. Develop the question wording: 
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The question content and wording was developed in consultation with, or 
with feedback from the industry and academic experts.46.  Special thanks 
is extended to Stephen Viederman, Immediate Past President of the 
Jessie Smith Noyes Foundation and Dr Raj Thamotheram, Consultant and 
previous Chief Responsible Investment Officer, AXA for the significant 
time and thought applied to the development of the survey. 
 
6. Put questions into a meaningful order and format 
7. Check the length of the questionnaire 
8. Pre-test the questionnaire. 
 
Feedback on the survey was provided by the professionals and academics in 
Table 5.4. 
 
Table 5.4 Respondents piloting the survey prior to deployment 
NAME DATE SENT DATE RECEIVED 
FEEDBACK 
INCORPORATED 
Round 1 
   
Prof. Janet Haddock-Fraser 23/10/2014 31/10/2014 ✓ 
Dr. Richard McManus 23/10/2014 31/10/2014 ✓ 
Merran Graff 16/10/2014 16/10/2014 ✓ 
Round 2 
   
                                            
46
  
1. Will Pomroy, Corporate Governance Policy Lead, The National Association of Pension Funds  
2. Prof. David Blake, Director, Pensions Institute, Cass Business School 
3. Dr. Debbie Hutton, Visiting Professor, The Pensions Institute , Cass Business School 
4. Prof. Kathryn Haynes, Professor of Accounting and Finance, University of Newcastle 
5. Prof. Laura Spira, Professor of Corporate Governance, Oxford Brookes University 
6. Prof. John Hoffman, Professor of Private Equity, Said Business School, Oxford University 
7. Mark Hedges, Chief Investment Officer, Nationwide 
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Dr. Zoe Davies 1/11/2014 4/11/2014 ✓ 
Dr. Janna Steadman 1/11/2014 6/11/2014 ✓ 
Dr. Sarah Tetley 1/11/2014 5/11/2014 ✓ 
Round 3 
   
Dr. Raj Thamotheram 6/11/2014 12/11/2014 ✓ 
Steve Viederman 6/11/2014 1/12/2014 ✓ 
Dr. Danny Santamaria 6/11/2014 N/A No feedback 
Round 4 
   
Richard Keery (Strathclyde Pension Fund) 1/12/14 7/12/2014 ✓ 
Ian McKnight (Royal Mail Pension Fund) 1/12/14 N/A No feedback 
Martina MacPherson (SRI Partners) 6/11/2014 10/12/2014 ✓ 
 
9. Develop the final survey form. 
 
Table 5.9 describes the methodological underpinning of the survey from the 
foundations established in the literature of Chapter 3.  The purpose is to convert 
the two objectives in the previous section into a set of testable characteristics to 
explore pension fund trustee decision making.  Specifically, whether trustees use 
any agency theory traits of corporate governance in their decision making in 
acknowledgement that fund managers exhibit institutional behaviour, and are not 
agency cost free.  Table 5.5 compares agency theory and finance theory to 
examine which more closely represents 1) that institutional behaviour; and 2) the 
decision making criteria prioritised by trustees. 
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Table 5.5 Finance theory or agency theory?  The predictor of fund management behaviour 
in the perceptions of pension trustees 
 FINANCE THEORY AGENCY THEORY 
FUND MANAGEMENT 
RELATIONSHIP 
GOAL 
INCONGRUITY 
[1] Parties meet as equals 
and will only contract 
when both goals are met 
by the contract. 
(Mehran and Stulz, 2007) 
[2] The principal must 
incentivise and monitor 
the agent to align their 
effort ǁith the priŶĐipal͛s 
interests.  The contract 
will be either behavioural 
based (professional fee) 
or outcome based 
(performance pay). 
(Eisenhardt, 1989) 
[3] The outcome based 
contract (for passive or 
active management) 
incentivises the agent to 
invest assets to attain 
performance at an agreed 
benchmark for an annual 
percentage of assets 
under management. 
(Whitwell, 2013) 
INFORMATION 
ASYMMETRY 
[4] Both parties are 
perfectly informed and 
the market is instantly 
updated with any new 
price-sensitive 
information. 
(Chan, 1983) 
[5] Information 
asymmetry benefits the 
agent, leaving the 
principal vulnerable to 
adverse selection and 
moral hazard. 
(Walter, 2004) 
[6] The pension trustees 
are unsophisticated 
investors, reliant on the 
financial expertise of the 
agent yet with little ability 
to monitor or evaluate the 
actions of this agent. 
(Clark, 2004) 
RISK 
ALIGNMENT 
[7] Risk is fully anticipated 
and born by the party 
with less risk aversion, 
and yet prepared for that 
risk to have downside 
(loss) implications. 
(Kolb, 2011) 
[8] The agent is assumed 
to be more risk adverse 
than the principal and 
must be incentivised to 
accept risk they would 
otherwise shirk. 
(Caprio and Levine, 2002) 
[9] The fund manager 
takes on no risk; the 
contracted fee provides 
for a percentage of the 
assets.  The pension fund 
is exposed to downside 
risk to the full amount of 
the assets managed. 
(Eichberger et al., 1999) 
FAIR PRICE [10] The price is that 
which equal parties agree 
for the contract to take 
place, and is distributively 
neutral. 
(Allen and Santomero, 
2001) 
[11] The problem of 
multiple principals 
incentivising and 
monitoring the agent 
(one principal is 
attempting to wealth 
capture off the other). 
(Bogle, 2009) 
[12] Publicly listed fund 
managers have stock 
market scrutiny over their 
share performance while 
others are owner-
managed.  Legislative and 
economic power benefits 
the shareholder. 
(Boatright, 2000) 
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OWNERSHIP 
STRUCTURE 
[13] No institutions (or 
institutional effects) exist 
in financial transactions.  
The markets are a 
seamless veil used by the 
counterparties. 
(Allen, 2001) 
[14] Agency theory 
analyses the impact of 
governance on the equity 
of the contract 
commanded by the 
principal.  It assumes one 
agent and one principal. 
(Bratton, 2001) 
[15] The governance of 
fund managers and the 
relationship between CEO 
and shareholders has 
shifted froŵ ͞ďureauĐrats 
or technocrats to 
shareholder partisaŶs.͟  
(Boatright, 2009; p417) 
FIDUCIARY 
DUTY 
[1ϲ] ͞The fiduĐiary 
relationship which exists 
between two parties 
must conform to the 
terms of any contract 
ǁhiĐh they sigŶ.͟ 
(Carvalho, 2008; p.406) 
[17] Managers have 
fiduciary duties to 
shareholders.  Firms have 
no legislated fiduciary 
duties to clients. 
(Boatright, 1994) 
[18] Fund managers have 
codified governance 
duties to shareholders.  
The Law Commission 
Review (2013) alludes to a 
fiduciary flavour in the 
fund management 
contract that despite 
recommendation, has not 
been legislated or tested 
in the courts.  See Chapter 
8. 
 
Table 5.6 takes the literature’s three competing theoretical implications in the fund 
management relationship from Table 5.8 (Column 3) and assigns the survey 
questions that operationalise these observations when first examining the agency 
theory of funds management.  The results of the survey are reported in Chapter 
7. 
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Table 5.6 Agency theory and finance theory constructs for the survey 
 
FUND MANAGEMENT 
RELATIONSHIP 
SURVEY QUESTIONS 
GOAL 
INCONGRUITY 
The outcome based 
contract (for passive or 
active management) 
incentivises the agent to 
invest assets to attain 
performance at an agreed 
benchmark for an annual 
percentage of assets under 
management. 
(Whitwell, 2013) 
Q1:  Does the trust as a whole have a preference for 
active (Alpha) or passive (Index) fund management? 
 
INFORMATION 
ASYMMETRY 
The pension trustees are 
unsophisticated investors, 
reliant on the financial 
expertise of the agent yet 
with little ability to 
monitor or evaluate the 
actions of this agent. 
(Clark, 2004) 
Q2:  Does the trust have a preference for single or 
multiple fund manager appointments 
Q2a:  What is the rationale for multiple fund manager 
appointment?  What could be the major disadvantage 
in multiple fund manager appointments? 
Q2b:  What is the rationale for engaging a single fund 
manager?  What could be the major disadvantage of 
single fund manager appointment? 
RISK 
ALIGNMENT 
The fund manager takes 
on no risk; the contracted 
fee provides for a 
percentage of the assets.  
The pension fund is 
exposed to downside risk 
to the full amount of the 
assets managed. 
(Eichberger et al., 1999) 
Q4:  How many years has the fund manager with the 
largest mandate been appointed for?  
Qϱ:  What ǁas the trust͛s ratioŶale for seleĐtiŶg this 
fund manager?  
FAIR PRICE Publicly listed fund 
managers have stock 
market scrutiny over their 
share performance while 
others are owner-
managed.  Legislative and 
economic power benefits 
the shareholder. 
(Boatright, 2000) 
Qϱ:  What ǁas the trust͛s ratioŶale for seleĐtiŶg this 
fund manager? 
Q6:  Which metric is of key importance when the trust 
rates financial performance of this fund manager? 
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OWNERSHIP 
STRUCTURE 
The governance of fund 
managers and the 
relationship between CEO 
and shareholders has 
shifted froŵ ͞ďureauĐrats 
or technocrats to 
shareholder partisaŶs.͟  
(Boatright 2009; p417) 
Q7:  Who owns the fund manager with the largest 
mandate? 
Q8:  Where are the headquarters of this fund 
ŵaŶager͛s holdiŶg ĐoŵpaŶy? 
Q9:  Were the two corporate governance 
characteristics of the fund manager in Q7&8 explicitly 
considered in the decision to engage them? 
Q10:  Does the trust as a whole believe any of the 
following corporate governance issues are important 
to the financial performance less fees of the fund 
manager? 
Q11:  Was information on any of the corporate 
governance issues provided to the trust by the fund 
manager? 
Q12:  Do you think the trust believes that the 
corporate governance profile of the fund manager 
helps them manage any of the following challenges? 
FIDUCIARY 
DUTY 
Fund managers have 
codified governance duties 
to shareholders.  The Law 
Commission Review (2013) 
alludes to a fiduciary 
flavour in the fund 
management contract that 
despite recommendation, 
has not been legislated or 
tested in the courts.  See 
Chapter 8. 
Q13:  Please indicate if you agree with the following 
statements on fiduciary duties: 
Fund managers should have fiduciary duties to 
Pension Trusts • Fund managers do have fiduciary duties to 
Pension Trusts • This duty should override fiduciary duties to 
their own shareholders/owners • This duty does override fiduciary duties to 
their own shareholders/owners • Governance analysis is available on fund 
managers • Governance analysis should be available on 
fund managers 
TRUST SAMPLE DEMOGRAPHIC CONSTRUCTS 
Q14:  NUMBER OF TRUSTEES 
(SCALE) 
Q15:  Assets Under 
Management (scale) 
Q15:  Number of members 
(scale) 
Q15:  NUMBER OF PENSIONERS 
(SCALE) 
Q15:  Establishment date 
(scale) 
Q15:  Scheme sector 
(categorical) 
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Table 5.7 Survey questions translated into predictive theory testing 
 
FUND 
MANAGEMENT 
RELATIONSHIP 
SURVEY QUESTIONS 
PREDICTIVE THEORY 
TESTING 
GOAL 
INCONGRUITY 
The outcome based 
contract (for 
passive or active 
management) 
incentivises the 
agent to invest 
assets to attain 
performance at an 
agreed benchmark 
for an annual 
percentage of 
assets under 
management. 
(Whitwell, 2013) 
Q1:  Does the trust as a whole have a 
preference for active (Alpha) or passive 
(Index) fund management? 
 
Finance theory 
predicts passive 
management.  
Intermediary agency 
costs are not 
modelled. 
Agency theory 
predicts active 
management.  
Intermediary agency 
costs are borne to 
incentivise and 
monitor the agent. 
INFORMATION 
ASYMMETRY 
The pension 
trustees are 
unsophisticated 
investors, reliant on 
the financial 
expertise of the 
agent yet with little 
ability to monitor 
or evaluate the 
actions of this 
agent. 
(Clark, 2004) 
Q2:  Does the trust have a preference for 
single or multiple fund manager 
appointments? 
Q2a:  What is the rationale for multiple fund 
manager appointment?  What could be the 
major disadvantage in multiple fund 
manager appointments? 
Q2b:  What is the rationale for engaging a 
single fund manager?  What could be the 
major disadvantage of single fund manager 
appointment? 
Agency theory 
predicts multiple fund 
management 
appointments as a 
method of reducing 
the information 
asymmetry leading to 
an adverse selection. 
Finance 
(intermediation) 
theory predicts single 
fund manager as the 
transaction cost of 
entering the market. 
See Table 5.12. 
RISK 
ALIGNMENT 
The fund manager 
takes on no risk; 
the contracted fee 
provides for a 
percentage of the 
assets.  The 
pension fund is 
exposed to 
downside risk to 
the full amount of 
the assets 
managed. 
(Eichberger et al., 
1999) 
Q4:  How many years has the fund manager 
with the largest mandate been appointed 
for?  
Qϱ:  What ǁas the trust͛s ratioŶale for 
selecting this fund manager?  
Agency theory 
insurance against 
moral hazard (risk 
alignment through 
incentivising) through 
relationship fostering. 
See Table 5.13. 
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FAIR PRICE Publicly listed fund 
managers have 
stock market 
scrutiny over their 
share performance 
while others are 
owner-managed.  
Legislative and 
economic power 
benefits the 
shareholder. 
(Boatright, 2000) 
Qϱ:  What ǁas the trust͛s ratioŶale for 
selecting this fund manager? 
Q6:  Which metric is of key importance when 
the trust rates financial performance of this 
fund manager? 
Agency theory 
suggests that the 
principal aligns their 
(fiduciary) interests 
with the agent 
through monitoring 
and incentivising.  
Value for fees is the 
key metric for 
alignment of fiduciary 
duties. 
See Table 5.14. 
OWNERSHIP 
STRUCTURE 
The governance of 
fund managers and 
the relationship 
between CEO and 
shareholders has 
shifted from 
͞ďureauĐrats or 
technocrats to 
shareholder 
partisaŶs.͟  
(Boatright, 2009; 
p417) 
Q7:  Who owns the fund manager with the 
largest mandate? 
Q8:  Where are the headquarters of this fund 
ŵaŶager͛s holdiŶg ĐoŵpaŶy? 
Q9:  Were the two corporate governance 
characteristics of the fund manager in Q7&8 
explicitly considered in the decision to 
engage them? 
Q10:  Does the trust as a whole believe any 
of the following corporate governance issues 
are important to the financial performance 
less fees of the fund manager? 
Q11:  Was information on any of the 
corporate governance issues provided to the 
trust by the fund manager? 
Q12:  Do you think the trust believes that the 
corporate governance profile of the fund 
manager helps them manage any of the 
following challenges? 
Agency theory 
predicts that the 
corporate governance 
of the agent will 
influence their 
institutional 
behaviour. 
Finance theory 
predicts that financial 
transactions are not 
subject to 
governance influence. 
See Table 5.15  
FIDUCIARY 
DUTY 
Fund managers 
have codified 
governance duties 
to shareholders.  
The Law 
Commission 
Review (2013) 
alludes to a 
fiduciary flavour in 
the fund 
management 
contract that 
despite 
recommendation, 
has not been 
legislated or tested 
in the courts.  See 
Chapter 8. 
Q13:  Please indicate if you agree with the 
following statements on fiduciary duties: • Fund managers should have 
fiduciary duties to Pension Trusts • Fund managers do have fiduciary 
duties to Pension Trusts • This duty should override fiduciary 
duties to their own 
shareholders/owners • This duty does override fiduciary 
duties to their own 
shareholders/owners • Governance analysis is available on 
fund managers • Governance analysis should be 
available on fund managers 
Agency theory 
predicts principals 
monitor and 
incentivise agents to 
align with their best 
interests.  This 
implies that the 
fiduciary duties owed 
by the principal 
should be passed to 
the agent.   
Finance theory 
predicts the 
counterparties act as 
equals in possession 
of perfect 
information in 
frictionless markets, 
making fiduciary 
agency irrelevant. 
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Table 5.8 Information asymmetry as a test of fund manager engagement rationales 
SURVEY QUESTION 
RATIONALE FOR APPOINTMENT 
STRATEGY (AND POTENTIAL 
DISADVANTAGES) 
PREDICTIVE THEORY TESTING 
Q2a:  What is the 
rationale for multiple 
fund manager 
appointment?  What 
could be the major 
disadvantage in 
multiple fund 
manager 
appointments? 
1. Hedging risk of under-performance 
in one fund manager with 
outperformance in another 
2. Benchmarking relative performance 
across fund managers 
3. Providing competition incentives 
between appointed fund managers 
4. Providing multiple sources of fund 
management comparison for the 
buy/sell decision 
5. Other* 
6. Professional consulting advice 
1. Agency theory predicts 
insurance against adverse 
selection. 
2. Agency theory insurance 
against moral hazard. 
3. Agency theory insurance 
against moral hazard 
(shirking). 
4. Agency theory insurance 
against information 
asymmetry (general). 
5. Open ended question. 
6. Agency theory insurance 
against information 
asymmetry (general) 
Q2a.  What could be 
the major 
disadvantage in 
multiple fund 
manager 
appointments? 
1. Administrative burden on the Trust 
2. Transactions costs inefficiency 
3. Other* 
4. None encountered 
1. Finance theory predicts 
transactions costs do not 
exist. 
2. Intermediation theory 
predicts transactions costs 
should be minimised. 
Q2b:  What is the 
rationale for engaging 
a single fund 
manager?  What 
could be the major 
disadvantage of single 
fund manager 
appointment? 
1. Minimising fund transactions costs 
2. Fostering long term relationship 
3. Minimising administrative 
complexity 
4. Simplifies the fund manager buy/sell 
decision 
5. Other* 
6. Professional consulting advice 
1. Intermediation theory 
predicts transactions costs 
should be minimised. 
2. Agency theory predicts 
relationships minimise 
moral hazard. 
3. Intermediation theory 
predicts agents add value 
to market transactions. 
Q2b. What could be 
the major 
disadvantage of single 
fund manager 
appointment? 
1. Key client reliance risk 
2. Difficulty with relative performance 
benchmarking 
3. Other* 
4. None encountered 
Agency theory insurance 
against moral hazard. 
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Table 5.9 Risk alignment as a test of fund manager engagement rationales 
SURVEY QUESTION RATIONALE FOR APPOINTMENT 
STRATEGY 
PREDICTIVE THEORY TESTING 
Q5:  What was the 
trust͛s ratioŶale for 
selecting this fund 
manager? 
1. asset class expertise 
2. reputation 
3. past performance data 
4. lowest overall fees 
5. provision of useful information 
6. managing unease 
7. transparency of fee structure 
8. Risk sharing (including 
downside risk) 
9. ESG and engagement 
strategies 
10. value for fees 
11. other criteria were applied* 
12. consultant recommendation 
13. other industry 
recommendation 
1. Finance theory (portfolio 
construction). 
2. Finance theory (portfolio 
construction). 
3. Finance theory (portfolio 
construction). 
4. Intermediation theory (transaction 
cost minimisation). 
5. Agency theory (insurance against 
information asymmetry). 
6. Agency theory (insurance against 
moral hazard). 
7. Agency theory (insurance against 
information asymmetry). 
8. Agency theory (incentivising 
alignment). 
9. Agency theory (directing agent 
activity). 
10. Agency theory (incentivising 
alignment through fiduciary duty 
passed to the agent). 
11. Agency theory (insurance against 
adverse selection). 
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Table 5.10 Fair price as a test of fund manager engagement rationales 
Q6:  Which metric is 
of key importance 
when the trust rates 
financial 
performance of this 
fund manager? 
1. Nominal financial returns generated 
in the last financial year of 
engagement 
2. Nominal returns compared to the 
requisite benchmark 
3. Nominal returns compared to verbal 
undertaking (promises) 
4. Value added performance (above 
market) 
5. Value for Annual Management Cost 
(AMC) 
6. Value for Total Expense Ratio (TER) 
1. Finance theory (portfolio 
analysis). 
2. Finance theory (portfolio 
analysis). 
3. Agency theory (institutional 
behaviour). 
4. Intermediation theory 
(intermediaries add value to 
transactions). 
5. Agency theory (fiduciary 
alignment). 
6. Agency theory (fiduciary 
alignment). 
 
Table 5.11 Ownership structure as a test of fund manager engagement rationales 
Who owns the fund manager 
discussed in the last section? 
1. Publicly traded corporation 
2. Privately owned corporation 
3. Conglomerate owned 
4. Employee owned corporation 
5. Partnership 
Agency theory 
(irrelevant to finance 
theory) 
Q8:  Where are the 
headquarters of this fund 
ŵaŶager͛s holding company? 
 
1. United Kingdom 
2. United States 
3. European Union 
4. Other European country 
5. Asia Pacific 
6. Africa 
Agency theory 
(irrelevant to finance 
theory) 
Q9:  Were the two corporate 
governance characteristics of 
the fund manager in Q7&8 
explicitly considered in the 
decision to engage them? 
Binary response Agency theory 
(irrelevant to finance 
theory) 
Q10:  Does the trust as a whole 
believe any of the following 
corporate governance issues 
are important to the financial 
performance less fees of the 
fund manager? 
1. CEO/Chairman separation 
2. Gender equality 
3. Employee engagement 
4. Corporate social responsibility 
5. Say on pay 
6. Board composition 
Agency theory 
(irrelevant to finance 
theory) 
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Q11:  Was information on any 
of the corporate governance 
issues provided to the trust by 
the fund manager? 
 
Binary response Agency theory 
(irrelevant to finance 
theory) 
Q12:  Do you think the trust 
believes that the corporate 
governance profile of the fund 
manager helps them manage 
any of the following challenges? 
1. Managing pressure from their own 
shareholders 
2. Prioritising the client relationship 
3. Prioritising value for money 
4. Prioritising transparency 
5. Prioritising spending on expertise 
6. Prioritising outperformance 
7. Sharing risk 
Agency theory 
(irrelevant to finance 
theory) 
 
These tables (Tables 5.9 to 5.12) are translated into statistical analysis of the 
survey responses in Chapter 7.  This analysis provides the comparative result 
between what is observed in the historical accounting record of the Wilmington 
Directory (2013) and the perceptions of the survey respondents.  The last 
analysis chapter triangulates these observations with the actual and reported 
state of fiduciary duties in funds management to discuss whether: 1) fiduciary 
agency exists in the pension supply chain; and 2) corporate governance has any 
perceived or recorded impact on the fund manager selection process give the 
burdensome duty placed on trustees to ensure beneficiary best interest. 
 
 
5.9  Applying caution when interpreting results 
 
The current empirical studies of agency theory in management have produced 
mixed predictive results (for commentary on this, see Foss and Stea, 2014; 
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Ghoshal, 2005; Daily et al., 2003) and there is little empirical evidence of the 
effect the governance of professional funds managers has on the interactions 
with their clients.  While arguing for more plurality in research paradigms Crane 
(1999) concedes that empirical business ethics research, the philosophical home 
of corporate governance, has also been overwhelmingly positivist, bringing large 
quantities of data and a natural sciences epistemology to the exploration of these 
social phenomena.  Ghoshal (2005; p86) describes this as the “hubris of physics 
envy”, having led us to adopt narrow versions of positivism together with relatively 
unsophisticated scientific methods to develop “causal and testable theories.”  
Despite this criticism positivism continues to dominate empirical enquiries into 
agency theory effects (Howorth and Moro, 2012; Drobetz et al., 2010; Fogarty et 
al., 2009; Goergen and Renneboog, 2008; Hutchison and Gul, 2003; Jacobides 
and Croson, 2001; Ogden and Watson, 1999).  In order to acknowledge the social 
nature of the research and the lack of experimental control, a post-positive 
position (rather than positivism described in Table 5.1) is closely applied when 
constructing the research design.  This is specifically to ensure both the internal 
validity (triangulation) and external validity (representativeness) of the sample 
frame are tested. 
 
 
5.10  Conclusion 
 
The conceptual framework orders the objectives of the thesis into quadrants of 
power and dependence for the two principals under investigation.  This logical 
organisation of the overarching question of whether an agent can (or does) have 
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two fiduciary principals in pension funds management allows the research design 
to mechanise its measurement.   
 
The chapters of analysis present different information gathering techniques from 
which to analyse the aim of the thesis; to investigate whether the corporate 
governance of professional fund managers with pension clients affects asset 
management outcomes for the UK pensions industry.  In a multi-principal 
environment in the funds management industry there is misconception over the 
fiduciary duties the agent owes two principals.  The first analysis chapter explores 
the relationships between the agent and the pension principal evident empirically 
(published economic data) that may suggest a relationship between the pension 
assets of the client beneficiaries correlating with different governance 
characteristics in the fund manager.  The second analysis chapter explores the 
perceptions the trustees of pension schemes held of the fiduciary responsibility 
owed to the trust by the agent, and how they selected and monitored the agent 
to foster this responsibility.  It also explores the perceptions they hold of the 
importance of fund manager corporate governance in influencing this.  These 
analyses alongside the exploration of the literature form the foundation of the 
discussion chapter (Chapter 8) on the actual economic and legal status of the 
fiduciary agent alongside the individual and aggregate perceptions of the 
pensions industry itself. 
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Chapter 6 
Analysis Part 1: Empirical examination of 
the relationship between fund manager 
corporate governance and pension assets 
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6.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter analyses the Wilmington Directory of Pension Funds and their 
Advisors (2013) spatial data for the fund managers engaged managing UK 
pension scheme assets for the year 2013.  Described in Chapter 5, this data was 
transcribed into a database in order to address the first two objectives of the 
thesis research design:  1) to describe the various corporate governance 
structures of the professional fund managers with UK pension clients; and 2) to 
investigate whether different corporate governance characteristics of 
professional fund managers relate with characteristics of their pension clients, 
and whether particular pension client attributes mitigate any negative corporate 
governance correlations. 
 
The first section re-establishes the conceptual framework and describes some of 
the challenges and consequent strategies employed with the analytical 
constructs for the research design.  The second section presents the descriptive 
statistics defining the fund management industry involved in pension asset 
management, augmented by an explicit list of each fund manager along with their 
characteristics in Appendix III.  This provides the elementary industry depiction 
upon which the second objective relies.  The third section then explores the 
database as a systematic test of the potential relationships between the fund 
manager corporate governance constructs and the pension scheme population, 
to determine whether the constructs of fund managers affect (or are affected by) 
pension scheme in meeting the second objective in the research design.  The 
sensitivity of the results is checked, controlling for several challenges with the 
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data, and their implications for the next stage of the research design (objectives 
three and four) are discussed in Section 6.9. 
 
 
6.2  The conceptual framework supporting objectives one and two of 
the research design 
 
The conceptual framework in Chapter 4 proposed the following interactions 
between the fund manager and pension client: 1) that publicly listed fund 
managers with shareholder oriented governance compliance in Anglo-American 
economies will appropriate pension client fees for shareholder benefit; and 2) the 
pension client characteristics of size and risk spreading (engaging multiple fund 
managers) can reduce moral hazard and adverse selection to counteract this 
appropriation through coercion, monitoring and incentives.  According to Mantere 
and Ketokivi’s (2013) systematic social science research objectives, if an 
observation has been predicted, the rule and the explanation of a theory can 
continue to be inferred.  If publicly incorporated Anglo-American fund managers 
are statistically observed to share a relationship with fewer assets for the clients 
they manage, the rule of a theory of multiple agency can be cautiously 
acknowledged as exhibiting a trend worthy of further investigation47. 
 
 
                                            
47
 Cautiously as the direction of any correlation cannot be inferred, as pension schemes with 
smaller asset bases may believe publicly quoted Anglo-American fund managers have 
reputational superiority, assisting fiduciary compliance. 
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6.3  The creation of the proprietary data 
 
As previously noted, the data for this analysis chapter were created and 
aggregated from various sources, and thereby representing a unique contribution 
to the thesis.  The result is two databases that separately register 502 fund 
managers servicing 2,154 UK pension schemes.  The Directory documented 
each pension scheme separately including their size by total members and assets 
under management.  It further documented the fund managers they had engaged 
to manage these assets at the time of the Directory’s publication.  The value of 
the Directory is that this engagement information is not publicly disclosed, and 
required the purchase and aggregation of its surveyed information to illuminate 
the contractual interconnection between the pension scheme principal and the 
fund manager agent.  The Directory did not provide information on the 
governance characteristics of the fund managers themselves, such as the legal 
incorporation status of their “owners” as competing principal.  The ownership 
structure, assets under management, and governance compliance regimes were 
retrieved from the websites of the individual fund managers. 
 
 
6.4  The contribution of the proprietary database to the literature of 
financial intermediation 
 
This time-consuming collation process has produced the valuable contribution to 
the field of fiduciary conflict in financial intermediation of results observed in a 
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proprietary database. It brings hitherto uncollected information about the 
relationship between the pension scheme principal and the corporate governed 
agent for novel empirical review.  The characteristics of fund managers were 
documented in a separate database to the characteristics of the pension 
schemes.  The pension scheme database included the identity(ies) of the fund 
managers they engaged as a list attached to each individual pension scheme 
case. 
 
The theory of financial intermediation assumes that no agency effects are 
reflected in the transactions between the principal and the underlying equity 
purchases (the agent brings the parties together in a mutually beneficial 
transaction that benefits the transacting parties: Allen, 2001).  The thesis 
contributes to the assumption that this is not necessarily the case.  
Intermediaries, as discussed in Chapter 3 are corporations in their own right, 
disavowed by the theory, to smooth or increase the efficiency of transaction costs 
(Williamson, 1980).  The hypothesis that this is not necessarily the case it 
examined in the Chapter.  Financial intermediary intentions are to maximise their 
own business proposition (Holland, 2011).  Exploring this hypothesis is a major 
contribution of the thesis. 
 
The Directory had missing assets under management data in 14 (0.65%) cases 
and missing fund manager data in 796 (37%) of cases, retaining 1,358 valid 
cases.  The UK Registered Occupational Pension Scheme survey (2011) 
deployed annually by the Office of National Statistics (ONS) plays a mediating 
role in the verifying the validity of the sample by lending its methodology to the 
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identification of constructs that affect pension performance and providing 
assurance that the dataset is representative of the ONS population (see Appendix 
I).  The relatively high number of missing fund manager cases suffers from the 
self-reporting bias observed by the methodology section of the ONS Annual 
Survey of Pension Schemes (2008).48  Smaller schemes provide little information 
about their activity other than statutory disclosure. 
 
The challenge in combining the two datasets was how to capture the individual 
characteristics of each fund manager when the list of fund managers engaged by 
a single pension scheme is as numerous as 67 unique entities.  This was resolved 
by converting the single pension scheme case into multiple cases, each attached 
to one of the fund managers engaged, followed by that particular fund manager’s 
governance characteristics from the second database (this conversion is 
illustrated by example in Figure 6.1).  There were challenges in maintaining the 
consistency between databases as the number of observations increased from 
2,154 pension schemes and 502 fund managers to 5,982 unique observations of 
a pension scheme matched to a single fund manager with schemes engaging 
multiple managers now over-represented (in Figure 6.1 3i PLC Pension now has 
four cases in the dataset rather than the original single case). 
 
 
 
                                            
48
 “The review has improved the methodology for weighting estimates of scheme numbers, but 
the problem of sampling variability which produced a set of unusual results in 2008 has not been 
solved by the new methodology. The only way to solve this problem would be to allocate additional 
resources to the survey so that sample size could be increased, particularly for very small 
schemes. ONS does not consider this to be a priority in terms of resource allocation at a time of 
tight budgets. It is important to note, therefore, that the estimates of numbers of very small 
schemes continue to be subject to considerable uncertainty” (OPSAR 2011; p6). 
226 
 
Figure 6.1  The process of combining the fund manager and pension scheme data 
(A+B=C) (A) Original database design (pension schemes n=2,154) 
Pension 
scheme 
Total 
members 
AUM (£) 
AUM per 
member (£) 
No. FM 
engaged 
FM1 FM2 FM3 FM4 
3i PLC 
Pension 
1,658 687,000,000 414,355 4 BLK PRU STD L&G 
+ 
(B) Original database design (fund managers n=502) 
Fund 
manager 
FM 
Code 
Assets under 
management ($US) 
[FMAUM] 
FM Ownership 
[FMOS] 
FM 
Headquarters 
[FMRR] 
# UK 
clients 
BlackRock BLK 3, 792, 000, 000, 000 PLC USA 430 
Prudential PRU 753, 000 ,000, 000 PLC UK 24 
Standard Life STD 280,016,100,000 LLC APAC 155 
Legal & 
General 
L&G 608, 400, 000, 000 PLC UK 539 
= 
(C) Convergence of the databases (n=5,982) 
Pension 
scheme 
Total 
members 
AUM (£) 
AUM per 
member 
(£) 
No. FM 
engaged 
FM 
code 
FMAUM 
(USD 
Billion) 
FMOS FMRR 
3i PLC 
Pension 
1,658 687,000,000 414,355 4 BLK $3,792 PLC US 
3i PLC 
Pension 
1,658 687,000,000 414,355 4 PRU $753 LLP UK 
3i PLC 
Pension 
1,658 687,000,000 414,355 4 STD $280 LLC APAC 
3i PLC 
Pension 
1,658 687,000,000 414,355 4 L&G $608 PLC UK 
 
The implications of this data merge are illustrated by the distribution of 
engagement in Figure 6.2(A) (n=1,358: mean 3.80 standard deviation (SD) ± 
4.99).  From no external fund manager to a single fund manager engaged, to 
multiple engagements (the majority of pension schemes (n=502:  37%) engage 
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a single fund manager).  However, larger schemes by assets under management 
tend to engage multiple fund managers (n=1,353, r=0.414, p=0.0001), skewing 
the mean number engaged to (a rounded) 4 fund managers. 
 
Figure 6.2  Distribution of the number of fund managers engaged 
 
A. Distribution with all cases   B. Distribution with cases <= 30 engaged 
 
 
 
In Figure 6.2(A) the histogram aggregates pension schemes engaging 1-2 fund 
managers (n=730) to accommodate the tail (schemes engaging >=30 fund 
managers).  In Figure 6.2(B) the X axis range is reduced from 80 to 30, with the 
number of schemes engaging a single fund manager now visible (n=502).  The 
effect that pension schemes with larger assets will be over represented in the 
converged database was central to the decision to remove the extreme outliers 
above 30 engagements. 
 
The challenge of large scheme over-representation in cases with multiple fund 
manager engagement was to acknowledge the altered relationship between the 
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assets under management per individual member and the actual assets under 
management of the pension scheme as a whole. 
 
The analysis draws on the separate databases when describing both the pension 
schemes population and the fund manager population, to isolate the effect the 
multiple engagements have over the combined data.  It then explores the 
interaction between fund manager governance constructs and the assets under 
management per member (AUMPM) of a pension scheme in the converged 
database, described as the proxy variable in Section 6.6.1.1.  The origins of the 
datasets used are made explicit in the analysis. 
 
With these data particulars considered explicitly throughout the chapter, the first 
objective of the research design, to describe the various corporate governance 
structures of the professional fund managers with UK pension clients, is the 
subject of Section 6.4.  The second objective of the research design, to 
investigate whether different corporate governance characteristics of 
professional fund managers correlate with the total asset outcomes of their 
pension clients, and whether particular pension client attributes mitigate any 
negative corporate governance correlations follows in Section 6.5. 
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6.5  Research objective one: Description of pension schemes and fund 
managers managing UK pension funds 
 
The following two subsections observe the descriptive statistics for both the 
pensions scheme population and the fund manager population to contextualise 
how these two populations interact.  The thesis hypothesises that the fund 
manager has an acquisitive influence over pension assets, but pension 
characteristics may resist this.  To explore the premise, the two populations are 
described. 
 
6.5.1  Descriptive statistics: Pension schemes in the UK 
 
The total registered occupational pension schemes (n=2154) had missing assets 
under management data in 14 cases and missing fund manager data in 796 
(37%) of cases, retaining 1358 valid cases.  The average pension scheme’s 
assets under management were £529 million (± £2,033 million) and the average 
member base was 10,616 (± 30,722) allowing for an average of funds per 
member of £87,000 (maximum £2,319,000; minimum £2,000:  ± £135,000).  The 
majority of schemes were Defined Benefit final salary open to new members 
(55% or 49% in the combined database) and Defined Benefit final salary closed 
to new members (23% or 26% in the converged database), with the remaining 
schemes (Defined Contribution, Hybrid, Stakeholder and PPP) accounting for the 
remaining 22%, or 25% in the converged database (see Figure 6.3 and for 
comparison of representativeness with the ONS data see Appendix I).   
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The majority of pension schemes outsource their assets to fund managers (86%), 
with many outsourcing to multiple fund managers.  Defined Benefit Open 
schemes outsourced in 2,898 schemes, Defined Benefit Closed in 1551 
schemes, Hybrid in 970 schemes and Defined contribution in 401 schemes with 
the average number of fund managers engaged across all schemes being 8.91 
(±11.27). 
 
Figure 6.3.  Frequencies of pension scheme type in the independent database 
 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the Office of National Statistics (ONS) has identified 
Defined Benefit schemes as a separate population from Defined Contribution and 
other schemes in their methodology.  The logic for consistent handling in line with 
their methodology is borne out by the significant size differences between them 
in both by both assets under management (F=91.598, df4, p=0.0001) and 
membership size (F=84.461, df4, p=0.0001) (see Table 6.1). 
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Table 6.1.  Schemes by assets under management and total membership 
Pension Scheme 
Assets under management 
mean and SD (£ million) 
Total membership mean and 
SD (retired and current 
participants) 
Defined benefit open (n=1146) 477 ± 1,770 13,013 ± 31,974 
Defined benefit closed (n=477) 567 ± 2,141 7,757 ± 24,467 
Hybrid (n=267) 911 ± 3,147 13,251 ± 44,144 
Defined contribution (n=160) 105 ± 228 5,186 ± 9,823 
 
The large disparity in size of both assets and members, particularly in hybrid 
schemes possibly reflects the complexity and resource intensity of running these 
multiple schemes for different parts of a large workforce. 
 
To evaluate whether any attributes of the fund manager affect the sustainability 
of a scheme when the size of schemes are heterogeneous, the unit of 
measurement should be the amount of the assets each member is entitled to, 
allowing a member of a small scheme to be applicably compared to a member of 
a large scheme.  This also allows cross-scheme comparisons to determine 
whether their size itself has any mediating effect on the size of the assets of a 
single member.  Illustrated in Figure 6.4, when total assets under management 
are divided by total members for the different scheme categories, the comparison 
between schemes flattens from very significant differences in asset size 
(F=119.664, df3, p=0.0001) to still significant, but less so (F=91.598, df4, 
p=0.0001).  Section 6.6 explores this phenomenon of pension scheme size as a 
potential determinant of the size of assets apportioned to a single member. 
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Figure 6.4.  Categorical differences in average asset allocations across schemes by assets under 
management and assets under management per member respectively 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pension schemes had various fund management engagement strategies, with 41 
(3%) schemes managing funds internally, 502 (37%) engaging a single funds 
manager and 120 (7%) engaging over 10 fund managers (average 3.4 ± 5.0), 
illustrated in Figure 6.3. 
 
Given 86% of pension schemes outsource their assets under management to 
one or more fund managers, the characteristics of these managers have 
important implications to the sustainability of pension assets for any given 
member.  These characteristics form the alternative variables in the analysis. 
 
6.5.2  Description of the fund managers managing UK pension 
funds 
 
The 502 fund management firms have aggregated assets under management of 
USD83.5 trillion, averaging $147,000 billion (standard deviation ± $1,303,000 
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billion),49 representing some of the largest corporations globally.  Figure 6.5 
depicts the ownership categorisation of the fund managers, 239 with external 
shareholders / owners and 219 with internal owners. 
 
Figure 6.5  The ownership structures of fund managers with UK pension clients in line with the 
rationale for this external variable. 
 
 
 
Table 6.2 outlines the frequency of entity ownership structures in each 
geographic location.  Anglo-American governance is described in Chapter 2 as 
comparatively more shareholder oriented (n=398) than that stakeholder oriented 
governance regimes of Europe and Asia (n=96).  These shareholder primacy 
regimes dominate the management of UK pension assets (80.6%). 
 
 
 
 
                                            
49
 A full list of fund managers and their governance characteristics can be found in Appendix IIII 
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Table 6.2  Frequency of observations of entity type in each geo-political reporting regime 
 
Publicly 
traded 
entity 
Private 
corporation 
Employee 
owned 
corporation 
Partnership 
Other/ 
defunct 
Total Total (%) 
USA 49 35 47 34 13 178 36.0 
UK 59 30 36 75 20 220 44.5 
Asia Pac 20 9 9 2 2 42 8.5 
Europe 8 10 9 3 0 30 6.1 
EU 16 3 2 2 1 24 4.9 
Total 152 87 103 116 36 494 100 
Total (%) 30.8 17.6 20.8 23.5 7.3 100  
 
With the three governance constructs described, there is a reasonable spread of 
fund managers across ownership structures, however the industry is dominated 
by fund managers from the USA (36%) and the UK (45%).   
 
6.5.3  The inter-relationship between the three fund manager 
governance variables and pension variables 
 
Collinearity between variables has important implications for the second objective 
of the research.  Should the variables prove interrelated (where no statistical 
difference is detectable between them), one characteristic’s influence over the 
assets of a pension member cannot be viewed as independent of the related 
variable’s influence.  For instance, the sample is dominated by publicly traded 
companies in the UK and USA.  If they relate to each other (it is likely that you 
are a PLC in the UK), then which is the characteristic that the pension client 
correlating with.  Isolating a particular governance influence over the member 
would be internally invalid. 
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The UK and USA dominate UK pension asset management averaging 82.4% of 
UK funds management globally.  The UK is dominant over the territories in the 
use of partnership structures (64.7% of partnerships are UK based), while the 
USA utilises more private sector entities.  Figure 6.6 illustrates the compliance 
regions by each organisational structure.  In each corporate structure category, 
the predominance of Anglo-America over the remaining territories is statistically 
significant, with partnerships proving the most disparate. 
 
Figure 6.6  Ownership structure variance of the fund managers in each geo-political compliance 
regime 
 
(A) Publicly traded entities (t=21.951, df151, p=0.0001)    (B) Private corporations (t=16.711, df86, p=0.0001) 
  
 
(C)  Employee owned (t=18.377, df102, p=0.0001)    (D)  Partnerships (t=26.689, df115,p=0.0001) 
  
 
236 
 
Anglo-American difference in assets per member between public and private 
ownership is not statistically significant (t=0.8966, df4,273, p=0.3700).  The 
difference in assets per member in stakeholder governance regimes between 
public and private ownership is also insignificant (t=0.1254, df435, p=0.9002).  
However, the difference between partnerships and the three other categories is 
significant (t=2.0711, df4710, p=0.0384) (See Table 6.3). 
 
Table 6.3  Assets per member by alternative ownership structures in shareholder and stakeholder 
oriented governance regimes 
Ownership Structure Anglo- American governance Stakeholder governance 
 Mean and standard deviation Mean and standard 
deviation 
Public corporation  £84,311 ± 140,962 (n=2,892) £87,687 ± 154,289 (n=282) 
Private corporation £83,969 ± 116,358 (n=459) £105,759 ± 203,984 (n=78) 
Employee owned £85,877 ± 136,109 (n=334) £74,134 ± 69,692 (n=62) 
Partnership £95,354 ± 156,616 (n=590) £77,789 ± 81,494 (n=15) 
 
While the third variable, the size by assets of the fund managers [FMAUM], differs 
significantly between organisational structures (F=2.634, df4, p=0.034), it does 
not by geographical location (F=0.924, df4, p=0.450).  Any reporting regime has 
big and small fund managers. 
 
While the observed economies of scale in larger assets under management are 
not preferred by a particular reporting regime, they do share a statistically 
significant relationship to ownership structures.  These ownership structures do 
share a statistically significant relationship with reporting regimes.  The apparent 
contradiction in this result is exacerbated by two factors: 1) the over-weighting of 
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US and UK representation in the reporting regime category evident in Figure 6.5; 
and 2) the fact that partnership structures are proportionally popular in the UK 
compared with publicly listed corporations in the US (75/59, or 127.1% in the UK 
and 34/49, or 69.4% in the US: �2=57.692, df6, p=0.0001).  However, it is 
important to note the cases identified as anomalies for the size of their assets 
under management (BNY Mellon, BlackRock and Vanguard) being ten to twenty 
times the size of the mean, are publicly quoted corporations in the USA.  
Removing their effect, highlighted in Figure 6.7, helps to normalise this 
distribution. 
 
Figure 6.7  Box plots of fund manager assets under management by reporting regime before and 
after the removal of outlier cases 
 
Fund manager assets under management (AUM) Fund manager AUM with outliers removed 
 
Larger fund managers (assets under management) tend to be publicly listed 
companies with more UK pension clients50.  With regard to the herding 
hypothesis51 that pension schemes gravitate towards certain fund manager 
                                            
50
 It is important to note that there is no category exclusivity implied.  A pension fund engaging 
multiple fund managers can conceivably engage the smallest and the largest of them. 
51
 The industry conjecture that small schemes gravitate to large fund managers is explored in 
Chapter 3, yet rarely empirically tested in the literature (Williams, 2014). 
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characteristics (particularly ownership structure) there is a significant difference 
in the mean number of clients managed by legal entity type (F=5.651, df4, 
p=0.001), biased towards publicly listed entities (illustrated in Table 6.452).  The 
causal direction of this relationship is undetermined.  FMOS biasing publicly 
trading entities have more clients and AUM, so it seems logical is that more 
clients create more assets under management.  The question of interest is 
whether particular clients share relationships marque brands. 
 
Table 6.4  Number of reported UK pension clients managed by fund manager legal entity53 
FMOS 
Public listed 
(n=149) 
Private 
corporation 
(n=87) 
Employee 
owned 
(n=103) 
Partnership 
(n=116) 
Other (n=41) 
Mean ± SD 18.26 ± 52.07 7.07 ± 15.94 4.21 ± 10.69 4.06 ± 5.51 2.98 ± 5.49 
 
The profile of the pension client for each fund manager is a significant inquiry for 
the following section addressing research objective two, assessing whether 
smaller pension schemes are gravitating to larger fund managers given that 
larger fund managers have more clients.  This potentially creates two types of 
herding in the fund management industry: 1) small schemes are over-
represented in the public listed fund manager category; and 2) large schemes are 
over-represented in the more boutique ownership structures of fund managers. 
 
 
                                            
52
 Given the influence that the two publicly quoted companies with the most clients BlackRock 
(n=430) and Legal & General (n=538) will have over this result they cannot be excluded as 
anomalies.  When explored individually, the BlackRock pension client profile (£1,228,580,615 ± 
£3,519,636,508) and Legal & General client profile is (£981,879,030 ± £3,064,614,273) both 
smaller than the general client profile (£1,844,630,998 ± 4,331,160,454).  
53
 According to the pension self-reported fund managers engaged in the Wilmington Directory 
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6.5.4  Implications for objective two 
 
There are three main implications of these findings for the research design of 
objective two; investigating whether different corporate governance 
characteristics of fund managers correlate with the total asset outcomes of their 
pension clients, and whether particular pension client attributes mitigate any 
negative corporate governance correlations.  Firstly, the difference in mean size 
between the ownership structures.  Secondly, the herding of small UK pension 
scheme clients towards large fund managers.  Thirdly, the over-represented large 
schemes in privately held ownership structures. 
 
The implications for the second objective are that while each variable will be 
explored individually for a direct relationship with assets under management per 
member, they are not independent of each other.  When interpreting results for 
the relative effect each shares with assets under management per member, 
acknowledgement must be made that they are not necessarily independent 
corporate governance effects over pension wealth capture and other pension 
variables may be responsible for greater effects. 
 
The implication for objective two of the over-representativeness of UK pension 
schemes by publicly listed corporations is that the two publicly listed companies 
managing a high percentage of clients (45% of pension schemes in the sample) 
have both recorded mean and standard deviations significantly lower assets per 
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member than the general client population. 54  While this will not always be an 
exclusive client relationship, the tendency for small pension funds to gravitate 
towards marque firms and engage fewer fund managers will exacerbate their 
governance profile influence over the results.  Conversely, large pension 
schemes have statistically more fund managers engaged, and therefore more 
cases recorded in the converged database. Their assets per member will account 
for a large part of any governance effect of the more boutique fund manager 
entities.  These two effects are depicted in Figure 6.8. 
 
Figure 6.8  Pension scheme size effect on results for objective two 
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The implications for an analysis framework for objective two are: 
 
a) The dominance of the UK and USA over the geography of origin for 
governance compliance.  The three smaller categories (Asia Pacific, 
European Union and Europe Other) will be combined to represent the 
stakeholder oriented regimes in governance.  This emphasises a rank, 
                                            
54
 Legal and General t=2.0356, df7014, p=0.0356*, BlackRock t = 2.8868, df6906, p=0.0039**. 
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rather than categorical construct useful for interpreting the relationship 
with the conceptual framework; 
 
b) Large fund managers are engaged by smaller pension schemes.  While 
this may prove a legitimate and interesting finding, the category is 
dominated by two publicly listed corporations.  A sensitivity analysis with 
BlackRock and Legal & General included then excluded from analysis will 
make their influence transparent;  
 
c) Inversely to the previous point, large pension schemes are over-
represented in privately held (smaller) fund management entities.  Larger 
schemes are positively correlated with assets per member and smaller 
schemes are negatively correlated (although neither significantly).  As with 
point (a), combining the category into the binary external owner / internal 
owner will be useful for interpreting the relationship with the conceptual 
framework; and 
 
d) Large pension schemes engage more fund managers, and hence have 
more individual cases in the combined database.  Their assets per 
member results will be over-represented in the analysis.  A sensitivity 
analysis with cases engaging less than 30 fund managers will make their 
influence transparent. 
 
These issues are explicitly considered in the next section where the conceptual 
framework is used to interpret the relationships the governance constructs share 
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with the pension scheme assets of a member to meet the second objective of the 
research design. 
 
 
6.6  Research objective two:  First analysis of the conceptual 
framework 
 
Objective two of the research design is to investigate whether different corporate 
governance characteristics of professional fund managers correlate with the total 
asset outcomes of their pension clients, and whether particular pension client 
attributes mitigate any negative corporate governance correlations.  The 
conceptual framework (Figure 4.3) has postulated a relationship between the 
corporate governance characteristics of a fund manager and the sustainability of 
pension scheme assets from the literature in Chapters 2, 3 and 4.  The 
contributing workforce has little control over fund manager selection, nor the 
ability to interact with the fund manager directly regarding their savings.  The 
framework proposes that certain characteristics of the pension scheme the 
member belongs to should have some mediating effect on the wealth capture 
from the assets of the member.  These include the ability to negotiate efficient 
fund management contracts and sufficient resources to monitor and manage their 
agents effectively. 
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6.6.1  Analysis plan:  Description of the relationships in the 
conceptual framework 
 
The conceptual framework imagined four quadrants of corporate governance 
behaviour, manifesting in relation to the governance traits of the firm (Section 
6.4).  The four quadrants suggest that management decision making discretion 
and external decision controlling (governance compliance) influence will cause 
different fiduciary agent protections.  The interpretation of the four quadrants: 
 
1. Investor oriented decision-making and shareholder oriented decision 
control 
The publicly listed fund manager will make decisions in favour of 
shareholders in the shareholder decision-controlling Anglo-American 
corporate governance regime (market oriented governance). 
 
2. Manager oriented decision-making and shareholder oriented decision 
control 
The privately owned fund manager will have discretion to make decisions 
in favour of pension clients despite the shareholder decision-controlling 
Anglo-American corporate governance regime. 
 
3. Investor oriented decision-making and stakeholder oriented decision 
control 
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The publicly listed fund manager will make decisions in favour of 
shareholders despite the stakeholder decision-controlling European 
corporate governance regimes. 
 
4. Manager oriented decision-making and stakeholder oriented decision 
control 
The privately owned fund manager will have discretion to make decisions 
in favour of pension clients in the stakeholder decision-controlling 
European corporate governance regime (polity oriented governance). 
 
According to the theory of agency in corporate governance, illustrated by the 
conceptual framework (Figure 4.3), Quadrants one and four should be 
unambiguous representations of shareholder primacy (Quadrant 1) and director 
primacy (Quadrant 4).  In quadrant one both the constructs of external firm 
ownership and shareholder primacy governance regimes work in unity to wealth 
capture the pension assets.  In quadrant four both the constructs of internal 
ownership in stakeholder oriented governance regimes work in unity to provide 
management with discretionary decision-making power to protect the pension 
from wealth capture.  Conversely, the conceptual framework suggests that in 
quadrants two and three the corporate governance constructs conflict with each 
other.  In Quadrant 2 internal firm owners should not be pressured by governance 
compliance favouring the shareholder.  The firm has the decision-making 
discretion to set their own tolerance for wealth capture.  Similarly, for Quadrant 3 
where externally owned corporations are managed in stakeholder oriented 
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compliance regimes, they should be capable of establishing their own wealth 
capture strategies, free from market oriented pressure.  Should the results reflect 
these propositions the agency theory of corporate governance cannot be 
rejected. 
 
Chapter 4 (Section 4.4.6) discussed the rationale for using Assets Under 
Management Per Member as the proxy dependent variable.  Given the thesis 
aims to examine the corporate governance effects of fund manages on the 
distribution of wealth back to the pension principal, the only way to compare 
pension schemes that differ to orders of magnitude in both member base and 
assets under management is to isolate the total assets attributable to a single 
member.  Chapter 5 discusses this concept of fungibility. 
 
6.6.2 The advantages and disadvantages of the dependent 
variable:  Assets Under Management per Member 
 
The construction of this variable was discussed in Section 4.4.6.  There are 
several advantages and disadvantages for using this proxy as the dependent 
variable.  Addressed in Section 4.4.6 was the need for fungibility between pension 
schemes for accurate comparison.  There are 2,154 pension schemes in the 
sample data in a range of sizes, both by assets under management (AUM) and 
total membership base.  While it is acknowledged in the research that these 
pension schemes are influenced by different factors, from an exogenous 
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viewpoint the size of the schemes by these two different measures leads to a lack 
of compatibility.  The research design needed to establish an independent 
measure of participant wealth to contribute to an opinion on the effect fund 
management may or may not have on member wealth.  If Member X is assigned 
to a £100 million AUM scheme with 10,000 members and Member Y is assigned 
to a £100 million AUM scheme with 20.000 members, Member X is worth £1 
million in their own right and Member Y is only worth £500, 000 in their own right.  
The schemes are identical in size of assets; however, the member experience is 
not equitable.  For instance, in the Wilmington data two schemes have £3,683 
million in assets under management.  Pharmaceutical company Astra Zeneca 
has 29,500 members, whereas National Rail has 35,287 members.  The 
difference in assets under management per member (£124,847 to £104,373) is 
20%.  The private property fortunes of the members are not comparable, even 
where the schemes purport the same mediating power of negotiation [PSAUM].  
This influenced the decision to create the proxy variable of the members’ own 
asset allocation being the appropriate fungible variable to control for the sample 
variance. 
 
The funds per member can be affected by many characteristics of the scheme 
relationships (not only those relating to fund manager governance).  This is 
explored in the ONS data analysed in Appendix I.  For instance, in the previous 
example it could be assumed that the average salary of an Astra Zeneca 
employee is higher than that of a National Rail employee.  It might also be that 
the National Rail pension scheme is older than the Astra Zeneca scheme.  At 
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present these assumptions are untested.  However, for the purpose of the 
research while acknowledging it is challenging to control for undetectable 
variables, under the a priori propositions the research design seeks to establish 
whether particular fund manager governance variables may account for part of 
the variance in the assets under management per member as the proxy 
dependent variable.  This is a limitation of the research, but certainly an indicator 
of future control variables for studies aiming to continue insight into the findings 
of the thesis that explain pension member asset growth. 
 
6.6.3  Analysing the governing and mediating principal variables 
 
Creswell (2009) portrays the measurement of a multiple agent environment as a 
set of constructs representing the principal of interest’s characteristics being 
mediated or intervened by the effect the second principal’s characteristics (see 
Figure 6.9).  This depiction of the analysis is an accurate reflection of the 
conceptual framework proposal.  However, it implies a cause and effect 
relationship that cannot be ascertained with the data at hand. 
 
Figure 6.9  Three independent constructs influencing a single dependent variable mediated by 
two intervening constructs 
X1 +    
 + Y1 +  
X2 +   Z1 
  Y2 +  
X3 -    
Independent variable Intervening variable Dependent variable 
Source: Creswell (2009; p122) 
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Certain characteristics of both principals should be capable of affecting their 
ability to monitor and incentivise the agent, such as the relative size of each 
principal.  In this analysis, these characteristics of the principal, the owners of 
fund management institutions have been hypothesised as corporate governance 
characteristics, specifically 1) the ownership structure of the fund manager 
[FMOS]; the headquarters for reporting corporate governance of the fund 
manager [FMRR]; and 3) the size of the fund manager and their ability to resist 
monitoring or encourage incentivising, measured by their own assets under 
management [FMAUM]. 
 
However the fund manager has another principal, the pension client whose 
assets they manage.  This alternative principal should also possess 
characteristics that allow them to monitor and incentivise agent, that may mediate 
or intervene in the owner’s ability to demand exclusive best interest from the fund 
manager.  These may include, but will not be limited to: 1) the pension scheme’s 
own size, measured by assets under management, assisting them in resisting the 
moral hazard of too few resources to monitor and influence the efficiency of the 
contract; and 2) the decision to have multiple fund managers engaged in 
managing their assets, assisting them in avoiding the adverse selection of a 
single under-performing fund manager, and resisting the problems of information 
asymmetry through cross fund manager bench-marking. 
 
A mediating variable is a variable used to explain causal links between other 
variables.  According to Wuensch (2014) “[c]onsider a model that proposes that 
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some independent variable (X) is correlated with some dependent variable (Y) 
not because it exerts some direct effect upon the dependent variable, but 
because it causes changes in an intervening or mediating variable (M), and then 
the mediating variable causes changes in the dependent variable.”  For the 
pension scheme variables to be considered mediating the corporate governance 
effects on the assets of a single member, they must share a significant 
relationship with both the dependent and independent variables (see Figure 
6.10). 
 
Figure 6.10.  Analysing the relationships between the independent, mediating and dependant 
variables.  An example relationship [FMOS→PSAUM → AUMPM] 
 
 
1. FMOS:PSAUM 
(p>0.05)          PSAUM 
2. PSAUM:AUMPM 
(P>0.05)  
     
FMOS  3. FMOS:AUMPM 
(p>0.05) 
 AUMPM 
Adapted from Wuensch (2014) 
 
In this example, for PSAUM to be considered a mediating variable, both 
FMOS:PSAUM (1.) and PSAUM:AUMPM (2.) must be significantly related 
alongside the relationship between FMOS:AUMPM (3.). 
 
 
6.7  Testing the analysis plan 
 
The analysis plan commences with a regression of the five relationships between 
the fund manager agent, the pension principal and the unit of measurement; the 
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assets of a single member in any given pension scheme.  In order for that 
regression to be valid, the collinearity between the variables is tested (see Table 
6.6). 
 
Collinearity was tested in the following methods: 1) With the converged database 
testing all Members separately (Total Members, Deferred Members and 
Pensioners); 2) With the converged database using Total Members only; 3) With 
the converged database on both member variable iterations where the three Fund 
Manager governance variables were converted to dummy variables. 
 
The dummy variables were constructed in the database by converting fund 
management ownership structure (FMOS) and fund management reporting 
regime (FMRR).  These were converted to FMOS (0=Publicly listed entity and 
1=Privately held entity) and FMRR (0=Anglo-American registered entity and 1= 
Stakeholder oriented entity).  Fund manager Assets Under Management were 
retained as a controlling governance variable.  With no significant differences 
between the tests the second (dummy) iteration is displayed in Table 6.5.  Total 
members include deferred members and pensioners, but also current 
contributors so portray the full view of current and previously contributing pension 
scheme membership. 
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Table 6.5 The relationships between the variables (Converged database with Total Members only) 
Correlation Assets Under Management 
AUM per 
Member Scheme Type Sponsor type FMs engaged 
Fund 
Manager 
Country 
FM 
Ownership FM AUM 
Total 
Members 
r .862** -.067** .020 .173** .653** .100** -.059** -.043** 
Sig .000 .000 .120 .000 .000 .000 .000 .001 
N 5982 5237 5915 5974 5982 5809 5838 5982 
Assets 
Under 
Manageme
nt 
r  .105** .043** .153** .640** .082** -.052** -.042** 
Sig  .000 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .001 
N 
 5237 5915 5974 5982 5809 5838 5982 
AUM per 
Member 
r   -.033* .022 .018 .009 .014 -.012 
Sig   .017 .108 .181 .527 .319 .399 
N   5197 5235 5237 5070 5098 5237 
Scheme 
Type 
r    -.237** .123** .107** -.142** .040** 
Sig    .000 .000 .000 .000 .002 
N    5915 5915 5742 5771 5915 
Sponsor 
type 
r     .141** -.094** .163** -.064** 
Sig     .000 .000 .000 .000 
N     5974 5801 5830 5974 
Fund 
Managers 
engaged 
r      .170** -.132** -.061** 
Sig      .000 .000 .000 
N      5809 5838 5982 
Fund 
Manager 
Country 
r       -.586** .095** 
Sig       .000 .000 
N       5808 5809 
FM 
Ownership 
r        -.306** 
Sig        .000 
N        5838 
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There is no collinearity between AUM per Member and the three governance 
(independent) variables (FMRR p=0.527; FMOS p=0.319; FMAUM p=0.399).  
There is significant collinearity between all independent variables and mediating 
variables (PSAUM and PSMFM) with low r scores.  The r score of note is between 
the two mediating variables (r=0.640, p=0.000).  Large schemes employ more 
fund managers.  The other r score of note is the relationship between 
independent variables FMOS and FMRR (r= -586, p=0.000).  The USA has the 
majority of listed fund managers and the UK the majority of partnerships.  These 
results are accommodated through weighting in the regression by individual 
variable in the following subsections: 
 
6.7.1  Fund manager ownership structure  
 
Proposition 1: Total pension funds per member will be lower when managed by 
fund managers with external shareholders (Berle and Means, 1932) ownership 
structures. 
 
The fund manager ownership structure relationship with assets per member is 
significant between ownership categories (F=24.678, df5, p=0.000) with a trend 
in higher assets per member relating to more internalised ownership structures.  
Table 6.6 illustrates the dominance of PLC ownership structures that will impact 
the interpretation of the regression.  There is a significant difference between 
publicly listed corporations (PLC) and partnerships (t=2.1241, df3777, p=0.034).  
However, uncertainty exists in the means between partnerships (higher) and 
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employee owned corporations (lower), both having internal ownership structures 
(although the difference is insignificant:  t=1.4279, df999, p=0.154). 
 
Table 6.6  Ownership relationship with assets per member 
Ownership structure 
Percentage of 
sample 
Mean assets per 
member (£) 
Standard 
deviation (£) 
Publicly listed corporation 
(n=3,174) 
67.4 81,455 140,415 
Private owned corporation 
(n=537) 
11.4 84,920 131,703 
Employee owned corporation 
(n=396) 
8.4 81,566 126,907 
Partnership 
(n=605) 
12.8 94,918 155,180 
 
The conceptual framework proposed that internal versus external ownership 
structures encouraging wealth capture may be exacerbated when the entity is 
based in a shareholder primacy governance regime.  This agency proposition, 
exhibited in the descriptive statistics (Table 6.8), is not consistently supported by 
the empirical observations. 
 
6.7.2  Fund manager reporting regime 
 
Proposition 2: Total pension funds per member will be lower when managed by 
fund managers located in dominant (Anglo-American) shareholder-agency 
economic environments. 
 
254 
 
The fund manager reporting regime effect on assets per member is statistically 
significant (F=24.265, df5, p=0.0001).  Table 6.7 illustrates the change in assets 
per member as the reporting regime moves from stakeholder to shareholder 
oriented compliance structures, with the exception of Asia Pacific. 
 
Table 6.7  Reporting regime relationship with assets per member 
Reporting regime Percentage of total 
Mean assets per 
member (£) 
Standard 
deviation (£) 
United States (n=1,324) 26.6 82,106 132,254 
United Kingdom (n=3,193) 64.2 82,953 139,962 
Asia Pacific (n=135) 2.7 77,952 120,939 
Europe Other (n=227) 4.6 83,685 141,772 
European Union (n=92) 1.9 103,657 206,793 
 
As with the ownership structure previously the sample is dominated by UK based 
fund managers.  There is no statistically significant difference between the poles 
of stakeholder and shareholder governance (USA to EU: t=1.4456, df1,414, 
p=0.149), however the category variance will be addressed in the regression 
following. 
 
The conceptual framework proposed that comparing shareholder versus 
stakeholder corporate governance reporting regimes, shareholder primacy 
regimes where shareholder wealth maximisation is the perceived goal of the 
corporation would encourage wealth capture through fees from pension clients.  
This agency proposition is the basis of the dummy variable for the regression. 
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6.7.3  Fund manager assets under management 
 
Proposition 3: Total pension funds per member will be lower when managed by 
larger fund managers. 
 
The fund manager assets under management relationship with assets per 
member is not significant (r=0.016, p=0.213).  While there is no discernible 
statistical relationship between the fund manager’s assets under management 
and the assets of the member, removing the outliers from the fund manager AUM 
increases visibility into the smaller fund managers.  When reanalysed with fund 
manager AUM above £3 trillion removed, the result evidences no further 
relationship (r=0.003, p=0.847). 
 
 
6.8  The corporate governance variables relationship with the pension 
scheme mediating variables 
 
The pension scheme variables are tested in the regression to determine their 
mediating qualities (the rationale described in Section 6.6.2).  The propositions 
explored by the regression below are that: 
 
Proposition 4: Total pension funds per member will be higher when pension 
clients are larger, avoiding wealth capture by the agent; 
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The conceptual framework posited that larger pension schemes would be 
capable of greater levels of measurement and monitoring of their agent’s 
behaviour in order to protect their members against the information asymmetry 
problem of moral hazard. 
 
Proposition 5: Total pension funds per member will be higher when pension 
clients have more agents, avoiding adverse selection of an underperforming 
agent. 
 
In the original pensions data the pensions’ scheme engagement behaviour 
shares a negative and statistically significant relationship with the assets of the 
member (p=0.020), implying that the pension principal decision to engage 
multiple fund managers has a negative bearing over the benefit accruing to their 
members. 
 
 
6.9  The regression analysis between the independent, mediating and 
dependent variables 
 
The regression testing was carried out iteratively to isolate the effect the 
independent variables have over the dependent variable and whether this is 
reduced once mediating variables are introduced (Baron and Kenny, 1986).  
From a mediating hypothesis, the independent variables must be significant 
predictors of the mediating variables to establish that they are indeed mediating 
something in the model.  This is the case in both the test for collinearity and linear 
257 
 
regression.  The regression analysis was carried out on both the independent 
variables as their original categorisations and as dummy variables.  There was 
no significant difference in the results for either variation.  The results displayed 
are with dummy variables for the three fund manager governance characteristics.  
Total members only is the variable employed as it will include deferred members 
and pensioners, but also current contributors.  Where possible, the results have 
been weighted by fund managers engage variable to reduce the impact of 
multiple cases discussed in Section 6.3. 
 
The first test was a linear regression of the relationship between the governance 
variables and the dependent variable (Table 6.8).  There is no significant 
relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable.  
When the regression is weighted for multiple cases of fund manager 
engagement, this statistical insignificance still stands, if slightly altered to Fund 
Manager Country increasing in significance (p=0.096) and Fund Manager 
Ownership declining (p=0.659).  This result is interesting given the weighting of 
Fund Manager Country to multiple engagement strategies among pension 
schemes, where the weighting should be controlling for this phenomenon. 
 
Table 6.8  Regression coefficients for three governance variables on the assets per member 
 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. Beta 
(Constant)  11.824 .000 
Fund Manager Country .016 1.030 .303 
FM Ownership .018 1.155 .248 
FM AUM -.008 -.565 .572 
Dependent Variable: AUM per Member 
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Table 6.9 tests the first pension scheme variable against three independent 
variables.  Fund Manager Country and Fund Manager AUM are both significant 
predictors, with the fund managers AUM being negatively associated.  This is 
consistent with the previous findings that small pension schemes gravitate to 
large fund managers in the UK.  It is important for the mediating hypothesis that 
this pension scheme variable is associated with the independent variables.  The 
characteristics of the pension scheme are predictors of the fund manager traits 
most likely engaged by that scheme.  This has important implications for the 
survey analysis in Chapter 7 involving what selection techniques are employed 
by pension schemes with different profiles. 
 
Table 6.9  Regression coefficients for three governance variables on the pension scheme assets 
 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. Beta 
(Constant)  7.809 .000 
Fund Manager Country .071 4.406 .000 
FM Ownership -.027 -1.598 .110 
FM AUM -.055 -3.962 .000 
Dependent Variable: Assets Under Management 
 
Table 6.10 examines the independent variable relationship with pension schemes 
engaging multiple fund managers.  All relationships are significant, with Fund 
Manager Ownership and Fund Manager AUM being negatively related.  
Engaging multiple fund managers encourages a strategy of selecting smaller 
fund managers, as previously reported in the descriptive statistics.  The most 
predictive variable is that pension schemes engaging multiple fund managers will 
trend towards engagement outside the UK.  This is again observed in the 
descriptive statistics and described in more detail in Appendix IV. 
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Table 6.10  Regression coefficients for three governance variables on the pension scheme fund 
manager engagement 
 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. Beta 
(Constant)  15.859 .000 
Fund Manager Country .128 7.992 .000 
FM Ownership -.087 -5.227 .000 
FM AUM -.095 -6.964 .000 
Dependent Variable: Fund Managers engaged 
 
In five of six relationships between the mediating and independent variables the 
results are significant.  While the mediating variables are predictors of fund 
management characteristics, as suggested in Table 6.11 they are also 
influencing the relationship with the dependent variable.  The size of the pension 
scheme has a positive and strong influence over the dependent variable and 
multiple fund manager engagement has a negative yet less predictive 
relationship with the assets of a single member.  This observation is in keeping 
with the qualitative results reported in Chapter 7 (Section 7.5.4) in the motivations 
for and against multiple fund manager engagement. 
 
Table 6.11 Regression coefficients for two mediating variables on the assets per member 
 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. Beta 
(Constant)  34.056 .000 
Assets Under Management .156 8.795 .000 
Fund Managers engaged -.081 -4.552 .000 
Dependent Variable: AUM per Member 
 
When all variables are regressed together, they are consistent with the narrative 
of these results (see Table 6.12).  The relationships have been examined for 
predictive qualities in three capacities: 1) independent variables predicting the 
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dependent variable; 2) independent variables predicting the mediating variables; 
and 3) mediating variables predicting the dependent variable.  The lack of 
predictive power in the direct relationship between independent and dependent 
variable becomes altered at the insertion of the mediating variables.  The size of 
a pension scheme (highly correlated with scheme type: p=0.001; see Appendix 
IV for detail) is the largest and strong predictor of member assets, with the model 
in total predicting 43% of the asset per member outcome (r=0.430) 
 
Table 6.12  Regression coefficients for all variables on the assets per member (dependent 
variable) 
 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. Beta 
(Constant)  10.489 .000 
Assets Under Management .664 24.370 .000 
Scheme Type -.056 -4.075 .000 
Sponsor type .026 1.859 .063 
Fund Managers engaged .019 1.067 .286 
Fund Manager Country .022 1.552 .121 
FM Ownership .027 1.807 .071 
FM AUM -.007 -.471 .638 
 
The corporate governance characteristics proposed by the conceptual framework 
have provided very little predictive power.  The corresponding relationship 
between the assets per member and the mediating pension scheme variable of 
multiple fund manager engagement has fallen away to insignificance.  Assets 
under management (size) of the pension scheme to which the member is 
attached has the largest influence over the assets of the member.  This result is 
important as it indicates that there is a strong mediating influence by the pension 
scheme, implying that the proposition that the moral hazard of agent 
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appropriation is avoided by the scheme’s ability to monitor and control the 
relationship.  The test fails to satisfy the proposition that this pension scheme trait 
protects the member from adverse selection. 
 
From a post-positive perspective, agency theory does not appear to perfectly 
model the principal-agent relationship as it was proposed a priori from the 
literature.  However, there is a strong indication that the a priori agency 
assumption that large (powerful) principals share a more positive relationship with 
outcomes for their beneficiaries.  Appendix IV provides further detail of the 
categorical breakdown of each variable, such as scheme type, to provide further 
insight into the data supporting these results.  The results conclude that different 
pension scheme traits lead to different asset outcomes for the member.  This, 
alongside the observation that small schemes gravitate towards publicly listed 
corporations provides important guidance for further sense-checking analysis 
and the survey design and construction for Chapter 7. 
 
6.9.1  Sense-checking the initial regression analysis 
 
Discussed in Section 6.3 were the challenges in analysis created by the merge 
of two databases creating a weighting bias towards pension schemes that 
engage multiple fund managers.  A pension scheme that engages one fund 
manager will generate one case in the combined database.  A pension scheme 
that engages 67 fund managers will generate 67 cases.  The following section 
controls for this by weighting multiple fund management engagement cases by a 
factor of their contribution to the data, bringing their weight over the data down to 
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their equivalent pension scheme companion of n=1.  The data will also be 
considered in the light of the conceptual framework assertion that an Anglo-
American PLC fund manager will provide a different outcome for members to their 
Stakeholder economy based privately owned fund manager competitors.  This 
polar comparison provides an important contribution to any trends suggesting 
lines of further enquiry into pension governance practice and policy. 
 
6.9.1.1  Weighted versus unweighted regression results 
 
The results of the analysis of the independent and mediating variables were 
weighted by number of fund managers engaged to ensure that the pension 
schemes engaging multiple fund managers were not skewing the interpretation 
of the impact that pension and fund manager principals were having over the 
beneficiary outcomes.  The weighting variable (Pension Scheme Multiple Fund 
Managers) was used as the control to sense-check the previous Section results.  
In the dataset where the fund manager variables were not converted to dummy 
variables the following results were observed (See Table 6.13): 
 
Table 6.13  Weighted versus unweighted regression results for assets under management per 
member (by regression significance) 
Results Unweighted (Sig.) Weighted (Sig.) 
Independent variable influence over dependent variable results  
 Original Dummy Original Dummy 
Fund manager Country p=0.303 p=0.303 p=0.096 p=0.096 
Fund manager Ownership p=0.248 p=0.248 p=0.659 p=0.659 
Fund manager AUM p=0.572 p=0.572 p=0.397 p=0.397 
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Independent variable influence over mediating variable [PSAUM] 
Fund manager Country p=0.000 p=0.000 p=0.000 p=0.000 
Fund manager Ownership p=0.110 p=0.110 p=0.110 p=0.110 
Fund manager AUM p=0.000 p=0.000 p=0.000 p=0.000 
Independent variable influence over mediating variable [PMFM] 
Fund manager Country p=0.000 (+ve) N/A 
Fund manager Ownership p=0.000(-ve) N/A 
Fund manager AUM p=0.000 (-ve) N/A 
 
There is no significant difference between the weighted and unweighted results 
for cases in either the normal or governance dummy variable databases.  The 
previous results are reflected in this.  The next important sense-checking test is 
to measure them against the conceptual framework (Section 4.3) assumptions of 
the different beneficiary outcomes between a Quadrant 1 result of an Anglo-
American PLC beneficiary outcome compared with a Quadrant 4 stakeholder 
privately owned fund manager providing benefit to their pension client members. 
 
6.9.1.2  Conceptual framework assumptions:  Quadrant 1 versus 
Quadrant 4 
 
The database was converted into two sections: 1) Fund managers incorporated 
in stakeholder based reporting regimes (Europe, European Union, Asia Pacific); 
and 2) Fund managers incorporated in Anglo-American economies (USA and 
UK).  In-house fund management was removed from this test to make direct 
comparison possible.  The results are reported in Table 6.14. 
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Table 6.14 Comparison between shareholder dominant and management dominant reporting 
regimes 
 Stakeholder FMRR Anglo-American FMRR 
 Beta t Sig. Beta t Sig. 
(Constant)  4.190 .000  7.836 .000 
Total Members -.212 -3.405 .001 -.673 -22.523 .000 
Scheme Type -.042 -.858 .391 .671 22.703 .000 
Sponsor type .057 1.150 .251 -.049 -3.306 .001 
FM Ownership -.106 -1.888 .060 .039 2.541 .011 
FM AUM -.140 -2.409 .016 .009 .632 .528 
Fund Managers engaged .142 2.178 .030 .029 1.928 .054 
Pension Scheme AUM .737 8.537 .000 .671 22.724 .000 
Dependent Variable: AUM per Member    
 
The conceptual framework proposed that corporate reporting regimes that 
support managerial discretion over shareholder decision-making priority would 
benefit the pension principal.  The regression controlled for scheme (such as 
Defined Benefit versus Defined Contribution) and sponsor type (such as private 
versus governmental and NGO organisations).  There are significantly more 
Defined Benefit pension schemes invested in the Anglo-American reporting 
regimes and more private sponsored pension schemes engaging fund managers 
in Anglo-American reporting regimes.  Fund manager ownership structures are 
significantly more likely to be publicly listed companies in Anglo-American 
regimes; however, the fund managers are significantly more likely to be larger in 
Stakeholder reporting regimes. 
 
Pension scheme size is a significant mediating factor in both reporting regimes, 
however they are more effective in Anglo-American economies.  These results 
are consistent with the conceptual framework.  The ability of a larger pension 
scheme to influence fund manager beneficial outcomes is more pronounced in 
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Anglo-American economies.  The interpretation of this is that these economies 
require more powerful pension principals to influence beneficiary outcomes to 
members whereas the stakeholder economies provide more equitable outcomes 
to members regardless of pension scheme size.  This is juxtaposed by results 
that Fund Manager ownership of publicly listed companies in Anglo-American 
structures supports better outcomes for members than in Stakeholder oriented 
reporting regimes. 
 
 
6.10  Conclusion 
 
This chapter contributes to the research by describing the various corporate 
governance characteristics of the professional fund managers with UK pension 
clients.  It investigates whether the different corporate governance characteristics 
of professional fund managers correlated with the wealth management outcomes 
for their pension clients, and whether particular pension client attributes moderate 
any possible corporate governance relationships.  When the rules of agency 
theory are tested in the empirical data of pension fund manager engagement, it 
looked at whether observations infer that agency theory is predicting a proxy 
variable being the assets of a single pension scheme member. 
 
The funds management industry described found that 152 of the 502 fund 
managers in the Wilmington Directory (2013:  30.8%) were publicly listed 
corporations, providing the ability to compare public versus private organisational 
traits proposed by the conceptual framework to conclude on any organisational 
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phenomena in fund managers interacting with the proxy variable.  This is 
important to the industry understanding of the nature of corporations that manage 
pension funds and whether they affect asset outcomes. 
 
Not any of the three independent variables provided a significant relationship with 
the dependent variable, and so superficially there is no relationship for the 
pension variables to mediate.  However, the relationships between the pension 
variables and the independent variables were strong, as was their relationship 
with the dependent variable, disavowing this simple assumption.  In the final 
regression, pension scheme assets under management was a significant 
predictor of the assets per member alongside fund manager selection criteria 
(with scheme type also describing or predicting the assets per member in a 
controlling capacity.  This variable does affect (or is affected by) both the 
independent variables and dependent variable and so must bear some mediating 
relationship.  The result is significant to the thesis proposition that agency theory 
is predictive of the empirical outcomes of pension governance analysis; large 
pension principals share a relationship with member outcomes regardless of fund 
manager selection choices, suggesting that their influence is important even 
while indicating that they share collective fund manager selection trends. 
 
The UK and USA dominate asset management in the UK, with 82.4% of the total 
funds under management.  The descriptive statistics illustrated the change in 
assets per member as the reporting regime moves from stakeholder to 
shareholder oriented compliance structures (with the exception of Asia Pacific).  
However, regardless of the proportional difference in means, there is no 
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statistically significant difference between the poles of shareholder (lowest mean) 
and stakeholder (highest mean) governance.  However, when compared at a 
macro-level between stakeholder and Anglo-American reporting regimes, fund 
manager selections by larger schemes trended towards smaller fund managers 
and away from publicly listed corporations.  While this did not adversely affect 
assets per member as hypothesised conceptually, it is an interesting pattern of 
selection that warrants further investigation. 
 
The dominance of Anglo-American firms in funds management is an interesting 
finding in its own right, raising the question of why European fund management 
markets are not more represented given the UK’s subscription to the Markets in 
Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID).  Watching for this trend as Brexit finalises 
has important ramification for the future management of pension funds. 
 
Pension scheme size proved the most challenging result of the research.  It 
proposed that total pension funds per member will be higher when pension clients 
are larger, avoiding wealth capture by the agent under the agency theory of moral 
hazard, with the pension principal able to appropriately manage the performance 
effort of the agent.  In the original pensions data (prior to converging with the fund 
management governance data), the pensions scheme assets share no statistical 
relationship with the assets of the member, implying this pension principal 
characteristic is not influencing the members’ assets, however in the later 
regression it was the single most predictive result.  This mediation of the 
relationship suggests there is an indirect mediation in action as the complete set 
of variables are read together and the interactions are comparatively viewed.  
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Size matters to the contracted results in a way that suggests collective bargaining 
is a future area of policy enquiry. 
 
The second pension scheme variable proposed was that total pension funds per 
member will be higher when pension clients have more agents, avoiding adverse 
selection of an underperforming agent.  Multiple fund manager engagement has 
statistically significant and negative association with the assets per member.  
Rather than avoiding adverse selection, multiple engagement shares a 
relationship with fewer pension assets per member.  The direction of this 
relationship is indeterminate but of important interest to the efficacy of pension 
fund management.  The phenomenon is important, and retested in the attitudinal 
survey results with pension trustees in Chapter 7.  The administrative burden of 
managing multiple agents is qualitatively suggested as overriding the advantage 
of competition between vying agents. 
 
It is important to highlight that the traits of the pension scheme were statistically 
related to the three governance characteristics in five of the six relationships, with 
pension scheme assets under management and fund manager ownership 
structures being the only not to.  This is possibly because large pension schemes 
engage across the spectrum of ownership structures and this nuance will be lost 
in the regression with the use of the dummy variable.  Smaller pension schemes 
gravitating towards public fund managers, while larger pension schemes share a 
relationship with internally owned fund managers.  Given the relationship 
between large pension schemes and multiple fund managers, they are simply 
engaging across a fuller spectrum of fund manager organisational types that are 
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consistent with the implications of larger schemes who engage more fund 
managers are more likely to spread their assets with geographic diversity.  
Conversely, the smaller the pension scheme, the fewer fund managers engaged, 
and those fund managers will be large and predominantly based in the UK.  As 
these relationships, do not improve the statistical significance of the asset per 
member, the expedience of engaging particular ownership structures, large fund 
managers or portfolio diversification requires further investigation. 
 
While it is important to note that there is a potential limitation in the 
interrelatedness of the fund manager variables and the limits of spatial rather than 
time series data, these results provide a compelling first and second step in the 
research design.  In the pension scheme population, as a whole, pension 
schemes were engaging fund managers in a consistent manner.  Given the 
direction of the relationship (cause and effect) is unknown the chapter cannot 
contribute to the thesis on whether large fund managers with external 
shareholders are making schemes smaller through appropriation, or whether 
small schemes naturally seek fiduciary comfort in large, publicly listed fund 
managers.  This has important implications for fund manager selection decisions, 
and contributes to the Chapter 7 survey design, exploring the reason for this 
phenomenon. 
 
The failure of the propositions to observe any relationship between these 
governance characteristics of the pension scheme and fund management agent, 
and the assets of the member raises two interesting possibilities:  1) the 
characteristics selected are immaterial to fund management selection benefits to 
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members, in which case an agency theory observation of the phenomenon does 
not hold predictive merit; and 2) pension schemes bring no benefits to members 
and the likelihood of a positive outcome to member assets is a product of chance.  
Either way, the empirical contributions to the study of agency theory  and what it 
brings to the management study of pensions has important contributions to the 
Academy in its search for meaningful predictive theory. 
 
The contribution to agency theory is the production of another empirical study to 
add to the business study of theory paradigm testing.  The unique contribution of 
this study is its multi-agency nature.  Agency theory has been historically tested 
in dyadic environments with a closed system assumption.  While there have been 
concept contributions to the theory of multi-agency, and the development of 
stakeholder theory has been important to this development, a body of empirical 
work on multi-principal agency is yet to appear in the literature. 
 
The most important point to move forward with from this chapter is to the practice 
of fund manager selection in the execution of pension asset outsourcing.  As the 
UK pension industry moves away from Defined Benefit Open schemes, where 
member benefits are guaranteed and liability lies with the sponsoring employer, 
the implications of the findings have a contribution to make in the non-financial 
performance assessment of fund managers in pension scheme selection 
frameworks.  Non-financial performance assessments (such as environmental, 
social and governance performance) are widespread in the pensions industry in 
the process of underlying asset and portfolio selection.  Yet they have been 
conspicuously absent in fund manager selection criteria in both the academic and 
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practitioner literature.  The hypothesis moving into the next chapter is that fund 
manager selection is grounded in finance theory, yet more appropriately 
embodied by agency theory. 
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Chapter 7 
Analysis Part 2: Survey examination of the 
perceptions of pension trustees 
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7.1  Introduction 
 
A survey of pension trustees was developed in July 2014 with the assistance of 
numerous pension industry practitioners and academic input from both pension 
governance and traditional corporate governance expertise.  Objectives 1 and 2 
were addressed in Chapter 6.  The purpose of the survey in contributing to the 
subsequent research objectives are twofold: 
 
1. To investigate whether pension clients perceive that the corporate 
governance of the fund manager matters to the fiduciary governance of 
asset management for their beneficiaries; and 
 
2. To determine whether pension clients believe the fiduciary duties of 
professional fund managers conflict with the delivery of fiduciary asset 
management. 
 
It was deployed to the list of trustee contacts by emails that were published in the 
Wilmington Directory of Pension Funds and their Advisors (2013) totalling 1,243 
potential respondents.  Respondents were emailed individually with an invitation 
to complete the survey using the software package Qualtrics.  The response rate 
achieved over two months was 112 completed surveys (representing 9.01% of 
potential respondents).  The detailed description of the design and construction 
of the survey is outlined in Chapter 5 (Section 5.8). 
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In brief, the respondents reported with some uniformity that the corporate 
governance characteristics of the fund manager were not considered important 
to the selection decision compared with the financial considerations of historical 
returns on investment achieved and the perception of asset class expertise.  The 
perceptions held of the fiduciary duty that fund managers owed their shareholders 
were that in reality they were greater than those owed to the assets they managed 
for pension clients.  It was also suggested that this should not be the case. 
 
These results are in keeping with the findings of the Kay Review (2012; p13): 
“The Law Commission should be asked to review the legal concept of fiduciary 
duty as applied to investment to address uncertainties and misunderstandings on 
the part of trustees and their advisers,” and subsequently the Law Commission 
Review (2013; p4):  
 
“A number of submissions – in particular, powerful argument from 
FairPensions – suggested that some pension fund trustees equated their 
fiduciary responsibilities with a narrow interpretation of the interests of 
their beneficiaries which focused on maximising financial returns over a 
short timescale and prevented the consideration of longer term factors 
which might impact on company performance, including questions of 
sustainability or environmental and social impact.  Lawyers who 
participated in our discussions, however, suggested that the law allowed 
a more robust interpretation.  Several commented that pension fund 
trustees who insisted on a narrow view of fiduciary duty were often hiding 
behind risk-averse legal advice, designed to protect the adviser and client 
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rather than to provide guidance as to the proper discharge of fiduciary 
duty.” 
 
This chapter commences with a review of the theoretical foundations establishing 
the objectives.  It revisits the contention made in Chapter 3 that finance theory, 
and the heuristic assumptions of the risk/reward relationship are still the basis for 
fund manager selection decisions.  The chapter continues with a comparison of 
the demographics of the cases to both the Wilmington Directory (2013) where the 
sample originated, and the Office of National Statistics (ONS, 2014), being an 
approximation of the pension population.  The research acknowledges a large 
pension scheme self-selection bias raised by the ONS.  The chapter finally 
reports the results separately for each of the objectives and discusses the 
methodological challenges and the issues of secrecy and sensitivity around the 
fees contract for asset management endemic to the industry. 
 
 
7.2  A post-positivist analysis of fund management governance 
 
The survey is a perceptions based analysis of pension trustees and as such can 
only look for patterns of stated observations made by respondents rather than 
any revealed preference through their market based transactions.  Market based 
data is widely available on the absolute investment performance of all fund 
managers, such as MorningStar.com, discussed in Chapter 5.  However, given 
the comprehensive absence of market based data on the cost of investment 
performance to the pension trust, these perceptions are the only information 
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available on its value for money after all fees and charges have been 
appropriated.  The first section of the survey elicited the agency characteristics 
(if any) that were used in the fund manager selection process (in fulfilment of the 
research Objective 3) and how these relate to the perception of fiduciary duties 
owed to the trust by the fund manager (in fulfilment of Objective 4).  The survey 
construction was described in Section 5.8.1.  The demography in the second 
section of the survey ensures the sample is representative of both the sample 
frame in Chapter 6 and the pension population according to the Office of National 
Statistics.  The next section tests the sample against these previous populations 
before Sections 7.4 and 7.5 present the analysis in exploration of Objectives 3 
and 4 respectively. 
 
 
7.3  Descriptive statistics: Analysis of the representativeness of the 
sample 
 
According to the Occupational Pension Schemes Annual Report for 2010 
(OPSAR, 2011), the most recent time the ONS survey sought scheme 
information, there were 44,380 schemes registered in the UK, 21,730 of these 
still functioning unclosed to new business.  The majority of registered schemes 
(80%) have only 2-11 members and the largest schemes (5,000+ members) 
account for only 1% of the population (see Table 7.1 for further detail). 
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Table 7.1 Number of private sector occupational pension schemes by size and operational 
status, 2010 
 Members  Open Closed Frozen Winding up Total 
5,000+ 250 180 40 10 480 
1,000 to 4,999 430 400 160 70 1,060 
100 to 999 760 1,220 1,180 410 3,570 
12 to 99 1,020 960 1,460 510 3,950 
2 to 11 19,270 10,240 5,560 250 35,320 
Total 21,730 12,990 8,400 1,250 44,380 
Source: Occupational Pension Schemes Survey 2010 
 
This skewed distribution of members (mean 8,876 ± 14,860: see Figure A1.9 in 
Appendix III) has provided the ONS with a methodological challenge of large 
scheme self-selection bias, unsolved by a methodology review post the 
unsatisfactory results of the 2008 survey: 
 
“The review has improved the methodology for weighting estimates of 
scheme numbers, but the problem of sampling variability which produced 
a set of unusual results in 2008 has not been solved by the new 
methodology. The only way to solve this problem would be to allocate 
additional resources to the survey so that sample size could be 
increased, particularly for very small schemes. ONS does not consider 
this to be a priority in terms of resource allocation at a time of tight 
budgets. It is important to note, therefore, that the estimates of numbers 
of very small schemes continue to be subject to considerable 
uncertainty.” (OPSAR, 2011; p6). 
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The total registered occupational pension schemes in the Wilmington Directory 
(2013: n=2,154) represent the pension assets of 15,987,000 members.  This 
accounts for 57.3% of the membership population recorded by the ONS in 2013 
(Table 7.2).  Total members were reported by 1,506 (70%) of schemes, 
distributed around the mean as 10,616 ± 30,722 (Range: 10 – 425,823).  
Categorising total members into scheme size using the ONS methodology 
enables the sample frame to be compared to the population for 
representativeness.  Noting the ONS concerns regarding self-deselection in the 
category of 2-11 members, supported by the single case in the Wilmington (2013) 
sample frame, the single observation in this category was disregarded on 
strength of the ONS observation for the Chapter 6 analysis yet the two survey 
respondents were included in analysis in this chapter. 
 
Table 7.2 Total number of registered occupational pension schemes by membership size 
Membership 
size categories 
ONS 
reported 
(A) 
Wilmington 
reported 
(B) 
Survey 
respondents 
(C) 
Percentage of sample1 
- - - - A B C 
2-11 35,320 1 2 80 0 3 
12-99 3,950 39 1 9 2 1 
100-999 3,570 505 17 8 23 22 
1000-4999 1,060 492 26 2 23 34 
5000+ 480 469 29 1 22 38 
Unreported - 647 1 0 30 1 
Total 44,380 2,154 76 100 100 100 
Source: Office of National Statistics (ONS2013) and Wilmington Pension Directory (Wilmington, 2013) 
1. Rounded to 0 decimal points, comparing ONS/Wilmington/Survey results (See Figure 7.1) 
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When comparing the distribution of the ONS population and the Wilmington 
sample (described in Chapter 6) with the sample of respondents there is a 
consistent trend towards larger pension schemes responding to the three surveys 
(Figure 7.1). This self-selection trend is supported by the distribution of 
membership of the Wilmington Directory of 10,616 ± 30,722 members per fund 
compared with the larger member base of survey recipients at 26,407 ± 65,868.  
This is discussed in Chapter 8 as a methodological challenge of smaller pension 
funds self-exclude that has been met through limiting any interpretations as only 
relevant to large funds with more sophisticated fund management capability (and 
resources to complete surveys).  As member size increases, Wilmington data 
and survey respondents become less representative of the ONS data.  The fault 
observed in the ONS methodology is heightened in the following Wilmington 
dependent data. 
 
Figure 7.1 The trend towards large scheme self-selection through the three surveys:  
Graphic representation of the membership categories in Table 7.2. 
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The types of schemes considered by the two surveys in Chapter 6 (Wilmington 
Directory and ONS) and the survey are compared as Defined Benefit Open, 
Defined Benefit Closed, Defined Contribution and Other.  Table 7.3 compares the 
survey demographics to the Wilmington sample.  It is important to note that the 
survey represents 12.6% of the total members in the Wilmington Directory, 
despite the survey being completed by only 112 pension schemes.  In this the 
sample well represents members of occupational pension schemes in the UK. 
 
Table 7.3 Total members per pension benefit structure 
Benefit structure 
Total members 
Wilmington 
Directory 
Percentage of 
Directory total 
(%) 
Total members 
Survey 
Percentage of 
Survey total (%) 
Defined Benefit Open 8,315,595 52 1,612,665 80 
Defined Benefit Closed 3,125,892 20 339,480 17 
Defined Contribution 788,269 5 54,804 3 
Other 3,671,927 22.5 0 0 
Unreported 85,317 0.5  0 
Total 15,987,000 100 2,006,949 100 
Source: Wilmington Pensions Directory (Wilmington 2013) and survey respondents 
 
There is a statistical difference between the number of survey respondents from 
Defined Benefit Open schemes and the Wilmington Directory (�2=5.939, df1, 
p=0.0148).  This is the only significant difference in scheme taxa between the 
sample and survey respondents.  The category of “other” for the Wilmington 
sample includes the designation “hybrid”, as a fund that is running multiple 
schemes.  Given the dominance of Defined Benefit schemes in both samples, 
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(and the dominance Defined Benefit schemes have over large funds; see Chapter 
6) the interpretation of any results are limited to large Defined Benefit schemes. 
 
This analysis illustrates that the survey attracts the same methodological issues 
that both the ONS and Wilmington Directory in Chapter 6 have been challenged 
by, it is easier to extract information on the specifics of operations from larger, 
more resourced schemes.  While acknowledging this limitation in the scope of the 
results, it is important to note that these survey respondents have an important 
contribution to make to the understanding of pension governance for three 
reasons: 1) they represent a vast number of UK contributing members (2 million); 
2) they have influence over the industry and regulators generally that the smaller 
schemes do not (Aubrey, 2015);  and 3) they have the resources and profile to 
be thought leaders for smaller schemes (Aubrey, 2015), so are a legitimate place 
to begin contemplation of how pension trusts view the fund management 
relationship.  Section 7.5 will draw on this caveat when interpreting the responses 
to the questions supporting Objective 3 of the research design. 
 
 
7.4  Anomalies in the reporting on fund managers engaged 
 
The fund managers named in Question 3 as the bearer of the survey 
respondent’s largest mandate are heavily weighted to PLC ownership structures 
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(80% of respondents).  The predominance of UK engagement (56%)55 is followed 
by the USA (24%) then EU (7%) and Europe Other (5%) and Africa (2%), with 
6% of the respondents managing funds in house.  These results differ from the 
Chapter 6 findings, where UK engagement was higher (64.2%:  �2=14.682, df4, 
p=0.0054).  Table 7.4 illustrates the diversity of these characteristics (or lack 
thereof), with the 71 respondents engaging only 22 fund managers.  Very large, 
publicly listed UK based fund managers are predominant in the sample (50.7%), 
with PLC and privately owned corporations being the only indicated as owning 
the mandate (this is significantly different to the expected findings from Chapter 
6, where more diversity was in evidence: �2=25.699, df2, p=0.0001).  This is in 
keeping with the self-selection bias discussed in the previous section.  Legal & 
General Investment Management account for 27% of the respondents’ mandate 
(n=19: see Box 7.1 for a description of Legal & General). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
55
 See the change in sample demographics between respondents.  Chapter 6 (Section 6.5.2) 
theorised that larger pension schemes have diversified fund managers outside the UL reporting 
regime.  This accounts for the statistical difference between the 56% of UK engagement in the 
survey results compared with the 64.2% in the revealed data results. The Chapter discusses the 
selection bias towards larger schemes that supports this conclusion. 
285 
 
Table 7.4 Diversity in the fund managers with largest mandate 
Fund manager Ownership structure 
Geographical 
headquarters 
Number of 
respondents 
Legal & General PLC UK 19 
BlackRock PLC USA 10 
Insight PLC UK 8 
In house N/A N/A 4 
Standard Life PLC UK 4 
State Street PLC USA 4 
Cardano Private Ownership EU 3 
Cazenove PLC UK 3 
Grosvenor Capital Private Ownership UK 2 
UBS PLC Europe Other 2 
AllianceBernstein PLC USA 1 
AXA Rosenberg PLC EU 1 
Baillie Gifford Private Ownership UK 1 
Credit Suisse PLC UK 1 
Investec PLC Africa 1 
IPM (Sweden) Private Ownership Europe Other 1 
J P Morgan  PLC USA 1 
Lazard Private Ownership USA 1 
Lothbury Private Ownership UK 1 
Russell Investments Private Ownership UK 1 
SEI PLC USA 1 
Threadneedle PLC UK 1 
Total (n=22) 57 PLC /10 PO 6 USA / 10 UK / 5 Other 71 
 
There are twelve fund managers in the FTSE100, with a combined market 
capitalisation of £124.25 billion (FTSE, 2015).  Table 7.5 compares the 
shareholder’s asset contribution to their agent (shareholder equity in the form of 
market capitalisation) with the asset contribution made by the pension principal 
to their agent. 
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Table 7.5 Market capitalisation of FTSE100 fund managers compared with the size of 
assets managed 
Fund manager 
Market capitalisation in £ 
billions 
Assets under management in £ 
billions 
Prudential 31.63 753.00 
Aviva 17.69 374.17 
Standard Chartered 13.52 725.90 
Legal & General 13.21 608.40 
Old Mutual 8.45 319.40 
Schroders 6.63 390.44 
Standard Life 6.63 280.02 
Hargreaves Lansdown 5.87 55.20 
Provident Financial 4.74 6.50 
St. James's Place 4.68 62.67 
Aberdeen Asset Management 3.14 304.81 
Total 109.66 3,880.51 
Sources:  London Stock Exchange (2016) and Wilmington (2013).  Currency conversion xe.com at 2 
March 2016 
 
This represents an average market capitalisation of (volume of shares on issue 
multiplied by current share price) £10.35 billion per institution, and 1.1% of the 
total company capitalisation on the London Stock Exchange FTSI100 (Russell, 
2015).  This proxy for shareholder perceptions of share value makes them 
important institutions to the investment market; finance theory suggesting this is 
because their returns on investment are adequate to attract and retain equity 
capital (Levine, 2005; Allen and Santomero, 1997).  The contribution of the 
shareholder principal is not correlated with the size of the pension assets the fund 
manager manages, the latter being three orders of magnitude more (35.4 times), 
yet the direction of the fiduciary duty is reported by trustees as due to the 
comparatively modest shareholder assets.  Pressure to maintain market 
capitalisation through year-on-year profit improvement is a strong corporate 
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objective for publicly traded entities (Bainbridge, 1993).  Box 1 illustrates this point 
using Legal & General, the most prevalent fund manager elicited by the survey 
sample.  The survey examines whether this was a consideration for the trustees 
engaging PLCs compared with alternatively owned fund managers. 
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  Box 1. Case study description of Legal & General:  The dominant fund manager 
amongst survey respondents. 
Organisational name:  Legal & General Group PLC (LSE: LGEN) 
 
Legal & General Group Plc, commonly known as Legal & General, is a British multinational financial 
services company headquartered in London, United Kingdom. Its products include life insurance, 
general insurance, pensions and investments. Legal & General is listed on the London Stock 
Exchange and is a constituent of the FTSE 100 Index1. 
Profile:  £709bn in total assets and 9,000 employees worldwide, established in 1836.  It has 10m 
customers worldwide and a £16.5 billion market capitalisation as at 31 March 20151.  This makes it 
the 35th largest PLC listed on the London Stock Exchange3.   
• Asset expertise:  Legal and General manages fixed income, equity, multi-asset, liability-driven 
investment, property and alternative solutions on behalf of its clients4 • Share price:  £214.10 on 12-May-20165 increasing 33.3% since May 2013 • Dividends6 
"The Board has confidence in the strength and growth prospects for the business. This underpins 
the Board's recommendation of a final dividend of 9.95p, giving a full year dividend of 13.40p, 19% 
higher than 2014." 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
6.40p 7.65p 9.30p 11.25p 13.40p 
• Investment performance for pension principals 
2013 Worst-performing funds:  Managers who've lost investors the most ground – Legal and General 
7th at 26.67% underperformance on sector average7 
“2015 We recently reviewed 54 Legal & General unit trust and OEIC funds. The review found that 
70% of the total money invested with Legal & General is held in consistently poor performing funds. 
Our analysis found that only 2 or (3.7%) of the 54 funds managed to consistently maintain top 
quartile performance over the most recent 5 year period. 
These 2 funds hold a combined £494 million. Therefore, only 2% of the money invested within the 54 
Legal & General funds are actually placed within consistently top performing funds. 
 
Sources:   
1. www.legalandgeneralgroup.com 
2. http://www.londonstockexchange.com/exchange/prices-and-markets/stocks/summary/company-
summary/GB0005603997GBGBXSET1.html 
3. http://www.ftse.com/products/indices/uk 
4.  http://www.lgim.com/global/about-us/ 
5.http://www.londonstockexchange.com/exchange/prices-and-markets/stocks/summary/company-
summary/GB0005603997GBGBXSET1.html 
6. http://www.legalandgeneralgroup.com/investors/dividend.html 
7. http://www.thisismoney.co.uk/money/investing/article-2348068/The-10-worst-performing-investment- 
funds-2010.html#ixzz48WGE2sPy 
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The question of whether ownership structure is an important attribute to pension 
schemes was elicited in the survey.  This was to ascertain whether the conflicted 
agency duty to shareholders highlighted above matters to the pension trustees 
engaging PLC fund managers. 
 
In Question 7 (see Appendix II) of the survey only 65% (n=44) of respondents 
labelled the fund manager they had described in Question 3 as a PLC.  This is 
15% lower than actual number of PLCs in the fund managers according to the 
Chapter 6 database.  This suggests that ownership structure was not considered 
important by some of the respondents in the selection process, given the 
proportion of mislabelling.  Conversely, 55% designated their fund manager of 
UK origin and 28% of USA origin, an accurate reflection of the fund manager 
governance regime provided in the Question 3 list (Table 7.5), suggesting 
geographic origins may be more deliberated.  Given the differences in response 
to these two governance characteristics, the survey does not later delineate 
between the two.  The response to Question 9 was that 53% of participants 
thought that these origin and ownership characteristics were not considered in 
the selection process (with 27% responding it was only implicitly considered).  
This observation leads directly into consideration of the third objective of the 
thesis. 
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7.5  Analysis of objective three of the thesis 
 
The aim of this section is to analyse the survey data in accomplishing the 
following objective: 
 
To investigate whether pension clients perceive that the corporate 
governance of the fund manager matters to the fiduciary governance of 
asset management for their beneficiaries. 
 
Where fiduciary governance is defined as avoided wealth capture; or value for 
money in the outsourcing of funds management.  According to the Chapter 6 
findings, external ownership structures did not disadvantage pension members 
in terms of wealth capture.  The assets under management per member of the 
survey group was £95,450 ± £74,739.  This is statistically equivalent to the 
Chapter 6 sample (t=0.4699, df2202, p=0.6385).  The survey respondents were 
proportionally likely to select a PLC fund manager as the manager of their largest 
mandate (see Table 7.4).  The difference in the assets per member between the 
group of respondents that engaged a PLC and those who engaged alternative 
fund managers was statistically insignificant (t=0.0994, df64, p=0.9212).  This 
corresponds with the Chapter 6 proposition that the agency characteristic of 
governance structure is not predictive of pension asset allocation. 
 
When respondents were asked whether corporate governance information had 
been provided by the fund manager (n=66), 55% (36) responded that it either had 
been, 32% (21) responded that they were unaware and 14% (9) responded no.  
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While approximately half the respondents were aware of the provision of 
information, the other half had not sought any.  This does not rule out the 
possibility that information was sought from other resources (for example, 
consultants or industry publications). 
 
The three main questions on whether, once governance information was known, 
it was used in a decision making capacity creates the early impression that the 
importance of governance in selection criteria was not high.  This lends weight to 
the proposal that financial information is a priority in selection decisions, rather 
than agency information.  Question 9 of the survey asks whether ownership 
structure or geographical headquarters for compliance played a part in fund 
manager selection, with 53% of responses a definitive no (n=66) or 27% the more 
ambiguous “implicitly only” (leaving only 20% of the sample a definitive “yes”).  
Question 10 supports the notion that financial criteria are prioritised over agency 
criteria, asking specifically whether corporate governance is relevant to the funds 
management contract (agreed performance less fees).  It finds most governance 
traits congregate around the lower end of a Likert range (1 is not important, 7 is 
very important).  With the exception of “Corporate Social Responsibility” and 
“Board Composition” in Table 7.6, typical corporate governance criteria applied 
by the governance codes to the shareholder principal are not prioritised by the 
pension principal. 
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Table 7.6 Trustees’ beliefs on the importance of corporate governance on the management 
of the fund management contract (agreed performance less fees n=67) 
Governance assistance in managing net 
performance 
Mean and median 
Total respoŶses ч ͞ϯ͟ oŶ 
Likert scale (n / %) 
CEO/Chairman separation 3.22 and 3 34 (51%) 
Gender equality 2.66 and 2 46 (69%) 
Employee engagement 3.76 and 3 34 (51%) 
Corporate social responsibility 3.70 and 4 32 (48%) 
Say on pay 3.09  and 3 37 (55%) 
Board composition 3.75 and 4 29 (43%) 
 
“Say on pay” (senior management and Board directors’ remuneration) is 
interesting as a corporate governance trait of low importance (Likert median score 
3).  There is pressure for fund managers to increase and disguise the client fee 
base alluded to by the Kay Review (2012; also see Chapter 3).  This is a key 
concern to current pension governance dialogue, described as the effort 
shareholders should expend to curb run-away increases in executive 
remuneration that decrease investor value (or as Jensen (2001b; p2) more 
emotively expresses, “steals from investors”) in the form of perquisites.  This 
issue has become central to concerns for corporate value retention, and active 
ownership proponents suggest it should by compulsory to proxy vote on this issue 
alone (Karmel, 2010).  Many pension schemes instruct their fund managers to 
operate active ownership mandates on this issue, to vote on board remuneration 
on their behalf.  Yet the survey responses have not supported the notion that the 
respondents entertain a duty to contain perquisites within their own financial 
intermediaries, despite having a fiduciary duty to defray costs facing contributors. 
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While Question 10 of the survey asked “does the trust as a whole believe any of 
the following corporate governance issues are important to the financial 
performance less fees of the fund manager?”, Question 5 asks “what was the 
Trust’s rationale for selecting this fund / manager?”  The question moves the 
respondent from reflecting on the importance of specific governance criteria to 
asking about fund manager selection criteria that includes agency and finance 
theory constructs.  Table 7.7 proposes that the three highest performing key 
metrics for selecting a fund manager (asset class expertise 71%, reputation 56% 
and past performance data 48%) are all market facing financial performance 
criteria. 
 
Table 7.7 Question 5: What was the Trust’s rationale for selecting this fund / manager? 
Criteria* Answer Response % 
1 Asset class expertise 52 71% 
2 Reputation 41 56% 
3 Past performance data 35 48% 
4 Lowest overall fees 25 34% 
5 Provision of useful information 12 16% 
6 Managing unease 2 3% 
7 Transparency of fee structure 23 32% 
8 Risk sharing (including downside risk) 4 5% 
9 ESG and engagement strategies 6 8% 
10 Value for fees 28 38% 
11 Other criteria were applied* 7 10% 
12 Consultant recommendation 34 47% 
13 Other industry recommendation 3 4% 
Total respondents 73  
*Where any number of criteria could be selected 
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The next key metric is by consultant recommendation (47%), an observation also 
made in the Kay Review (2012) as a method for fulfilling the trust’s fiduciary duty 
through the purchase of external advice (or cynically viewed as outsourcing 
fiduciary responsibility).  These four metrics outweighed low fees (34%) and value 
of fees (38%).  The tepid result for value for fees is interesting regardless of other 
selection rationale, or portfolio management preferences.  From a fiduciary 
perspective achieving value for money would be the minimum duty assigned to 
the trustees in responding to a question where any number of criteria could be 
selected. 
 
Analysing the 73 responses individually reinforces these observations.  In the 
71% of the respondents selecting asset class expertise, only two selected it as 
their sole criterion.  Other respondents selecting only one criterion (therefore a 
more definitive representation of their decision methodology) elected consultant 
recommendation (n=3), past performance (n=1) and reputation (n=1).  These 
criteria are not as oriented to fiduciary agency as value for fees, selected by only 
38% of respondents.  These respondents selected value for fees in a bundle of 
an average of 4.2 criteria compared with the average of 3.2 criteria selected by 
the remaining responses.  Table 7.8 illustrates the criteria also selected by the 
value for fees group. 
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Table 7.8 Additional criteria selected by “value for fees” responses 
Criteria Answer Response % 
1 Asset class expertise 22 26% 
2 Reputation 14 17% 
3 Past performance data 14 17% 
4 Lowest overall fees 11 13% 
5 Provision of useful information 5 6% 
6 Managing unease 0 0 
7 Transparency of fee structure 9 11% 
8 Risk sharing (including downside risk) 0 0 
9 ESG and engagement strategies 1 1% 
11 Value for fees 1 1% 
12 Other criteria were applied* 7 8% 
13 Consultant recommendation 0 0 
Total 84  
 
Asset class expertise is dominating the additional criteria selected by the group.  
Value for fees is one characteristic of a larger decision bundle where the 
remaining criteria are market facing.  This intimation of the preference for market 
facing rather than governance key performance indicators can also be observed 
in Question 12 of the survey.  The question asks “Do you think the Trust believes 
that the corporate governance profile of the find manager helps them manage 
any of the following challenges (1 is not important, 7 is very important)”.  This 
question, when interpreted next to the analysis of Questions 5 and 10 provides 
an indication for the third research objective that pension principals do not see 
corporate governance as influencing their fiduciary asset management decisions.  
The responses to Question 12 are displayed in Table 7.9. 
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Table 7.9 Trustees’ beliefs on the importance of corporate governance on the management 
of the fund manager 
Governance assistance in managing the pension 
principal 
Mean and median 
͞Not iŵportaŶt͟ 
response (% of total)* 
Managing pressure from their own shareholders 3.29 and 4 22 (34%) 
Prioritising the client relationship 3.98 and 4 13 (20%) 
Prioritising value for money 4.06 and 4 12 (18%) 
Prioritising transparency 4.57 and 5 8 (12%) 
Prioritising spending on expertise 4.11 and 4 10 (15%) 
Prioritising outperformance 4.23 and 5 11 (17%) 
Sharing risk 3.57 and 4 11 (17%) 
*”Not important” being defined as a Likert score of less than or equal to 3 where 1 is not important and 7 is 
very important. 
 
The interesting observation in this result is the two lowest mean scores are on 
the aspects of the fund manager governance that are central to the thesis: 1) that 
shareholders necessarily matter to the governance of a PLC fund manager; and 
2) that a lack of interest in risk sharing is aligned with Boatright’s (2009; p471) 
observation of governance in the finance industry, that CEOs have shifted from 
“bureaucrats or technocrats to partisan shareholders”.  This would imply that fund 
managers are agents for their shareholders, incentivised through ownership 
(shares or options) of the organisation itself and potentially motivated to 
appropriate fees from the risk free environment of the pension client contract to 
the self-incentivised environment of shareholder wealth maximisation. 
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7.5.1  Combining the selection criteria results 
 
Combining the results from Questions 5 and 10 implies that governance 
characteristics are not viewed as canaries in the mines in the fiduciary pursuit of 
net value for pension contributors.  This general speculation cannot be inferred 
from the aggregate survey results.  However, each individual case can be 
examined to observe whether prioritised governance characteristics share any 
relationship with the key performance indicators of assessed fund managers.  
Sixteen respondents rated all Question 10 governance criteria as ≤ 3 on the Likert 
scale (unimportant).  Conversely twenty respondents valued all governance 
criteria ≥ 4.  Table 7.10 compares the key performance selection criteria indicated 
by these groups. 
 
Table 7.10 Key fund manager performance indicators selected by respondents prioritising 
and deprioritising corporate governance characteristics on the Likert scale 
Criteria Answer IŵportaŶce ч ϯ IŵportaŶce ш ϰ 
  Response % Response % 
1 Asset class expertise 5 15% 17 17% 
2 Reputation 6 18% 17 17% 
3 Past performance data 5 15% 14 14% 
4 Lowest overall fees 6 18% 10 10% 
5 Provision of useful information 1 3% 3 3% 
6 Managing unease 0 0 2 2% 
7 Transparency of fee structure 2 6% 7 7% 
8 Risk sharing (including downside risk) 0 0 3 3% 
9 ESG and engagement strategies 0 0 5 5% 
10 Value for fees 4 12% 10 10% 
11 Other criteria were applied 1 3% 5 5% 
12 Consultant recommendation 3 9% 6 6% 
13 Other industry recommendation 1 3% 0 0 
Total 34  99  
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Acknowledging the limited sample size, the results are consistent with the 
previous analysis section.  Respondents either prioritising or deprioritising 
corporate governance agency traits prioritised selection alternative criteria in 
equal measure (�2=17.516, df12, p=0.131).  The three finance oriented 
characteristics of asset class expertise, reputation and past performance data 
comprise 48% in both categories. 
 
Table 7.11 compares this result with Question 12 (“Do you think the Trust 
believes that the corporate governance profile of the find manager helps them 
manage any of the following challenges (1 is not important, 7 is very important)”.  
It takes the responses to each of the of the governance criteria and compares 
these to the aggregate Likert score for the importance of selection criteria from 
Question 10. 
 
Table 7.11 Responses to governance assistance in assuring fiduciary agency over the 
pension relationship compared with key fund manager performance indicators (KPIs) from Table 
7.10 
Governance assistance in managing the 
pension principal 
Likert score ш ϰ KPIs ш ϰ KPIs ч ϯ 
Managing pressure from their own 
shareholders 
33 14 8 
Prioritising the client relationship 42 10 8 
Prioritising value for money 42 13 10 
Prioritising transparency 47 18 10 
Prioritising spending on expertise 43 15 11 
Prioritising outperformance 42 14 9 
Sharing risk 35 12 8 
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There is no significant difference in the scores between governance assistance 
responses and either an aggregate KPI score ≥ 4 from Question 10, (�2=2.286, 
df5, p=0.683) or KPI score ≤ 3 (�2=1.571, df6, p=0.666).  Transparency is the 
highest correlating characteristic chosen by respondents who scored all KPIs 
over four in importance, despite not being prioritised as a criterion in the KPI list 
in Question 10.  Conversely, outperformance scores above four were equal with 
value for money, despite past performance rating higher as a KPI than value for 
money in Question 10.  This results in a mixed message as to whether the agency 
characteristic of transparency (alleviating information asymmetry) and the 
traditional finance characteristic of performance are the true reflection of trustee 
behaviour being oriented towards agency theory predictability. 
 
Central to interpreting these results, highlighted in Chapter 6, is distinguishing 
between pension trustees who have their largest mandate with PLC owned fund 
managers and those engaged with alternative ownership structures.  This will 
provide further detail for discussion on whether alternative ownership structures 
point to any trend in this conundrum between agency and finance theory in the 
following sections, and is an important avenue for future research. 
 
7.5.2  Individual cases engaging PLC owned fund managers 
 
There is a predominance of UK based PLC entities appointed as pension fund 
managers in the sample.  To analyse any differences between PLC and other 
entities, the size of assets under management and scheme designation of the 
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individual trust is examined to ask two questions: 1) Who chose to engage a UK 
PLC?; and 2) Does this group choose governance characteristics in the fund 
manager differently?  Table 7.12 addresses the first question; the respondents 
choosing a UK PLC fund manager. 
 
Table 7.12 Total Assets Under Management and percentage of respondents engaging UK 
PLC fund managers and alternative fund managers 
Total Assets Under 
Management 
All cases 
(£000) 
UK PLC cases (£000) (% 
of total) 
Other cases (£000) (% 
of total) 
Defined Benefit Open 
(n=20) 
134,754,472 84,403,375 (63%) 50,351,097 (37%) 
Defined Benefit Closed (n=34) 68,648,174 49,450,000 (72%) 19,198,174 (28%) 
Defined Contribution 
(n=26) 
3,760,329 2,861,939 (76%) 898,390 (24%) 
Total 207,162,975   
 
Twenty respondents reported operating Defined Benefit Open schemes, six of 
them engaging UK PLC fund managers.  The six, however, account for 63% of 
the total assets under management in this scheme type among survey 
respondents.  They are individually significantly larger than the schemes 
appointing alternative fund manager entities (£14.1 billion ± £9.9 billion compared 
with £6.7 billion ± £4.8 billion for all cases:  t=2.5350, df24, p=0.018).  However, 
the assets per member for this scheme are £105,850 ± £95,384.  This is 
consistent with the assets per member in Chapter 6 (£86,457 ± 134,820:  
t=0.6411, df1527, p=0.521) 
 
Defined Benefit Closed schemes were reported by 34 respondents, with the 12 
appointing UK PLC, again accounting for a large proportion of the total assets 
under management (72%:  See Table 7.10).  They are also larger at individual 
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level than the schemes appointing alternative structures (£4.1 billion ± £2.9 billion 
compared with £2.0 billion ± £1.4 billion: t=2.3868, df44, p=0.021).   
 
In the Defined Contribution responses 11 of the 26 schemes engaged a UK PLC, 
yet this represents 76% of the assets under management for this scheme type 
(illustrated in Table 7.10). As with the Defined Benefit schemes, larger pension 
schemes are engaging UK PLC fund managers (£260,176 ± £183,965 compared 
with £144,628 ± £102,249: t=2.4540, df35, p=0.019).  Larger schemes in the 
range of all scheme types are engaging UK PLCs.  However, no particular 
scheme type is doing this more than any other (�2=2.140, df2, p=0.343).  No 
schemes were reported in the category “Other” among respondents. 
 
Viewing the three scheme types in aggregate, the difference in assets under 
management between PLC respondents (n=29) and all other fund manager 
ownership types (n=26) increases in significance (£18.4 billion ± £13.0 billion 
compared with £8.2 billion ± 5.8 billion: t=3.7036, df53, p=0.0001).  This 
contradicts the Chapter 6 findings of an inverse relationship between the size of 
the pension scheme and the size of the fund manager.  However, given the 
survey sample consists solely of large pension schemes, this is a within-category 
observation of a group of pension schemes who are statistically likely to engage 
multiple fund managers and have only been asked to comment on one (the fund 
manager carrying their largest mandate).  Given Chapter 6 does not identify the 
fund manager with the largest scheme mandate when multiple managers are 
engaged in most cases, no comparison can be drawn between the two sets of 
analysis on this particular test. 
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The second question addresses whether these different groups respond 
differently to the governance characteristics questions in the survey.  From the 
29 PLC engaging respondents, only 22% considered ownership structure and 
governance compliance headquarters in their fund manager selection processes.  
Table 7.13 demonstrates how as the responses to Question 5 (the rationale for 
selecting the fund manager) become less frequent in number (less important 
selection criteria) they are likely to be considered important by the PLC engaging 
group.  Asset class expertise is the most important key metric in general, but 
disproportionately more so to PLC respondents.  This disproportion is observed 
more keenly with consultant recommendations, with 81% of respondents to this 
criterion engaging PLCs. 
 
Table 7.13 What was the Trust’s rationale for selecting this fund manager ranked by number 
of respondents (percentage of PLC versus “Other” respondents) 
Selection criteria 
Number of 
responses 
Percentage of  PLC 
respondents 
nominating KPI 
Percentage  of PLC 
respondents in total 
Asset class expertise 52 70 58 
Reputation 41 72 75 
Past performance 35 72 57 
Consultant recommendation 34 81 62 
Value for fees 28 76 57 
Lowest overall fees 25 75 68 
Transparency of fee structure 23 73 70 
Provision of useful information 12 55 67 
Other criteria were applied 7 43 43 
ESG and engagement strategies 6 50 100 
Risk sharing (inc. downside risk) 4 50 50 
Other industry recommendation 3 0 33 
Managing unease 2 0 0 
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Taking the market facing (finance oriented) criteria alone (Asset class expertise, 
Reputation and Past performance) the difference between the groups favouring 
these KPIs is only pronounced for reputation (�2=10.000, df1, p=0.0016).  This is 
consistent with the Chapter 6 proposition that trustees select PLC marque brands 
to create the appearance of fiduciary care through brand association.  As Table 
7.14 illustrates, this difference between groups is further found in Question 6 
(Which metric is of key importance when the Trust rates the financial performance 
of this fund manager?).  The key criteria were market and benchmark oriented to 
the respondents as a whole, yet disproportionately selected by the PLC engaging 
respondents.  The further fiduciary key metrics of fund management cost and 
promise keeping are undervalued by the PLC group (Value for Annual 
Management Cost 29% of responses, Value for Total Expense Ratio 29% of 
responses, and Nominal returns compared to verbal undertaking (promises) 27% 
of responses).  Having acknowledged that Legal & General is the fund manager 
dominating PLC engagement, the nominal returns to the benchmark criterion was 
the key metric to the majority of this group (68%). 
 
Table 7.14 Metrics of key importance for PLC fund manager engaging Trust funds (% 
frequency for UK PLC versus total respondents) 
Key metric 
% of PLC respondents 
nominating the key metric 
% of PLC respondents 
in total respondents 
Nominal returns compared to the requisite 
benchmark 
76 86 
Value added performance (above market) 38 57 
Value for Annual Management Cost (AMC) 37 29 
Nominal financial returns generated in the 
last financial year of engagement 
31 25 
Value for Total Expense Ratio (TER) 22 29 
Nominal returns compared to verbal 
undertaking (promises) 
14 27 
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In summary, when analysed on a case-by-case basis the criteria for asset 
manager selection are predominantly market based.  These criteria become even 
more important to the respondents engaging a PLC fund manager.  Fiduciary 
agency characteristics, including value for fees have not been assigned the same 
importance by either category of respondent.  Yet the importance of the fiduciary 
characteristics is further underrated in the PLC engagement category 
(�2=17.640, df1, p=0.0001 in both categories of value for annual management 
cost and value for total expense ratio).  The survey results have corroborated the 
Chapter 6 findings that PLC fund manager engagement dominates pension 
scheme selection in the UK (Chapter 6 recording 56.5% of PLC engagements 
out of six entity types).  However, the individual cases selecting PLC fund 
managers by pension scheme type are lower in the survey same than the Chapter 
6 results (DBO survey 30%: Wilmington 52%; DBC survey 35%: Wilmington 60%; 
DC survey 42%: Wilmington 70%).  Furthermore, the size of the pension schemes 
selecting PLC fund managers has inverted between the two sets of results.  The 
implications of these a contradictions are discussed in Section 7.8. 
 
7.5.3  Moral hazard and adverse selection 
 
Question 2 of the survey asked respondents’ preferences for single or multiple 
fund manager appointments to determine whether multiple fund manager 
engagement may be seen as means of avoiding the adverse selection of a single, 
non-performing manager.  However, the converse of this strategy is the moral 
hazard of expensive monitoring and incentivising of multiple agents.  The 
question was split into three asset classes (equities, fixed income and other), 
305 
 
acknowledging that asset classes (such as property) will each be managed 
differently depending on the propensity for active management and bespoke 
asset class expertise in the fund manager.  Figure 7.2 describes the response to 
a preference for fund managers in each asset category. 
 
Figure 7.2 Preferences for single or multiple fund manager appointments by asset class 
 
 
Removing in-house results from the responses (as cases with no agent), the 
majority of respondents advocate multiple appointments, with 2-5 engagements 
being the largest category (�2=113.754, df3, p=0.0001 between all engagement 
categories and �2=15.906, df1, p=0.0001 between 1 engagement and 2-5 
engagements).  The stated rationale for multiple fund manager appointments 
(49% of responses) was to hedge against under-performance in one fund 
manager with outperformance in another.  This implies a strategy to avoid 
deleterious effects from adverse selection.  The second rationale (22% of 
responses) was on the recommendation of professional consulting advice.  As 
discussed previously, the purchase of external advice may be for the purpose of 
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fiduciary auditability.  The majority of respondents (58%) saw the administrative 
burden on the trust as the main disadvantage of a multiple appointment strategy. 
 
Conversely, the single appointment advantage was perceived by the majority of 
respondents as minimising transaction costs (63.6%), with the disadvantage 
perceived as (40%) key client risk.  These results are consistent with the tension 
in agency theory between avoiding adverse selection (key client risk) and 
minimising costs (cost of monitoring).  This may not be consistent with the market 
facing criteria for individual fund manager selection.  The finance theory 
characteristics applied to the appointment of each individual fund manager are 
now contradicted by agency characteristics associated with information 
asymmetry, or the need for fiduciary protection from the consequences of single 
multiple fund management engagement. 
 
Whether this is empirically observed in the size of the assets under management 
correlating with a multiple engagement strategy is illustrated in Table 7.15. 
 
Table 7.15 Relationship between assets under management per member and multiple fund 
manager engagement strategies (one manager versus multiple engagement t-test) 
Number of 
FMS engaged 
Scheme type / 
asset class 
Defined benefit 
open 
Defined benefit 
closed 
Defined 
contribution 
1  v. >1 Equities (n=4 v. n=16) 
p=0.0312** (S) 
(n=9 v. n=22) 
p=0.0973 
(n=7 v. n=13) 
p=0.5401 
1 v. >1 Fixed income (n=8 v. n=12) 
p=0.6039 
(n=9 v. n=22) 
p=0.0001*** (M) 
(n=7 v. n=16) 
p=0.4760 
1 v. >1 Alternative (n=5 v. n=15) 
p=4174 
(n=6 v. n=25) 
p=9137 
(n=3 v. n=20) 
p=4142 
S= in favour of single fund manager engagement 
M= in favour of multiple fund manager engagement 
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The Table 7.15 results do not meet the predicted agency theory results of multiple 
fund manager engagement allowing adverse selection to be avoided except in 
one case (fixed income assets in Defined Benefit Closed schemes).  In Defined 
Benefit Open schemes, single fund manager engagement shares a positive 
relationship with assets per member in the equities asset class.  The general lack 
of a relationship is consistent with the Chapter 6 results; the relationship is not 
revealing itself as a hedging strategy to advance the size of assets per member.  
However, the motivations for these strategies were reflected in the text responses 
supplied and meet the agency theory expectations of the desire to avoid adverse 
selection of an underperforming fund manager: 
 
• Advantages of single fund manager appointments:  No comments were 
forthcoming. 
• Disadvantages of single fund manager appointments:   
o Exposure to single manager style 
o Missing out on other better performing funds 
o At any given time the manager's style may be suboptimal for 
current market conditions 
o Fee arrangement can limit fund investment options within a 
particular asset class 
 
These comments reflect the agency theory of adverse selection and moral 
hazard, with the disadvantage of no hedging strategy against underperformance 
in the agent.  They differ from the motivations for multiple fund manager 
appointments in a manner consistent with agency theory. 
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• Advantages of multiple fund manager appointments: 
o Different styles of management [which, to a degree, covers the 1st 
point] (hedging risk of underperformance in one fund manager 
with outperformance in another). 
o Fund managers with different strategies/who target different 
sectors of the market can complement one another, and aim to 
achieve steady returns by hedging the risk of one managers' 
underperformance against another’s overperformance (different 
sectors of the market may flourish/shrink at different times) 
• Disadvantages of multiple fund manager appointments: 
o Increased costs ie higher manager fee in total for multiple vs 
single manager 
o Less purchasing power to negotiate fees 
o Governance burden 
o Over diversification 
o More likely to result in index performance and defeat the object of 
active management. 
 
The concept of hedging one manager’s underperformance against another 
manager’s outperformance was hypothesised in Chapter 4 as a motivation for 
multiple fund manager engagement.  This is consistent with the observations of 
disadvantages to multiple fund manager appointments.  Specifically the 
principal’s ability to monitor (governance burden) and incentivise (less purchasing 
power to negotiate fees) the agent to act in the principal’s best interest.  While 
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hedging and diversification are integral elements to portfolio construction theory, 
they are consistent with both if they can predict pension trust behaviour.  
However, finance theory would suggest that the fund manager performs the 
hedging function in portfolio construction.  Observations on the advantages of 
multiple fund manager engagement that do not reflect agency theory and reflect 
the market oriented selection criteria prioritised in the previous Section included: 
 
• Diversification of assets  
• Our approach to investing within equities includes multiple exposures 
to various alternative risk premia, which we implement using a variety 
of different approaches (generally 2 per risk premium). 
• Diversification, complementing managers, different equity styles 
including fundamental indexation and unconstrained selection 
• Being able to use different manager styles in each asset class, eg., 
growth and value in equities 
• Different investment processes and philosophies to exploit market 
inefficiencies 
• Opportunity set of more specific activities that require specialist 
expertise that cannot be obtained from single or small portfolio of 
managers 
• Use different managers for each sub-class of assets eg in equities, 
have different managers for UK equities (largely passive) and 
emerging markets (active). Each subclass has a single manager 
• Managers/strategies appointed to provide exposure to different risk 
factors within each asset class, specifically equities 
• Property management specialisms 
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Question 4 of the survey asked how long the largest fund manager elected had 
been engaged.  The majority of responses (62%, n=45) were 5 years or more.  
Chapter 3 explored the concept of agency theory in financial intermediation as 
the challenge the principal faces in monitoring agent performance, with the 
perception in the literature that agents are not re-evaluated often enough for 
fiduciary compliance (see the findings of the NAPF Engagement Survey, 2014).  
In the cases responding 5 years or more 47% suggested the rationale for this 
was asset class expertise (assisting the pursuit of financial performance), 30% 
believed it was the value for fees charged (the fiduciary requirement to minimise 
costs) and 23% responded that it was on consultant recommendation 
(outsourcing fiduciary responsibility).  This result cannot interpret whether strong 
management by the principal (continuous assessment of agent satisfaction) or 
weak fiduciary management (prolonged moral hazard exposure to the agent). 
 
7.5.4  Reflections on the survey responses through finance 
theory and agency theory 
 
The survey aimed to address two objectives of the thesis.  The first objective 
above was to explore whether trustees of pension schemes viewed corporate 
governance characteristics of fund managers as important indicators of fund 
manager value for money (avoiding wealth capture).  The fiduciary duty to 
pension contributors to ensure value for money requires engaging an agent who 
will act in their exclusive best interest and defray any unreasonable costs of doing 
so.  Yet this section concludes that trustees underrate corporate governance 
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characteristics in favour of selection criteria based on perceived portfolio 
construction expertise in different asset classes and markets. 
 
As discussed, Question 9 asked whether these two characteristics (the presence 
of shareholders in shareholder wealth maximising marketplaces) were 
considered in fund manager selection.  The majority did not (53%), with only 20% 
responding that they did explicitly.  Question 12 (Do you think the Trust believes 
that the corporate governance profile of the find manager helps them manage 
any of the following challenges) reinforced this impression with 19% of responses 
stating “value for money” was “not important” and “when managing pressure from 
their own shareholders”, 34% of respondents stated that this was also not 
important, suggesting that a substantial proportion of the survey base do not 
consider governance characteristics are relevant to fiduciary pension 
management. 
 
Conversely, Question 5 (the trust’s rationale for selecting the fund manager) 
earlier discussed that the three highest performing key metrics for selecting a 
fund manager (asset class expertise 71%, reputation 56% and past performance 
data 48%) are all market facing financial performance criteria.  Only 38% 
regarded value for fees in the selection criteria.  In Question 6 (key metrics for 
rating fund manager financial performance) 86% of responses rated nominal 
returns compared to the requisite bench mark as the key metric for selection and 
evaluation.  Given the benchmark is the aggregate of fund manager performance, 
this is in effect achieving the average.  A further 57% rated above market 
performance as a key metric, yet only 29% rated the annual cost of management 
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and 29% the total expense ratio as a key metric.  Achieving the average of the 
market with no regard to the cost of this would not be considered a legal 
discharging of a fiduciary duty.  The Kay Review (2012) intimated that this may 
be why the next highest performing metric in Question 5 was consultant 
recommendation (46%) as a means of fulfilling a fiduciary duty through deflecting 
the selection process onto a purported industry expert. 
 
Trustees discussing performing their fiduciary duty in fund manager selection 
suggested in the open ended response to Question 2 suggested alternative 
criteria were applied.  In particular, the agency theory prediction of multiple 
manager engagement for avoiding adverse selection.  However, the data in 
Section 7.5.3 does not bear this strategy out.  This corresponds with the Chapter 
6 findings. 
 
This evidence leaves an impression that the trustees consider market information 
as more important to their fund manager selection process than governance 
information.  While market information is in the public domain, with finance theory 
holding that the market is perfectly informed and instantly updated, governance 
information is proprietary and leaves the principal vulnerable to information 
asymmetry.  In the pursuit of fiduciary protection for pension contributors, the 
initial indication is that trustees participating in the survey prioritise selection 
criteria based on the principles of finance theory over the principles of agency 
theory, and consequently may be discounting the importance of the concept that 
financial intermediaries are not free of agency problems.  Chapter 3 and Chapter 
8 both address the problem of secret and proprietary information being controlled 
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by the fund manager surrounding their fee structures as problematic for 
fiduciaries.  The next Section employs this premise as the basis for analysing the 
survey data in response to the fourth objective of the thesis, the trustee 
perceptions of the fiduciary duties arising for fund managers in the management 
of another’s private property.  
 
 
7.6  Analysis of objective four of the thesis 
 
The fourth objective of the thesis was to determine whether pension clients 
believe the fiduciary duties of professional fund managers conflict with the 
delivery of fiduciary asset management.  This was accomplished through the 
question in the survey instrument displayed in Figure 7.3.  The survey question 
consisted of six statements, three of which were “fund managers should…” and 
three being “fund managers do…” questions regarding their fiduciary duties.  The 
only responses were “agree” or “disagree”, purposefully providing no opt-out 
option to elicit an absolute response. 
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Figure 7.3 Fiduciary duties survey question: “Please indicate whether you agree or disagree 
with the following statements” 
 
 
Overwhelmingly there is a belief that fund managers should have fiduciary duties 
to their pension assets but ambiguity over whether they actually do.  The feeling 
that they should override duties to shareholders is strongly perceived, however 
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there is a contradiction in the perception on whether they do.  This is an important 
indication of the persisting confusion surrounding the allocation of fiduciary duties 
post the Kay and Law Commission reviews. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the Kay Review (2012) and the Law Commission 
Review (2013) both determined that while the relationship between the fund 
manager and the pension client was fiduciary in nature, no fiduciary duties were 
arising from the funds management contract in either case or statute law.  Both 
reviews endorsed statutory rectification in their parliamentary recommendations, 
a recommendation that was rejected in the Parliament’s response to the reviews 
(Clark, 2013).  When looking at the fiduciary responsibilities pension trustees 
believe fund managers should bear, there is evidence that the trustees also 
believe the relationship is fiduciary in nature. 
 
There is a strong perception that fiduciary duties should be owed by the agent 
with 88% (n=58) agreeing with the binary statement.  The results are indicative 
of the confusion in the industry over the custodial responsibilities of pension 
assets, with only 45% (n=29) agreeing that the fund manager should but does 
not have fiduciary responsibility for the assets.  The remaining majority believe 
the fund manager does have these duties.  There are eight cases that disagree 
that fund managers should have duties.  The governance characteristics of these 
cases were unexpectedly diverse; UK PLC (n=3), USA PLC (n=2), UK 
Partnership (n=1), USA Private (n=1), UK Don’t know (n=1).  This does not imply 
that trustees selecting a particular type of fund manager governance have been 
influenced into this opinion.  It seems a spurious response to a concept that only 
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causes benefit to the respondent and a curious reflection on their fiduciary 
discharge.  Furthermore, two cases responded that while fund managers 
shouldn’t hold duties, they do.  The remaining cases that responded “don’t know” 
to the governance characteristics of their fund manager (n=10) believe that the 
fund manager should have fiduciary duties to the pension scheme but don’t.  
Acknowledging the small number of cases, this implies that their perception that 
conflicting governance duties brought by corporate governance codes is not a 
consideration in the execution of their own duties. This contradicts the overall 
message of the responses to the questions addressed in the section on Objective 
3 where governance was expressly not included in fund management selection 
frameworks and was continuously underrated in the comparison with other 
financial (market) metrics. 
 
Within the two constructs, categories were collapsed into “PLC” and “Private” for 
Ownership Structure of the fund manager engaged, and USA, UK and Other for 
Governance Reporting Regime.  Table 7.16 and 7.17 examine the cases 
individually to determine if there is any discrepancy in the perceptions of fiduciary 
duties between the different categories.  The two fiduciary statements of 
relevance were “Fund managers should have fiduciary duties to Pension Trusts” 
and “Fund managers do have fiduciary duties to Pension Trusts”.  Both required 
an agree or disagree response with no opt out alternative.  The Tables were 
converted into percentages to facilitate comparison between the categories. 
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Table 7.16 Ownership structure of the fund manager collapsed to public verses private  
Ownership 
structure 
Cases 
(n) 
Fund managers should have 
fiduciary duties to pension 
clients 
Fund managers do have 
fiduciary duties to pension 
clients 
  
Agree Disagree Agree Disagree 
PLC 43 38 5 22 21 
Private 15 13 2 13 2 
Cases as %  Cases 
(n) 
Fund managers should have 
fiduciary duties to pension 
clients 
Fund managers do have 
fiduciary duties to pension 
clients 
 
 
Agree Disagree Agree Disagree 
PLC 43 0.88 0.12 0.51 0.49 
Private 15 0.87 0.13 0.87 0.15 
 
There is general strong agreement between PLC and Private ownership 
structures that fund managers should have fiduciary duties (87% and 88% 
respectively).  However, there is a divergence between the two on the perception 
of the duties actually owed to them.  Trusts appointing PLC fund managers 
believe agree and disagree in equal measure that a duty is owed (51% to 49%).  
However, Trusts engaging privately owned entities perceive a fiduciary duty 
actually in place (87%).  Acknowledging the small sample size, this is a tenuous 
indication of trustee perception for both objectives three and four.  The ownership 
structure matters to the perception of the status of fiduciary asset management.  
Engaging fund managers on the managerial discretion end of the conceptual 
framework X axis and perceptions of fiduciary wealth management in place may 
show a trend. 
 
This trend is also observed when reporting regimes are compared between 
shareholder primacy and stakeholder regimes.  Table 7.17 indicates (again, in a 
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small sample size) the broad agreement that fund managers should have 
fiduciary duties, however trustees with USA based engagements are less likely 
to agree that they do (56% compared with 61% in the UK and 71% in Europe). 
 
Table 7.17 Governance regime categories of fund managers collapsed to USA, UK and 
Other 
Governance 
regime 
Cases 
(n) 
Fund managers should have 
fiduciary duties to pension 
clients 
Fund managers do have 
fiduciary duties to pension 
clients 
  
Agree Disagree Agree Disagree 
USA 18 15 3 10 8 
UK 33 29 4 20 13 
Other 7 7 0 5 2 
Cases as %  Cases 
(n) 
Fund managers should have 
fiduciary duties to pension 
clients 
Fund managers do have 
fiduciary duties to pension 
clients 
 
 
Agree Disagree Agree Disagree 
USA 18 0.83 0.17 0.56 0.44 
UK 33 0.88 0.12 0.61 0.39 
Other 7 1.00 0.00 0.71 0.29 
 
Whether respondent knowledge of the corporate governance characteristics is 
connected to perceptions of fiduciary duty is difficult to assess visually in the 
populated conceptual framework (Figure 7.4).  Many of the categories have 
returned too few (or no) observations to justify any interpretation. 
 
 
 
 
319 
 
Figure 7.4 Corporate governance characteristics and Trustee perceptions compared 
through the conceptual framework 
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Δ  Fund manager with the largest mandate reported by respondents (Question 3:  Who is the fund 
manager managing the most of the trust’s assets?): Governance  characteristics applied from the Chapter 
6 data. 
ȅ  Respondent answers to Questions 7 and 8 (Fund manager’s headquarters and ownership structure).  
Remaining responses: 1) Other (n=4) and 2) Don’t know (n=8). 
Ȇ  Respondents believing fund managers should have fiduciary duties to pension clients whose assets 
they manage. 
■  Respondents believing fund managers do have fiduciary duties to pension clients whose assets they 
manage. 
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When the objectives are read together, the apparent contradiction between what 
fund manager fiduciary duties should be, and what they are, alongside the 
contradiction between these governance duties being important yet not 
considered in the fund manager selection process.  This is particularly 
pronounced in the first quadrant of the conceptual framework, where governance 
characteristics (de)prioritised in Objective 3 (Figure 7.4) in publicly listed 
organisations in shareholder primacy regimes depart from trustee perceptions of 
fiduciary duties owed by the fund manager.  These fund managers who have a 
fiduciary conflict with their shareholders are less likely to be perceived as having 
or needing a duty to the pension client, and yet they dominate the fund managers 
selected.  The trustees are perceiving fiduciary duties are important, however 
don’t use this information to alleviate asymmetry in the selection process. 
 
This conundrum forms the basis of the third analysis chapter of the thesis.  This 
content analysis considers the actual state of fund management fiduciary duty 
discussed by courts and legislators alongside the perceived state of this duty in 
the industry press.  The chapter forms the final connection in the sequential 
pursuit of a research design aimed at exploring the importance of fund manager 
corporate governance in the discharge of fiduciary pension asset management. 
 
 
7.7  Asymmetric information implications in the industry 
 
There is a well-documented reluctance to engage in discussions regarding fund 
management fees in the industry literature (Shah, 2014).  This was exacerbated 
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by the dialogue at the time of the survey that fund manager contracts should be 
subject to non-disclosure agreements (Blake, 2014).  This development, 
alongside the fact that the fee contracts are private domain caused difficulty with 
the respondent rate and sample size.  The methodological problem of self-
selection has been discussed in detail alongside the Office of National Statistics 
observations that larger pension schemes have the resources to partake in 
surveys that smaller schemes do not.  There was also a corresponding issue with 
incomplete data in some of the completed surveys.  As far as possible, this has 
been accounted for by analysis at case level, rather than taking an overall, or 
inferential view of the survey for the purpose of deriving a trends based approach 
to determine where the survey and the literature overlap.  It needs to be 
acknowledged that the survey does not lend itself to exploration of the population 
as a whole, but rather presents fertile highlights for further investigation. 
 
Herding in the finance industry is not a phenomenon that was captured by the 
survey.  According to the industry and academic literature addressed in Chapter 
3 many schemes look to others or industry consultants for the formulation of their 
fund manager selection criteria, rather than the use of rigorous key performance 
indicators of their own.  If the selection process is a “black box” from which the 
name of their selected fund manager appears, governance characteristics may 
have been considered that they are not aware of.  The recommendation to follow 
up on this is proposition with consultants Aon Hewitt, Mercer and Towers Watson 
is discussed in Chapter 8.  This leads to a problem with index benchmarks, as 
they are a measure of average investment behaviour, rather than an independent 
metric for accountability.  As the sample frame suggested, many of respondents 
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are invested heavily in Legal & General, so the benchmark against which this 
company’s performance is judged influences the survey results.  Overcoming this 
from a research perspective is challenging, as herding behaviour in pension asset 
management is a phenomenon remarked upon in the industry press, but not 
easily observed in a research environment as it can be perceived as critical of 
the fiduciary judgement of individual trustees. 
 
With hindsight, the question “does active management demonstrably increase 
asset performance?” was not asked which would have been beneficial for the 
hypothesis on finance theory (if correlated with active management against 
performance against benchmark and consultant recommendation) to further 
investigate the potential for a herding phenomenon.  Do all pension investors 
invest the same as their peers as there is fiduciary safety in doing so?  This would 
be a challenging premise for a survey to approach.  Further improvements to the 
survey have been suggested by the respondents in Appendix II.  These are 
reflected upon in the Appendix as a response to feedback and recommendations 
of the Chapter 8 discussion. 
 
 
7.8  Conclusion and further research 
 
The survey respondents were predominantly pension trusts running large 
Defined Benefit schemes. Large UK based fund managers dominate the survey 
sample of pension schemes engaged with the largest mandates over these 
schemes.  This is challenging from a representativeness perspective viewed 
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against the larger pension population.  There are three hypothesised reasons for 
this: 1) the secret nature of the fund manager contract that is explicit in the 
literature encouraged frigidity in the less resourced trusts to reveal information 
that may jeopardise their fiduciary duties; 2) the observations made by the Office 
of National Statistics in Chapter 3 as a challenge to their methodology that smaller 
trusts with few resources experience survey fatigue; and 3) the respondent 
contact information was dependent on the quality of the Wilmington (2013) data 
and larger trusts have more visible data available to industry bodies. 
 
The challenges to methodology continue to be prevalent in all aspects of research 
into this industry, and include the sample size of responses and a reluctance to 
provide data.  The post-positivist objective of the survey was to compare trustee 
perceptions of fund manager fees with the analysis of Chapter 6, rather than infer 
or extrapolate anything about the pension population.  To this point, the chapter 
recognised that the survey can only comment on the perceptions of a limited 
number of large pension schemes and it is explicit about how respondents 
skewed against the population in response demographics.  Nevertheless, it 
represents the start of collecting a proprietary set of data on a notoriously 
confidential industry to enable exploration of this extremely important issue.  
These respondents who collectively manage the assets of over 2 million 
members of the UK investing public believe fund managers should support, and 
even adopt, their fiduciary obligations yet also believe the fund manager’s primary 
fiduciary obligation to corporate ownership is in conflict with this objective.  The 
sensitive nature of the subject forced the exploration of the fourth objective to be 
more elusive than explicit in the survey’s examination of whether trusts believe 
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fund managers exploit the fiduciary free nature of the contract for the fulfilment of 
their own duties to owners, yet yielded interesting findings that are worthy of 
further examination.  Chapter 3 explored much ambiguity in the area as the Kay 
Review and Law Commission Review highlighted, where the boundaries of the 
fiduciary need further legal definition.  This was reinforced by the survey results. 
 
The two objectives of the thesis that the survey explored were deliberately 
designed to cause tension for respondents between perceiving whether the 
corporate governance of fund managers matters in the fiduciary management of 
their assets, and perceiving whether the fiduciary duties of fund managers 
themselves lie with the trust or with the owners they govern for.  The overall 
impression given by respondents was that the corporate governance of fund 
managers is not an urgent or explicit consideration in fund manager selection.  
Market performance objectives in different asset classes advertised by the fund 
manager take priority.  In the case of trusts engaging PLC fund managers, their 
responses that the key metric in selection is nominal returns tied to requisite 
benchmarks proportionately dominated the total respondents, entrenching a 
market oriented view to trustee decision-making.  The concept of value for money 
in the assets they are placing is not appearing a priority in the (undeniably) 
fiduciary decision of where to place assets under management. Yet there was 
strong acknowledgement that while the fiduciary duties of fund managers should 
lie with pension trusts as the duty to protect they beneficiaries, they in fact lie with 
the owners of the fund manager (with the fiduciary responsibility to maximise this 
owner’s return on investment).  This represents a conflict in perceptions held by 
trustees that was observed by the Kay Review (2012) and Law Commission 
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Review (2013).  There is much work needed at policy level to clarify this alarming 
and material conflict in the purpose of the financial services industry.  These 
issues are reflected on in the following discussion chapter regarding industry 
reform. 
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Chapter 8 
Discussion and Conclusion 
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8.1  Introduction 
 
In his book Paupers’ Progress, Joe Harris describes seven centuries of 
“paternalistic and demeaning attitudes towards older people and the 
inadequacies of public pensions.” (Harris, 2006; foreword).  The common belief 
of Parliament, reflected in centuries of development of the Poor Laws was that 
poverty was self-inflicted and the provision of relief rendered the poor “indolent 
and wasteful” (Harris, 2006; p25).  By the 19th Century as the UK’s population 
reached 16 million people, 1.6 million of whom were destitute, and only those 
people “deserving and of good character” were entitled to public purse relief 
(Harris, 2006; p27).  Social momentum was generated between the wars to pass 
the National Insurance Act 1946, establishing the National Insurance pay-as-you-
go system (Bozio et al., 2010).  The designation of “pauper”, a pejorative term, 
was dropped from the statute books by this Act of Parliament in effect in 1948.  
Providing a productive member of society had contributed to National Insurance 
(the equivalent of 21.3p per week for 44 years for men and 39 years for women 
matched by 16.3p from the employer) a retired employee (the qualifying age for 
men at 65 years and women at 60 years) would receive £1.30 a week (£2.10 per 
couple) from the State (Harris, 2006; p48).  Average life expectancy at the time 
was 60 years (Bernard, 2006).  This history is critical to the thesis as the context 
of the investment proposition for pension funds.  They need to be maximised with 
minimal interference by the finance industry. 
 
The Office of National Statistics estimates that 17.8% of the UK population is 
aged over 65 (ONS, 2015), projected to rise to 24% by 2032 (Blackburn, 2006).  
330 
 
A new bracket, the over 80’s was inconceivable when the pension apparatus was 
established and yet it is the most rapidly expanding bracket globally with actuaries 
now debating whether there actually is a natural human lifespan (Blackburn, 
2006).  At the same time there are fewer young people contributing to the pension 
pool as the age bracket 20-64 is projected to continue its decline (Barr, 2006).  
The projected impact of State pensions on the public purse did not anticipate 
these major demographic shifts, and Anglo-American governments have reacted 
with various reforms such as increasing the statutory retirement age, reducing 
entitlements, decreasing tax incentives and increasing immigration (Dale, 2012; 
Hannah, 2002).  The main reform was to privatise significant proportions of 
pension provision to the finance industry (McSweeney, 2008; Deakin, 2005; 
Stephen and Backhous, 2003) and in October 1986 the Thatcher government 
deregulated the finance industry in the UK to this end (Davies et al., 2010). 
 
While much attention has been paid by governments and researchers to US 
Social Security and UK National Insurance funding gaps “little or no scrutiny” has 
been paid to the sustainability of the relatively new welfare capitalists – the private 
pension sector (Boatright, 2011; Blackburn, 2006).  This is why the thesis is 
important, the industry provides financial products designed to comfort the 
member (consumer) who requires access to social goods (health care, education, 
retirement security) which can be purchased out of current salary and will be 
adequately and assuredly provided above subsistence in the future (Klumps and 
McCrea, 1999).  However, numerous misadventures in the private pension 
sector, from corporate looting of pension funds (for instance Robert Maxwell in 
Kutsch and Lizieri, 2005) to product miss-selling (for instance Equitable Life in 
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Handley-Schachler et al., 2007) or the “fiasco” of Tony Blair’s attempt to revive 
British pension prospects by means of ‘partnership’ with the financial services 
industry (Barr, 2006), caused the government’s own Pensions Commission to 
describe private pension provision as ‘not fit for purpose’ (Blackburn, 2006; Note 
23).  This lends itself to a reflection on what the role and function of the pension 
supply chain actually entails. 
 
During a conference on Investing in Responsibility, London in 2011 one of the 
speakers was the Chief Responsibility Officer for one of the largest Fund 
Managers globally.  He was talking about their product offerings in active 
ownership and non-financial performance screening over the equities they place 
and manage for pension funds, saying that these equities have a fiduciary 
responsibility to their shareholders (in this case pension funds) to maximise 
returns to pension schemes.  When asked “do publicly listed shareholders own 
companies?” apparently bemused, he said yes.  His fund management 
corporation is publicly listed and talks in its investor relations literature about its 
responsibility to its own shareholders, and how they have grown their own 
profitability for shareholder benefit over the last reporting periods.  To do this their 
corporate objective is to charge fees for pension asset management, and 
presumably maximise these for their shareholders’ wealth growing ambitions.  
This was the genesis of this thesis.  It grew from the desire to know whether 
shareholders are the owners of corporations, and if so, when those corporations 
managing the social savings of the general workforce, do their shareholders 
deserve a higher duty of investment care than the pension funds they manage?  
Boatright (2011) and Monks (2002a) believe they do not.  Maximising the fees 
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and charges they demand for their expertise are the means of providing codified 
fiduciary care to their shareholders.  If that expertise equally benefits the pension 
contributors with returns over market where the contributors bear “virtually all the 
[financial] risk,” (FCA, 2016; p7), there should be no fiduciary conflict.  However, 
where the fees and charges erode the rightful returns on investment to pension 
contributors a conflict arises where the fiduciary responsibility to one principal 
whose assets they manage disadvantages the principal whose assets they also 
manage, and whether the rightful direction of duties to exercise financial expertise 
become unclear, or even unjustifiable.  The thesis places its foundations in the 
premise of the academic reasoning for the existence of financial intermediaries 
(Allen, 2001).  From an economic efficiency perspective, financial intermediaries 
only exist to add benefit to the counteracting parties, and have no role if they bring 
no benefit to net asset growth for the social sector who comprise their client base. 
 
This is wholly aligned with the observations of the Financial Conduct Authority 
Interim Report (FCA, 2016; p11): “the evidence suggests there is weak price 
competition in a number of areas of the asset management industry.  This has a 
material impact on the investment returns of investors through their payments for 
asset management services.”  The theory of financial intermediation suggests 
that the pension supply chain should be naturally competitive (Allen, 2001; Allen 
and Santomero, 1997; Ramakrishnan and Thakor, 1984), supplying services that 
aid and abet the efficient exchange operation of the market place.  They have no 
reason for existence if buyers and sellers can find each other and negotiate in 
light of perfect information without them (Allen, 2001).  Yet the funds management 
business is one of the largest growth businesses in the finance industry (Malkeil, 
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2011).  The FCA investigation into competitiveness in the market concurs with 
Malkeil and has been critical in its initial assessment of fee pricing (FCA, 2016). 
 
The industry has been criticised for seeking advantage from the boon of 
compulsory social savings to charge for management (Monks, 2002a; Boatright, 
1999), yet little confirmation has been forthcoming into the duties the finance 
industry has to these savings and whether any duties to protect them are legally 
owed.  Over the time of the thesis, three significant enquiries were enacted:  1) 
The Kay review (2012); 2) The Law Commission Review (2013); and 3) The 
Financial Conduct Authority Review (2016).  Each had a remit to investigate the 
operation of the financial services supply chain and how it supports the 
sustainability of the net investments of the pensions industry.  Their joint findings 
were critical of the operation of the finance supply chain in the efficient 
management of social savings.  The thesis contributes to the continuing 
investigation into the equity of, and fiduciary responsibility to pension savings 
governance. 
 
The literature proposed that any analysis of the finance industry requires a 
fundamental understanding of how the underlying nature and role of the markets 
have been socially constructed and understood (Ardalan, 2007).  Most 
occupational pension funds are compelled by law to act as trustees for 
contributing beneficiaries for the “exclusive purpose of providing benefits to them 
and defraying administrative expenses,” (Greenwood, 1996).  In the examination 
of the purpose of a financial intermediary firm, the thesis initially examined 
whether shareholders could or should be considered the owners of firms, able to 
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distract from this purpose in the investment supply chain.  There is much 
evidence in the literature that shareholders are not the owners of firms (Lan and 
Heracleous, 2010; Verret, 2010; Bainbridge, 2002; Iwai, 1999).  They are the 
owners of shares traded exclusively on a stock market, and not owners of the 
underlying corporation or corporate purpose (Anabtawi and Stout, 2008; Ryan 
and Stout, 2003; Stout, 2003).  This contributes to the importance of the 
foundation of the thesis, as it raises the question of whether this “principal” has 
countermanding fiduciary sway over the loyalties of the firm if they do not 
technically own it.  Comparatively, the pension principals’ assets are important to 
understand and protect in fiduciary as the fund manager wholly acting for the 
benefit of their beneficiaries’ private property in any financial management 
contract they enter. 
 
The aim of the thesis is to investigate whether the corporate governance of 
professional fund managers with pension clients influences asset management 
outcomes for the UK pensions industry.  It proposes to achieve this aim through 
a set of four research objectives. 
 
1) To describe the various corporate governance structures of the 
professional fund managers with UK pension clients; 
2) To investigate whether different corporate governance 
characteristics of professional fund managers relate with 
characteristics of their pension clients, and whether particular 
pension client attributes mitigate any negative corporate 
governance correlations; 
335 
 
3) To investigate whether pension clients perceive that the corporate 
governance of the fund manager matters to the governance of 
asset management for their beneficiaries; and 
4) To determine whether pension clients believe the fiduciary duties 
of professional fund managers conflict with the delivery of 
outsourced asset management. 
 
 
8.2  Why this was a current imperative 
 
Despite a raft of pension legislative reforms in recent decades, the UK pension 
system continues to be criticised as overly complex and opaque (Bozio et al., 
2007).  There are three tiers to the UK pension apparatus, each providing a 
contributing member of the workforce with different benefits and administrative 
costs (Barr, 2006).  The first is the Basic State Pension (BSP), the stipend paid 
from the compulsory contributions to the National Insurance Fund.  The second 
is the voluntary Second State Pension (S2P), replacing the State Earnings 
Related Pension (SERPS) in 2002.  The main objective of these two State 
pension systems when taken together is only to reduce old age poverty (Bozio et 
al., 2010).  The third is the voluntary occupational pension system, administered 
outside the government fostered system (Bozio et al., 2010).  The government 
has long embraced the idea of privatising pension provision to take advantage of 
the theoretical efficiency virtues of the market (Dixon and Hyde, 2003).  In the 
markets, theory has it that private pension provision can meet the demographic 
challenge of the aging population more efficiently than State provision by 
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assuming financial risk and commanding extraordinary financial performance 
from its pooled assets (Clark, 2004). This requires the academic virtues of market 
efficiency to translate into empirical reality. 
 
These two material risks are neatly addressed by Clark and Urwin (2007), one a 
noted pension governance academic, the other a well-known practitioner with 
Towers Watson, commenting: 
 
If nation states are to redesign pension and retirement income institutions 
to cope with twenty-first century imperatives like demographic ageing, the 
sustainability of plan sponsors, and the increasing premium on (and 
visibility of) financial performance, issues of structural design must be 
considered in relation to institutional governance. 
 
Keith Ambachtsheer of Harvard Business School concurs (Ambachtsheer et al., 
2011, Ambachtsheer, 2007) declaring their inherited current form “not fit-for-
purpose”.  This presents a challenge to the newly conceived finance industry in 
establishing their responsibility for pension management.  Should it be that the 
industry 1) use their new inter-temporal role as pension custodians to deliver 
adequate returns on investment to achieve retirement for members today while 
protecting the savings contributions of future generations (Monks, 2002a); 2) use 
their new role as institutional investors with vast capital at their disposal to 
influence the long term sustainable value creation activity of the entities in which 
they are invested (Sparkes and Cowton, 2004); or 3) fulfil their traditional role as 
institutions with shareholders of their own, to protect and serve the interests of 
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their shareholders as fiduciaries with duties to the commonly understood owners 
of the corporation (Bebchuk and Weisbach, 2010). 
 
This is where fiduciary ambiguity enters the new pensions governance 
environment (Boatright, 2011).  Pension trusts have clear and legislated fiduciary 
responsibility to their trustees.  However, few have the financial expertise to 
adequately discharge this duty.  The financial intermediaries that purport to take 
on numerous ownership structures, from partnerships to global listed 
corporations (Ingley and van der Walt, 2004).  In Anglo-American corporate 
governance regimes listed corporations have codified fiduciary duties to “the 
company and its shareholders” (Waring, 2006).  Karns (2011) believes these 
duties are commonly understood to be the requirement to maximise shareholder 
wealth.  Where a fund manager has both shareholders and pension clients their 
primary fiduciary duty is (but should not be, according to Monks (2002a)) to the 
shareholder.  Juntunen (2007) also believes the landscape is shifting: “…the 
ownership structure of many consultancies changed from partnerships to 
corporates where the goal is to boost shareholder assets”.  This confronts the 
issue of conflicts of interest central to the academic contribution of the thesis; 
whether corporations are appropriately nonaligned to be financial intermediaries 
for pension funds.  To determine this, the thesis investigated whether there is a 
discernible difference between the funds managed by listed corporations and 
those managed by alternative structures.  It also explored whether there was a 
difference between economies that are more aggressively pro-shareholder and 
those less inclined to this pursuit. 
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8.3  The nature of the contract between the pension scheme and fund 
manager 
 
The contractual relationship between the pension scheme and fund manager 
exhibit typical principal-agent characteristics, where the principal lacks the 
expertise to carry out a task and enlists the agent with relevant expertise to act 
on their behalf (Eisenhardt, 1989).  The law of agency confers strong 
commitments on the agent to protect the principal and avoid using their 
advantageous position to the principal’s detriment (Lan and Heracleous, 2010).  
Protecting the suppliers of finance needs to acknowledge that managed funds 
dwarf equity financing on the balance sheet of financial intermediaries (Clark, 
1976).  Clark (1976) describes shareholders of finance giants as "elite suppliers 
of capital" typically less numerous, wealthier, and suppliers of a smaller and static 
proportion of the funds under management.  As the 2007 financial crisis 
demonstrated, it was excessive leveraging in pursuit of shareholder wealth 
maximisation to the point of illiquidity that led to the socialised rescues of some 
of the largest banks around the world (Liedekerke, 2013; Graafland, 2011; 
Shahabian, 2011).  Although poor quality macroeconomic policy and economic 
shocks often play a major part in financial instability, Handley-Schachler et al. 
(2007) accuse inadequate risk management within the finance industry as the 
cause of most episodes of financial system distress that wiped trillions of dollars 
from pensions globally, and view the frequent cause of poor risk management 
being inadequate corporate governance.  Some scholars have suggested that 
the shocks to the economy of poor risk management are final proof that the social 
responsibilities of financial intermediaries are special and specific (O’Brien, 2012; 
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Das and Ghosh, 2004; Green, 1989).  They not only have weighty obligations to 
contributors, they are central to market making in global economies (Macey and 
O’Hara, 2003).  Given the theory of financial intermediation, where intermediaries 
are compensated for the efficient costs of information aggregation and exchange 
facilitation, many scholars view finance corporations governed by the shareholder 
wealth maximisation axiom of the real economy as a threat to market efficiency 
and stability (Losada, 2013; Macey and O’Hara, 2003; Kangis and Kareklis, 
2001). 
 
Academics in both law and economics have paid little specific attention to the 
corporate governance of financial intermediaries despite the significant amount 
of attention being paid to the role that the intermediaries themselves play in 
demanding good governance in the equities under investment (Macey and 
O’Hara, 2003).  In an efficient capital market losses should be borne by the 
bearers of that risk.  If the downside of losses can be outsourced, leveraging to 
dangerous extremes in pursuit of shareholder value maximisation becomes risk 
free to shareholders, resulting in the relationship between risk and reward 
becoming uncoupled.  Macey and O’Hara (2003) warn of this moral hazard, 
where the pension scheme bears the entire loss of poor investment choices yet 
still mostly pays a performance fee to the fund manager.  Kolb (2011) sees this 
breakdown in the risk/reward relationship as a distributive justice issue where 
shareholders and executives become handsomely compensated despite the risk 
borne by pension contributors and society more widely. 
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Regarding this remuneration arrangement, Chapter 3 of the thesis explored the 
legal nature of the contract between the pension scheme and fund manager to 
confirm that the courts consistently find that no fiduciary duties arise between 
principal and agent.  The relationship is wholly determined by the terms of the 
contract.  Contract law assumes that the counterparties meet on equal footing, 
yet some suggest that this is not always the case between, for instance, that 
between a small pension fund and large fund manager (Anabtawi and Stout, 
2008).  Malkiel, 2013 concurs: 
 
From 1980 to 2006, the financial services sector of the United States 
economy grew from 4.9 percent to 8.3 percent of GDP.  A substantial 
share of that increase was comprised of increases in the fees paid for 
asset management.  This paper examines the significant increase in 
asset management fees charged to both individual and institutional 
investors.  Despite the economies of scale that should be realizable in 
the asset management business, the asset-weighted expense ratios 
charged to both individual and institutional investors have actually risen 
over time…fees have risen substantially as a percentage of assets 
managed. 
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8.4  Exploring the agency of the relationship:  Are fund managers 
delivering value for money? 
 
The role of the financial intermediary is to direct the flow of pension capital to the 
real economy for a return on investment to the capital they are placing (Walter, 
2004).  The price they charge to do this should theoretically be the point at which 
supply equals demand where substitution is readily available (Spithoven, 2005).  
The theory of intermediation implies that the buyer and seller will not require an 
intermediary if that function adds no value to a transaction (Allen and Santomero, 
1997).  One of the main roles of intermediary is that of overseer to provide 
accountability that firms are efficiently using society’s resources to the end 
investor (Liedekerke, 2013). 
 
Analysing value for money is crucial to understanding whether pension funds 
management is currently appropriate.  In the behavioural analysis of capital 
channelling Franklin Allen (2001, p1165) asked “do financial institutions matter?” 
He continues (Allen, 2001, p1166) argues “how can it be that when you give your 
money to a financial institution there is no agency problem, but when you give it 
to a firm there is?”  The narrow focus of corporate governance theory remains on 
traditional corporations, and financial intermediation theory assumes an 
institution-free finance industry, so these phenomena have not been analysed 
together (Bogle, 2009).  Agency theory has been rarely used to examine whether 
financial intermediaries deliver value for money.  The analysis of financial 
performance has been dominated by finance theory, and the comparison of risk 
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adjusted returns compared with an agreed industry benchmark.  Again, Malkiel 
(2013) makes an important observation in this regard: 
 
One could argue that the increase in fees charged by actively managed 
funds could prove to be socially useful, if it reflected increasing returns 
for investors from active management or if it was necessary to improve 
the efficiency of the market for investors who availed themselves of low-
cost passive (index) funds. But neither of these arguments can be 
supported by the data. Actively managed funds of publicly traded 
securities have consistently underperformed index funds, and the 
amount of the underperformance is well approximated by the difference 
in the fees charged by the two types of funds. 
 
This was a challenge for the research in an industry Harrison (2012) describes 
as rife with an absence of transparency.  The FCA (2016; p16) again concurs in 
their interim findings: “The transparency of charges has been under scrutiny and 
debate for some time.”  The thesis propositions were established from the 
literature a priori to the investigation.  It established there was reason to explore 
whether fund managers with external shareholders potentially charged higher 
fees and charges or provided less value for money than fund managers with 
internal ownership structures for the purpose of the corporate governance rubric 
of shareholder wealth maximisation.  This is consistent with the FCA (2016; p13) 
interim findings: 
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We have found considerable price clustering for active equity funds, with 
many funds priced at 1% and 0.75%, particularly once assets under 
management are greater than £100 million.  This is consistent with firms’ 
reluctance to undercut each other by offering lower charges.  We also 
note that as fund size increases, price does not fall, suggesting the 
economies of scale are captured by the fund managers rather than being 
passed onto investors in these funds. 
 
If the theory of financial intermediation were to hold true, these economies of 
scale would exist and investors should not seek inefficient intermediation.  
However, under agency theory it could be hypothesised that the principal with 
little financial expertise needs to incentives the agent to apply their own expertise 
to growing the pension assets.  With no access to research information on the 
fees and charges embedded in the contracts between the fund manager and 
pension scheme, the relationship had to be discerned by alternative means in the 
research.  By comparing the pension scheme assets with the corporate 
governance traits of the fund manager, observations could be made of any 
evident trend.  In the first analysis of the relationship there was no direct 
connection between the corporate governance traits and the size of the assets of 
a single member.  These were the result of the direct relationship proposed in the 
a priori set-up of the agency theory hypothesis, suggesting agency theory was 
neither predictive nor prescriptive in analysing pension governance behaviour.  
However it is observed in this analysis that the average assets per member, at 
£87,000 represent an insignificant sum of money to support to support an 
average of 15 years life expectancy post retirement.  This raised the need for 
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further research addressing leakage through the entire pension supply chain, not 
only through funds management, but also other services such as custodial 
services, consulting advice, actuarial services, etc.  It also concurs with the 
findings of Malkiel (2013) and Sharpe (2015; 2014; 2013) supporting the 
observation that risk-adjusted net returns flowing from the schemes are not 
currently academically or practically justifiable in the pensions management 
industry. 
 
The interesting and exceedingly relevant finding from this analysis was in pension 
scheme behaviour (the interaction between the fund manager agent and pension 
scheme principal).  Small pension schemes (by assets under management) 
gravitated towards large, publicly listed fund managers, mostly in the UK and 
typically a smaller number of managers engaged (the majority with just one).  
However, large pension schemes were overly represent among fund managers 
with internal ownership structures and were far more likely to invest abroad and 
with multiple fund manager engagement.  This finding had important ramifications 
for the survey of trustees.  The thesis proposed that pension scheme size would 
ameliorate the moral hazard of overpayment for management services by 
negotiating from a position of power (See Section 8.4 for a discussion of the 
relevance of power in the theories of business).  Again, this is in keeping with the 
FCA (2016; p19) interim report, noting “[t]he amount of assets also affects 
oversight committees’ bargaining position, with smaller schemes being less able 
to secure discounts from asset managers.”  However, the direction of the 
relationship is indeterminate - do smaller schemes gravitate towards large fund 
managers, or do large fund managers, who tend to be listed entities, make 
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schemes smaller through appropriation - and so the rationale for selection 
needed clarification from the trustees themselves.  The thesis also proposed that 
engaging multiple fund managers would avoid the adverse selection of an 
underperforming fund manager.  Under this proposition it is the principal’s 
problem when entering the relationship at being unable to properly estimate 
potential for performance through lack of information (Mande et al., 2012; Cormier 
et al., 2011).  Reflecting previous observations on a lack of transparency, 
comparison between managers should be more available when the pension 
scheme has two or more management contracts to contrast, rather than relying 
on third party or anecdotal information.  However the findings suggest that not 
only do multiple fund managers fail to be reflected by more assets per member, 
they are negatively (however not significantly) related to the member’s assets.  
These findings had important implications for the development of the survey as 
to the rationale for both selection routes.  They also correspond neatly with the 
FCA (2016; p15) two-fold observations: 1) “actively managed investments do not 
outperform their benchmarks after costs”; and 2) “there is no clear relationship 
between price and performance…before or after costs”.  In other words having 
the administrative burden of engaging 2+ underperforming fund managers is 
more burdensome to the fund than having just one. 
 
It was an imperative to interrogate the trustees making fund manager selection 
decision why, as it seems fund managers are adding little value to the 
benchmarks, they were being selected and on what basis.  These decisions 
should be made by duty-bound and rational trustees to augment scheme value.  
Holland and Johanson (2003) see the fund manager value creation model as 
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information aggregators.  Information on market risk is communicated to pension 
schemes, removing the requirement for their own (purportedly less informed) 
analysis.  Eichberger et al. (1999; p136) report on empirical examinations of the 
performance of equity investments in mutual funds that “seem to subtract rather 
than add value relative to the performance of the SandP 500 Index”.  They also 
suggest that fund managers may actively ‘herd’ with other funds on similar assets.  
In a related field, Mahoney (2004) finds the literature on mutual funds focuses 
primarily on whether stock selection efforts generate additional returns that justify 
the associated fees and transaction costs, while treating the mutual funds’ actual 
governance as a black box.  Houge and Wellman (2005) document how mutual 
funds have regularly employed trading strategies that increase fees while diluting 
shareholder returns and yet have escaped governance reforms.  If the 
governance of a financial intermediary can be observed to destroy investor value 
with regularity, it would seem logical to conclude that this governance should be 
of immediate concern to pension trustees with fiduciary duties. 
 
The survey had two main questions:  1) do trustees use any agency theory criteria 
in selecting a fund management agent that may suggest non-financial 
performance is an important predictor of future financial performance?; and 2) do 
trustees believe their agent has a fiduciary duty to manage assets in the pension 
scheme’s exclusive best interest?  Between 2010 and 2015 the average profit of 
a fund manager rose by approximately 80%, while over the same period the 
assets they manage grew by only approximately 68% (FCA Annex 8: p9).  In light 
of thesis statistics it was important to understand if trustees thought fund 
managers were operated for shareholder wealth maximisation, and whether this 
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was a fiduciary duty when no such duty was owed to them.  For instance, two of 
the largest fund managers globally (Legal and General and BlackRock) had 
significantly lower assets per member in the pension schemes they were 
managing than the general client population. Regardless of the size of the 
schemes they were managing.  Box 7.1 looked at the case of Legal and General 
specifically to illustrate how, even as their aggregate fund performance was 
consistently rated poorly, their share price showed consistent growth.  
Interestingly, the (statistical) majority of respondents to the survey recorded Legal 
and General as holding their largest mandate.  There was very little evidence that 
any corporate governance (agency) traits were considered in the selection 
process, with typical finance theory traits of asset class expertise, past 
performance and reputation all weighted higher in the selection process than any 
concepts of fees or value for money.  This is an important contribution of the 
thesis to the literature as while it is regularly observed that fund managers do not 
add value, the fact that traits of the fund managers persistently underperforming 
has not been examined. 
 
In further confirmation that agency characteristics were not incorporated into 
selection processes, the importance of managing the fund manager’s own 
shareholder pressure was the lowest rated selection consideration of all those 
considered by the survey with 34% of the survey declaring it unimportant.  This 
reinforces the view from the literature that finance theory characteristics continue 
to dominate the selection criteria in funds management.  The contribution of the 
thesis to the FCA investigation has important implication for future research.  The 
FCA (2016; p17) suggested that the factors driving fund manager choice were 
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return achieved, price paid, risk taken and quality of additional services.  
However, they conclude that past performance is not a good indicator of future 
risk adjusted returns for two main reasons: 1) there is often no accurate 
comparability between past and future performance as portfolios are fluid 
(changing mandates, merging, closing or even liquidating); and 2) “The academic 
literature shows little evidence of persistence in outperformance.  In other words, 
managers that outperform in one year do not reliably outperform in future years.”  
They conclude that most pension schemes think of value for money as simply 
risk-adjusted returns.  The implications for future research is in the thesis findings 
that this view is prevalent in pension schemes engaging PLC fund managers 
(86% of the respondents that expressed this view were outsourcing to PLCs, yet 
only 29% of respondents who viewed value for fees as the key performance 
indicator believed net value for cost was a key performance indicator).  This 
finding is not explored in the literature, and implies that there is an agency effect 
at play supporting the earlier herding findings that smaller pensions outsource to 
marque brand fund managers with large marketing budgets and the ability to 
merge and adjust performance data across portfolios with more ease and less 
visibility than smaller fund managers.  It is possibly in the belief that this reliance 
on the high profile brands discharges the pensions’ fiduciary duty regardless of 
the lack of comparability across fund managers of different size and orientation. 
 
William F. Sharpe is the Nobel Prize winning economist and father of thought in 
the development of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).  Over the past three 
years he has made possibly controversial contributions to this trend in pension 
fund management.  In 2013, Sharpe (2013) agreed with Kinnel, (2010; p2-3): “In 
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every single time period and data point tested, low-cost funds beat high-cost 
funds. . . . Investors should make expense ratios a primary test in fund selection.  
They are still the most dependable predictor of performance.”  This is not 
modelled by the CAPM, and yet has come to be more important to the value 
proposition investors receive from an agent manager as time has gone on 
(Sharpe, 2014).  This intimately implies that the decisions fund managers are 
making on charging clients for the management of their funds has increased in 
importance to one of the seminal thinkers in finance theory of our generation.  In 
2015, Sharpe (2015; p1) told a group of college students at Stanford University: 
 
Why should you be interested in the subject of financing retirement since 
you haven’t even started your working career? For two reasons. First, 
you will almost certainly receive some retirement income from a social 
(government) policy designed to provide a minimum standard level of 
living. You should understand the issues associated with such programs 
as both a participant and a citizen. Second, you will probably need to 
save and invest a considerable part of your earnings to provide the 
overall standard of retirement living you would like. The more you know 
about this subject, the better. 
 
The more research in this area that can shed light on the costs and benefits of 
the pensions supply chain to aid in this regard must be considered an academic 
research imperative.  At its heart involves the increasingly complex issue of the 
fiduciary duty in finance.  According to the business ethics canon, When the 
college students William Sharpe addressed are naïve to their need to care about 
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the management of their own retirement funds, the finance industry has a duty to 
protect their best interests in providing this care as the manager of their private 
property interests (Boatright, 1999). 
 
This brings the final contribution of the thesis neatly into light.  The fiduciary duties 
behoved to the finance industry’s responsibility to pension funds that has been 
greatly overlooked by pension governance research to date in the literature and 
practice of investment responsibility.  There are two issues at play here:  1) 
Financial intermediation implies a race to the bottom must exist for the market to 
be considered as efficiently operating (Allen, 2001); and 2) Finance ethics implies 
that a fiduciary duty arises when one party is managing the private property of 
another (Boatright, 2011).  The first issue is the conundrum expressed, not by 
means of fiduciary concern in the FCA Review, but rather as weak price and 
competition control, so where is the race to the bottom in terms of efficiency and 
transparent, readily available competition.  The FCA has noted its instrumental 
concerns over the lack of competition in the market and has expressed an interest 
in addressing this through regulatory reform.  The second issue is, as expressed 
in more normative terms by the Kay Review (2012) and Law commission Review 
(2013), the lack of fiduciary clarity throughout the pensions investment supply 
chain. 
 
In the survey of pension trustees, respondents were asked binary questions on 
their views of the fiduciary nature of funds management in the pensions supply 
chain.  This is an area of contribution for the thesis that is of great importance as 
it highlights the different opinions of trustees engaging alternative fund manager 
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entities.  Firstly, a fiduciary duty is a duty over and above the contract between 
parties to protect the assets of an investor subject to information asymmetry 
(Anabtawi and Stout, 2008; Boatright, 2000).  This is descriptive of the average 
pension contributor and pension trustee (Clark, 2004).  In the survey data there 
was consistency over the fund manager selection structures on whether fund 
managers should have a fiduciary duty to pension schemes (88%) yet very 
different opinions on whether they do (52% PLC versus 87% private entity 
engagement).  One of the defining outcomes of the thesis is that this discrepancy 
is in need of urgent policy address.  The conclusion reflects on whether there is 
need to consult with the FCA enquiry on the appropriate corporate vehicle for 
funds management in the supply chain to protect pension investments, such as 
auditing and legal firms that were historically required to be partnerships to avoid 
sheltering behind limited liability in their discharge of duties to clients (The Law 
Society, 2013; Oxera, 2007). It also suggests further investigation into why these 
discrepancies exist between the opinions of the pension selectors of the fund 
manager structure and duties most appropriate to them. 
 
 
8.5  Contribution of the thesis to academia 
 
There are two main contributions to academia: 1) A review of whether 
shareholders the owners of firms under the theory of the firm; and 2) A review of 
the theories from the Academy of Management best explain and interpret the 
fund management phenomenon.  The first questions whether academia has 
advanced enough to answer the question of an appropriate corporate vehicle to 
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manage pension wealth when the legal ownership question is still under debate.  
The second questions whether we yet have the appropriate theoretical tools to 
examine this question of the vehicle and its duties prescriptively and predictively.   
 
Kuhn (1962) tells us that a theory in a scientific discipline can persist as a 
dominant paradigm until it no longer adequately explains or predicts empirical 
observations.  At this time rival theories will be accommodated in attempts to 
restore normative and predictive legitimacy. Jensen (2001; p14) describes this 
phenomenon as it applies to business and economics:  “In the last few hundred 
years a theory of market exchange based on property rights and freedom to act 
has come to dominate academic thinking”.  Described as “managerial capitalism” 
by Freeman (1984) it faces mounting pressure to address criticism Jensen (2001) 
pronounces as a lack of normative substance, nor grounding in the emerging 
theories of human behavioural influence over the firm, and a general questioning 
of the fundamental purpose of the corporation.  Freeman’s stakeholder theory 
came to prominence in the business ethics literature to rethink shareholder 
capitalism, the dominant model of the firm he claims is “no longer workable, 
resistant to change, not consistent with the law and for the most part, simply 
ignores matters of ethics” (Stieb, 2009; p401).  With the fundamental 
understanding of the firm in question, academic scholarship continues through 
the fields of economics and business, now joined by political, social and 
behavioural fields, to take positions in a stakeholder versus shareholder debate.  
However, this does not suggest that stakeholder theory has yet represented 
Kuhn’s subversive paradigm as a researchable tool for empirical investigations. 
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The premise of stakeholder theory that is relevant to the thesis is that the firm has 
relationships with many constituents that can affect or are affected by its 
decisions (Jones and Wicks, 1999).  Key (1999) accords Freeman’s 1984 work 
“Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach” the closest attempt at 
developing a new theory to challenge the old.  The interests of “legitimate” 
stakeholders hold intrinsic value and no one group can assume to dominate the 
rights of others when it comes to management decision making, overturning the 
existing paradigm of shareholder bias.  It was important to consider this 
development in the creation of the research, as pension clients represent 
exceptionally legitimate stakeholders to fund management organisations. 
 
Freeman (1994; p410) acknowledges, when describing a multi-fiduciary 
interpretation, that stakeholder theory is pragmatic; less about “what is true” in 
favour of “how should we live,” concluding “there is no such thing as stakeholder 
theory...[but] a genre of stories about how we could live”.  Therefore, not designed 
as a theory, it is a way of thinking about the firm that challenges the dominant 
paradigm.  However, testing this pragmatically through empirical methods was 
problematic given its purely normative nature. 
 
One of the limitations of agency theory considered by the thesis design was its 
inability to consider negotiating power when the agent has two (or more) 
principals.  If the fund management firm wields enormous power (as Carroll 
(1996) has no doubt is the current consensus), does this premise naturally lead 
to the conclusion that business as usual is abusing power?  Mitchell et al. (1997) 
use a Weberian definition, “the probability that one actor within a social 
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relationship would be able to carry out his own will despite resistance”, and 
describe the wrestle between power and legitimacy challenging most major 
theories of the firm (agency, behavioural, institutional, population ecology, 
resource dependence and transaction cost theories).  Power can take different 
forms; physical (force), utilitarian (finance) and normative (symbolic), or the more 
firm centric interpretation of economic, voting and policy (Greenwood & Van 
Buren 2010).  Managers could reasonably be expected to pay attention to the 
stakeholders who can reward or punish them.  Indeed, power does not always 
reside with the shareholder, as stakeholder theorists advocate.  Mitchell et al. 
(1997) reference minority shareholders and Greenwood and Van Buren (2010) 
the ability shareholders have to vote in the board of directors, but not to nominate 
them or vote on most other activity.  This was the genesis of the proposition that 
traits of the pension scheme have the ability to mediate the power of the fund 
manager over dictating the terms of the funds management contract.  According 
to the review undertaken by Mitchell et al. (1997) stakeholder theorists such as 
Freeman and Evan (1990), Hell and Jones (1992) and Cornell and Shapiro (1987) 
already view stakeholders as contractors or “participants in an exchange 
relationship”.  Freeman (1994; p412) says “start with the presumption of equality 
among contractors rather than the presumption in favour of financier rights” where 
a fair contract is one both parties would enter if unaware of their side.  However, 
in a market place of contracting parties with unequal power contract law does not 
provide stakeholder theory with the rigour required to become a competing 
paradigm.  Jensen (2001) says this about the stakeholder theory premise: 
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New laws are constraining corporations in a way they once were not:  
therefore we have to (or should) change the beneficiaries of business 
from the stockholder to the stakeholders and give the stakeholders 
serious decision making power…. Clearly, the conclusion need not follow 
from the premise.  The conclusion that we should or in fact are changing 
the beneficiaries and the decision makers from stockholders to 
stakeholders does not follow from laws preventing violations of the rights 
of stakeholders.  Civil tort law regulates the relations between aggrieved 
parties.  Such a remedy does not change beneficiaries nor award any 
greater decision making power to the plaintiff that she did not already 
possess as a right. 
 
As the research established, the courts have asserted that the fund management 
contract is the binding agreement and the rights of pension schemes to a fiduciary 
duty from the fund manager has not been established by judge-made law.  At the 
basic level Jensen (2001; p12) writes “the real issue is what corporate behaviour 
will get the most out of society’s limited resources… not whether one group is or 
should be more privileged than another”.  Jones and Wicks (1999) believe 
stakeholder theorists find the reduction of human behaviour to a set of simple 
assumptions necessary for modelling to be inappropriate as it overly simplifies 
the very complex, however agency theory demands this.  Freeman (1994), citing 
the Nemo Dat principle of protection in law, says shareholders can’t expect 
managers to disobey reasonable community standards of ethics (neither principal 
nor agent can claim the agent has moral immunity).  The academic contribution 
of the thesis is to highlight the flaws in agency theory in a multiple-principal 
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environment where no aspects of social construction are considered in the 
reductionist economic modelling of compelling the agent to act on the principal’s 
behalf through monitoring and incentivising.  However, it asserted that it is the 
only academic theory currently available to study the phenomenon of corporate 
behaviour and motivation in the currently held view of pensions research that the 
financial intermediary is simply a vessel for pension funds to be placed into real 
world assets.  In the funds management industry under investigation, this leads 
to the necessary further contribution to policy on consideration of the position that 
fiduciary duties hold in the management of social savings under such a 
reductionist theoretical view.  Where academia’s prescriptive and predictive 
theories fail to describe the phenomenon, the future response of the polity is 
paramount in guiding future research into fiduciary care. 
 
 
8.6  Contribution to policy 
 
The thesis came into being at a time of deep reflection into the financial services 
industry by numerous regulatory authorities (See Section 8.3).  No longer an 
industry of bespoke bankers and brokers, it is now one of the most significant 
industries in the Anglo-American economies (Malkiel, 2013).  The research 
showed that trustees have a confused and undefined understanding of what 
extra-contractual relationship they can demand of their pension supply chain.  In 
the 1960s Nobel economist William Sharpe modelled a ground-breaking tool for 
modelling financial portfolio risk and return in the 1960s – the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM) (Sharpe, 2014).  It has formed the foundation of Modern 
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Portfolio Theory and established the still prevalent assumption that investment 
value for money can be assessed on risk-adjusted returns alone, without 
accounting for the cost of investment (or value for money).  Financial returns 
should be modelled on risk diversification in portfolio design alone.  In recent 
years Sharpe has turned his attention to the pension problem with a significant 
departure from his original doctrine of an agency free environment for the 
development of financial portfolios.  His comments reflect the findings of 
ambiguity in fund manager selection highlighted in the thesis survey: 
 
Recent regulatory changes have brought a renewed focus on the impact 
of investment expenses on investors’ financial well-being. The author 
offers methods for calculating relative terminal wealth levels for those 
investing in funds with different expense ratios. Under plausible 
conditions, a person saving for retirement who chooses low-cost 
investments could have a standard of living throughout retirement more 
than 20% higher than that of a comparable investor in high-cost 
investments. (Sharpe, 2013; p34) 
 
Charles Ellis (2012; p4) wrote an article titled “Investment Management Fees Are 
(Much) Higher Than You Think,” in which he argued that as a percentage of 
assets, such fees do look low, but calculated correctly, as a percentage of returns, 
fees no longer look low.  Investors should consider fees charged by active 
managers not as a percentage of total returns but as incremental fees versus 
risk-adjusted incremental returns above the market index. Kinnel (2010; p2) 
concurs: “If there’s anything in the whole world of mutual funds that you can take 
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to the bank, it’s that expense ratios help you make a better decision. In every 
single time period and data point tested, low-cost funds beat high-cost funds. . . 
Investors should make expense ratios a primary test in fund selection.  They are 
still the most dependable predictor of performance.” 
 
However, the research was conclusive in its findings on value for money being a 
secondary consideration for pension trustees, particularly those outsourcing to a 
listed fund manager.  This leads to the significant contribution that fund manager 
governance matters to the selection framework.  The FCA (2016; p17) made the 
observation in their interim report under the title “Factors that drive investor 
choice”: 
 
The investor community is a diverse mix of individuals and institutions. 
However, we found broad agreement that value for money for asset 
management products is seen as a combination of the: 
• return achieved 
• price paid 
• risk taken 
• quality of any additional services provided by the asset manager 
This means that most investors generally think of value for money as risk-
adjusted net returns.  We found that a key focus for retail investors and, 
to some extent, institutional investors when choosing between asset 
managers is past performance. However, past performance is not a good 
indicator of future risk-adjusted net returns for two main reasons.   
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First, it can be difficult to interpret and compare past performance 
information. Funds set up at different times will measure performance 
over different time periods, which can make comparison difficult. The 
performance of one fund might be measured more frequently than 
another, which can affect the perceived volatility of the fund’s 
performance, especially over periods of volatility in the relevant market. 
Funds that perform poorly are often liquidated or merged into another 
fund, giving investors the false impression that there are few poorly 
performing funds on the market. 
 
Second, even if past performance were easier to interpret and compare, 
past performance has limited value as an indicator of future performance. 
The academic literature shows little evidence of persistence in 
outperformance. In other words, managers that outperform in one year 
do not reliably outperform in future years. Previous UK analysis has found 
that the majority of funds with historical outperformance do not continue 
to outperform the relevant market index or peer group for more than a 
few years. 
 
When interpreting the research findings alongside the observations of William 
Sharpe and the FCA, both concur that fees are a significant issue in fund 
management selection criteria, yet the research finds that trustees do not account 
for this in their analysis of fund manager quality or value for money.  The research 
also found that while overwhelmingly pension trustees believe that fund 
managers should have a fiduciary duty to pension trusts, only half believe they 
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do (see Figure 7.3).  Further, while the majority believe that these fiduciary duties 
should override the duty fund managers have to their own shareholders, only a 
small minority believe they do, more pronounced among contractors of privately 
owned fund managers than those engaging PLCs.  Conversely, and contrary to 
the survey responses that finance theory criteria such as portfolio benchmarking 
drive fund manager selection, the majority believe that governance information 
on fund managers should be transparent to the fund management selection 
process.  These gaps and contradictions are imperatives for further research 
informing policy development and the continued joint narrative between the 
contributions of academic pursuits such as this thesis to the future of policy 
development. 
 
 
8.7  Limitations to the research and further enquiry 
 
The theory of the firm has not yet concluded whether shareholders are the rightful 
owners of firms and rightful recipients of their residual claim.  This is an important 
area of future corporate governance research, both from a legal and economic 
perspective.  The research highlights much ambiguity in the common 
understanding of to whom and for what purpose a firm should be focused.  This 
has deep and abiding consequences for funds management and the finance 
industry in general.  The thesis was unable to conclude this matter, other than 
the speculation of a small sample of pension trustees on this issue, and it remains 
in the realm of corporate law and firm theorists to finalise the duties financial 
intermediaries have to the fiduciary care of all stakeholders in their societal 
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sphere.  Transparency (the lack there of) in the industry impairs this research 
currently, acknowledged by the broad range of scholars discussed.  This is 
reflected in the paucity of data collection opportunities and still seeks empirical 
techniques to assist empirically robust investigations into the field of pension 
governance that avoids the reductionist nature of agency theory investigations.  
While it is important to note that the survey was completed by some of the largest 
pension schemes in the UK – thereby providing a view of a majority of UK 
members – it fails to capture the perspectives of smaller funds, ones that the FCA 
believe could benefit from collective bargaining and a more transparent 
contracting platform.  This self-selection bias was recognised by the ONS in their 
own methodology.  The research design does not capture the influence that 
pension consultants have over the fund management selection criteria, and this 
is an area of further research that is a definitive gap in the literature.  These 
opportunities for further research were highlighted by the thesis as a result of its 
findings, rather than being currently expressed in the literature.  It is a sincere 
hope that this research can assist regulatory authorities in shedding light on this 
social issue outside the parsimony of economic agency or financial theory, the 
current philosophies that continue to dominate pension governance decision 
making. 
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8.8  Conclusion 
 
One of the most important voices in this industry who originally advocated a 
finance theory view of investment assessment, William Sharpe (2014) spoke at 
interview in 2014, articulating the importance of the thesis: 
 
Are public pensions a problem? You bet. Is this a disaster? You bet. The 
true liabilities of the public pensions in the United States—by which I 
mean governmental pensions—are, according to the actuaries, much 
larger than the assets.  Using any sensible economic view of the value of 
those liabilities, the difference in value is astronomical.  It’s a crisis of epic 
proportions. 
 
The view that funds managers are the Svengalis of knowledge on how to achieve 
long-term returns on pensions assets for reasonable value is not supported by 
current research, and yet this thesis has highlighted that it is still the current view 
among pension governance decision makers in their fund manager selection 
process (the bigger and more high-profile the fund manager the better).  Stock 
market driven capital allocation did not occur until the twentieth century when 
corporate equity could be broken up into small shares and sold en masse to 
passive investors, leaving management with practically unshackled owner 
control, seminally captured by Berle and Means in 1932.  Discussed in Chapter 
2 was their observation that share ownership was so removed from control over 
the underlying asset that it bore only passing resemblance what was commonly 
understood as private property.  However, it is possible that corporate control has 
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shifted back to institutional owners in what has come to be called “investor 
capitalism” (Ryan and Dennis, 2003).  Stock market manipulators, as owners, 
have currently come to assert increased levels of control over the corporate 
pursuit of their wealth maximisation.  In this process, Brinkman and Brinkman 
(2002) see the making of money rather than the production of goods servicing 
society’s needs has increasingly come to prevail over the UK economy.  This shift 
in focus can be described as the shift from stock picking to benefit from financial 
association with a well-run company for the long term benefit of pension holders 
to demanding that companies be run for short-term fortune, benefiting the 
performance fees and charges of the fund manager. 
 
Stock markets are intended to distribute continuous information about the value 
and performance of the underlying corporation (Liedekerke, 2013).  Even if that 
corporation is not raising capital in the market but through banks or retained 
earnings the stock market ensures continuous monitoring.  Theory has it that 
firms with management not governing with the consensus in the market will 
eventually be forced to relinquish control either because they cannot raise 
additional, cost appropriate capital or they become a takeover target (Kumar and 
Langberg, 2009).  This monitoring function theoretically allows what Jensen 
(1994) describes as the elimination of corporate excess capacity through 
leveraged acquisitions, stock buybacks, hostile takeovers, buyouts and divisional 
sales that helps the efficient allocation of resources in the real economy.  This 
market functionality should advantage pension asset growth (Kay, 2012) and 
apply equally to fund manager entities that are subject to the same corporate 
governance requirements of efficiency and transparency. 
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However, The Kay Review (2012) criticised the development and even marketing 
of fund manager “expertise” in investment management as trading rather than 
investing, seeking to exploit short-term information advantages, or arbitrage 
opportunities within and between asset classes.  Professor Kay took the view that 
short-term trading was encouraged by the market ecology rather than being 
grounded in investment fundamentals, concluding that “competition between 
asset managers to outperform each other by anticipating the changing whims of 
market sentiment…can add nothing, in aggregate, to the value of 
companies…and hence nothing to the overall returns to savers” (Kay, 2102; par 
5.30).  This corresponds with the suspicions of many scholars surrounding the 
reality that agnostic “mathematical” models of portfolio construction fund 
managers promote can consistently outperform the aggregate of buyers and 
sellers in the market over the long term (Petraki, 2012; Hoepner and Zeume, 
2009; Angel and McCabe, 2008).  Spitoven (2005) observes that portfolio 
selection does not model the real world, assuming full information, independent 
decision-making, perfect substitution, and fixed preferences.  In reality 
investment behaviour exists in a social structure coordinated by the mechanism 
of price, but also mechanisms such as economic, political or social power, or 
accepted practices and routines.  For instance, Belasco et al. (2012) find that 
SandP 500 stock uptake in one managed portfolio increased the flow of funds 
into that stock and hence raised its value, unconnected to corporate activity, and 
warn “mispricings among individual stocks arising from index fund investing may 
reduce the allocative efficiency of the stock market and distort investors’ 
performance evaluations of managed funds.”  Conversely, Joly (2010; p21) 
mused on the received wisdom of managed funds that simply tracked an index 
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assuming that market efficiency implies that over time no manager can 
individually beat the market.  He interprets this as a portfolio theory flaw; if every 
portfolio were floating on the index, who is making the price?  At the 
macroeconomic level “passive investment taken to its ultimate conclusion means 
the end of markets made up of buyers and sellers, the end of information and of 
making judgments about the future.  It is the ultimate falsification of the efficient 
market theory.”  In theory this questions whether it is possible for fund managers 
to add value for money. 
 
Conversely, in Anglo-American economies stock and bond market activity is 
dwarfed by funding from retained earnings to the point that Liedekerke (2013) 
believes stock markets have not even marginally fulfilled an investment role.  
Rather than raising funds through Initial Public Offerings or bond issues for 
investment in real economic development, stock markets have become casinos 
for investor speculation on the future fortunes of existing firms.  The fund manager 
is one of these speculators and past performance of a manager is not a reliable 
indicator of future performance.  With the private property appreciation in value 
of shares enjoyed by the investor having only tangential benefit to the underlying 
corporation, Anabtawi and Stout (2008) would concur that owning a share and 
owning a corporation may have become separate endeavours.  There are two 
questions arising from this view in the literature.  Firstly, are the shareholders of 
fund managers the owners of those fund managers, or simply the owners of their 
shares?  Secondly, are fund managers identifying value-added real world 
opportunities, or simply speculators in the market casino, in which case what 
value does the intermediary bring to the pension fund?  While a shareholder 
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primacy view of corporations continues to dominate Anglo-American thinking, 
and these questions remain ambiguous, corporations may not be appropriate 
vehicles for improving the efficiency and value of pension long term pension 
assets. 
 
Mutual funds developed as the financial product of a new financial intermediary, 
bundling the services of other intermediaries, which seems to Allen and 
Santomero (2001) as “if not contrary to standard theory, at least inconsistent with 
it.”  They argue that understanding these industry changes requires different 
theories of intermediation that stress risk trading, risk management and 
participation costs as the key reasons for their existence in order to capture the 
change in the length of intermediation chains.  Adding a new intermediary adds 
an additional layer of transaction costs to the end buyer (Harris and Souder, 
2004).  Fund managers package the intermediary costs of purchasing underlying 
assets then wrap their own transaction costs of portfolio creation, advertising and 
administration into the end-user price (Mahoney, 2004).  The fund manager has 
a management team that legitimately subtract the entirety of their own production 
costs (including performance linked remuneration) from the fund performance.  
Crespo’s (2009; p224) examination of Spanish mutual funds concluded, “the only 
beneficiary seems to be the financial institution itself.  On this view, the survival 
of intermediaries seems to depend on the lack of financial sophistication of their 
clientele, combined with market inefficiencies.  It is worth asking about the ethics 
of a situation of market segmentation that allows managing institutions to benefit 
from the segment of the least sophisticated investors”.  This equally applies to 
fund managers with financially naïve pension clients.  The relationship between 
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risk and ROI has become abrogated by the amount of financial return withheld 
by the intermediary who is bearing no financial risk.  The financial returns rightly 
belonging to the end investor are distorted by the lengthening of the 
intermediation chain.  The finance industry can no longer be theoretically viewed 
as a veil, but as an industry of institutional agents that aggregate or repackage 
information and risk, and sell these products to one another along the 
intermediation chain, increasingly unconnected to production in the real economy 
(Allen and Santomero, 2001). 
 
The thesis has contributed to the concept that the current contractual 
arrangement between pension schemes and fund managers is under-examined.  
It has established that the courts will seek the contract as the induction of duties 
established and has not envisioned a fiduciary role for the managers of social 
savings.  This may be acceptable where pension schemes are large and well 
resourced (powerful stakeholders in negotiations).  However for the contributing 
members to small and increasingly outsourced pension schemes, this does not 
appear to present a desirable industry outcome.  The agent is incentivised to 
extract risk-free fees that bear little relationship to underlying performance.  This 
relationship is no longer predicted by agency theory or represented by finance 
theory.  The intermediary pressure on fees should not only be a race to the 
bottom, this should be of primary concern to trustees with fiduciary 
responsibilities.  Social savings should be protected and better regulated, their 
custodians managing them with competence and care.  It will be a timely and 
fascinating to examine the results of the final Financial Conduct Authority review 
to see where market change can be enacted, appropriately regulated, and 
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supported by the research of the Academy.  The thesis presents a quantitative 
analysis of the structure of the pensions industry that supports the call for reform 
of the appropriateness of intermediary institutions and contracting regulations in 
this fundamental social industry.
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Appendix I 
The target population: The Office of 
National Statistics description of the 
occupational pension schemes in the 
United Kingdom 
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I.I  The description of the Wilmington Directory data 
 
The average pension scheme’s assets under management were £529 million (± 
£2,033 million) and the average member base was 10,616 (± 30,722) allowing 
for an average of funds per member of £87,000 ± £135,000 (maximum 
£2,319,000; minimum £2,000).  The majority of schemes were Defined Benefit 
final salary open to new members (57%) and Defined Benefit final salary closed 
to new members (23%), with the remaining schemes (Defined Contribution, 
Hybrid, Stakeholder and PPP) accounting for the remaining 22% (see Figure 
A1.1). 
 
Figure A1.1 Frequencies of pension scheme type in the original database 
 
The Office of National Statistics has identified Defined Benefit schemes as a 
separate population to Defined Contribution in their methodology and the logic 
for adopting this methodological stance is borne out by the significant size 
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differences between them in both by assets under management (F=91.598, df4, 
p=0.0001) and membership size (F=84.461, df4, p=0.0001) (see Table A1.1). 
Table A1.1 Schemes by assets under management and total membership 
Pension Scheme Assets under management 
mean and SD (£) 
Total membership mean and 
SD (retired and current 
participants) 
Defined benefit open 
(n=1,146) 477,674,018 ± 1,770,094,353 13,013 ± 31,974 
Defined benefit closed 
(n=477) 567,434,725 ± 2,141,828,927 7,757 ± 24,467 
Hybrid 
(n=267) 911,030,768 ± 3,147,755,498 13,251 ± 44,144 
Defined contribution 
(n=160) 105,716,831 ± 228,132,743 5,186 ± 9,823 
 
The large disparity in size of both assets and members, particularly in hybrid 
schemes most likely reflects the complexity and resource intensity of running 
multiple schemes for different parts of a large workforce, and reflected in the size 
of their mean membership, only an option for large employers.  In order to 
evaluate whether any attributes of the fund manager affect the sustainability of a 
scheme when the size of schemes are heterogeneous, the unit of measurement 
should be the amount of the assets each member is entitled to, allowing a 
member of a small scheme to be fungible with a member of a large scheme.  This 
also allows cross-scheme comparisons to determine whether their size itself has 
any mediating effect on the size of the assets of a single member. 
 
The majority of pension schemes outsource their assets to fund managers (86%), 
with many outsourcing to multiple fund managers.  Defined Benefit Open 
schemes outsourced in 545 schemes, Defined Benefit Closed in 365 schemes, 
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Hybrid in 231 schemes and Defined Contribution in 129 schemes, with the 
average number of fund managers engaged across all schemes being 3.80 
(±4.99).  Pension schemes had various fund management engagement 
strategies, with 41 (3%) schemes managing funds internally, 502 (37%) engaging 
a single funds manager and 120 (7%) engaging over 10 fund managers (average 
3.4 ± 5.0).  Given that 86% of pension schemes outsource their assets under 
management to one or more fund manager(s), the corporate governance 
characteristics of these management institutions, described in the literature as 
the mechanism to protect shareholders rather than specifically clients, should 
have important implications to the sustainability of pension assets for any given 
member.  These characteristics form the independent variables in the analysis of 
this secondary data. 
 
 
I.II  The description of the Occupations Pension Schemes Annual 
Report 2010 data 
 
According to the Occupational Pension Schemes Annual Report for 2010 
(OPSAR 2011), the most recent time the ONS survey sought scheme information, 
there were 44,380 schemes registered in the UK, 21,730 of these still operating.  
The majority of registered schemes (80%) have only 2-11 members and the 
largest schemes (5,000+ members) account for only 1% of the population (Table 
A1.2). 
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Table A1.2 Number of private sector occupational pension schemes in the United Kingdom: 
by size and operational status, 2010 
Members  Open Closed Frozen Winding up Total 
5,000+ 250 180 40 10 480 
1,000 to 4,999 430 400 160 70 1,060 
100 to 999 760 1,220 1,180 410 3,570 
12 to 99 1,020 960 1,460 510 3,950 
2 to 11 19,270 10,240 5,560 250 35,320 
Total 21,730 12,990 8,400 1,250 44,380 
Source: Occupational Pension Schemes Survey 2010 
 
This skewed distribution (mean 8,876 ± 14,860: see Figure A1.2) has provided 
the ONS with a methodological challenge of large scheme self-selection bias, 
unsolved by a methodology review post the unsatisfactory results of the 2008 
survey: 
 
“The review has improved the methodology for weighting estimates of 
scheme numbers, but the problem of sampling variability which produced 
a set of unusual results in 2008 has not been solved by the new 
methodology. The only way to solve this problem would be to allocate 
additional resources to the survey so that sample size could be 
increased, particularly for very small schemes. ONS does not consider 
this to be a priority in terms of resource allocation at a time of tight 
budgets. It is important to note, therefore, that the estimates of numbers 
of very small schemes continue to be subject to considerable uncertainty” 
(OPSAR 2011; p6). 
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Figure A1.2 Number of  occupational pension schemes by membership size  
 
 
This self-selection challenge and the violation of normal distribution of the 
population are reflected in the sample frame.  The Occupational Pension 
Schemes Survey (OPSS 2014) is an annual survey of occupational pension 
schemes, run by the ONS.  The survey was first undertaken in 1953, and took 
place every four to five years until 2004, when it became an annual survey.  The 
2013 results published in September 2014 describe the demography of the UK 
occupational pension members.  Total membership of pension schemes with two 
or more members was reported at 27.9 million in 2013.  The ONS distinguishes 
between Defined Contribution (DC) schemes and Defined Benefit (DB) schemes 
only (not covering commercial schemes such as money purchase or GPPP), 
illustrating the considerable advantage of DB scheme membership.  For DB 
schemes, the average contribution rate was 5.2% of earnings for members 
(employees) and 15.4% for employers.  For private sector DC schemes, the 
average contribution rate was 2.9% for members (employees) and 6.1% for 
employers.  According to the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings UK 2013, 
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published by the ONS in December 2013 (ASHE 2013) the average national 
weekly salary for public sector and private sector earners was £574 and £490 
respectively.  Table A1.3 extrapolates these aggregate statistics into an overview 
of the average annual contributions base between benefit structures.  In both the 
public and private sector the average salary earner in a DB scheme has an asset 
accumulation advantage over their DC contemporaries. 
 
Table A1.3 Average contributions to defined benefit and defined contribution schemes based 
on the ONS ASHE data 
Sector Defined Benefit (£) Defined Contribution (£) Total 
 Employee Employer Employee Employer DB DC 
Public 1,552 4,597 866 1,821 6,149 2,687 
Private 1,325 3,924 739 1,554 5,249 2,293 
 
The total contribution benefit between schemes, based on the average salary 
form statistically different populations (t=12.66, df1, p=0.05), supporting the 
growing belief that steering new active members towards DC schemes allows 
sponsoring employees to de-risk away from Liability Driven Investment (LDI) 
commitments  (Figure A1.3).  Taking the calculation for private sector earners 
and the number of active members in 2013 approximately £9.118 billion in  
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Figure A1.3 Number of active members of occupational pension schemes by benefit structure 
2000-2013 
 
Source: Office for National Statistics (data available to download from ONS2013) 
 
contributions are flowing into DB schemes and £2.988 billion into DC schemes.  
This counter weighted trend away from the financially advantageous DB for new 
entrants suggests that the cost of contributions management will be crucial to the 
welfare of member contributions not protected by DB contracts.  Alongside this 
phenomena, when examining the destination of these ~ £12 billion in pension 
funds injects annually, table 6 outlines the division of contributions between active 
and passive members (pensions in payment or preserved entitlement) has 
changed dramatically over time to 8.1 million active (employee) members 
supporting 9.6 million pensions in payment and 10.2 million preserved pension 
entitlements in 2013.  From a high level perspective, as contributions decline in 
the trend towards DC enrolment, fewer active members are now supporting more 
non-contributing members with historical preserved entitlements than ever 
before.  From a ratio of 70%  active/passive membership three decades ago, 
active members now support a combined passive membership of almost 250% 
their size in 2013 (Table A1.4).  The preservation of current contributions ring-
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fenced for active members through leakage prevention in the investment supply 
chain will only grow in importance in the light of these two phenomena. 
 
Table A1.4 Number of members of occupational pension schemes by membership type, 
1983 to 2013 in the UK (millions) 
 1983 1995 2000 2006 2008 2010 2012 2013 
Active members 11.1 10.3 10.1 9.2 9.0 8.3 7.8 8.1 
Pensions in payment 5.0 8.5 8.2 8.2 8.8 9.0 9.5 9.6 
Preserved pension 
entitlements 2.8 7.0 6.7 9.4 9.9 9.8 10.2 10.2 
Combined passive 
entitlements 7.8 15.5 14.9 17.6 18.7 18.9 19.7 19.8 
Percentage of active 
members 70% 150% 148% 191% 208% 227% 253% 244% 
Total 18.9 25.8 25.0 26.7 27.7 27.2 27.6 27.9 
Adapted from: Office for National Statistics 2013 (ONS 2013) 
 
Pension Protection Fund (PPF) estimates of DB scheme liabilities have increased 
over the last few years, suggesting schemes may need to consider raising regular 
contribution rates.  Increasing liabilities could be linked to several factors such as 
ageing population and influenced by the returns on investment in gilts (ONS 
2013).  As employers continue to adjust to pension reforms, such as compulsory 
automatic enrolment, the desirability of Defined Contribution schemes, where the 
sponsor bears no fixed liability to the member should continue to grow in 
popularity. 
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I.III  Comparing the sample frame to the ONS population 
 
Given the comprehensive information regarding the UK pension scheme 
population provided by the ONS, assessing the sample frame against this 
respected and comprehensive dataset compiled using a published methodology 
provides comfort to a post-positivist study that the basis for knowledge generation 
is supported by the findings in the ONS population. 
 
 
I.IV  Comparing the sample frame to the ONS population 
 
The total registered occupational pension schemes (2,154) represent the pension 
assets of 15,987,000 members.  This accounts for 57.3% of the membership 
population recorded by the ONS in 2013 (Table A1.5).  Total members were 
reported by 1,506 (70%) of schemes, distributed around the mean as 10,616 ± 
30,722 (Range: 10 – 425,823).  Categorising total members into scheme size 
using the ONS methodology enables the sample frame to be compared to the 
population for representativeness in Figure A1.4.  Noting the ONS concerns 
regarding self-deselection in the category of 2-11 members, supported by the 
single case in the Wilmington (2013) sample frame (Table A1.5), the category 
was discarded. 
 
 
 
 
382 
 
Table A1.5 Total number of registered occupational pension schemes by membership size 
Membership size categories ONS reported Wilmington 
reported Wilmington/ONS 
2-11 35,320 1 0% 
12-99 3,950 39 1% 
100-999 3,570 505 14% 
1000-4999 1,060 492 46% 
5000+ 480 469 98% 
Unreported - 647 - 
Source:  Office of National Statistics (ONS2013) and Wilmington Pension Directory (Wilmington 2013) 
 
The average assets under management for the 647 cases where membership 
size was unreported are £132,574,624 ± 697,998,192 or approximately £20, 490 
± £1,078,823 per unreported case supports the ONS concern that these are 
generally small funds self-excluded from the survey. 
 
Figure A1.4 Number and percentage of registered pension schemes per ONS size categories 
in the ONS and Wilmington datasets 
 
 
Source:  Office of National Statistics (ONS2013) and Wilmington Pension Directory (Wilmington 2013) 
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It will be important in the analysis of the observational and survey data to 
acknowledge that, as the ONS observed, any contributions can only be seen as 
representing the larger end of the occupational pension schemes spectrum. 
 
 
I.V  Description of pension scheme by benefit structures 
 
When the occupational pension schemes dataset was constructed, the benefit 
structures recorded were divided into five categories (see Table A1.6).  
Conversely, the ONS records DB and DC schemes alone.  This is consistent with 
the small schemes omission, where smaller employers may find running bespoke 
schemes cost prohibitive compared with enrolling members in commercially 
available schemes that bear the administrative burden.  The distinction between 
DB open and DB closed has been retained on the basis that the later receive no 
active member contributions.  The remaining categories “Hybrid” and “Other” 
contain dual schemes, Stakeholder schemes and GPPP schemes, all involving 
no LDI commitment from the sponsor, making it logically consistent that they 
merge with the DC schemes to reflect the ONS methodology (see Table A1.6). 
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Table A1.6 Total members per pension benefit structure 
Benefit structure Total members 
Defined benefit open 8,315,595 
Defined benefit closed 3,125,892 
Hybrid 3,299,530 
Defined contribution 788,269 
Other 372,397 
Unreported 85,317 
Total 15,987,000 
Source: Wilmington Pensions Directory (Wilmington 2013) 
 
 
I.VI  Description of the membership base composition 
 
The similarity between the Wilmington and ONS data as a percentage is salient 
(Figure A1.5).  The large group of non-contributing members has significant 
implications for the performance required of the underlying fund.  The fund must 
either minimise its non-contributing membership base or maximise the return on 
investment of its pooled assets under management in order to meet its estimated 
liability. 
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Figure A1.5 ONS and Wilmington members by entitlement to pension payments 
  
Adapted from Office of National Statistics (ONS 2013) and Wilmington Pension Directory (Wilmington 
2013) 
 
 
I.VII  Summary: the Wilmington data as a representation of the ONS 
data 
 
The Wilmington data provides a sample size based on the number of members 
equal to 57.3% of the ONS data (once the membership category containing two 
to eleven members has been removed from both data sets).  The similarity 
between the datasets based on active and passive membership, and division of 
membership between DB and DC schemes provides support for the inferential 
use of the Wilmington data provided care is taken to acknowledge, as the ONS 
acknowledges, larger scheme self-selection is more evident in the Wilmington 
observations. 
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Appendix II 
Survey of Pension Trustees 2014 shown as 
raw downloaded format from Qualtrics 
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Q1  Informed Consent Form   Introduction     This survey aims to examine the 
fund manager selection process by UK Pension Trusts             Procedure        This 
survey should take approximately 15 minutes to complete.The survey comprises 
16 questions divided into four discrete sections. It will explore the characteristics 
of one of the fund managers running the Trust mandate.    It concludes with some 
details of the scheme(s) the Trust is operating, including their assets under 
management.This questionnaire will be conducted with an online Qualtrics-
created survey.              Benefit from participating       As an acknowledgement 
for fully completing the survey the researchers will provide a report on where this 
individual case feedback benchmarks against the overall distribution of 
respondents, as an indication of relative satisfaction in the decision making 
process.                Confidentiality       At no stage is the Trust or Trustee asked to 
identify themselves in this survey.  All data obtained will be kept confidential and 
will only be reported in an aggregate format.  No one other than then primary 
investigator will have access to the questionnaires. The data collected will be 
stored in the HIPPA-compliant, Qualtrics-secure database until it has been 
deleted by the primary investigator.              Participation          Participation in 
this research study is completely voluntary.                 Questions about the 
Research         If you have questions regarding this study, you should contact 
Kira Shevchenko of the University of Canterbury Christ Church Business School, 
on +44(0)1227 506423, or at k.shevchenko416@canterbury.ac.uk. 
 
Q2 Please let us know if you would like to be informed of the results of the survey? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
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Q4 Section 1:  Fund management mandate detailsQ1. Does the Trust as a whole 
have a preference for active (Alpha) or passive (Index) fund management? 
 Active (1) Passive (2) No preference (3) 
Equities (1)       
Fixed income (2)       
Other asset 
classes (3) 
      
 
Q5 Q2. Does the Trust have a preference for single or multiple fund manager 
appointments?   
 1 (1) 2-5 (2) 6-10 (3) >10 (4) In-house 
(5) 
Equities (1)           
Fixed 
income (2) 
          
Other asset 
classes (3) 
          
 
Answer If Q2. Does the Trust have a preference for single or multiple fund  
manager appointments?   Equities - 2-5 Is Selected Or Q2. Does the Trust have 
a preference for single or multiple fund  manager appointments?   Equities - 6-10 
Is Selected Or Q2. Does the Trust have a preference for single or multiple fund  
manager appointments?   Equities - >10 Is Selected Or Q2. Does the Trust have 
a preference for single or multiple fund  manager appointments?   Fixed income 
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- 2-5 Is Selected Or Q2. Does the Trust have a preference for single or multiple 
fund  manager appointments?   Fixed income - 6-10 Is Selected Or Q2. Does the 
Trust have a preference for single or multiple fund  manager 
appointments?   Fixed income - >10 Is Selected Or Q2. Does the Trust have a 
preference for single or multiple fund  manager appointments?   Other asset 
classes - 2-5 Is Selected Or Q2. Does the Trust have a preference for single or 
multiple fund  manager appointments?   Other asset classes - 6-10 Is Selected 
Or Q2. Does the Trust have a preference for single or multiple fund  manager 
appointments?   Other asset classes - >10 Is Selected 
Q6 Q2a. What is the rationale for multiple fund manager appointment? (Please 
select the most pertinent of the following): 
 Hedging risk of under-performance in one fund manager with outperformance 
in another (1) 
 Benchmarking relative performance across fund managers (2) 
 Professional consulting advice (6) 
 Providing competition incentives between appointed fund managers (3) 
 Providing multiple sources of fund management comparison for the buy/sell 
decision (4) 
 Other* (5) 
 
Answer If Q2a. What is the rationale for multiple fund manager appointment?  
(Please select the most pertin... Other* Is Selected 
Q27 Please specify: 
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Answer If Q2. Does the Trust have a preference for single or multiple fund  
manager appointments?   Equities - 2-5 Is Selected Or Q2. Does the Trust have 
a preference for single or multiple fund  manager appointments?   Equities - 6-10 
Is Selected Or Q2. Does the Trust have a preference for single or multiple fund  
manager appointments?   Equities - >10 Is Selected Or Q2. Does the Trust have 
a preference for single or multiple fund  manager appointments?   Fixed income 
- 2-5 Is Selected Or Q2. Does the Trust have a preference for single or multiple 
fund  manager appointments?   Fixed income - 6-10 Is Selected Or Q2. Does the 
Trust have a preference for single or multiple fund  manager 
appointments?   Fixed income - >10 Is Selected Or Q2. Does the Trust have a 
preference for single or multiple fund  manager appointments?   Other asset 
classes - 2-5 Is Selected Or Q2. Does the Trust have a preference for single or 
multiple fund  manager appointments?   Other asset classes - 6-10 Is Selected 
And Q2. Does the Trust have a preference for single or multiple fund  manager 
appointments?   Other asset classes - >10 Is Selected 
Q7 Q2a.  What could be the major disadvantage in multiple fund manager 
appointments? (Please select the most important of the following): 
 Administrative burden on the Trust (1) 
 Transactions costs inefficiency (2) 
 Other* (3) 
 None encountered (4) 
 
Answer If Q2a. &nbsp;What could be the major disadvantage in multiple fund 
manager appointments? (Please select the most important of the following): 
Other* Is Selected 
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Q28 Please specify: 
 
Answer If Q2. Does the Trust have a preference for single or multiple fund  
manager appointments?   Equities - 1 Is Selected And Q2. Does the Trust have 
a preference for single or multiple fund  manager appointments?   Fixed income 
- 1 Is Selected And Q2. Does the Trust have a preference for single or multiple 
fund  manager appointments?   Other asset classes - 1 Is Selected 
Q8 Q2b. What is the rationale for engaging a single fund manager? (Please select 
the most important of the following): 
 Minimising fund transactions costs (1) 
 Fostering long term relationship (2) 
 Minimising administrative complexity (3) 
 Simplifies the fund manager buy/sell decision (4) 
 Other* (5) 
 Professional consulting advice (6) 
 
Answer If Q2b. What is the rationale for engaging a single fund manager?  
(Please select the most important... Other* Is Selected 
Q29 Please specify: 
 
Answer If Q2. Does the Trust have a preference for single or multiple fund  
manager appointments?   Equities - 1 Is Selected Or Q2. Does the Trust have a 
preference for single or multiple fund  manager appointments?   Fixed income - 
1 Is Selected Or Q2. Does the Trust have a preference for single or multiple fund  
manager appointments?   Other asset classes - 1 Is Selected 
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Q9 Q2b. What could be the major disadvantage of single fund manager 
appointment? (Please select the most important of the following): 
 Key client reliance risk (1) 
 Difficulty with relative performance benchmarking (2) 
 Other* (3) 
 None encountered (4) 
 
Answer If Q2b. What could be the major disadvantage of single fund manager 
appointment? (Please select the most important of the following): Other* Is 
Selected 
Q30 Please specify: 
 
Answer If Q2. Does the Trust have a preference for single or multiple fund  
manager appointments?   Equities - In-house Is Selected And Q2. Does the Trust 
have a preference for single or multiple fund  manager appointments?   Fixed 
income - In-house Is Selected And Q2. Does the Trust have a preference for 
single or multiple fund  manager appointments?   Other asset classes - In-house 
Is Selected 
Q10 Q2c. What is the rationale for managing funds in-house? (Please select the 
most important of the following): 
 Minimising fund transactions costs (1) 
 Existing internal financial expertise (2) 
 Professional consulting advice (6) 
 Ensuring full control and oversight (3) 
 Trust Terms of Reference (4) 
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 Other* (5) 
 
Answer If Q2c. What is the rationale for managing funds in-house? (Please select 
the most important of the... Other* Is Selected 
Q31 Please specify: 
 
Answer If Q2. Does the Trust have a preference for single or multiple fund  
manager appointments?   Equities - In-house Is Selected And Q2. Does the Trust 
have a preference for single or multiple fund  manager appointments?   Fixed 
income - In-house Is Selected And Q2. Does the Trust have a preference for 
single or multiple fund  manager appointments?   Other asset classes - In-house 
Is Selected 
Q11 Q2c. What could be the major disadvantage of in-house fund management? 
(Please select the most important of the following): 
 Cost of expertise (1) 
 Cost of compliance (2) 
 Other* (3) 
 
Answer If Q2c. What could be the major disadvantage of in-house fund 
management? (Please select the most important of the following):<o:p></o:p> 
Other* Is Selected 
Q32 Please specify: 
 
Q12 Q3:  Who is the fund manager managing the most of the Trust's assets 
(largest mandate)? 
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Q14 Q4:  How many years has this fund manager been appointed for?  
 < 1 year (1) 
 2 to 5 years (2) 
 > 5 years (3) 
 
Q15 Q5:  What was the Trust’s rationale for selecting this fund manager? (Please 
select as many as relevant): 
 asset class expertise (1) 
 reputation (2) 
 past performance data (3) 
 lowest overall fees (4) 
 provision of useful information (5) 
 managing unease (6) 
 consultant recommendation (12) 
 transparency of fee structure (7) 
 Risk sharing (including downside risk) (8) 
 ESG and engagement strategies (9) 
 value for fees (10) 
 other industry recommendation (13) 
 other criteria were applied* (11) 
 
Answer If Q5:  What was the Trust’s rationale for selecting this fund manager? 
(Please select as many as re... ESG and engagement strategies Is Selected 
Q33 Please specify: 
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Q16 Q6.  Which metric is of key importance when the Trust rates the financial 
performance of this fund manager? (Please indicate the key metric and any 
further metrics that may be examined): 
 Key metric (1) Somewhat 
important (2) 
Not applicable (3) 
Nominal financial 
returns generated 
in the last financial 
year of 
engagement (1) 
      
Nominal returns 
compared to the 
requisite 
benchmark (2) 
      
Nominal returns 
compared to 
verbal undertaking 
(promises) (3) 
      
Value added 
performance 
(above market) (4) 
      
398 
 
Value for Annual 
Management Cost 
(AMC) (5) 
      
Value for Total 
Expense Ratio 
(TER) (6) 
      
 
Q18 Section 2:  Fund Manager governanceQ7. Who owns the fund manager 
discussed in the last section? 
 Publicly traded corporation (1) 
 Privately owned corporation (2) 
 Conglomerate owned (3) 
 Employee owned corporation (4) 
 Partnership (5) 
 Other* (6) 
 Don’t know (7) 
 
Q19 Q8. Where are the headquarters of this fund manager‘s holding company? 
 United Kingdom (1) 
 United States (2) 
 European Union, outside of the UK (3) 
 Other European country outside of the EU (4) 
 Asia/Pacific (5) 
 Africa (6) 
 Other* (7) 
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 Don’t know (8) 
 
Q20 Q9.  Were the two corporate governance characteristics of the fund manager 
in questions 7 and 8 explicitly considered in the decision to engage them? (Please 
select one only): 
 Yes* (1) 
 No (2) 
 Implicitly only (3) 
 N/A (4) 
 
Q34 Q10.  Does the trust as a whole believe any of the following corporate 
governance issues are important to the financial performance less fees of the 
fund manager? (Please rate between 1 and 7, where 1 is not important and 7 is 
highly important) 
 Not 
important 
(1) 
2 (2) 3 (3) 4 (4) 5 (5) 6 (6) Highly 
important 
(7) 
CEO/Chairman 
separation (1) 
              
Gender 
equality (2) 
              
Employee 
engagement 
(3) 
              
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Corporate 
social 
responsibility 
(4) 
              
Say on pay (5)               
Board 
composition (6) 
              
 
Q35 Q11. Was information on any of the corporate governance issues provided 
to the Trust by the fund manager? 
 Yes (1) 
 Don't know (2) 
 No (3) 
 
Q21 Q12.  Do you think  the Trust believes that the corporate governance profile 
of the fund manager helps them manage any of the following 
challenges?  (Please rate between 1 and 7, where 1 is not important and 7 is very 
important) 
 Not 
important 
(1) 
2 (2) 3 (3) 4 (4) 5 (5) 6 (6) Very 
important 
(7) 
Managing 
pressure from 
their own 
              
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shareholders 
(1) 
Prioritising 
the client 
relationship 
(2) 
              
Prioritising 
value for 
money (3) 
              
Prioritising 
transparency 
(4) 
              
Prioritising 
spending on 
expertise (5) 
              
Prioritising 
outperforman
ce (6) 
              
Sharing risk 
(7) 
              
 
Q36 Section 3:  Fiduciary dutiesQ13. Please indicate of you agree or disagree 
with the following statements: 
 Agree  Disagree 
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Fund managers should have fiduciary duties 
to Pension Trusts (1) 
    
Fund managers do have fiduciary duties to 
Pension Trusts (2) 
    
This duty should override fiduciary duties to 
their own shareholders/owners (3) 
    
This duty does override fiduciary duties to their 
own shareholders/owners (4) 
    
Governance analysis is available on fund 
managers (5) 
    
Governance analysis should be available on 
fund managers (6) 
    
 
Q23 Section 4:  Pension fund detailsQ14:  What is the composition of the Trust 
 Member elected Sponsor elected Other* 
Number of 
members 
   
 
 
Answer If Section 4:  Pension fund details     Q14:  What is the composition of the 
Trust Number of members - Other* Is Not Empty 
Q37 Please specify: 
 
Q24 Q15:  What type of Schemes operated by the Trust  Please complete for one 
or more schemes operated as applicable: 
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 Establish-
ment year 
Assets under 
management 
(£000) 
Total 
Members 
Total 
pensioners 
Defined benefit Open      
Defined benefit Closed      
Defined contribution      
Other*      
 
Answer If Q15:  What type of Schemes operated by the Trust   Please complete 
for one or more schemes operat... Other* - Establishment year Is Not Empty Or 
Q15:  What type of Schemes operated by the Trust   Please complete for one or 
more schemes operat... Other* - Assets under management (£000) Is Not Empty 
Or Q15:  What type of Schemes operated by the Trust   Please complete for one 
or more schemes operat... Other* - Total Members Is Not Empty Or Q15:  What 
type of Schemes operated by the Trust   Please complete for one or more 
schemes operat... Other* - Total pensioners Is Not Empty 
Q38 Please specify: 
 
Q25 Q16: Sponsor industry sector 
 Private sector (1) 
 Public sector (2) 
 Industry sector (3) 
 Charity sector (4) 
 Other* (5) 
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Q26 Further comments(Optional) If you wish to provide further information we 
would be greatly interested in learning more about your views on the topics 
mentioned in the questionnaire. 
 
 
II.I  Feedback from respondents 
 
• There is no "go back" button; 
• Your questions did not address managers with multiple mandates with 
the same manager (I could only select one time horizon when in fact I 
have several mandates some appointed within last year and others 2-5); 
• I think that you are asking the wrong questions. There are no specific 
questions on the methodology on how we select managers, the interplay 
of the different skills and attributes of the managers and the relative 
complementarity and diversifications required for large pension funds. 
This therefore suggests to me that you have already decided on the 
messages/conclusions you want to reach and you have angled the 
questions accordingly. The gaps in your questions are otherwise too 
large and you have not at all asked about how we go about selecting 
managers. Disappointing. 
• Like many Trustee Boards, we rely heavily on the research and advice 
from our investment consultants. The governance of fund managers is a 
topic we expect the consultants' research team to investigate. Your 
research will be more grounded in actual practice if you are able to ask 
similar questions of the research teams at Towers Watson, Aon Hewitt 
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and Mercer. As these three are all pushing fiduciary management hard, 
you might also want to ask for input from Lane Clark and Peacock; 
• Interesting but the main drive is on obtaining returns and avoiding capital 
losses 
• Questions 10 and 14 were badly worded.  On 10 specifically, we felt that 
it should have referenced whether the corporate governance factors 
impacted the overall long-term performance of the company (or 
companies in general) rather than performance less fees. 
 
 
II.II  Response to feedback from respondents 
 
The constructive criticism from the respondents was gratefully received.  The first 
and second points are technical aspects of the software construction to be 
investigated.  The third point criticises the semantics of the survey content.  The 
purpose of the survey was to enquire into the specific corporate governance 
issues that were factored into the fund management selection process as the 
fiduciary management of value for money for the contributing beneficiaries.  The 
feedback that the survey should go over and above this remit loses the focus of 
the objective, which research methods manuals explain as the constant tension 
in survey research (the dyadic challenge of researcher led bias versus a survey 
so broad and ambitious that it actually addresses no issue: Bernard, 2006).  Much 
thought was put into the optimal way of linking one trust with one fund manager 
(as with Chapter 6) so that the respondent could generate meaningful and 
comparable variables.  At the cost of trying to explore “relative complementarity 
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and diversifications required for large pension funds,” the survey author and 
advisers agreed that selecting one fund manager (the manager with the largest 
of the trust’s mandates) to answer the questions related to the specific variables.  
While acknowledging that this is legitimate criticism, it is the inevitable opportunity 
cost associated with closed question survey techniques.  The questions were 
designed (and validated through piloting the survey with industry experts) to look 
specifically at the corporate governance characteristics of the fund manager 
considered by the trust in the fulfilment of their fiduciary duty to defray cost to the 
beneficiary.  It would be hubristic to attempt to capture the infinite set of 
motivations for selecting a particular manager. 
 
The objection that the survey should have dealt with the corporate governance of 
the underlying equities rather than the fund manager is the contradiction at the 
heart of the thesis.  The pension industry already employs this practice 
extensively.  An established industry of non-financial performance analysts (ESG 
analysts) exists to support this practice and is extensively researched.  This 
research was discussed in Chapter 3 as the identification of a link between non-
financial sustainability performance in the asset and its financial performance.  
The gap in knowledge that that the thesis in general and survey in particular 
attempts to contribute to is the non-financial performance of the fund managers 
themselves, specifically their governance behaviour.  These financial 
intermediaries are the corporations who will engage ESG analysts to assess the 
non-financial performance of the equities they are selecting for their pension 
clients, but thus far have eluded scrutiny of their own behaviour.  The survey 
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attempts to determine if this is a pension industry norm, or whether there are 
characteristics of the trust or the fund manager that exacerbates this blind spot. 
 
The feedback is valuable for further development of the survey for future 
research, and appreciatively received.  Particularly the advice to enquire into 
the role consultants such as Towers Watson, Mercer and Aon Hewitt play in the 
integration of governance characteristics into the recommendations they make 
to pension clients on fund manager selection.  These firms have been contacted 
for comment that will be incorporated in the discussion in Chapter 8 and would 
be the target of future qualitative research. 
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Appendix III 
List of Fund Managers 
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Table A3.1 Table of Fund Management Entities 
FMID Fund Management Corporation FMOS FMRR FMAUM (USD) 
0 Assets Managed Inhouse 0 0 0 
1 300 North Capital 3 1 429,040,000 
2 Abbott Capital Management 2 1 7,000,000,000 
3 Aberdeen Asset Management 1 2 304,808,400,000 
4 Absolute Return Partners LLP 4 2 500,000,000  
5 Acadian Asset Management (UK) Ltd 1 2 55,000,000,000  
6 
Adam & Company Investment 
Management Ltd 
1 2 2,433,600,000  
7 Adams Street Partners UK LLP 2 1 22,000,000,000  
8 Adrian Lee & Partners 4 2 6,000,000,000  
9 Advent Capital Management UK Ltd 2 1 7,300,000,000  
10 Aegis Investment Partners 3 1 125,000,000  
11 Aerion Fund Management 5 2 23,575,500,000  
12 Affiliated Managers Group 1 1 508,000,000,000  
13 A.G. Bisset & Co Ltd 2 1 1,340,000,000  
14 Alchemy Parners LLP 4 2 2,281,500,000  
15 Alignment Capital Group LLC 5 1 99  
16 Alinda Capital Partners 3 1 7,800,000,000  
17 
AllianceBernstein Institutional 
Investment 
1 1 447,000,000,000  
18 Allianz Global Investors 1 5 389,728,000,000  
19 Altius Associates 3 2 25,400,000,000  
20 Altrinsic Global Advisors UK Ltd 3 1 5,860,000,000  
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21 American Century Investments 2 2 52,000,000,000  
22 American Securities 2 1 8,000,000,000  
23 AMP Capital Investors 1 3 131,000,000,000  
24 Amundi 1 5 961,500,000,000  
25 AnaCap Financial Partners 4 2 2,179,400,000  
26 Analytic Investors LLC 3 1 1,800,000,000  
27 Anchorage Capital Partners 3 3 99  
28 AQR 2 1 105,000,000,000  
29 Aon Hewitt 1 2 39,000,000,000  
30 Apax Partners Ltd 4 2 58,000,000,000  
31 Archer Capital 2 3 3,126,000,000  
32 Arcus Infrastructure Partners LLP 4 2 15,384,000,000  
33 Arden Asset Management 3 1 7,500,000,000  
34 Ares Management Tld 2 1 68,000,000,000  
35 Armstrong Investment Managers LLP 4 2 200,000,000  
36 Arrowgrass Capital Partners 4 2 4,500,000,000  
37 Arrowstreet Capital LP 4 1 47,000,000,000  
38 Artemis Investment Management LLP 4 2 25,552,800,000  
39 Ascend Capital 4 1 2,690,000,000  
40 Ashmore Investment Management 1 2 78,500,000,000  
41 Atlantis Investment Management Ltd 5 2 3,200,000,000  
42 Auriel Capital Management LLP 4 2 99  
43 Aurora Investment Management LLC 2 1 9,300,000,000  
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44 Avenue Advisors 5 1 53,700,000  
45 Avenue Capital Group 5 1 12,300,000,000  
46 Aviva Investors 1 2 374,166,000,000  
47 AXA Investment Management UK Ltd 1 5 687,152,000,000  
48 
AXA Rosenberg Investment 
Management Ltd 
1 5 23,717,000,000  
49 Baillie Gifford 4 2 153,621,000,000  
50 Bain Capital 2 1 70,000,000,000  
51 Balderton Capital 4 2 2,000,000,000  
52 Banco Votorantim SA 1 3 141,917,400,000  
53 BankInvest Asset Management 2 4 15,127,600,000  
54 Barclays Wealth 1 2 308,458,800,000  
55 Baring Asset Management Ltd 1 1 57,433,600,000  
56 Battery Financial Management Inc 1 1 10,900,000,000  
57 Beach Point Capital 4 1 4,408,000,000  
58 The Beck Group 5 2 99  
59 Bedlam Asset Management 3 2 532,350,000  
60 Belgrave Capital Management 2 5 8,432,000,000  
61 Benchmark Plus 3 1 2,350,000,000  
62 Berenberg Bank 2 5 12,820,000,000  
63 Beringea 3 1 330,000,000  
64 Berry Asset Management plc 1 4 6,000,000,000  
65 
Blackstone Alternative Asset 
Management 
1 1 272,000,000,000  
66 Blackhorse Asset Management Pte Ltd 3 3 137,000,000  
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67 BlackRock 1 2 3,792,000,000,000  
68 Blakeney Management 4 2 99  
69 BlueBay Asset Management 1 2 56,000,000,000  
70 BlueCrest Capital Management 4 2 215,000,000,000  
71 BlueMountain Capital Partners LLP 1 1 12,000,000,000  
72 BNP Paribas Investment Partners Ltd 1 5 612,796,000,000  
73 BNY Mellon 1 1 27,400,000,000,000  
74 
BNY Mellon Investment Management 
EMEA 
1 1 1,400,000,000,000  
75 
The Boston Company Asset 
Management 
1 1 45,000,000,000  
76 Bramdean Asset Management LLP 5 2 99  
77 Brandeaux Administrators Ltd 2 2 1,825,200,000  
78 Brandes Investment Partners L.P 4 1 26,400,000,000  
79 Brevan Howard 3 4 40,000,000,000  
80 Brewin Dolphin Asset Management 1 2 42,588,000,000  
81 Brian Shearing & Partners Ltd 4 2 99  
82 Bridgepoint 3 2 15,384,000,000  
83 Bridges Ventures 4 2 190,125,000  
84 Bridgewater Associates 4 1 150,000,000,000  
85 Broadstone Pensions & Investments 3 2 3,042,000,000  
86 Brockton Capital LLP 4 2 91,260,000,000  
87 
Brookfield Investment Management UK 
Ltd 
5 1 175,000,000,000  
88 Burgundy Asset Management Ltd 3 1 9,000,000,000  
89 Cairn Capital Ltd 2 2 3,300,000,000  
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90 Calamos International LLP 1 1 27,800,000,000  
91 Caliburn Capital Partners 4 2 600,000,000  
92 The Cambridge Strategy 5 2 130,000,000  
93 Canada Life Asset Management 1 3 565,812,000,000  
94 Cantillon Capital Management LLP 5 2 1,000,000,000  
95 Cantor Fitzgerald 4 1 99  
96 Canyon Partners 3 1 23,000,000,000  
97 Capital & Regional plc 1 2 1,270,035,000  
98 Capital Dynamics 2 4 17,000,000,000  
99 Capital International Limited 1 1 1,147,000,000,000  
100 Capula Investment Management LLP 4 2 22,000,000,000  
101 Carlyle Group 1 1 185,000,000,000  
102 Carnegie Asset Management 3 4 15,300,000,000  
103 CarVal Investors 2 1 68,000,000,000  
104 Castlefield Investments Partners 4 2 99  
105 Catapult 4 2 100,000,000  
106 Cavendish Asset Mangement 2 2 1,438,866,000,000  
107 Cazenove Capital Management 1 2 26,161,200,000  
108 CBPE Capital 4 2 608,400,000  
109 CBRE Global Investors 2 1 87,600,000,000  
110 CCLA Investment Management Ltd 2 2 6,996,600,000  
111 CCMP Capital Advisors (UK) LLP 2 1 12,000,000,000  
112 Cedar Rock Capital Ltd 3 2 3,848,130,000  
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113 
Central Finance Board of the Methodist 
Church 
5 2 1,444,950,000  
114 Cerberus 4 1 20,000,000,000  
115 Chamberlin & Hill plc 1 2 99  
116 Charlemagne Capital (UK) Ltd 3 2 2,400,000,000  
117 Charles Stanley Securities 1 2 24,883,560,000  
118 Charlesbank Capital Partners 2 1 2,000,000,000  
119 Chayton Capital 4 2 99  
120 Cheviot Asset Management 2 2 22,815,000,000  
121 Chilton Investment Company 2 1 7,000,000,000  
122 CI Capital Partners 3 1 1,100,000,000  
123 Cinven Partners LLP 4 2 19,773,000,000  
124 City of London Investment Group plc 1 2 3,500,000,000  
125 Close Brothers Asset Management 1 2 13,841,100,000  
126 Cohen & Steers UK Ltd 1 1 46,300,000,000  
127 Colchester Global Investors Limited 3 2 22,000,000,000  
128 Coller Capital Ltd 5 2 5,500,000,000  
129 Collins Alternative Solutions 3 1 1,800,000,000  
130 
Colonial First State Global Asset 
Management 
1 3 52,100,000,000  
131 Columbia Capital 3 1 2,500,000,000  
132 
Comgest Asset Management 
International Ltd 
1 5 17,947,800,000  
133 Conning Asset Management Ltd 1 1 86,000,000,000  
134 ConvergEx 2 1 32,000,000,000  
135 Coronation International Ltd 1 3 46,872,000,000  
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136 CP2 3 3 2,917,600,000  
137 Credit Suisse Asset Management Ltd 1 2 825,598,800,000  
138 Crestline Investors Inc 1 1 7,200,000,000  
139 
Crown Agents Investment Management 
Ltd 
2 2 1,374,223,500  
140 Cube Infrastructure Fund 4 5 1,410,200,000  
141 CZ Capital 4 2 167,000,000  
142 Daiwa SB Investments (UK) 1 5 50,000,000,000  
143 Dalton Strategic Partnership 4 2 2,000,000,000  
144 
Darwin Property Investment 
Management Ltd 
3 2 351,351,000  
145 Dasos Capital Oy 3 4 301,270,000  
146 Davis Selected Advisers L.P. 4 1 56,000,000,000  
147 DB Advisors 1 5 1,240,000,000,000  
148 Delmore Asset Management 3 2 15,210,000,000  
149 Duetsche Bank AG 1 5 1,210,208,000,000  
150 
Diapason Commodities Management UK 
LLP 
1 4 8,500,000,000  
151 Dimensional Fund Advisors Ltd 3 1 315,400,000,000  
152 Diversified Global Asset Management 3 3 6,700,000,000  
153 Dorchester Investment Management 4 3 750,000,000  
154 Driehaus Capital Management 3 1 11,900,000,000  
155 DTZ 1 1 2,000,000,000  
156 Duke Street Capital 4 2 3,954,600,000  
157 Dunedin Capital Partners 4 2 608,400,000  
158 Dynagest 3 4 99  
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159 East Midlands Early Growth Fund 2 2 7,605,000  
160 
Eaton Vance Management 
(international) Ltd 
3 2 260,600,000,000  
161 ECI Partners 4 2 1,673,100,000  
162 ECM Asset Management Ltd 1 2 9,500,000,000  
163 Edinburgh Partners 3 2 7,900,000,000  
164 Efficient Capital Management 3 1 1,000,000,000  
165 EFG Asset Management (UK) Ltd 1 4 82,949,800,000  
166 E.I.M. S.A. 3 4 7,000,000,000  
167 EIM (UK) Ltd 3 4 7,000,000,000  
168 Elysian Capital 4 2 38,025,000  
169 Emerald Hill Capital Partners 3 3 500,000,000  
170 Environmental Technologies Fund 4 2 167,310,000  
171 EQT Funds Management Ltd 2 4 25,640,000,000  
172 Equitix 2 2 158,184,000  
173 Equitable Life 1 2 13,600,000,000  
174 eSecLending 5 1 99  
175 Esemplia 1 2 698,000,000  
176 Europa Capital LLP 4 2 8,974,000,000  
177 
Evercore  Pan Asset Capital 
Management 
1 2 901,953,000  
178 F&C Asset Management plc 1 2 137,042,100,000  
179 Fauchier Partners 1 1 22,000,000,000  
180 Fidelity Worldwide Investment 3 1 1,489,400,000,000  
181 Financial Risk Management (FRM) 1 2 8,200,000,000  
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182 First Quadrant 4 1 17,000,000,000  
183 First State Investments 2 3 52,100,000,000  
184 Fisch Asset Mangement 3 4 1,791,800,000  
185 Fortress Investment Group 1 1 62,500,000,000  
186 FourWinds Capital Management 2 1 4,000,000,000  
187 Friends Life 1 2 199,920,000,000  
188 Frankin Templeton Investments 1 2 792,441,000,000  
189 Friess Associates 3 1 1,250,000,000  
190 Frontpoint 5 1 99  
191 Fulcrum Asset Management 4 2 500,000,000  
192 FundQuest 1 5 40,000,000,000  
193 FX Concepts Inc 5 1 99  
194 GAM 2 4 1,228,964,000  
195 Gardner Lewis 3 1 369,060,000  
196 GE Asset Management 1 1 116,000,000,000  
197 Generali Portfolio Management 1 4 90,960,200,000  
198 
Generation Investment Management 
LLP 
4 2 6,000,000,000  
199 Genesis Investment Management LLP 4 2 13,036,000,000  
200 GLG Partners LP 1 2 27,700,000,000  
201 Global Fund Analysis Ltd 1 2 99 
202 Global Infrastructure Partners 4 1 15,000,000,000  
203 Global Wealth Allocation Ltd 2 2 6,000,000,000  
204 GMO UK Limited 3 1 112,000,000,000  
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205 
Goldman Sachs Asset Management 
International 
1 1 878,000,000,000  
206 Goodhart Partners LLP 3 2 496,000,000  
207 Gottex Asset Management 2 4 640,000,000  
208 Governance for Owners LLP 4 2 1,240,000,000  
209 Graham Capital Management 4 1 7,200,000,000  
210 Gramercy 4 1 3,900,000,000  
211 Great Hill Partners 3 1 3,000,000,000  
212 Greenpark Capital Ltd 5 1 10,000,000,000  
213 Greenspring Associates 4 1 2,400,000,000  
214 Gresham Investment Management 3 1 16,000,000,000  
215 Greystone Financial Services Ltd 2 2 337,205,700  
216 Grosvenor Fund Management Ltd 2 2 18,000,000,000  
217 H2O Asset Management LLP 4 2 3,954,600,000  
218 Halcyon Asset Management (UK) LLP 3 1 13,000,000,000  
219 SG Hambros Bank Ltd 1 2 107,688,000,000  
220 Hamilton Lane 2 1 28,000,000,000  
221 Hancock Timber Resourse Group 1 1 11,500,000,000  
222 HarbourVest Partners (UK) Ltd 3 1 11,800,000,000  
223 Harding Loevner LP 1 1 32,000,000,000  
224 Havenport Asset Management 4 3 1,300,000,000  
225 Headland Capital Partners 3 3 2,400,000,000  
226 Heitman 3 1 27,800,000,000  
227 Henderson Global Investors 1 2 70,800,000,000  
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228 Herald Investment Management 3 2 98,865,000  
229 Hermes Fund Managers Limited 5 2 39,698,100,000  
230 
Heronbridge Investment Management 
LLP 
4 2 1,233,531,000  
231 HgCapital 4 2 7,757,100,000  
232 Highland Capital Partners 4 1 23,000,000,000  
233 Highstar Capital 4 1 7,600,000,000  
234 Honister Capital  5 2 99  
235 Hony Capital 2 3 6,800,000,000  
236 Horsley Bridge Partners 2 1 9,680,000,000  
237 
HSBC Global Asset Management (UK) 
Limited 
1 3 419,100,000,000  
238 ICAP 1 2 99  
239 IGNIS Asset Management Ltd 2 2 102,819,600,000  
240 
IMAS Investment Monitoring and 
Accounting Services 
99 99 99  
241 Impax Asset Management Ltd 1 2 3,498,300,000  
242 Independent Franchise Partners 4 2 3,900,000,000  
243 Indigo Capital 4 2 705,100,000  
244 Indus Capital Advisors (UK) LLP 3 1 6,200,000,000  
245 Industry Funds Management 5 3 50,016,000,000  
246 Informed Portfolio Management (IPM) 2 4 6,000,000,000  
247 Infracapital 1 2 2,585,700,000  
248 
ING Real Estate Investment 
Management 
5 99 99  
249 Innisfree Ltd 5 2 28,746,900,000  
250 Innova Investments 3 5 99  
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251 
Insight Investment Management 
(Global) Limited 
1 2 413,559,900,000  
252 Institutional Capital Inc 1 1 402,000,000,000  
253 Institutional Venture Partners 4 1 2,900,000,000  
254 Integrity Life Settlement Solutions Ltd 99 99 99  
255 Intermediate Capital Group Plc 1 2 15,512,200,000  
256 
International Administration Guernsey 
Ltd 
3 2 23,000,000,000  
257 International Asset Management Ltd 3 2 2,700,000,000  
258 Invesco Global Cash Management 1 1 763,900,000,000  
259 Invesco Perpetual 1 2 106,470,000,000  
260 Investec Asset Management 1 3 107,000,000,000  
261 Investment Solutions Ltd 2 2 16,620,000,000  
262 IronBridge Capital Partners 4 2 99  
263 ITG Europe 1 1 222,000,000,000  
264 Ivory Investment Management 4 1 2,110,000,000  
265 Jacobs Levy 3 1 5,680,000,000  
266 Janus Capital International Ltd 1 1 167,700,000,000  
267 JD Asset Management Plc 5 2 99  
268 Jefferies International Ltd 1 1 2,000,000,000  
269 Jegi 5 1 99  
270 
J.O. Hambro Investment Management 
Ltd 
1 2 19,164,600,000  
271 JP Morgan Asset Management 1 1 1,500,000,000,000  
272 Jupiter Asset Management 1 2 45,477,900,000  
273 K2 Asset Management Ltd 1 3 1,000,000,000  
423 
 
274 Kames Capital 1 2 80,613,000,000  
275 Kazimir Partners UK Ltd 3 3 1,500,000,000  
276 Kennet Venture Partners Ltd 4 2 600,000,000  
277 Key Asset Management (UK) Ltd 5 99 99  
278 Key Capital Partners 4 2 99  
279 Keyhaven Capital Partners Ltd 4 2 1,200,000,000  
280 Khosla Ventures 5 1 1,300,000,000  
281 Killik & Co 3 2 3,700,000,000  
282 King Street Capital Management 4 1 20,000,000,000  
283 Knight Vinke Asset Management 3 4 1,570,000,000  
284 Knightsbridge 3 1 446,900,000  
285 Kohlberg & Co. 3 1 5,300,000,000  
286 KPS Capital Partners 4 1 6,000,000,000  
287 Lane Clark & Peacock LLP 4 2 99  
288 LaSalle Investment Management 1 1 47,600,000,000  
289 Lazard Asset Management Ltd 2 1 159,300,000,000  
290 Leadenhall Capital Partners LLP 4 2 1,500,000,000  
291 
Legal & General Investment 
Management Ltd 
1 2 608,400,000,000  
292 Levin Capital Strategies 4 1 5,000,000,000  
293 Lexington Partners UK Ltd 3 2 20,000,000,000  
294 LGT Capital Partners 4 4 25,000,000,000  
295 Liberty Square Asset Management Ltd 5 2 2,205,450,000  
296 Lindsell Train Ltd 3 2 63,200,000  
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297 Liontrust Asset Management 1 2 3,194,100,000  
298 Lloyd George Management 1 3 26,100,000  
299 Logan Circle Partners 4 1 23,600,000,000  
300 
Lombard Odier Darier Hentcsh Asset 
Management 
4 4 163,370,000,000  
301 Lansdowne Partners 3 2 7,460,000,000  
302 Longview Partners 4 2 10,760,000,000  
303 Loomis Sayles 2 1 193,500,000,000  
304 Lothbury Investment Management 2 2 1,840,410,000  
305 LSV Asset Management 4 1 77,000,000,000  
306 Lucidus Capital Partners LLP 4 2 1,500,000,000  
307 Lyster Watson 3 1 1,720,000,000,000  
308 Lyxor Asset Management 1 5 110,800,000,000  
309 Mackay Shields 1 1 77,700,000,000  
310 
Macquarie Infrastructure and Real 
Assets 
1 3 265,000,000,000  
311 Magnitude Capital LLC 3 1 3,100,000,000  
312 Majedie Asset Management 2 2 12,168,000,000  
313 Man Investments Ltd 1 2 52,500,000,000  
314 M&G Investments 2 2 356,370,300,000  
315 Maple-Brown Abbott 2 3 8,961,200,000  
316 Marathon Asset Management 4 2 53,000,000,000  
317 
Martin Currie Investment Management 
Ltd 
3 2 7,909,200,000  
318 Marvin Palmer Associates Inc 1 1 152,780,000,000  
319 Maverick Capital Ltd 3 1 9,700,000,000  
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320 MaxCap Partners LLP 4 2 99  
321 McKinley Capital Management 3 1 7,400,000,000  
322 Mercator Asset Management 4 1 5,400,000,000  
323 Meridiam Infrastructure 2 5 3,589,600,000  
324 Meridian Capital Partners 1 1 825,000,000  
325 MFS Investment Management 1 1 397,500,000,000  
326 Midas Capital Partners Ltd 1 2 9,000,000,000  
327 Mercer 1 1 5,300,000,000  
328 Millenium Global Investments Ltd 2 2 13,000,000,000  
329 MIR Investment Management Pty Ltd 1 3 1,025,600,000  
330 Mirabaud Investment Management Ltd 4 4 26,350,000,000  
331 Mirae Asset Global Investment 2 2 60,100,000,000  
332 
Mitsubishi UFJ Asset Management (UK) 
Ltd 
1 3 529,000,000,000  
333 
MMIP Investment Management Limit 
(Guernsey) 
3 2 99  
334 Mondrian Investment Partners Ltd 4 2 66,000,000,000  
335 Montag & Caldwell Inc 3 1 12,800,000,000  
336 Montagu Private Equity 4 2 5,128,000,000  
337 Montanaro Asset Management 2 2 3,205,000,000  
338 
Morgan Stanley Investment 
Management 
1 1 347,000,000,000  
339 MTM Capital Partners Ltd 5 2 99  
340 Muzinich & Co Ltd 1 1 15,000,000,000  
341 Natwest 1 2 78,667,641,000  
342 Navis Capital Partners Ltd 1 3 3,000,000,000  
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343 Nephila Capital 2 3 8,000,000,000  
344 Neptune Investment Management Ltd 3 2 8,821,800,000  
345 Neuberger Berman 3 2 227,000,000,000  
346 New Forests Pty Ltd 3 3 1,875,600,000  
347 New Mountain Partners 2 1 10,000,000,000  
348 New Star 2 2 9,180,000,000  
349 Newedge Group UK 5 5 99  
350 Schroders NewFinance Capital LLP 4 2 6,844,500,000  
351 NewSmith Asset Management 4 2 3,194,100,000  
352 Newton Investment Management Ltd 1 2 77,418,900,000  
353 NGAM UK Ltd 1 5 838,200,000,000  
354 Nikko Asset Management Europe Ltd 2 3 163,000,000,000  
355 Nomura Asset Management UK Limited 2 2 287,000,000,000  
356 Nordea Investment Management 1 4 292,039,600,000  
357 Northern Trust Asset Management 1 1 846,200,000,000  
358 Northwater Capital 2 1 9,000,000,000  
359 
Norwich & Peterborough Building 
Society 
5 2 7,452,900,000  
360 Nova Capital Management Ltd 3 2 1,666,600,000  
361 Numeric Investors 2 1 10,500,000,000  
362 Oaktree Capital Management Limited 4 1 78,800,000,000  
363 Objective Completion Ltd 3 2 2,281,500,000  
364 Och-Ziff Capital Management Group 2 1 39,200,000,000  
365 Odey Asset Management 4 2 11,300,000,000  
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366 Orbis 3 3 40,000,000,000  
367 Oldfield Partners 4 2 6,100,000,000  
368 Olympia Capital Management Ltd 3 5 5,000,000,000  
369 Optimal Fund Management 3 3 2,500,800,000  
370 
Orchard Street Investment 
Management LLT 
4 2 4,563,000,000  
371 Origin Asset Management 4 2 2,500,000,000  
372 Orion Capital Managers 4 2 5,128,000,000  
373 Overlay Asset Management 1 5 99  
374 Oxford Investment Partners 5 1 99  
375 P-Solve Investments Limited 2 1 13,000,000,000  
376 
Pacific Alternative Asset Management 
Company LLP 
2 1 8,500,000,000  
377 Pantheon Ventures 4 2 25,400,000,000  
378 Pareto Investment Management 5 99 99  
379 Parish Capital Advisors Europe LLP 5 99 99  
380 Partners Group 3 4 38,460,000,000  
381 Pathway Capital Management (UK Ltd 4 1 25,000,000,000  
382 Paul Capital Advisors 4 1 6,700,000,000  
383 Payden & Rygel Global Ltd 3 1 80,000,000,000  
384 Perennial Investment Partners 2 3 18,000,000,000  
385 Permira Advisers LLP 4 2 25,640,000,000  
386 Pictet Asset Management 3 4 317,254,000,000  
387 PIL Invests 5 99 99  
388 PIMCO Europe Ltd 1 2 1,970,000,000,000  
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389 Pinebridge Investments Europe Ltd 5 3 69,100,000,000  
390 Pioneer Investments Ltd 2 2 216,658,000,000  
391 PIRC Ltd 5 2 99  
392 Plainfield Asset Management LLC 5 1 99  
393 Polaris Capital Management 2 1 7,692,000,000  
394 Pomona Capital 3 1 6,900,000,000  
395 Premier Asset Management 99 3 12,087,200,000  
396 PRIMECAP Management Company 3 1 64,000,000,000  
397 Principal Global Investors (Europe) Ltd 1 1 292,400,000,000  
398 Prudential 1 2 753,000,000,000  
399 
Prisma Capital Management 
International 
2 1 8,100,000,000  
400 Private Wealth Management 1 5 1,000,000,000,000  
401 Psignma Investment Management 2 2 18,252,000,000  
402 Putnam Investments Ltd 5 1 148,000,000,000  
403 Pyramis Global Advisors UK Ltd 1 1 198,800,000,000  
404 Pyrford International Plc 1 3 10,000,000,000  
 
405 
 
Pzena Investment Management 
 
1 
 
1 
24,400,000,000  
406 Quester Capital 1 1 450,000,000  
407 Quilter 2 2 22,815,000,000  
408 Rathbone Unit Trust Management 1 2 23,773,230,000  
409 RC Brown Investment Management 1 2 304,200,000  
410 RCM UK Ltd 5 2 99  
411 Realty Capital Partners 3 1 350,000,000  
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412 Record Currency Management Ltd 1 2 35,439,300,000  
413 Reech CBRE Alternative Real Estate LLP 4 2 200,000,000  
414 Relational Investors LLC 3 1 5,550,000,000  
415 
River & Mercantile Asset Management 
Ltd 
4 1 2,585,700,000  
416 RMB Asset Management 1 3 3,500,000,000  
417 Robeco (Schweiz) AG 1 5 242,298,000,000  
418 The Rock Creek Group 2 1 7,000,000,000  
419 
Rockspring Property Investment 
Managers 
4 2 8,204,800,000  
420 Rogge Global Partners plc 3 2 57,000,000,000  
421 T. Rowe Price 1 1 647,200,000,000  
422 Royal London Asset Management Ltd 1 2 76,050,000,000  
423 Royal London Cash Management 1 2 9,126,000,000  
424 RREEF 1 5 1,210,208,000,000  
425 Ruffer LLP 4 2 20,685,600,000  
426 Russell Investments 2 2 246,800,000,000  
427 RWC Partners 3 2 6,100,000,000  
428 St James Place Wealth Management 1 2 62,665,200,000  
429 Sankaty Advisors Ltd 1 1 70,000,000,000  
430 Sarasin & Partners 4 2 19,925,100,000  
431 Scale Venture Partners 4 1 900,000,000  
432 Schroder Investment Management Ltd 1 2 390,440,700,000  
433 Schroders New Finance Capital LLP 4 2 4,500,000,000  
434 
Scottish Widows Investment 
Partnership Ltd 
1 2 221,746,590,000  
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435 SEI 1 1 529,000,000,000  
436 Semperian PPP Investment Partners LP 4 2 1,977,300,000  
437 Sequoia Capital  2 1 4,000,000,000  
438 Signet Capital Management Ltd 2 2 700,000,000  
439 Siguler Guff 4 1 10,000,000,000  
440 Silver Creek Capital Management LLC 2 1 5,500,000,000  
441 Silverfleet Capital 4 2 1,410,200,000  
442 Skagen Funds 2 4 7,244,142,000  
443 Skandia Investment Group 1 2 115,596,000,000  
444 SL Capital Partners LLP 1 2 8,333,000,000  
445 Slater Investments Ltd 3 2 45,630,000  
446 Souteastern Asset Management 1 1 34,200,000,000  
447 Speirs & Jeffrey Ltd 3 2 7,605,000,000  
448 Squadron Capital Advisors Ltd 2 3 6,000,000,000  
449 Stafford Timberland Group 3 2 1,300,000,000  
450 Standard Life Investment Ltd 1 2 280,016,100,000  
451 Standard Pacific Capital LLC 3 1 483,890,000  
452 State Street Global Advisors UK Ltd 1 1 2,100,000,000,000  
453 SteelRiver 4 1 1,900,000,000  
454 Stenham Asset Management 2 2 2,000,000,000  
455 Stone Harbor Investment Partners UK 4 1 63,100,000,000  
456 Stonepoint Capital LLC 2 1 9,000,000,000  
457 Stralem & Company Inc 2 1 3,500,000,000  
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458 Strategic Fixed Income LLC 3 1 1,540,000,000  
459 STW Fixed Interest Management Ltd 1 1 2,910,000,000  
460 
Sumitomo Mitsui Asset Management 
(London) Ltd 
1 3 117,180,000,000  
461 Sun Capital Partners 3 1 10,000,000,000  
462 Sun Life Financial of Canada 1 3 12,200,000,000  
463 SVG Investment Managers 1 2 3,954,600,000  
464 SVM Asset Management 3 2 1,140,750,000  
465 SW Mitchell Capital 4 2 1,700,000,000  
466 Taiyo Pacific Partners LP 4 1 2,000,000,000  
467 Taube Hodson Stonex Partners LLP 4 2 5,400,000,000  
468 
Taylor Young Investment Management 
Ltd 
2 2 575,698,500  
469 TCW 2 1 130,800,000,000  
470 Thames River Capital (UK) Ltd 5  99  
471 Threadneedle Asset Management Ltd 1 2 129,132,900,000  
472 Times Square Capital Management 1 1 18,400,000,000  
473 
Tokio Marine Asset Management 
(London) Ltd 
1 3 59,400,000,000  
474 Trilogy Global Advisors LP 4 1 4,640,000,000  
475 TT International 4 2 9,100,000,000  
476 UBP Asset Management LLC 2 4 85,700,000,000  
477 UBS Global Asset Management  1 4 621,000,000,000  
478 UBS Infrastructure and Private Equity 1 4 1,520,000,000  
479 Unicorn Asset Management 3 2 228,150,000  
480 Unigenstion (UK) Ltd 2 4 14,000,000,000  
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481 Union Cancaire Privee (UPB) 2 4 84,320,000,000  
482 UOB Global Capital LLC 1 1 8,821,800,000  
483 Vanguard Asset Management Limited 1 1 2,400,000,000,000  
484 VenCap International plc 1 2 1,900,000,000  
485 Veritas Asset Management 4 2 11,407,500,000  
486 Vestra Wealth LLP 4 2 2,889,900,000  
487 Victory Capital Management Inc 2 1 18,000,000,000  
488 Vintage Asset Management 3 1 233,513,000  
489 Vontobel Europe S.A 1 4 44,000,000,000  
490 Walker Crips Investment Management 1 2 3,042,000,000  
491 Walter Scott & Partners Ltd 1 1 59,800,000,000  
492 Wasserman Asset Management Ltd 3 1 96,000,000  
493 WAY Fund Managers 2 2 6,692,400,000  
494 WCM Investment Management 3 1 1,910,000,000  
495 
Wellington Management International 
Ltd 
2 1 774,000,000,000  
496 Wesleyan Assurance Society 5 2 7,909,200,000  
497 Western Asset Management Co. Ltd 1 1 442,700,000,000  
498 Westfield Capital Management 4 1 16,000,000,000  
499 Wilky Fund Management Ltd 2 2 45,630,000  
500 Winton Capital Management 3 2 29,000,000,000  
501 YFM Equity Partners 3 2 1,368,900,000  
502 York Capital Management 3 1 3,900,000,000  
503 Other manager (unlisted) 99 99 99  
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Sources:  Fund Managers:  Wilmington Directory of Pension Funds and their Advisors 2013:  (Wilmington 
2013) 
FMOS:  Individual fund manager websites (accessed September 2013-January 2014) 
o 1= public entity 
o 2= private entity 
o 3= employee owned 
o 4= partnership 
o 5= other 
FMRR:  Individual fund manager websites (accessed September 2013-January 2014) 
o 1= USA 
o 2= UK 
o 3= Asia Pacific 
o Europe Other 
o European Union 
FMAUM:  Individual fund manager websites (accessed September 2013-January 2014) 
[Missing data coded as “99” or “999”]  
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Appendix IV 
Additional supporting analysis 
for Chapter 6 
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This appendix provides support for the analysis in Chapter 6 and visibility into the 
data that was not covered in the descriptive statistics and regression analysis.  
The results are consistent with the outcomes of the Chapter. 
 
 
IV.I  Fund manager ownership structure and pension scheme AUM 
 
There significant difference between the AUM means of pension schemes 
engaging publicly listed corporation compared with partnerships (t=7.9209, 
df3919, p=0.0001; see Table A4.1).  As with the fund manager ownership 
structure relationship with assets per member previously, the category is 
dominated by PLCs.  When analysed as the binary internal owners and external 
owners (PLC v other: mean 2,933 ± 4,658) the result is also statistically significant 
(t=10.0537, df4878, p=0.0001).  Larger pension schemes share a relationship 
with internally owned fund managers. 
 
Table A4.1 Pension Scheme AUM by Fund manager ownership structure 
Ownership structure Mean (£million) Standard deviation (£million) 
Publicly listed corporation (n=3,297) 1,637 3,987 
Privately owned corporation (n=551) 2,962 5,693 
Employee owned corporation (n=408) 2,646 4,947 
Partnership (n=624) 3,099 5,328 
 
Conversely, smaller pension schemes share a relationship with PLCs.  Given 
they are statistically correlated with lower scheme assets, fiduciary prudence 
would suggest that these are not the ownership structures benefiting less 
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resourced pensions.  This premise holds regardless of the direction of the cause 
and effect in the relationship. 
 
 
IV.II  Fund manager reporting regime and pension scheme AUM 
 
The sample is dominated by UK based fund management firms (64.2%).  Table 
A4.2 illustrates that UK reporting fund managers are statistically significantly 
managing smaller pension schemes (t=9.0763, df4969, p=0.0001). 
 
Table A4.2 Pension Scheme AUM by Fund manager reporting regime 
Ownership structure Mean (£million) Standard deviation (£million) 
United States (n=1,324) 2,656 5,181 
United Kingdom (n=3,193) 1,760 4,151 
Asia Pacific (n=135) 3,446 5,914 
Europe Other (n=227) 2,178 4,613 
European Union (n=92) 2,398 4,613 
 
Smaller schemes seem to be predominantly selecting UK based fund managers.  
As with the ownership structure analysis previously, the direction of the 
relationship cannot be determined.  However, the results suggest that these 
schemes may benefit from emulating the investment destinations of their larger 
cousins. 
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IV.III  Fund manager AUM and pension scheme AUM 
 
The association between fund manager assets and pension scheme assets was 
negatively and significantly correlated (r= -0.071, p=0.001).  This result included 
the fund manager AUM outliers.  Figure A4.1 depicts how the cases spread when 
the outliers are removed. 
 
Figure A4.1 Assets under management correlation between pension schemes and fund 
managers assets under management 
A. Correlation with all cases   B.  Outliers >= £1 trillion removed 
 
 
The interesting result is that the relationship still remains negative and significant 
(r= -0.052, p=0.0001).  Smaller pension schemes are gravitating towards larger 
fund managers, as predicted by the ownership structure results. 
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IV.IV  Fund manager ownership structure and pension scheme 
multiple fund manager engagements 
 
This relationship was also statistically significant (F=105.030, df3, p=0.0001).  
The majority of pension schemes in every category of fund management 
engagement numbers preference PLCs.  This is statistically likely, given the 
predominance of this ownership structure. 
 
Table A4.3 Number of fund managers engaged by ownership structure as a percentage 
FM Engaged PLC (%) Private (%) Employee 
owned (%) 
Partnership 
(%) Total (n) 
1 82.9 9.0 3.1 5.0 486 
2-5 80.3 7.2 5.3 7.3 1,576 
6-10 64.4 12.9 9.5 13.3 1,275 
11-30 55.3 14.1 11.4 19.2 1,285 
>30 38.0 19.0 16.3 26.7 258 
 
However, as the schemes gravitate towards larger numbers of fund engagement, 
the likelihood of engaging a PLC decreases markedly.  This is in keeping with 
previous results reported in Section 6.5.2.  Larger schemes are more likely to 
spread their funds management across a range of ownership structures, 
regardless of the fact that this shows no evidence of benefiting the individual 
member. 
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IV.V  Fund manager reporting regime and pension scheme multiple 
fund manager engagements 
 
The predominant territory where funds are placed is the UK, regardless of the 
number of fund managers engaged.  However, this dominance dissipates as the 
number of schemes engaged increases.  As Table A4.4 implies, the trend 
strongly inclines toward the USA as schemes diversify. 
Table A4.4 Number of fund managers engaged by reporting regime as a percentage 
FM 
Engaged USA (%) UK (%) 
Asia 
Pacific (%) 
Europe 
other (%) EU (%) Total (n) 
1 16.1 78.2 1.4 3.7 0.4 491 
2-5 18.7 74.1 1.6 4.0 1.6 1,595 
6-10 28.6 61.0 2.6 5.5 2.2 1,301 
11-30 34.8 53.9 4.0 4.6 2.3 1,327 
>30 42.6 44.5 5.7 4.9 1.9 265 
 
As with the previous result, larger schemes who engage more fund managers are 
more likely to spread their assets with geographic diversity.  This does not 
improve the statistical significance of the asset per member, so the expedience 
of portfolio diversification requires further investigation. 
 
IV.VI  Fund manager AUM and pension scheme fund manager 
engagement 
 
Removing the outliers gives a better indication of the relationship between the 
size of the fund managers pension schemes are engaging as they select more 
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management parties.  It is still statistically (and negatively) significant (r= -0.3, 
p=0.0001) that the more fund managers engaged, the smaller those fund 
managers will tend to be.  The reverse is the same, choosing fewer fund 
managers inclines the pension scheme towards larger fund managers. 
 
Figure A4.2 Assets under management correlation between pension schemes assets under 
management and fund managers engaged 
 
A. Correlation with all cases   B.  Outliers >= £1 trillion removed 
  
 
The correlation between multiple engagement and fund manager size implies that 
the smaller the pension scheme, the fewer fund managers and those fund 
managers will be large. 
 
 
IV.VII  Summary 
 
There is a consistent relationship between the characteristics of the pension 
scheme and the fund managers they have engaged.  The larger the pension 
scheme, the more fund managers they will engage and the smaller (more 
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boutique) these become.  This has no bearing on the wealth of the individual 
pension scheme member (evidenced from Section 6.7) but does suggest that 
there are trends, or consistent behaviours based around the size of the pension 
scheme.  The issue of the direction of this relationship, the cause and effect, is 
undetermined. 
 
This may suggest, for recommendations to policy makers and practitioners, that 
decision making including collective bargaining and consolidated fund manager 
choices may be beneficial to the efficient placement of assets.  The fact that PLC 
owned fund managers dominate asset management may not be a trend that is 
benefiting the pension schemes, with the caveat that these pension schemes may 
be investing their smaller funds into large fund managers possibly to provide 
fiduciary security and limit potential exposure to the risks of boutique investing. 
 
IV.VIII  Analysis of the relationship between the governance variables 
and assets per member by pension scheme type 
 
In keeping with the Office of National Statistics methodology described in Chapter 
4, the pension scheme types (Defined Benefit Open, Defined Benefit Closed, 
Hybrid and Defined Contribution) have been treated as significantly distinct taxa 
by both assets under management and total membership (Assets under 
management (F=91.598, df4, p=0.0001) and membership size (F=84.461, df4, 
p=0.0001: see Table A4.5). 
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Table A4.5 Schemes by assets under management and total membership 
Pension Scheme 
Assets under management mean and 
SD (£) 
Total membership mean and 
SD (retired and current 
participants) (£) 
Defined benefit open 
(n=1146) 
477,674,018 ± 1,770,094,353 13,013 ± 31,974 
Defined benefit closed 
(n=477) 
567,434,725 ± 2,141,828,927 7,757 ± 24,467 
Hybrid 
(n=267) 
911,030,768 ± 3,147,755,498 13,251 ± 44,144 
Defined contribution 
(n=204) 
105,716,831 ± 228,132,743 5,186 ± 9,823 
 
To determine whether the governance constructs are a statistically significant, in-
house and defunct results were removed to consider ownership structures of fund 
manager agents alone, without these categories prejudicing the results.  
Similarly, in-house results were removed from FMRR to examine external fund 
managers only.  The results for Defined Benefit Open schemes are depicted in 
Table A4.6, Defined Benefit Closed schemes in Table A4.7, Hybrid schemes in 
Table A4.8.  The last population to test the premise in is the defined contribution 
sample in Table A4.9.  The dataset used for analysis was the converged 
database. 
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Table A4.6 The relationships between the governance, mediating pension and dependant 
variables relating to the member assets in Defined Benefit Open Schemes (n=2,898) 
Number/ 
dataset1 
Governance construct Dependant construct Result 
1  CD 
FMOS AUMPM 
F=32.421, df5, 
p=0.0001*** 
2  CD 
FMRR AUMPM 
F=32.401, df5, 
p=0.0001*** 
3  CD FMAUM AUMPM 
r=0.065, 
p=0.0001*** 
 
Table A4.7 The relationships between the independent, mediating and dependant variables 
determining the existence of mediation in Defined Benefit Closed Schemes (n=1,492) 
Number/ 
dataset1 
Governance construct Dependant construct Results 
1  CD FMOS AUMPM 
F=3.076, df5, 
p=0.010** 
2  CD FMRR AUMPM 
F=3.076, df5, 
p=0.009** 
3  CD FMAUM AUMPM 
r=- 0.014, 
p=0.573 
 
Table A4.8 The relationships between the independent, mediating and dependant variables 
determining the existence of mediation in Hybrid Schemes (n=938) 
Number/ 
dataset1 
Governance construct Dependant construct Results 
1 CD FMOS AUMPM F=0.403 df5, p=0.847 
2 CD FMRR AUMPM F=0.384, df5, p=0.860 
3 CD FMAUM AUMPM 
r=-0.018, 
p=0.571 
 
 
 
 
446 
 
Table A4.9 The relationships between the independent, mediating and dependant variables 
determining the existence of mediation in Defined Contribution Schemes (n=395) 
Number/ 
dataset1 
Governance construct Dependant construct Results 
1 CD FMOS AUMPM F=0.561, df5, p=0.730 
2 CD FMRR AUMPM F=1.404, df5, p=0.222 
3 CD FMAUM AUMPM 
r=0.055, 
p=0.269 
 
As sponsoring employers move to close Defined Benefit Open schemes and 
move members into schemes that no longer guarantee the end benefit, the 
analysis by scheme taxa is important to the results.  Defined Benefit Open 
schemes are the only ones to share a direct relationship with the three 
governance variables.  These schemes are more likely to diversify in fund 
manager selection away from the UK and into boutique ownership structures.  
Most importantly, there is a positive correlation between the assets under 
management of the fund manager engaged and the assets per member. 
As the direction of this relationship cannot be determined it requires further 
examination in the following analysis chapter.  The inference may be that the 
statistically larger pension schemes are better managers of their principal.  
Alternatively, it could be that large fund managers court large pension schemes 
are key clients and expend more effort ensuring their principal receives exclusive 
best interest. 
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